Ken:

Bureacratic Malaise might be the best term.

CPA/IRMO/ITAO stumbled through Iraq under the constant belief that they were just very short-term organizations.

As a result, the actual State Department seldom got engaged, and certainly did not institutionalize a process for reconstruction.

The new reconstruction corps seems to be primarily staffed with foreign service officers and in-house staff, so I assume it will be, when established, a proper entity with some level of continuity. I understand from their website that it only engages federal assignees from other agencies, so I'm not sure how successful it can be on the ground.

A recent Newsweek article "The A-Team in Blue Suits" described how a reconstruction staff member (a foreign service officer assignee) hit the ground in Afghanistan for three months, built a police substation, and negotiated some agreements with local leaders.

Unfortunately, that sounds like what was going on in Iraq---drop in for a short tour, nail some short-term low-hanging fruit, and move on... Not a great way to rebuild an actual nation in conflict, is it?

Gotta be a better way to do this. It seems like we have plenty of reasons for why we do it this way, but no examples that show that doing it this way can be successful.

I was seconded to UN for a few months, and noticed that they use experts on a continuous basis. They come, say from a university, every summer and whenever there is a crisis or problem in their sphere. Same expert with continuum of contacts and experience. Not to speak to the UN's capabiolities generally, but this seems like a very smart way tooperate with experts.

Steve