Iran & USA allies in Afghanistan:stranger than reality

[jonSlack]

Washington Post - Arnaud de Borchgrave - Broken Afghan Consensus

"The Shia suburbs of Kabul are now under the control of Iranian or pro-Iranian agents. The capital city has mushroomed from 400,000 at the time of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America to 2 million today. Some 500,000 acres of public land was seized and sold for the benefit of the entrenched bureaucracy. To control this vast country of 30 million would require several hundred thousand troops. The U.S.- and allied-trained Afghan army numbers 20,000 instead of the 35,000 projected by now.

The consensus forged in the heady days of liberation in December 2001 is broken. Fear of the B-52 bombers is gone. And today's Afghanistan is totally insecure, so much so it has already been promoted to the ranks of failed states -- except for an all-pervasive opium culture that keeps Afghanistan from sinking into total chaos.

The illicit opium poppy industry is, according to a former minister in President Hamid Karzai's government, "a pyramid structure. If ever there were a management prize for the perfect supply chain," it would go to what generates from one-half to two-thirds of Afghan gross domestic product. He said there are "25 mafia dons at the top of the pyramid who control the key power levers. The Interior Ministry is owned by the drug industry." In Helmand Province (40 percent of the country's opium production), Taliban fighters protect poppy farmers from eradication efforts -- and extract millions of dollars for their services."

[Jedburgh]

...The Shia suburbs of Kabul are now under the control of Iranian or pro-Iranian agents....

A very provocative sentence, especially given today's geo-political environment, with absolutely no further discussion or clarification given in the article.

However, I was reminded of a decent short piece in The Economist 17 Feb 07 issue:

Afghanistan's Hazaras are Doing Well

...Yet Hazara successes are breeding their own problems. The community's migration to the cities over the past five years has caused local resentment, particularly in Herat. They are accused of acting as agents for their co-religionists in Iran, receiving money and business support in return. Many of the Hazaras who have settled in Herat were refugees in Iran during the war years, fuelling such suspicions. Iranian cultural influence has grown steadily, particularly in Herat, since 2001. This is largely through trade ties and redevelopment work, though charges of more sinister machinations persist. As one Western analyst puts it, Iran is “keeping its foot in the door”. Iranian officials themselves have hinted at their ability to destabilise Afghanistan as well as Iraq. But there is no reason to believe that the Hazaras would be Iran's natural ally in this. For the time being, they clearly equate the removal of NATO troops with an end to their own renaissance—and a return to the divisions that brought their past suffering.

Among all the rest that is going on in the world, potential Afghan Hazara operational linkages with Iran is not something I've looked at. But it looks to be an interesting study...

[jonSlack]

It is not just the Hazaras that coalition forces need to worry about.

Jamestown Foundation - Iranian Involvement in Afghanistan

More than a decade ago, while mujahideen leaders were toppling the Moscow-backed Afghan leader Mohammad Najibullah, it was predicted that a strong Sunni fundamentalist regime in Kabul could come into conflict with Shiite Iran. This fear led Tehran to support groups such as the Shiite Hazara parties and the influential Tajik commander Ismail Khan in Herat province. When the Taliban finally gained control of Afghanistan, Iran referred to the development as a Sunni and U.S. plot to isolate Iran. The relationship between Kabul and Tehran took a more serious hit when Taliban forces killed seven Iranian diplomats who were serving in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998. This Taliban action led Tehran to announce its open support for all forces that would resist the Taliban and to increase its activities to bring anti-Taliban factions together. The most notable act by Tehran was to allow the influential Pashtun leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to be stationed in Iran.

While Hekmatyar and Iran had a falling out in 2002, I do not think it is completely unlikely for them to create another friendly relationship with the US as the common enemy. Additionally, since Iran already has a history of supporting non-Shiites like Hekmatyar, they are just as likely to establish relationships with other Afghani and Pakistani warlords, regardless of ethnic or religious affliation, if they have not already.

[Jedburgh]

...While Hekmatyar and Iran had a falling out in 2002, I do not think it is completely unlikely for them to create another friendly relationship with the US as the common enemy...

When we kicked off ops in Afghanistan, the Iranians looked at it as a positive development. We had a quiet agreement with them regarding CSAR on their territory if it became necessary, among other things. All that went in the crapper with the "Axis of Evil" speech in Jan 02.

The Iranian body politic is a fractious one, with a tight coterie of US-hating fundies attempting to maintain control over all the rest. Not to mention the larger government trying to keep the lid on a young population seething with desire for change. For far too long we've treated the place as some sort of monolithic entity, and lost many excellent opportunities for manipulation and exploitation - unfortunately, as time has passed, such opportunities have become rarer, narrower and more limited in potential.