Studies on radicalization & comments

[davidbfpo]

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) a report:

In this document, the Service will outline selected findings from research it has conducted over the past three years. The purpose of this document is not to answer questions such as what are the causes of terrorism and radicalization and how these phenomena can be prevented. Although these questions are important, this document is intended as an analysis of the process of mobilization to terrorist activity. It explores not why a person becomes radicalized, but rather how the person mobilizes to engage in terrorism.

Link:https://csis.gc.ca/pblctns/thrpblctns/2018-02-05-en.php

[davidbfpo]

A short interview with an ICSR researcher, Rajan Basra; simply explained as:

Evidence suggests that criminal and jihadist milieus are more and more intertwined, challenging established beliefs about the incompatibility of criminal behavior and religious Islamic fundamentalism.

Link:https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/...w-rajan-basra/

He was the co-author of a recent ICSR report (54 pgs.) 'Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus'.
Link:http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/...171214_web.pdf

[davidbfpo]

A report by two academics / advocates (one of whom I recognise as a critical SME) from the Transnational Institute (TNI), a think tank and they explanation:

provides a critical account of the emergence of CVE policies and analyses their subsequent institutionalisation within three international bodies: the European Union, the United Nations, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

Link:https://www.tni.org/en/publication/t...emism-policies

The summary ends with:

This report begins by examining the origins and proliferation of CVE policies and the problems that have accompanied and continue to surround their development and implementation. We then examine CVE policy and practice across the three aforementioned international bodies. The final sections contain conclusions and recommendations stemming from our research, including a framework we have developed to analyze the legitimacy of national CVE policies through their impact on fundamental rights and democratic and pluralist aspirations.

Finally, we would like to note from the outset that for all the ‘CVE mania’, it is surprising how little qualifies as the ‘evidence-led policy’ we hear so much about in other fields. Not only should we be asking for evidence that CVE policies are effective in terms of countering the terrorism, ‘radicalisation’ and extremism they purport to address, we should also be ensuring that in the absence of such evidence, policies do not risk exacerbating the divisions and grievances on which extremism feeds.

[davidbfpo]

A book review of Professor Olivier Roy's latest, very short book, with 99 pages 'Jihad and Death'. A "taster":

The conclusions Roy advances in Jihad and Death are based on a database of approximately 140 individuals “involved in terrorism in mainland France and/or having left France to take part in a ‘global’ jihad between 1994 and 2016.” While there is no singular terrorist biography, there are recurrent characteristics: second-generation immigrants or converts with backgrounds featuring petty crime and prison stays, and often seemingly well integrated into secular culture.

Link:https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/...had-and-death/

On Twitter an Oxford University academic, Easkandar Sadeghi, has commented:

Roy is most original when discussing these links between jihadism and other forms of youth culture and revolt, linking the self-performance element evident among many militants to video game heroes and a broader aestheticization of violence. In a welcome addition to literature on Islamic violence, he draws explicit parallels between “our” violence and “theirs,” noting that the “boundaries between a suicidal psychopath and a militant for the caliphate” have grown increasingly hazy.” While there is no singular terrorist biography, there are recurrent characteristics: second-generation immigrants or converts with backgrounds featuring petty crime and prison stays, and often seemingly well integrated into secular culture. He argues that “combat-sports clubs are more important than mosques in jihadi socialization,” drawing on examples like that of a group of Portuguese converts who joined ISIS and whose bond was solidified in a Thai boxing club.

[davidbfpo]

A contrary view on the theme there is an overlap between crime and terror via Stratfor. Two sentences:

An enduring and sometimes inescapable tendency in national security circles is inflated threat assessments. This is not surprising: it is usually far less dangerous to exaggerate than to downplay threats to national and international security.

The nexus thesis is based in large part on confirmation bias: analysts looking for cooperative relationships between criminals and terrorists almost invariably find them.

Link:https://marcom.stratfor.com/horizons...g-relationship

[davidbfpo]

An updated edition of a 2016 article by Professor Randy Borum (one time Forum member) after recent events. So it may be here already and without a working Search function I cannot tell.

His closing passage:

It is not always easy to “make sense” of lone-offender attacks. But by understanding their origins, elements and context, we can avoid misconceptions and more accurately describe the problem. That will be a key to helping detect and prevent these kinds of attacks.

Link:https://www.rawstory.com/2018/10/kno...yQu3Rg.twitter

[davidbfpo]

A CNN commentary by Peter Bergen, entitled 'Zeros trying to be heroes: what motivates terrorists'. He opens with:

When I was researching a book about Americans becoming violent jihadists, again and again I was struck by how often they were men who were going nowhere fast in life and who turned to violent jihadist ideology as a way of giving their lives greater meaning. They were often zeros trying to be heroes in their own story.The terrorist incidents of the past week in the United States show that this can also be the case for alleged right-wing terrorists such as Cesar Sayoc, who is accused of mailing crude bombs to prominent Democrats and others, and Robert Bowers, who is accused of killing 11 at a synagogue in Pittsburgh.
Both Sayoc and Bowers display some of the same characteristics as American jihadist terrorists: losers who attached themselves to extremist right-wing ideologies that gave meaning to their otherwise dead-end lives.

Link:https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/30/o...gen/index.html

Just perhaps the latest attacks will be the last, alas I tend to agree with his last passage:

The truth is that zeros wanting to be heroes, motivated by a number of toxic ideologies and armed with semi-automatic weapons, will likely continue to massacre Americans at frequent intervals for the foreseeable future.

I do wonder whether parts of the USG are "clutching at straws" when I read of an academic project is getting (tiny) support ($731k):

to use the Western Jihadism Project’s data collection to create an algorithm that can predict when an individual will become radicalized.

Link:http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2018/nov...n-profile.html

Becoming 'radicalized' does not mean you become violent and from my reading IMHO the tipping point is so multi-faceted prediction is impossible.

A short article from New Zealand, actually originally in the WaPo, 'The psychology of how someone becomes radicalised' and focused on the extreme right in the USA:

For radicalisation to occur, there are three necessary ingredients, according to Kruglanski's research. The first is the universal need to live a worthwhile life - to have significance. People usually satisfy this need through socially accepted means, "like working hard, having families, other kinds of achievements," Kruglanski said. Radicals instead tend to place significance on their gender, religion or race. The second is "the narrative," which gives someone permission to use violence. Kruglanski said the narrative is usually that there is an enemy attacking your group, and the radical must fight to gain or maintain respect, honor or glory. The third necessary component is the community, or the network of people who validate the narrative and the violence.

Link:https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/new...ectid=12153329