Studies on radicalization & comments

[SWJED]

25 November London Daily Telegraph - Town that Breeds Suicide Bombers by Fiona Govan.

Their destination may be almost 3,000 miles away, but the draw of martyrdom in Iraq is proving irresistable for the young men of Tetouan.

American intelligence officials believe that the Moroccan town, less than 30 miles from the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, has become one of the world's most fertile recruiting ground for jihadists.

In the last eight months a group of young men, all worshippers at the same mosque, have left their homes to become suicide bombers in Iraq.

After DNA tests on their bodies, and Moroccan authorities asking families to provide samples, US intelligence traced at least nine of those responsible for recent suicide missions in and around Baghdad to Tetouan and its surrounding area in the foothills of the Rif Mountains.

Local reports suggest that another 21 individuals have left the area to seek martyrdom, following in the footsteps of five other Tetouanis who blew themselves up in a Madrid suburb when cornered by police, who believed they played a part in the train bombings in the Spanish capital in March 2004...

[Rob Thornton]

You know I used to have a very narrow view of suicide jihadists, but after reading the post on the making of a French Jihadist, I realize I need to understand the different motivations better. Its not enough for me to say they are duped by an interpretation of religious faith to travel to another place and commit themselves to the fight as a human PGM. I feel like I don't know the enemy in this regard. Any thoughts by some of you who have done the tough research?
Thanks, Rob

[Sarajevo071]

You know I used to have a very narrow view of suicide jihadists, but after reading the post on the making of a French Jihadist, I realize I need to understand the different motivations better. Its not enough for me to say they are duped by an interpretation of religious faith to travel to another place and commit themselves to the fight as a human PGM. I feel like I don't know the enemy in this regard. Any thoughts by some of you who have done the tough research?
Thanks, Rob

No one is “duped” nor do they have “mercenaries” like some here like to think… Only mercenaries that I know of are those from private companies in Iraq and Afghanistan… Now about they “ideology” or “motivation”, no one can give one satisfactory answer since they motivations are different and somewhat complicated… Also, be sure that you make distinction between Islamic martyrs (suicide attacks) and Islamic jihadi fighters (guerilla that fights to live so they can fight other day). Also there are different motivations in older versus younger jihadi, different motivations in born Muslims versus converts, and different motivations between different schools of thoughts in Islam.

Hope this will guide you toward better understanding of this topic.

[Rob Thornton]

That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

[aktarian]

That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

They don't call it "suicide bombings" but "martyrdom seeking operations". As suicide is prohibited they would go to hell. but if their act of killing themselves strikes a blow against the enemy they are martyrs and admited to paradise. think of it as modern day kamikaze rather than suiciders.

We had a debate about a year ago about this motivation. You might want to find it.

[Sarajevo071]

They don't call it "suicide bombings" but "martyrdom seeking operations". As suicide is prohibited they would go to hell. but if their act of killing themselves strikes a blow against the enemy they are martyrs and admited to paradise. think of it as modern day kamikaze rather than suiciders.

Great point there!

Also... Sometimes, just to be participant in the war (jihad) and being killed (with intention of seeking martyrdom or with wish to defend Muslim Umma) will be enough for some of them… It’s not necessary for enemy to be killed.

[Sarajevo071]

That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

It is not suicide. It’s sacrifice in the name of God and greater good having no other weapon except one’s own life, against powerful enemy with better weapons or bigger numbers… There is no fear of wining or loosing since either win (on the battlefield) over the enemy or being killed in that holly struggle is – win.

It is deep religious feeling and motivation, either from childhood or “newcomers” (converts) who are sometimes even more zealots trying to prove that they can be good Muslims like they brethren who was born in Islam… That’s reason why you see high number of converts doing martyrdom seeking operations…

Attraction are not virgins they are promised (like many westerners like to mock them) but promise of Paradise, of doing something great for Islam and they people (since not everyone can be martyr) and promise that to they souls would be forgiven any transgressions they did (and they families)…

They are not thinking in ways of “facing the death” or “accepting the death”, since they essentially not dieing… For them, being not Muslim is being dead.

[davidbfpo]

Just found a new report on radicalisation / radicalization by a US think tank:
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downl...ts_USandUK.pdf

On my first reading a nice easy read, with a literature review and an attempt to interpret the pathway taken by convicted terrorists in the UK and USA as a template. Some of the conclusions are different, notably that prisons should be a low priority in the struggle!

Refers to many previous studies e.g. NYPD report and the views of Sageman etc.

Of note are the six signposts, which could be used to enable assessment (sorry police thinking to the fore).

When downloaded, slow as one large colour image, appears as sixty-nine pages and do not despair many are blanks.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

Danish Institute for International Studies, Feb 08:

Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory

Why do some apparently well-integrated youth in Europe become attracted to Islamist militancy? Why and when do people cross from violent talk to violent action? What prevents others, exposed to the same political, ideological, and socioeconomic influences, from crossing? When and how might people de-radicalize and draw back from violent action? What policy initiatives would be called for to limit the spread of radical ideas, counter the factors that spur violent radicalization, and strengthen those, which pull in the other direction? In sum: When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against civilians, and what can be done about it?

These questions have been at the center of both academic and public debate over the past years. Yet, there is still a scarcity of empirically based knowledge and no consensus with regard to which theories and approaches to apply to the study of violent radicalization and mobilization.

This working paper explores the potential contribution of Social Movement Theory to throw light on the question of violent radicalization in Europe....

Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe II: The Potential Contribution of Sociopsychological and Psychological Approaches

The subfield of socio-psychological and psychological approaches to terrorism studies is, like the overall field of terrorism research, characterized by a variety of competing approaches with different explanations of what causes terrorism and violent radicalization. For the sake of overview this paper groups them into sociological approaches, individual level approaches, and group process approaches.

Sociological theories focus on overall structural factors impacting large groups, group process approaches focus on mechanisms at play in smaller groups, and psychoanalytically inspired and cognitive theories focus on factors at the level of the individual personality. Sociological and psychoanalytical approaches focus on relatively stable factors – be they structural conditions or individual dispositions – hypothesized to cause radicalization and terrorism. Group process approaches, in contrast, take a dynamic view and focus on processes and stages through which violent dispositions emerge. Some approaches rely on a psychology of needs (what psychological or group psychological traits make individuals or groups prone to violence?); whereas others instead rely on a psychology of rewards (what do radical groups offer the individual?)....

[Jedburgh]

Kings College London, Dec 07:

Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe

This report presents a comprehensive overview of the methods through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise their supporters and find new recruits. It finds that Islamist militant recruitment efforts have largely been driven underground, with little overt propagation and recruitment now occurring at mosques. Prisons and other ‘places of vulnerability’ continue to be a great cause of concern. Rather than ‘radical imams’, who have lost some influence, the report points out that ‘activists’ are now the ‘engines’ of Islamist militant recruitment. They often draw on recruits from so-called ‘gateway organisations’ which prepare individuals ideologically and socialise them into the extremist ‘milieu’. It also shows how Islamist militants skilfully exploit young Muslims’ identity conflicts between Western society and the ‘cultural’ Islam of their parents. Furthermore, the report highlights the role of the Internet which has come to play an increasingly important role in Islamist militant recruitment, either in support of ‘real-world’ recruitment or in entirely new forms of militant activism described as ‘virtual self-recruitment’.

The reports finds there to be clear differences between countries in Southern Europe, where Muslim immigration is recent, and those in which the second and third generation of European Muslims is reaching adolescence. In countries with no second or third generation of European Muslims, language is less of an issue, nor is the conflict of identity between Western society and traditional culture as pivotal. Across all countries, however, the environment in which Islamist militants seek support has changed. Especially after the attacks in Madrid and London, open recruitment has become difficult. The authorities and many Muslim communities have become more vigilant and willing to confront extremism, yet there are no indications at all that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed away. Based on these observations, the report argues that the trend towards ‘seekers’ and self-starter groups will continue. It also predicts that, given the constraints now faced by Islamist militants in the ‘open’ environment, the significance of the Internet as a ‘virtual’ recruitment place will grow, with new forms of Islamist militant activism becoming more important.

The report proposes a series of measures aimed at countering recruitment. In the short term, governments need to prevent the emergence of ‘recruitment magnets’ which allow ‘seekers’ and ‘selfstarters to find ‘links to the jihad’ and deepen their involvement in the Islamist militant movement. Governments also need to pay urgent attention to the situation in European prisons, which are likely to become major hubs for radicalisation and recruitment. Intelligence and law enforcement strategies have to be geared towards identifying the ‘activist’ leaders of cells. The report challenges governments to tackle the problem posed by gateway organisations, and to be clear and consistent in doing so. It also calls for more attention to be paid to extremist activities on the Internet. In the longer term, mainstream Muslim communities need to be re-vitalised and empowered. Law enforcement agencies need to build and/or re-establish trust with Muslim communities. It is also vital for schools to address the narratives used by violent extremists as well as the ways in which they are likely to be drawn into their circles. A similar effort is required on the Internet. The report concludes by saying that even longer term measures aimed at resolving the drivers of recruitment will not bear fruit unless the causes of radicalisation are successfully addressed.

Complete 103-page paper at the link.

[davidbfpo]

Just as the UK government advocates filtering extremist on-line content up pops Jamie Bartlett of the London-based think tank Demos, in a blog on The Daily Telegraph and mentions how hard this will be:

...there is a bigger problem that no one wants to mention: we still don’t really know whether watching extremist material online actually radicalises people. In my experience, it is not sermons by frothing fundamentalists that radicalise, but mainstream BBC reports about Syria or Palestine.

At the end he writes:

Dealing with extremism is difficult, and on the whole, we’re doing a remarkably good job. The internet is making this a little harder. But in the age of ever-increasing information and openness, reaching for the block button is not the answer.

Link:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technol...dea-heres-why/

Within is a reference and link to a RAND report, based on research in the UK, 'Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism'.

Link:http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand...RAND_RR453.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Published yesterday by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue: 'Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What works and what are the implications for government'. Their explanation:

..it provides an overview of the efforts made to push back on extremist content online, or ‘counter-narratives’. It involved background research and interviews with former violent extremists, policy-makers and civil society activists.

The work was funded by Public Safety Canada. The report is 49 pgs, cases studies amount to half. Link:http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Cou...ivesFN2011.pdf

After years of national and international counter-terrorist action it is remarkable that the report's summary states:

It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in it's infancy.

Short of time? There is a short article by Rachel Briggs (co-author) here:http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/seba...b_4397982.html

[davidbfpo]

A short, detailed article based on an interview of Professor John Horgan, a British psychologist now @ UMass-Lowell:http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08...-recruits.html

A key point:

They’re offering an opportunity for people to feel powerful. They’re making disillusioned, disaffected radicals feel like they’re doing something truly meaningful with their lives.

Are we and others ready for this?

Disillusionment is very, very common in every single terrorist and extremist group you can think of. That’s something that can be very toxic if those accounts get out and gather momentum.

Disillusionment is the most common reason why people voluntarily choose to walk away from a terrorist group. People become disillusioned if they feel that the group has gone too far, if they don’t seem to have a strategy beyond indiscriminate killing. Disillusionment can arise from disagreements with a leader, it can arise from dissatisfaction with the day-to-day minutiae. There are many directions from which disillusionment can arise, and it’s only a matter of time before those accounts leak out from ISIS, and I think we would do very well to be on the lookout for those kinds of accounts, because they offer an opportunity to dissuade further potential recruits from being involved.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...mes-foley.html

ISIS, Hip-Hop Jihadists and the Man Who Killed James Foley

Anthropologist Scott Atran, who is frequently consulted by the U.S. government, has long argued that a jihadist’s motivations cannot be fit within a purely rational framework of costs and benefits, nor can they be understood as utterly irrational. Instead they work within the context of what they come to see as “sacred values,” which may be religious, or may have to do more with honor and respect and, perhaps, what the 18th-century political theorist Edmund Burke called “the sublime”: that “quest for greatness, glory, eternal meaning in an inherently chaotic world,” as Atran says.

“It seems like volunteers for ISIS are surfing for the sublime,” Atran wrote to me on Sunday. They are escaping “the jaded, tired world of democratic liberalism, especially on the margins where Europe’s immigrants mostly live.”

Not everything is governance, religion, or any of the other areas myopic theorists focus on, sometimes is just simple human psychology.

[Bob's World]

Why any individual is motivated to join the USMC is not why the USMC exists.

Why the USMC is employed to address any particular problem is not why the USMC exists.

To understand why the USMC exists one must study the organization, its history, missions and role in relation to the goals of the US as a whole. The stories of individual Marines, battles and campaigns are interesting, but only lend color, not clarity to the larger question.

We understand this inherently, and yet we continue to agonize over the eaches of any particular individual who decides to throw their support behind a group such as AQ or ISIS in an odd belief that if we understand why individuals join we will somehow be better postured to make the organization as a whole either comply with acceptable social norms or go away in the entirety.

The sum of these many personal stories does not tell the story of why these organizations exist. These stories certainly lend insights, but they equally distract us from reasons much more closely aligned to challenging the activities of those these organizations oppose, than to the promotion of the beliefs or promises these challengers advertise.

Historically there is almost universally a powerful bias of perspective regarding the nature and rationale for revolutionary actors by those these revolutions are directed against. We need to adjust for that bias in our analysis.

Revolutionary activity tends to be far more about the removal of some system of power or governance (often associated with some ideological system of beliefs) deemed as both intolerable and equally something one is now empowered to do something about; than they are about advancing something new and better.

Far easier to get a disparate group to agree that the status quo is intolerable, than it is to get them to agree to some future solution. Thus the chaos that typically follows a wholesale regime change, regardless of how bad or evil that previous regime might have been.

Revolution creates the chaos opportunity is made of - the problem is that so many line up to seize that opportunity, and typically not with the good of the many as their prime directive.

[Bill Moore]

Why any individual is motivated to join the USMC is not why the USMC exists.

Why the USMC is employed to address any particular problem is not why the USMC exists.

To understand why the USMC exists one must study the organization, its history, missions and role in relation to the goals of the US as a whole. The stories of individual Marines, battles and campaigns are interesting, but only lend color, not clarity to the larger question.

We understand this inherently, and yet we continue to agonize over the eaches of any particular individual who decides to throw their support behind a group such as AQ or ISIS in an odd belief that if we understand why individuals join we will somehow be better postured to make the organization as a whole either comply with acceptable social norms or go away in the entirety.

The sum of these many personal stories does not tell the story of why these organizations exist. These stories certainly lend insights, but they equally distract us from reasons much more closely aligned to challenging the activities of those these organizations oppose, than to the promotion of the beliefs or promises these challengers advertise.

Historically there is almost universally a powerful bias of perspective regarding the nature and rationale for revolutionary actors by those these revolutions are directed against. We need to adjust for that bias in our analysis.

Revolutionary activity tends to be far more about the removal of some system of power or governance (often associated with some ideological system of beliefs) deemed as both intolerable and equally something one is now empowered to do something about; than they are about advancing something new and better.

Far easier to get a disparate group to agree that the status quo is intolerable, than it is to get them to agree to some future solution. Thus the chaos that typically follows a wholesale regime change, regardless of how bad or evil that previous regime might have been.

Revolution creates the chaos opportunity is made of - the problem is that so many line up to seize that opportunity, and typically not with the good of the many as their prime directive.

Despite how intelligent this analysis appears on the surface it is deeply flawed when it is applied to ISIS. Apply to the Kurds and it fits perfectly. ISIS is not popular, and they're not focused on removing so much as focused on imposing their form of governance regardless of what the masses desire. It is obviously true that existing governments can and do create conditions that enable these movements to gain steam, but that doesn't mean the existing form of governance is the "sole" problem and that this morally justifies ISIS/ISIL's activities and intent. What is also true is we have our strategy must address protecting our interested (interests can be debated) and our citizens (not debatable), and if we sincerely believe ISIS/ISIL is a threat then there is a moral obligation to act. How we act to protect those interests must be informed by a wide range of factors, and it doesn't necessarily mean military action, nor does it mean we always must address the core underlying issues that are frankly beyond our control.

Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, etc. all have ineffectively executed governance and created an ecosystem that AQism groups can exploit, but that does not make their movements popular or just. If our interests our threatened, we merely need to protect our interests in the short run and stop fooling ourselves that we have the power to solve the deeper issues of inappropriate borders, ethnic hatred, etc. Limited objectives should be our guiding light, not social-political reform, that aspect belongs to the indigenous people.

[goesh]

My opinion on the proposition that prisons contribute very little to the radicalisation is that gangs are too dominant and powerful and personal survival often centers on some degree of attachment to an established group/gang. There probably isn't enough literal and figurative space for a radical Islamic cell to thrive. I also note that immediately after 9/11, there was a blurb in the news on how much money convicts in the prison systems had donated. The general prison populations may not be very accepting of a group whose power base is not related to drugs, extortion and profit. With a Quaran in every cell and an established prayer space on hand ( Masjid) it remains possible for a jihadist to at least keep his faith active and accept the inhibition of direct action imposed by confinement.

I found it very odd the huge conversion discrepancy between Europe and the US. Rouhgly 43% here at home had converted from Christianity to Islam compared to roughly 18% in Europe.

[Ron Humphrey]

I found it very odd the huge conversion discrepancy between Europe and the US. Rouhgly 43% here at home had converted from Christianity to Islam compared to roughly 18% in Europe.

numbers can be decieving when

There are given requirements for access to certain materials if you claim them

1- You get a prayer rug (Actually its an extra blanket because that's what they have, and its often pretty cold in the cells)

2- Attend worship meetings (There's usually a marked difference in the demographics at various services)

3-Different meals than others so invariably there's barter capacity built into that

There are a variety of other things which lead to "official" choice besides actually believing, Not always but quite often.

[Rex Brynen]

While the Somali context isn't handled very well, the NYT nonetheless has an interesting, lengthy case study of the radicalization of Omar Hammami (Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki).

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE PREVIEW
The Jihadist Next Door

By ANDREA ELLIOTT
Published: January 27, 2010

ON A WARM, cloudy day in the fall of 1999, the town of Daphne, Ala., stirred to life. The high-school band came pounding down Main Street, past the post office and the library and Christ the King Church. Trumpeters in gold-tasseled coats tipped their horns to the sky, heralding the arrival of teenage demigods. The star quarterback and his teammates came first in the parade, followed by the homecoming queen and her court. Behind them, on a float bearing leaders of the student government, a giddy mop-haired kid tossed candy to the crowd.

Omar Hammami had every right to flash his magnetic smile. He had just been elected president of his sophomore class. He was dating a luminous blonde, one of the most sought-after girls in school. He was a star in the gifted-student program, with visions of becoming a surgeon. For a 15-year-old, he had remarkable charisma.

Despite the name he acquired from his father, an immigrant from Syria, Hammami was every bit as Alabaman as his mother, a warm, plain-spoken woman who sprinkles her conversation with blandishments like “sugar” and “darlin’.” Brought up a Southern Baptist, Omar went to Bible camp as a boy and sang “Away in a Manger” on Christmas Eve. As a teenager, his passions veered between Shakespeare and Kurt Cobain, soccer and Nintendo. In the thick of his adolescence, he was fearless, raucously funny, rebellious, contrarian. “It felt cool just to be with him,” his best friend at the time, Trey Gunter, said recently. “You knew he was going to be a leader.”

A decade later, Hammami has fulfilled that promise in the most unimaginable way. Some 8,500 miles from Alabama, on the eastern edge of Africa, he has become a key figure in one of the world’s most ruthless Islamist insurgencies. That guerrilla army, known as the Shabab, is fighting to overthrow the fragile American-backed Somali government. The rebels are known for beheading political enemies, chopping off the hands of thieves and stoning women accused of adultery. With help from Al Qaeda, they have managed to turn Somalia into an ever more popular destination for jihadis from around the world.

More than 20 of those fighters have come from the United States, many of them young Somali-Americans from a gritty part of Minneapolis. But it is Hammami who has put a contemporary face on the Shabab’s medieval tactics. In a recent propaganda video viewed by thousands on YouTube, he is shown leading a platoon of gun-toting rebels as a soundtrack of jihadi rap plays in the background.

He is identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, “the American,” and speaks to the camera with a cool, almost eerie confidence. “We’re waiting for the enemy to come,” Hammami whispers, a smile crossing his face. Later he vows, “We’re going to kill all of them.”

In the three years since Hammami made his way to Somalia, his ascent into the Shabab’s leadership has put him in a class of his own, according to United States law-enforcement and intelligence officials. While other American terror suspects have drawn greater publicity, Hammami exercises a more powerful role, commanding guerrilla forces in the field, organizing attacks and plotting strategy with Qaeda operatives, the officials said. He has also emerged as something of a jihadist icon, starring in a recruitment campaign that has helped draw hundreds of foreign fighters to Somalia. “To have an American citizen that has risen to this kind of a rank in a terrorist organization — we have not seen that before,” a senior American law-enforcement official said earlier this month.

...

[bourbon]

While the Somali context isn't handled very well, the NYT nonetheless has an interesting, lengthy case study of the radicalization of Omar Hammami (Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki).

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE PREVIEW
The Jihadist Next Door

By ANDREA ELLIOTT
Published: January 27, 2010

A very fascinating and well done article. Here’s what stood out to me:

If anything has remained a constant in Hammami’s life, it is his striving for another place and purpose, which flickered in a poem he wrote when he was 12:

“My reality is a bore. I wish, I want, I need the wall to fall and the monster to let me pass, the leash to snap, the chains to break. . . .
“I’ve got a taste of glory, the ticket, but where is my train?”

Yet for all of his social triumph, Hammami was consumed with a profound internal conflict. He didn’t know whether to be Muslim or Christian. On rare trips to Damascus when they were little, Omar and Dena were warned by relatives that they would go to hell if they weren’t Muslim, Dena recalled. In Perdido, their mother’s family insisted that hell was reserved for non-Christians.

A trip to Damascus the summer before Hammami’s sophomore year would make a lasting impression on him. He loved the order of things: how his aunts waited on him, how his male cousins shared a “cohesiveness of brotherhood,”...

When he got back to Daphne, Hammami remained conflicted. One night before he went to sleep, he turned to God for guidance. “Slowly I started to incline toward Islam,” he later wrote to his sister, “and my heart became tranquil.”

Hammami plunged headlong into Salafism, mastering its nuances and lexicon. The movement gave him a new sense of brotherhood and discipline. But it was, above all, “an excuse to disobey his father,” recalls Joseph Stewart, a Muslim convert who became close to Hammami.

Hammami concluded that his Salafi mentors had been “hiding many parts of the religion that have a direct relationship to jihad and politics,” he wrote. He began searching for guidance on the Internet, Culveyhouse says, discovering a documentary about the life of Amir Khattab, a legendary jihadist who fought in Chechnya. The documentary traces Khattab’s evolution as a promising Saudi student who gave up a life that “any young man would desire” to embrace a higher purpose. Hammami was mesmerized, Culveyhouse recalls.

....
Back then, Hammami and Culveyhouse talked about jihad in the way that star football players at Daphne High School dreamed about the N.F.L. The idea remained romantic and hypothetical.

That same month, Hammami seemed more taken by his cause than ever. “I have become a Somali you could say,” he wrote in the December e-mail message. “I hear bullets, I dodge mortars, I hear nasheeds” — Islamic songs — “and play soccer. Sometimes I live in the bush with camels, sometimes I live the five-star life. Sometimes I walk for miles in the terrible heat with no water, sometimes I ride in extremely slick cars. Sometimes I’m chased by the enemy, sometimes I chase him!”

“I have hatred, I have love,” he went on. “It’s the best life on earth!”