Studies on radicalization & comments

[Dayuhan]

Governance is not unlike this. My one liner there is "Ensure the governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the governed."

Is it possible for us to ensure the legitimacy of someone else's government?

When the military is tasked to assist with an insurgency the first questions go to "how do I defeat the insurgent?" I would offer that the first questions should go to "why is there an insurgency?" What I find is that it can almost always be traced back to governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace.

In this case I would have to say that the "insurgency" does not trace back to "governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace". It traces back to invasion, conquest, and occupation by a foreign power. The insurgency was not generated by resentment against the Karzai government, it was (like the Karzai government) a consequence of our intervention.

We didn't go to Afghanistan to support a government against insurgents. We went there to remove a government that gave aid and shelter to people who attacked us. For that reason, an acceptable end state for us is not only the presence of a legitimate government, but the presence of a legitimate government that does not harbor our enemies. If we arrive at a legitimate government by sacrificing the objective that brought us there in the first place, we haven't accomplished anything.

Afghanistan has suffered under nearly 30 years of illegitimate government. Address that first, and the rest will follow. Ignore it, and no amount of good COIN tactics and hard effort are likely to produce more than temporary suppression of the symptoms of the insurgency.

I agree. Unfortunately, our initial efforts to create a government in Afghanistan were undertaken by an administration that was under fire on the home front and internationally, and our actions were calculated not to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans but to establish legitimacy in the eyes of our own populace and an international audience. That has led us to a pretty uncomfortable place. The next obvious question: how do we get from where we are now to where we want to be? Having put the weight of our approval and support behind a government and a process that were not appropriate to the environment where we were operating, how - short of going back in time and doing it all differently - do we undo what we've done and move back to some course that has some reasonable chance of generating a legitimate government that has reasonable prospects of surviving and that will not give aid and comfort to our enemies?

[Ken White]

Is it possible for us to ensure the legitimacy of someone else's government?

That would be, IMO, the 'No.'

...our actions were calculated not to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans but to establish legitimacy in the eyes of our own populace and an international audience.

That would be the 'yes', with a tag-on that the bulk of our political effort is always expended internally; our domestic politics drive our international actions to a very significant extent -- and to the confusion of the rest of the world.

This is the crux of the issue:

...how - short of going back in time and doing it all differently - do we undo what we've done and move back to some course that has some reasonable chance of generating a legitimate government that has reasonable prospects of surviving and that will not give aid and comfort to our enemies?

It shows the flaw of predicating international action on domestic party politics -- a condition that is unlikely to change in the near term. However, it deserves an answer and that answer has to unhappily be that we cannot. We will leave and what happens will happen. It will not all be for naught but it will have been far more costly in all terms than it needed to be simply because we ignored your first question and the US domestic concern drove the second ...

[Bob's World]

I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.

I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency. If we would have enabled (yes, you can indeed enable a populace's legitimate processes to form governance and select leaders. It only becomes illegitimate if you also try to shape outcomes, or some other ways meddle with the process) legitimate local processes we would not have had this problem.

So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. It merely needs to recognize that step one to true success is to force the GIROA hand on the legitimacy issue. Mr. Karzai has claimed he wants to hold a "Peace Jirga." Frankly, I believe he is bluffing and wants nothing of the kind, but I say call his bluff. He would far rather we conduct elections that he an easily manipulate and keep all his buddies in the plump positions; while we expend our national blood and treasure feeding his ponzi scheme and protecting him from popular backlash.

A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government. I will probably look much like the current one, but could look very different; but if done correctly would, I believe, take the starch out of the "Big T" Taliban revolutionary insurgency (about 10%), which in turn will allow the Coalition to begin ramping down, which will take the starch out of the "little t" taliban resistance insurgency.

The critical task is that the west must not manipulate the results, and must commit to recognize and work with whatever and whomever emerges. Good Cold Warriors choke on that one. They might well choke to death on it. There is little room for Cold War strategy here. We will not "contain" AQ in Pakistan by manipulating governance in Afghanistan. Trust me.

But by changing our approach to Muslim populaces in countries like Afghanistan, we will disempower AQ over time and render them moot.

[Ken White]

I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.

I sure didn't.

I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency...we would not have had this problem.

That's possible but far from certain.

So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan.

Is that DoD's call? I think not.

A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government. I will probably look much like the current one, but could look very different...

You will? Will your wife still recognize you?

But by changing our approach to Muslim populaces in countries like Afghanistan, we will disempower AQ over time and render them moot.

True, we'll get there -- may not do it your way or mine but it will happen...

[Bob's World]

Ok, a couple of typos. I was tired. "It will look much like the current..."

Agree completely that DoD needs to get out of the lead on this; as does the coalition. But we are all so fearful of what will happen if we do the right thing, that we instead cling desperately to the wrong thing.

I've said it before, but we need to confront our fears as a Nation; and it is not a fear of terrorists or even of other nations. It is a fear of who we will be if we relinquish the role of controling outcomes.

Why is our military so budget-crushing big compared to other states? To fight the wars that might occur? No. It is so damn big and committed to so many big ticket programs to control the peace

If we relinquish the "control" task as the essential one, we could then build a foreign policy and defense department that are designed to maintain the peace; and to win our naiton's wars. That is a very different thing altogether. For my one vote, a better thing as well.

[Ken White]

Ok, a couple of typos. I was tired. "It will look much like the current..."

AR 600-8-22, 11 Dec 2006, Para 8-49. k (1) says SF Colonels ain't authorized to be tired...

However, given you are where you are, we can waive that.

If we relinquish the "control" task as the essential one, we could then build a foreign policy and defense department that are designed to maintain the peace; and to win our naiton's wars. That is a very different thing altogether. For my one vote, a better thing as well.

I'll vote for that.

[Dayuhan]

I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.

I didn't say that... but some of the mistakes made in Afghanistan have certainly made success (which was never going to easy) far more remote and failure far more likely.

I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency. If we would have enabled (yes, you can indeed enable a populace's legitimate processes to form governance and select leaders. It only becomes illegitimate if you also try to shape outcomes, or some other ways meddle with the process) legitimate local processes we would not have had this problem.

I'm not sure that global perceptions mean much. It's Afghan perceptions that count, and it appears that to many Afghans our presence is precisely what deprives the Government of legitimacy. If large portions of a populace see foreign efforts to enable as an inherently de-legitimizing factor, the outcome of anything we do will be seen as illegitimate simply because it was we who did it.

It also has to be noted that we do have a stake in at least one facet of the outcome: the question of whether AQ will be able to use Afghanistan as a refuge and a base. If that interest is illegitimate, then our entire presence there has been illegitimate from the start, because that's why we're there.

So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. It merely needs to recognize that step one to true success is to force the GIROA hand on the legitimacy issue. Mr. Karzai has claimed he wants to hold a "Peace Jirga." Frankly, I believe he is bluffing and wants nothing of the kind, but I say call his bluff. He would far rather we conduct elections that he an easily manipulate and keep all his buddies in the plump positions; while we expend our national blood and treasure feeding his ponzi scheme and protecting him from popular backlash.

A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government.

I'm not sure we have the capacity to force the GIROA to dissolve itself and hold a Loya Jirga to create a new government. Afghanistan has a Constitution - adopted by a Loya Jirga, I believe. Does it provide for an outside power demanding a new government? Are we proposing to tell the Afghans that WE have decided that what that Loya Jirga did was no good, this constitution is no good, this government isn't working, and WE want a new Loya Jirga to select a new government? Do we propose the toss the entire edifice that we helped to establish, because WE aren't happy with what it's done? Somehow I don't think that's going to be interpreted as us relinquishing control.

Of course Karzai isn't going to hold any kind of assembly that could remove him from power. I expect he'd like to stage a sort of grand consultation, packed with delegates that support him, and use it to reinforce himself. If we try to stop him, we are effectively asserting ourselves as the real governing power in Afghanistan, which is more likely to enable the insurgency than to disable it.

I've said it before, but we need to confront our fears as a Nation; and it is not a fear of terrorists or even of other nations. It is a fear of who we will be if we relinquish the role of controling outcomes.

Why is our military so budget-crushing big compared to other states? To fight the wars that might occur? No. It is so damn big and committed to so many big ticket programs to control the peace

If we've been paying all that money to control the peace, or to control anything, we've gotten a very raw deal, because when you get right down to it, what have we actually controlled? Between, say, the end of the Cold War and 9/11, did we ever control a Muslim country? If we did it must have been very briefly and under cover of absolute darkness, because I sure didn't notice it. Even during the Cold War we were manipulated more effectively and more consistently than we manipulated others: how many dictators discovered to their delight that they could unlock the US Treasury simply by shouting the word "Communist"?

Though much of the 90s our policy was not to control, but rather to avoid, deny, and kick as many problems as possible down the road for others to deal with. Once the Soviets were out of Afghanistan we forgot the place existed. We let the UN take the lead in Iraq, and ended up with a stagnant stalemate - we may or may not have had a better alternative, but we certainly didn't try to take control. When AQ first attacked us our response was not to seek control, but to fire off a few cruise missiles and go back to watching the Nasdaq.

Not saying I'm in favor of the control passion, but I'm not convinced that it's the sole cause of our current problems. There's a fair blend of causes at play, and I think we're deceiving ourselves if we choose to see the problems purely as a response to our actions. The other parties involved do not merely respond, they can and do actively initiate actions in pursuit of their own agenda.

[Spud]

Hi guys

haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.

Bit from my paper

Psychologist Fathali Moghaddam sought to develop better understanding of the cognitive reasoning and psychological processes that lead to terrorism in a 2005 paper. Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism model focuses on the perceptions of the individual at each stage and utilises a staircase metaphor to highlight the options open to the affected individual. His work is particularly important in that through the use of the model it clearly identifies points of intervention at which an individual can be persuaded from ascending to the next level. While worldview is the predominant manifestation of perception throughout the staircase model, it is not until an individual ascends to the third floor that that they develop a moral complicity with terrorism. Moghaddam believes that entry to the third floor of his model is last point at which intervention will prevent ascendency to the conduct of a terrorist act. Whether a person reaches the fifth floor and commits to destructive acts of terrorism is still open to external influences. By entering the third floor of the terrorism staircase a person’s worldview statement transforms from one of perceived grievances towards one of fundamentalist reality – the person becomes morally engaged with the narrative that underpins the cause. Importantly it is also at this point that increased isolationism to external factors becomes the norm and through this action the potential terrorist gains greater cultural consensus for their thoughts by excluding competing ideals. Widening the cultural information basis may prevent the limiting of group consensus. However once a potential terrorist enter the fourth floor and enters the secret world of an active terrorist organisation Moghaddam argues that “there is little or no opportunity to exit alive.” At this point the impact of any influence strategy is negligible and the focus shifts to law enforcement or counter-terrorism solutions. In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program. Moghaddam expands the communication requirement further by highlighting that ascension from the first to second floor is often precipitated by a lack of participation or engagement in decision making on justice issues. He also argues the importance of cultural understanding during this early stage of terrorism. He found that “when local cultural interpretations lead to a view that the in-group is being treated fairly, there is greater likelihood of support for central authorities.” Maintaining linkages with the widest possible cultural group then seems a pertinent course of action.

Another decent read was:

Halverschied, Susanne & Witte, Erich H, 2008. “Justification of War and Terrorism: A Comparative Case Study Analyzing Ethical Positions Based on Prescriptive Attribution Theory,” Social Psychology, Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. Vol 39(1). p 26-36.

[Bob's World]

"In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program."

This ia an area where we are in complete agreement.

[Global Scout]

Posted by Bob's World

The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

B.W. I think you tend to conflate issues at times. This particular thread was focused on counter radicalization. While the term radicalization is problematic to say the least, the practice of undoing the harmful effects of brainwashing have been practiced throughout history with mixed results. If you look at the process that is used to convince people to become suicide bombers it is a very skillful approach (often enhanced with the use of drugs) to get a subject to commit suicide (thus become a useful idiot to some group).

I guess you can call this individual choice, or more accurately you could label it as maligned outside influence (actors from outside his/her previous social circles) that are hunting the psychologically vulnerable. Is it really self choice? Maybe as much as it is for a kid to join a gang, start taking meth, etc., but that sure as hell doesn't make it legitimate.

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

[bourbon]

haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.

PDF of the article and additional work available on the Professors webpage.