My 'evidence' is anecdotal, no data points, ergo it isn't modeling it's heresy. Oops, er, uh -- it's hearsay...Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
Hmmm....so perhaps there is something to modeling human behavior after all?
Best,
Steve
Again JMM is as clear as mud ....
I do better in I Law and associated areas.
OK, I'll try again - with a diagram - and the question (which I didn't really ask in the prior post) is: does this make sense ?
What I'm suggesting is that DA is a very different thing from COIN-FID (no Genghis Khan suggested there; FM 3-24 and Niel's courses, etc.). In fact, DA may be contra-indicated in a COIN-FID situation; or maybe not.
In the case of DA, there are two preliminary issues: (1) defining the targets, in accord with US domestic law (including I Law accepted by the US) in such a way as to allow them to be hit by DA; and (2) gaining access rights in others' sovereign territories (or establishing a clear "white-space" doctrine) to allow DA to be executed. And other issues to derive ROEs.
We then move away from my little world to the world of intelligence and martial artistry to identify and destroy the targets. That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.
Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion.
Heh. You know better thant that...
My 'evidence' is anecdotal, no data points, ergo it isn't modeling it's heresy. Oops, er, uh -- it's hearsay...Hmmm....so perhaps there is something to modeling human behavior after all?
Best,
Steve
I know all that, John but IMO
It could've been done with, as Gavin said, more class.
Gates went all the way over there to tell him face to face and good for Gates for doing so. My personal belief is that it was not done with more discretion -- or class -- so that the new President gets props for being decisive and forceful. If that's correct it's shoddy; even if not the relief could've been done with a bit of finesses; McKiernan I think deserved better. Any US ARmy General who has the testicular fortitude to approve Armored Brigade Thunder Runs through Baghdad is okay in my book.
No, we don't know and in any event, it's done.
I will point out though, that Woerner's case and this one are a couple of many that answer the question about why Generals stick together and don't criticize each other in public...
I agree McKiernan probably wasn't the right guy for the job; didn't think he should've gotten it in the first place. First he's a heavy guy; second he's probably too nice. My perception is that Afghanistan is run sort of loosely -- which is fine if you have a well trained and educated Army -- we don't. Mc Crystal may be better, he's sharp, no question and he's one senior SOF guy who's not opposed to the GPF on principle. We'll see.
Think it'll be Petreaus replaces Casey, McCrystal replaces first Olson and then Petreaus...
Ah, yes, the class of '76. Now what was it about them. Oh, no -- that was '77...
You left out Odierno, '76 -- and Petreaus, '74.
Barno, McCrystal and Rodriguez are all Ranger Regiment Mafiosos.
I think I don't understand all I know
about what you might be asking...
Yes.
Use of DA in going after High Value Targets may or may not be a viable option in COIN / FID. Personally, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, I thought it worthwhile -- but I also think we're close to overdoing it based on what I read in the funnypaper. That's just my take...All true but even there ROEs rule (with the normal self defense latitude, enhanced)....And other issues to derive ROEs.True but he's also worked well with the GPF and has insisted that SOF elements coordinate with said GPF.That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.This is where I get lost -- not sure precisely what you're suggesting.Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion.
If it's "victory as to that list," well, yeah, I suppose so -- but I'm dubious that would accomplish much of anything in Afghanistan or the world. IOW, what would be the point?
I understand that concern, but I don't think it takes a lifetime of working with SOF to understand how to effectively employ it. The criticisms that you mentioned regarding Sanchez and the observations that Max Boot makes about McKiernan here have little, if anything, to do with the former specialty of the officers, but more to do with the type of leadership that was rewarded in our peacetime Army of the 1990s and got those guys promoted. That's not branch-specific. That is just the result of an era of foolishness in our Army that allowed transactional leaders to succeed beyond their abilities.
If there is anything special about SOF in that regard, it is simply that, as somewhat of a red-headed stepchild during that time period, SOF was not infected with the same institutional irrationality that so pervaded the rest of the force. I am willing to concede that it is less likely for a SOF General Officer to be some linear-thinking manager (I know a few SF field grades and SGM/CSMs who would laugh me out of the room I were to say that out loud - and they would name names - but I think it is generally true). But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc).
If McCrystal's background is so influential, then I hope that it doesn't carry over too much. I see in the Boot article mentioned above that he "spent an unusually long time (2003-2008) heading the Joint Special Operations Command, which is responsible for 'black' counter-terrorism operations using elite units." Let's hope he doesn't leverage them too much in Afghanistan. I laughed when I read your tongue-in-cheek comment that "SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea," because it was one of those "it's funny because it's true" statements. Many a mess has had to be "mitigated" due to SOF-DA killing people for less provocative reasons.
Just to be clear - I've got no issue with any of these personnel changes. I just don't like reasoning for why it makes sense. It's a great talking point for the masses (we're putting a SOF General in charge to clean up this mess!), but it just seems like too simplistic of an explanation for us.
Last edited by Schmedlap; 05-13-2009 at 11:27 AM.
"But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc)."
Brother I couldn't have said it better myself. As much as I love my SF brothers, I don't think they have the market cornered on leadership. When you're talking about a 4-star running operations in Afghanistan, he better not be thinking like a tanker, grunt, or snake eater. He has to put ALL the pieces together, including diplomacy to be effective. It takes a very special leader to do this. The great ones are rare and in my opinion are not concentrated in any one branch.
Having said that, I do think he'll do a great job, but time will tell.
"Mono Labe"
John Dethlefs
Good points
There's merit in that but I noticed the same thing back in the 50s and 60s before we got all PC and well educated, thus it's not a new, post Viet Nam phenomenon. So I think there's a bit of both...
Talking to my son last night and he made a point that I had totally missed lo these many years. The Germans used the Generalist model and we adapted ours (as so many other things, some good, some not so good) from them. There is a difference. Their General Staff Officers allow their system to be far more effective than do our oversized, over-ranked and branch centric Staffs. That's an area that needs some thought and probably action.Agree totally.If there is anything special about SOF in that regard, it is simply that, as somewhat of a red-headed stepchild during that time period, SOF was not infected with the same institutional irrationality that so pervaded the rest of the force...Also agree with that -- and I don't think I said anything to imply that was not the case. My comments addressed proclivities developed over the years and were generalizations. I've met exceptions to everything I cited -- but I also observed the things I cited so we have not a model or an inscribed truth but some general tendencies, no more.But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc).It wasn't tongue in cheek; been there, know the genre. Again, I agree on your end point -- I've said here several times that we are overdoing the DA bit...Let's hope he doesn't leverage them too much in Afghanistan. I laughed when I read your tongue-in-cheek comment that "SOF-DA guys will kill you if you offer them tea," because it was one of those "it's funny because it's true" statements. Many a mess has had to be "mitigated" due to SOF-DA killing people for less provocative reasons.I agree on the no issue but as I've said, the McKiernan relief was done poorly, he deserved better. McChrystal will probably do okay, he's a smart guy and he and Rodriguez both have a good rep with the Troops but I expressed concern with the DA background of both and I did not and do not say that a SOF guy was / is needed or better. My choice would've been a Light Infantry guy -- but there aren't many of those around now who are not tainted with Ranger service. Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out is not a good way to go...Just to be clear - I've got no issue with any of these personnel changes. I just don't like reasoning for why it makes sense. It's a great talking point for the masses (we're putting a SOF General in charge to clean up this mess!), but it just seems like too simplistic of an explanation for us.
So what is our disagreement?
Are Rangers really SOF?
Ken, I didn't look up Odierno.
Really, though, how much difference does background and training make? Although John Abizaid was a ME FAO Dave Petraeus had a better feel for the Iraqis than Abizaid. In eth absence of actually knowing the person we fall back on what we do know which is the background and experience that we know has some effect on shaping the person. How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.
Cheers
JohnT
That, too is a truth...
Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.
Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...
Not IMO. Or they should not be...
In my observation it depends, some folks can put aside their past better than others, some can acquire new skills faster than others and, of course, specific situations can have an impact. Basically, the short answer to your question is 'probably some, probably not totally.' See my Post above on 20%.Agreed. The key will be the amount of DA emphasis, I think. We'll see.How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.
To satisfy my curiosity before I retire to lurking again,
What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?
I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?
Two strengths to consider
Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) He truly gets small unit tactics (company and below), and he has a knack for team development. In his former capacity within JSOC he gets much credit for bringing interagency to the forefront of military doctrine today although he his somewhat humble and would probably give his staff more credit than himself. 2) He is all about "flattening" organizations with regards to C4I. He would often say "Centralized command with decentralized control", so I think you will see a paradigm shift in letting BCT/RCT and Bn commanders make strategic and operational decisions at their level vice waiting to push CONOPs up and down the reporting chain.... Again, I don't know LTG McChrystal is the purist in a COIN sense (SF versus Ranger arguments) but he will bring a new approach to the way the war is fought. I look forward to it...Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.
Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...
PT SENDS
Based on the little I know
I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.
Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...
Others know better than I but based on
what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:
How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?
Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?
Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?
I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...
I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.
I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.
We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...
There is a process
what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:
How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?
Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?
Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?
I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...
I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.
I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.
We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...
1) Verfiying the target is important and that is done through various collection means, it is non-negotiable and usually redundancy is required for any kinetic operations
2) Using ISR to establish a 'pattern of life' which will form the basis of the collateral damage assessment is also SOP for kinetic strikes
3) The target is 'vetted' and already identified within the targeting process thus has intelligence to back it up making it a "true" HVI
The kinetic option works but we are behind the proverbial eight ball with our IO strategy. Al Jazeera is on the scene by sun-up filming the "carnage" from yet another infidel attack. Right behind them is Hamid Karazai who will invariably do what he does best -- blame Americans for so-called civilian casualities while relying on us to keep him tucked in safe inside the Presidential Palace in Kabul. Somewhere around Day Two of the post-strike the American forces are finally getting something out the wider global audience. AQ and TB are all too aware of perceptions and how to use the global media as a weapon against us... Again, we are usually on the defensive and that makes us look guilty when in fact we are not... It isn't enough to say AQ/TB uses women and children as shields but we need to show it and say it FIRST... My hope is LTG McChrystal will bring this to bear with his management style of "flattening" and "decentralized control". We need to allow our press on the scene without waiting 48 hrs. to get a CONOP approved by USFOR-A in Kabul for a Marine Battalion to escort a CNN crew to the bomb site. This type of warfare management has to end...
PT SENDS
Quote from "Killer Elite"
Michael Smith quotes LTG McChrystal in his book "Killer Elite" (pg. 276)...I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.
Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...
Although Task Force 145 was under the control of the coalition commander, its operations were largely autonomous and heavily influenced by the JSOC Commander LTGEN Stanley McChrystal. His views were articulated in a memo sent to all JSOC operators at the same time as the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism was published. "This has been, and will be, a long and serious war," McChrystal told them. "Although initial structures and TTP's have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating within manning and operating processes that need to be improved to be more effective and professional. We must increasingly be a force of totally focused counterterrorists-that is what we do. This is a complex as developing Long Term Strategic Debriefing Facility that feeds our in-depth understanding of the enemy, and as simple as losing the casual, "I am off at my war adventure," manner of dress and grooming. In every case it will not be about what's easy, or even what we normally associate with conventional military standards. It will not even be about what is effective. It will be about what is the MOST effective way to operate- and we will do everything to increase the effectiveness in small ways. If anyone finds this inconvenient or onerous, there's no place in the force for you. This is about winning-and making as few trips to Arlington Cemetary en route to that objective."
I think this type of thinking and attitude are what SECDEF Gates was referring to when he spoke publically about LTG McChrystal replacing GEN McKiernan. There is no doubt that LTG McChrystal brings great management and leadership skills to the helm of this fight. He is also a huge proponent of SOF-GPF integration and isn't one to engage in who is better but rather how each compliments the other on the battlefield, but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them." He has on more than one occassion said that very thing... I think we will see some fresh ideas and some real shifts in doctrine for ALL forces in Afghanistan as he brings his unique leadership and management style to USFOR-A headquarters...
PT SENDS
As you say...
I hear you. I was saying that in 1952. Unfortunately, it just kept getting worse...
From your later post:I didn't start saying that until 1962 when I left the Hill for the 82d at the urging of wife who threatened to leave if I did not depart SF. I departed, so did she anyway. Second best thing that ever happened to me (Her leaving, not me leaving Group).but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them."
Oh, that ego and attitude factor -- it also has simply gotten worse.
I never cease to be amazed that we do as well as we do. That we do so well is living testimony to the under 35s who make it all work in spite of what we older nut not necessarily wiser heads might have done to foul it up (with some rare exceptions. That 20% again...).
Tankers????
As a dumbass former tank commander (Anybody remember M60s?), I'll take some offense to that statement, but leave it to history.
The guy running the military side of the surge in the North was MG Hertling (1AD), and a real tanker to boot. I was in 3/64 Armor when he was in 2/64 Armor, so I know he has cherry juice in his veins.
History, I'm sure, will more clearly explain the role of SF in the North, and how it worked hand-in-hand with a tank general's efforts. All of it part of the "Big Game," and, at least one tank general was working just fine with SF.
Reconstruction stuff is nice, but it is that essential level of hard power (caught between the formal army and a sniper?) that has to happen before soft power becomes practical in a conflict zone.
Steve
PS- Yeah, I know. Tanks are dinosaurs NOW. But, back in the day....
I'll see your M-60 and raise you
an M4A3E8 an M26 and an M-46...
Some Tankers are true heirs of John Buford. Some are heirs of McClellan. I've served under both kinds. I suspect the 20% rule applies.
Tanks aren't going away. I've heard that prediction on and off since the 50s, they're still here -- and still needed.
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