McKiernan replaced

[Spartan6]

"But as for a SOF background giving someone some special skill in commanding a multinational force at the 4-star level - I just don't see it. A good leader will be effective in any setting within the bounds of his profession - and not all good leaders opted for the SFAS try-outs. Many stayed in their branch (Petraeus, Odierno, etc)."

Brother I couldn't have said it better myself. As much as I love my SF brothers, I don't think they have the market cornered on leadership. When you're talking about a 4-star running operations in Afghanistan, he better not be thinking like a tanker, grunt, or snake eater. He has to put ALL the pieces together, including diplomacy to be effective. It takes a very special leader to do this. The great ones are rare and in my opinion are not concentrated in any one branch.

Having said that, I do think he'll do a great job, but time will tell.

[John T. Fishel]

Ken, I didn't look up Odierno.

Really, though, how much difference does background and training make? Although John Abizaid was a ME FAO Dave Petraeus had a better feel for the Iraqis than Abizaid. In eth absence of actually knowing the person we fall back on what we do know which is the background and experience that we know has some effect on shaping the person. How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Really, though, how much difference does background and training make?

In my observation it depends, some folks can put aside their past better than others, some can acquire new skills faster than others and, of course, specific situations can have an impact. Basically, the short answer to your question is 'probably some, probably not totally.' See my Post above on 20%.

How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.

Agreed. The key will be the amount of DA emphasis, I think. We'll see.

[jcustis]

What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?

I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?

[Ken White]

What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?

I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?

what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:

How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?

Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?

Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?

I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...

I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.

I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.

We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...) and not on the effects of what we do.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:

How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?

Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?

Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?

I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...

I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.

I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.

We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...) and not on the effects of what we do.

1) Verfiying the target is important and that is done through various collection means, it is non-negotiable and usually redundancy is required for any kinetic operations
2) Using ISR to establish a 'pattern of life' which will form the basis of the collateral damage assessment is also SOP for kinetic strikes
3) The target is 'vetted' and already identified within the targeting process thus has intelligence to back it up making it a "true" HVI

The kinetic option works but we are behind the proverbial eight ball with our IO strategy. Al Jazeera is on the scene by sun-up filming the "carnage" from yet another infidel attack. Right behind them is Hamid Karazai who will invariably do what he does best -- blame Americans for so-called civilian casualities while relying on us to keep him tucked in safe inside the Presidential Palace in Kabul. Somewhere around Day Two of the post-strike the American forces are finally getting something out the wider global audience. AQ and TB are all too aware of perceptions and how to use the global media as a weapon against us... Again, we are usually on the defensive and that makes us look guilty when in fact we are not... It isn't enough to say AQ/TB uses women and children as shields but we need to show it and say it FIRST... My hope is LTG McChrystal will bring this to bear with his management style of "flattening" and "decentralized control". We need to allow our press on the scene without waiting 48 hrs. to get a CONOP approved by USFOR-A in Kabul for a Marine Battalion to escort a CNN crew to the bomb site. This type of warfare management has to end...

PT SENDS

[Ken White]

When you're talking about a 4-star running operations in Afghanistan, he better not be thinking like a tanker, grunt, or snake eater. He has to put ALL the pieces together, including diplomacy to be effective. It takes a very special leader to do this. The great ones are rare and in my opinion are not concentrated in any one branch.

Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.

Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.

Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...

Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) He truly gets small unit tactics (company and below), and he has a knack for team development. In his former capacity within JSOC he gets much credit for bringing interagency to the forefront of military doctrine today although he his somewhat humble and would probably give his staff more credit than himself. 2) He is all about "flattening" organizations with regards to C4I. He would often say "Centralized command with decentralized control", so I think you will see a paradigm shift in letting BCT/RCT and Bn commanders make strategic and operational decisions at their level vice waiting to push CONOPs up and down the reporting chain.... Again, I don't know LTG McChrystal is the purist in a COIN sense (SF versus Ranger arguments) but he will bring a new approach to the way the war is fought. I look forward to it...

PT SENDS

[Ken White]

Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) ... 2)...

I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.

Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.

Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...

Michael Smith quotes LTG McChrystal in his book "Killer Elite" (pg. 276)...

Although Task Force 145 was under the control of the coalition commander, its operations were largely autonomous and heavily influenced by the JSOC Commander LTGEN Stanley McChrystal. His views were articulated in a memo sent to all JSOC operators at the same time as the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism was published. "This has been, and will be, a long and serious war," McChrystal told them. "Although initial structures and TTP's have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating within manning and operating processes that need to be improved to be more effective and professional. We must increasingly be a force of totally focused counterterrorists-that is what we do. This is a complex as developing Long Term Strategic Debriefing Facility that feeds our in-depth understanding of the enemy, and as simple as losing the casual, "I am off at my war adventure," manner of dress and grooming. In every case it will not be about what's easy, or even what we normally associate with conventional military standards. It will not even be about what is effective. It will be about what is the MOST effective way to operate- and we will do everything to increase the effectiveness in small ways. If anyone finds this inconvenient or onerous, there's no place in the force for you. This is about winning-and making as few trips to Arlington Cemetary en route to that objective."

I think this type of thinking and attitude are what SECDEF Gates was referring to when he spoke publically about LTG McChrystal replacing GEN McKiernan. There is no doubt that LTG McChrystal brings great management and leadership skills to the helm of this fight. He is also a huge proponent of SOF-GPF integration and isn't one to engage in who is better but rather how each compliments the other on the battlefield, but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them." He has on more than one occassion said that very thing... I think we will see some fresh ideas and some real shifts in doctrine for ALL forces in Afghanistan as he brings his unique leadership and management style to USFOR-A headquarters...

PT SENDS

[Ken White]

...This type of warfare management has to end...

I hear you. I was saying that in 1952. Unfortunately, it just kept getting worse...

From your later post:

but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them."

I didn't start saying that until 1962 when I left the Hill for the 82d at the urging of wife who threatened to leave if I did not depart SF. I departed, so did she anyway. Second best thing that ever happened to me (Her leaving, not me leaving Group).

Oh, that ego and attitude factor -- it also has simply gotten worse.

I never cease to be amazed that we do as well as we do. That we do so well is living testimony to the under 35s who make it all work in spite of what we older nut not necessarily wiser heads might have done to foul it up (with some rare exceptions. That 20% again... ).