"Tarnished Brass" (new article by Dick Kohn)

[jmm99]

from Cav
I don't see officers voting as the downfall of the profession, or retired officers voicing opinions as a threat to the republic.

nor do I.

As to the third part of Kohn's article, starting here:

Related to these strategic and political failures are possible moral deficiencies among the officer corps, which have arisen in the last few years.

I simply do not see it based on what I see here; and among the actives and retireds who inhabit my little world.

When I compare the "moral deficiencies" of similar management and leadership classes in the broader civilian world (including my own profession), there is no comparison.

I do see problems with the civilian-military interface (which I perceive to be the focus of Kohn's 1st two points - strategy and politics). We have to communicate better - something about hanging together, or hanging separately.

[Mark O'Neill]

that this the article is 100% USA centric. That said, based on my knowledge and experience of the US mil , it is also nearly 100% assertion and prejudice. I think Niel and Van nailed apt responses,

Cheers

Mark

[Eden]

To posit a decline one has to either assume or demonstrate that things were somehow better in the past. If Kohn believes that there was some golden moment when the officer corps (as a whole) was:

1. Apolitical
2. Intellectual
3. Not prone to micromanagement
4. A moral exemplar
5. Capable of seamlessly integrating tactics, operations, and strategy

I wish he would point it out.

[AmericanPride]

To posit a decline one has to either assume or demonstrate that things were somehow better in the past.

The greatest measurement for the effectiveness of the military instrument is whether it wins its nation's wars. So the military may or may not have been more apolitical, intellectual, macro-managed, moral, and capable in the past, but that does not mean that the condition of those things have not contributed to a posited decline in American warfighting power. If it is true that the military now lacks a fundamental understanding of strategy, for example, it should reveal itself in American wars where even if battlefield victory was attained, the political objectives sought were not secured.

[Steve Blair]

To posit a decline one has to either assume or demonstrate that things were somehow better in the past. If Kohn believes that there was some golden moment when the officer corps (as a whole) was:

1. Apolitical
2. Intellectual
3. Not prone to micromanagement
4. A moral exemplar
5. Capable of seamlessly integrating tactics, operations, and strategy

I wish he would point it out.

He did fail there, although I suspect it's partly due to the nature of the article and (possibly) limits set by the journal.

It's been my read that the officer corps has never actually hit the "perfect" state in all of the above areas, although they have been more capable in some areas than others at various times in the past. In many cases the corps was apolitical only because they couldn't actually vote (due more to a lack of absentee voting mechanisms or postings in territories where no one could vote in national elections), but the level of internal politics and willingness to use political connections to gain desired postings was always high (especially in the days when there was a clear separation between the Line and the Staff...). As for moral exemplar...obviously one would have to ignore a great deal of stuff to make that claim. Like any other group, some come closer than others to the ideal.

There was a time when micromanagement was limited, but that was more due to widely dispersed units and a lack of rapid communication systems (and one could also contend that it was before the rise of "business school methods" in the post-World War II Army). Some commanders tried to micromanage, but the results were usually sub-par (imagine that...). I still think that in many ways our personnel system aggravates the flaws that might exist.

As an aside, it's kind of interesting to see the reaction to stereotyping and such when with a few word changes Kohn's comments could be quite similar to some of the rants against academics we've seen on this board. (just an observation...)

[wm]

To posit a decline one has to either assume or demonstrate that things were somehow better in the past. If Kohn believes that there was some golden moment when the officer corps (as a whole) was:

1. Apolitical
2. Intellectual
3. Not prone to micromanagement
4. A moral exemplar
5. Capable of seamlessly integrating tactics, operations, and strategy

I wish he would point it out.

He did in a rather left-handed way with his comments about the military that won World War II. Reading his piece somewhat reminded me of reading Vegetius, who spends a lot of his verbage extolling the virtues of the Republican-era Roman legionnaires (who probably never really existed), or Tactitus' discussion in either his Germannia or Agricola, 2 examples of panegyric with significant hidden agendas.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

[Old Eagle]

Micromanagement waxes and wanes, as I'm sure Ken and Tom can attest to. We used to refer to higher ranking micromanagers as "Squadleader 6". There are tales from Vietnam of multiple command and control helicopters stacking up over a single firefight in order to "help" the engaged unit. As a young officer, my favorite "get off my back" technique was to answer a radio call from higher with some garbled throat sounds, then turn off the radio.

I ain't buyin' the political thing either. I served as an apolitical, but voting officer. You think I'm not going to vote for someone who is going to define my life for the next four years? Maybe send me off to a BS war somewhere? On a coupla different occasions I have worked with foreign armies where bennies as low as battalion command were handed out by party. Trust me, we are not a political military.

[John T. Fishel]

Apolitical military in the mythical past: GEN winfield Scott, while on active duty, ran for POTUS as a Whig in 1852. MG George B. McClellan was actively opposing his commander-in-chief, A. Lincoln while in command of the Army of the Potomac and ran for Pres in 1864 (after he'd been fired).
Do we give up our rights as US citizens because we put on the uniform? some yes but mainly no. there is also a difference between the active and reserve components. Sen Lindsay Graham is a USAFR Colonel. there are still a few states that elect their Adjutant Generals and a significant number where the position is a purely political appointment. Note that a RC officer writing for publication does not have to get a security review of what he writes before it is published if he is (1) not on active duty and (2) not required to do so because of his civilian DOD (or OGA) job.
Strategy: I know one of the AWC faculty members quoted by Kohn here. But his complaint was based not on the issue of national strategy but rather on the strategies that officers produce by law and policy. Remember that the Goldwater-Nichols Act charged the CJCS to produce the National Military Strategy. Every unified command is required to produce its strategy by policy. Unless officers at the war colleges are required to learn to do strategy, how can they meet their legal obligations. (BTW I ran the SOUTHCOM Policy & Strategy shop in 1988 and 89 and was resposible for GEN Woerner's last strategy as well as GEN Thurman's.) In addition, the process of developing the National Security Strategy (NSS) - called for in the GNA - and the Defense Strategy (instituted by SECDEF Rumsfeld) requires military input.

Cheers

JohnT

[Surferbeetle]

Professor Kohn’s essay is an interesting piece, and captures a valid sentiment: America needs a cost effective strategy in order to meet the demands of our Nations range of desires and responsibilities. I’ll state the obvious assumption: the Department of Defense was created in order to conduct a large part of our Nations strategy and it is allocated a large part of our Nations resources in order to do so. Professor Kohn is of the opinion, however, that DOD is not providing an adequate return on the Nations investment.

Fair enough, he is a fellow taxpayer, and I applaud him for taking the time and effort to try and identify areas where we can improve.

My education, training, and experience have helped me to understand that in order to identify, define, and solve a problem one must understand the context of the problem and solution as well as have the appropriate skills to respond. Professor Kohn correctly identifies the importance of education, training, and experience for DOD personnel, however like Goesh I keyed in on the glaringly apparent failure to internalize the power of teamwork:

This may require further de-emphasis of mathematics, science, and engineering at the academies, on the grounds that war is first and foremost a human phenomenon, not a technical or engineering problem.

My drill sergeant taught me a valuable lesson very early in my career. A team is stronger than an individual…after 48 hours an individual needs sleep, an individual cannot watch all avenues of approach at once, etc. etc. Professor Kohn appears to subscribe to the mistaken idea that mathematics, science, engineering, and humanities can’t successfully team up to solve national strategy issues.

Contrary to Professor Kohn’s assertions the history of our nuclear forces to include Strategic Air Command and the Navy’s Submarine force, among others, are an example of the successes of this multidisciplinary approach. Proof positive are all of the free standing American and Russian populations.

Iraq 2003-06 (pre-surge) is a recent example of a failure to successfully create and employ an integrated mathematics, science, engineering, and humanities approach to warfare. Proof positive is our failure to consistently recognize the importance of the Iraqi population with the resultant exacerbation of the conflict. Afghanistan appears to follow this same pattern.

With respect to assertions of a political officer-corps, any one who would like to make these mostly baseless assertions needs to simply join and serve. My observation is that politically active officers are outliers in the general population and are dealt with appropriately. The assertion of a political officer corps is a red herring, which does not serve to identify, define, and solve our national strategy problems.

Fortunately the pace and requirements of the conflicts we have chosen to engage in are purging the force of dead weight and forcing the re-examination of faulty assumptions concerning American strategy, operations, and tactics. Professor Kohn would benefit from some more time spent in the field with USMC and US Army forces and we would benefit from his observations after this experience.