The question...

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with UBoat 509 so I'm looking forward to the discussion

[MikeF]

I'm inclined to agree with UBoat 509 so I'm looking forward to the discussion

SFC W is probably right. I can provide counter-arguments to my statements, but I though this would provide an interesting discussion.

Many do not understand the difference between SOF and SF. I didn't until I worked with them.

v/r

Mike

[jmm99]

I am not about to explain the difference. I will state where I am coming from (which ultimately goes back to the War Crimes thread where I had to read in order to understand, since most Gitmo detainees resulted from special operations, military and/or civilian).

My knowledge of SOCOM is based on looking at its legal framework, which is summarized in the Operational Law Handbook 2008 (chap. 24, Special Operations - all quotes below from that source); and by reading other, related materials.

From a lawyer's standpoint, SOCOM is very legal intensive: (1) as to the Laws of War and Rule of Law, and development of ROEs, because it is on the cutting edge of operational considerations involving them; and (2) as to the "Laws of Appropriations" (turf and rice bowls), which affect everything:

A. As noted above, 10 U.S.C. §167 established USSOCOM. This Combatant Command is unique in that it is the only Combatant Command specifically established by Congress and required by law. The DoD could, for example, eliminate the Pacific Command (PACOM) and reorganize its sub-component units. However, DoD does not have the authority to disband USSOCOM. Congress realized that, if it created a Combatant Command without a separate funding authority, DoD would continue to have tremendous control and the ability to drawdown SOF assets simply by refusing to fund their programs. Therefore, an entirely new budgetary authority, Major Force Program Eleven (MFP-11), was established to fund SO. Some have observed that USSOCOM is the only Combatant Command with its own "checkbook." This is important for SO because MFP-11 funds may only be used for articles and programs with an SO basis or nexus.

B. USSOCOM is both a supporting and supported command. It is a supporting command in that it is responsible for providing ready and trained SOF personnel to the geographic Combatant Commanders. It is a supported command in that, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), it must be capable of conducting selected strategic SO under its own command.

All of the following is well-known to everybody in this discussion - so, this is not intended to be educational, but solely a framework for discussion (which comes at it from a legal viewpoint):

D. Each service has its own specific SO command. For the Army, it is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), commanded by a Lieutenant General, at Fort Bragg, NC. The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) is commanded by a Rear Admiral at Coronado, CA. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is located at Hurlburt Field, FL and led by a Lieutenant General. These service specific SO commands are responsible for selecting, training, and equipping the force. They are also responsible for SO doctrine within their respective services. In the Army, USASOC is a Army Service Component Command (formerly MACOM) and, therefore, Army SOF (ARSOF) is not within the FORSCOM chain of command.

E. There is also a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a sub-unified command of USSOCOM, which is located at Fort Bragg, NC. This is a joint command that studies special operations requirements and techniques; ensures interoperability and equipment standardization; plans and conducts joint special operations exercises and training; and develops joint SO tactics.
[JMM: plus more].

F. In 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established at Camp Lejeune, NC under the command of a Major General. Other than MARSOC, certain units of the Marine Corps, along with particular conventional elements of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, have been designated "special operations-capable." SO-capable units are, from time to time, designated as SOF units by SECDEF for specific operations. Many Marine Corps units perform and train to perform SO-type missions. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it particularly well-suited as an SO-capable force.

The discussion re: the difference between SOF and SF (I think) focuses on USASOC and ARSOF and their components (quoting just the headings):

G. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) includes active duty, Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve elements. ARSOF falls under the command of USASOC, which is headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC. USASOC is comprised of the following subordinate commands:

1. U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)).
....
2. The 75th Ranger Regiment, commanded by a Colonel, and its three battalions, are also ARSOF.
....
3. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), commanded by a Colonel and located at Fort Campbell, KY, provides special aviation support to ARSOF, using specialized aircraft and highly-trained personnel.
....
4. The 95th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade and four active component CA battalions fall under USASOC. Additionally, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) falls under USASOC.
....
5. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) is responsible for training, leader development, and doctrine.
....
6. The Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) provides Combat Service Support and Combat Health Support to ARSOF. ....

I suspect that the difference(s) also relate to the mission tasked, which from a legal standpoint include nine basic missions (headings only):

A. Direct Action (DA).
....
B. Special Reconnaissance (SR).
....
C. Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
....
D. Unconventional Warfare (UW).
....
E. Combating Terrorism.
....
F. Psychological Operations (pSYOP).
....
G. Civil Affairs (CA) Operations.
....
H. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
....
I. Information Operations (I0).

Finally, besides the nine mission (operational) areas, a number of collateral activities fall within the legal ambit of SOCOM. E.g., the following (headings only):

A. Coalition Support.
....
B. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).
....
C. Counterdrug Activities (CD).
....
D. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
....
E. Countermine Activities.
....
F. Security Assistance (SA).
....
G. Peace Operations.
....
H. Special Activities. These are activities that are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Special activities require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight.

All of that is one heck of a mix of different missions and activities, as much driven by where funding and bodies are available than by logic (my perception).

So, I would like to hear the discussion from a practical standpoint. All the above tends to look very neat from a legal standpoint, but reality often differs.

[Ken White]

Depends on who's the White Queen and can really say "It means whatever I say it means." Not being dismissive or evasive, there are just too many varied situations to pin it down with legal precision (and if someone tried, the other guys lawyers would dispute it... ). It really does depend on the situation -- and the senior parties involved at the time. You are correct to point out the funding issues as that drives many things -- particularly in peacetime or, as now, near peacetime. Once a big war starts, most -- not all -- that infighting gets put away. Lacking that, lotsa turf and ego battles. At lower level, the troops generally work it out pretty well.

Basically, the conventional forces can do any of the missions listed in your two boxes. Note that the law says that SOCOM is on the hook for the special operations facets of all those missions, not the pure or total mission.

A, C and I on the upper chart can certainly be SOF missions but they are not exclusively so. Item D there and the application of items F and G can also leave the 'special' definition and become quite mainstream.

Same thing applies to your second chart. Items A, D, E ,F and G are not at all SO peculiar. Even Item D, which nominally is that can also be parceled out to conventional forces when things get busy. I've been on three CSAR mission myself when I was no longer SF.

Clear?

[Boot]

F. In 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established at Camp Lejeune, NC under the command of a Major General. Other than MARSOC, certain units of the Marine Corps, along with particular conventional elements of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, have been designated "special operations-capable." SO-capable units are, from time to time, designated as SOF units by SECDEF for specific operations. Many Marine Corps units perform and train to perform SO-type missions. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it particularly well-suited as an SO-capable force.

You know I have forgotten about that piece of this. Thanks for bringing it up; Perhaps the GPF who carry out FID/COIN get designated SOC. I had a discussion today with someone at yet another conference and we discussed the GPF/SOF subject. His take was that it a GPF individual that goes to a unit (NON-SOF, I know the difference between SF/SOF)
become "specialized" for the amount of time they are in a GPF unit designated "SOC" and after 2-4 years return to the GPF which would enhance their units having served as advisors and such. Now the organization carrying out FID or SFA missions aren't SOF but they aren't necessarilly a GPF unit. What would be the difference in this? Obviously the specialized training (a screening, language, culture, force protection skills, negotionation skills, title/authorities law etc...)
Also, if a Marine helo squadron is undermanned (pilots etc...) and are preparing to deploy, that squadron gets priority and from across the Marine Air Wing (other squadrons), Marines are sourced. In a GPF unit that specializes in traditional SF missions (lets say advisors) they would be fenced off, and not touched. I would also submit someone who is at this type unit would be a perfect candidate for MARSOC, AFSOC, USASOC (SF) organizations that carry out this type missions. Sure they would still have to qualify but would have a leg up on other potential selectees, and they probably wouldn't have to spend as much time and money training them as they would have language, culture and certain other skill sets already, that is if they got selected.
Just my thoughts.

Boot

[Ken White]

Many do not understand the difference between SOF and SF. I didn't until I worked with them.

I think that's partly due to our ignorant media, partly to the similarity in abbreviations, partly to the fact that SF is part of our SOF but all SOF is not part of our SF and partly due to the fact that the DA crowd effectively dominates SOCOM and therefor those SOF missions are given priority over normal SF missions -- even by some in SF -- and that priority has resulted in some SF doing SOF DA and allied missions...

Or something like that.

I think that is slowly changing and I acknowledge my perceptions are all from hearsay. Equal opportunity hearsay, though. SF, non-SF SOF and conventional -- and even less conventional -- military types all contribute to my hearsay collection. They contribute far more than I could ever gather open source (without more work than I'm prepared to put into it).

[John T. Fishel]

Special Forces are a US Army SOF element. SF consists of USASF Command under USASOC. SF Command consists of 1st SFG(A), 3rd SFG(A), 5th SFG(A), and 7th SFG(A) & 10th SFG(A) in the Active Component plus the 19th and 20th SFG(A) of the National Guard (reserve component). All other Army SOF are not SF with the exception of some of the training elements of the JFKSWC which train SF. To be considered SF and wear the Green Beret, Flash, and SF tab, a soldier has to have successfully completed the SF Qualification Course (and normally have been assigned to a SF unit).

SF soldiers are qualified infantrymen, airborne qualified, and trained and cross trained in two SF team specialties (intel, engr, comms, medic +). They are alos supposed to be proficient in the language (or one or more of the languages) of the area in which their group normally operates. They are all supposed to be proficient in all kinds of weapons including foreign and are trained to be trainers. And they train on knowing the culture, history, and politics of their region.

3 of the SF groups have left particular marks on SF as a whole. 10th SFG(A) historically specialized on UW, 7th SFG(A) on FID, and 5th SFG(A) on DA. Thus, 2 of the 3 central groups have a trainer/advisor focus.

Non-SF SOF do not go through the full array of training that SF do and focus on other SOF skills. I would not, for example want to give the Ranger Regiment the mission of training Afghan Rangers if I had 5th group available (or any other SFG). I would not want to give 4th POG the mission of training Iraqi infantry nor the 95th CAB the same mission. If I had a US commando mission, I would want SEALS, Delta, or Rangers to do it with support from AFSOC. If I had to lead foerign troops on a similar commando mission I would prefer to have SF rahter than any of the others. (I've left out MARSOC because I'm still not entirely sure of their niche but, from what I've heard and read, the Marines would likely be my back up choice for SF tasks.)

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

Basically, the conventional forces can do any of the missions listed in your two boxes. Note that the law says that SOCOM is on the hook for the special operations facets of all those missions, not the pure or total mission [JMM emphasis].

A, C and I on the upper chart can certainly be SOF missions but they are not exclusively so. Item D there and the application of items F and G can also leave the 'special' definition and become quite mainstream.

Same thing applies to your second chart. Items A, D, E ,F and G are not at all SO peculiar. Even Item D, which nominally is that can also be parceled out to conventional forces when things get busy.

because sec. 167(j) is clearly phrased inclusively, not exclusively, with respect to SOCOM:

(j) Special Operations Activities.— For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations:

(1) Direct action.
(2) Strategic reconnaissance.
(3) Unconventional warfare.
(4) Foreign internal defense.
(5) Civil affairs.
(6) Psychological operations.
(7) Counterterrorism.
(8) Humanitarian assistance.
(9) Theater search and rescue.
(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Also pretty much totally clear as to John's succinct explanation; except as to this one:

I would not, for example want to give the Ranger Regiment the mission of training Afghan Rangers...

Does this mean that the 75th is capable of performing its ranger mission, but incapable of transmitting that knowledge to trainees ? Maybe so, but that seems odd to me, since I can't think of a legal analogy.

I also understand the distinction between SF and non-SF (Rangers, CA and POG) as explained by John - and how it could be a source of friction. What I perceived (in at least one of the posts) as friction between SF and JSOC is really lost on me - I can only infer it is really inside-inside baseball.

Coming back to the OP question - "what in their view is the dividing line between GPF and SOF" - the answer seems to be that the lines are pretty well drawn from a legal standpoint - and organizationally.

One could I suppose question why CA and POG are in SOCOM; and probably a zillion other questions as to why this or why not that. I'd like to hear all of them. This is a very interesting area of the law in the process of development - Common Article 3 and the "irregular combatant" (which legally is different from the current buzzword "irregular warfare").

Hey, Boot, the US Marines have been doing special ops in "gray-space" areas since at least Puerto Plata - 1800 - my CFMs much earlier. They both attained and retained the art of shape-shifting from porpoises to land crabs. As they say, colonialement.

[ODB]

In a nut shell the seperation comes down to laws not to capabilities, at least not on the level it should. In a perfect world yes, capabilities would be as much as a dividing line as the laws are, but they are not.

IMO it is also time to relook the Titles that dictate what SF can and cannot do legally. The world has changed since these laws were implemented and need a re-evaluation. Will not elaborate other than there is a call from some to change these things and I think they are headed in the right direction.

We "SF" are own worse enemy. In many formal articles we do call ourselves SOF not SF. Forty some yars ago how many had Green Beret comic books? How many saw Green Berets in National Geographic? How many owned a Green Beret action figure? My point is that along the way we took the "Quiet Professional" role too far. I'm not advocating chest beating, but the line needs to be drawn again, before the identity disappears all together.

Ken: Your sources are good.......there is a fundamental shift taking place. Better late than never.

Can some one riddle me this? Why is the USASFC only a 1 star billet?

GPF vs SF training others. As an NCO in the U.S. Army do I not train my own soldiers daily? Am I not a trainer? So should GPF be able to train host nation forces? The quick answer would be yes, but! And that is a big but. One has to look at two big differences: mindset and maturity. In no other situation does that one oh sh!t wipe away 1000 atta boys more than when working with host nation forces. The effect can be disastorous if not deadly.

Finally to address the post about letting GPF slide into the ranks....no no no! The more I have thought about it over the years, it's not about the training I received, so much as about my assessment throughout SFAS and the Q-Course. It's not all about physical prowless or mental capacity but a whole person, what is SF getting when they get me? They know what they are looking for and are good at picking them out. Yes, inevitably some slip through the cracks, but very few. The QC is good. If you have read some of my posts on other threads you'd realize I am a fan of bringing them into the fold in a staff capacity and vice-versa. It would be good for Army and my stop some of the bigger d!ck on the block syndrome.

[jmm99]

from ODB
GPF vs SF training others. As an NCO in the U.S. Army do I not train my own soldiers daily? Am I not a trainer? So should GPF be able to train host nation forces? The quick answer would be yes, but! And that is a big but. One has to look at two big differences: mindset and maturity. In no other situation does that one oh sh!t wipe away 1000 atta boys more than when working with host nation forces. The effect can be disastorous if not deadly.

Good answer to my 75th question - mindset (teaching-oriented) and maturity (experience in both teaching and subject-matter).

General thought. The laws ("titles") should allow as full scope to operational considerations as is possible within the rather broad constraints that exist (my position - other lawyers will take a more retarded view). The laws are unclassified - so proposed changes can be discussed and hypotheticals safely proposed.

The laws are the broad strokes on the canvas. The ROEs, which result from a confluence of (1) operational considerations; (2) laws of war and rule of law (the latter to a lesser degree); and (3) diplomatic, policy and political considerations, are generally classified - so, e.g., JAG found it somewhat difficult to spell out with completeness, for public consumption, the lessons learned re: ROEs in Iraq and Astan.

CLAMO has a number of legal studies - for public consumption - dealing with special operations. You can find them here and here - big .pdf files (best have broadband - and put them on a CD).

Appreciate the answer.

[Ken White]

What I perceived (in at least one of the posts) as friction between SF and JSOC is really lost on me - I can only infer it is really inside-inside baseball.

is the basic problem. Though it's really more complex, that serves as a simple andswer.

It's just different tribes -- and different jobs. JSOC folks are shooters primarily; hard wired, multi skilled and pretty much Type A guys. The SF guys OTOH are fixers and trainer; educators, if you will primarily; most of' em are pretty laid back.

It's the battle (philosophical differences) between the SWAT eam and the EMTs in a sense.

Those are very broad generalizations and there are exceptions and nuances all over the place but that'll do for a quick and dirty broad description. Add in the fact that in the upper echelons of USSOCOM, preference has in the past been given to the slightly more glamorous (to some) but far smaller community of shooters and that the far more numerous SF guys have folks who also do the DA stuff and you have a recipe for dissension. As ODB mentioned, this is slowly changing as some high powered shooters realize the value of SF -- and become aware of the fact that one can train an Operator a lot quicker than one can train an SF Team member.

The operator takes more and expensive practice to sustain but the SF guy takes longer initially. The Rangers sort of get caught in the middle, though they serve as a farm team (Dalton Fury's words) to an extent for both JSOC and SF. All those folks cost more per bod than do conventional units; that and the selection and training time required preclude a rapid strength increase of either type.

As usual, most of the Troops on the ground work it out with little friction; the flaps occur in the States and are about dollars and spaces -- and who gets the dirty thankless jobs sort of stuff -- while in the field that stuff is not important. Usually.

SF and JSOC both run selection and assessment programs -- similar yet different and passing one does not mean automatic entry to the other (or it didn't used to...) -- and it has been said that passing that in both cases is seen as as big or a bigger bragging / unit cohesion factor than simply being there by many...

The 82d also plays farm team but they're far bigger, strength wise than the Ranger Regiment, so while the 82d grumbles about it, it doesn't impact them as badly as it does the Rangers. There are people who got to selection (both) without being in or having been in the Ranger Regiment or the 82d but from elsewhere in the Army; the numbers used to be sort of small. SF also directly recruits with the '18X' program (LINK); Uboat509 commented on that some time ago.

[jmm99]

had definite value in your answer to my inside-inside baseball question. Thanks for your insights.

Time for sleep.

Mike

[Bill Moore]

This is a great comedy. I have to agree with the posts that the differences between SOF and so called GPF are much easier to discern in the U.K. and Israel. In our system SOF is everything, but only as everything pertains to SOF. Sort of reminds me of Steve Martin's Special Purpose in one of his earlier movies, when he finally found out what is special purpose was for.

We didn't have the capabilities across the joint force to rescue our hostages in Iran because the services under invested in these special capabilities. There was a "real" capability gap, not a perceived gap, so we have SOCOM, and I think we can make a strong argument that SOCOM has done a pretty darn good job of fixing that problem.

Unfortunately, as Ken has pointed out a lot of common Army skills related to COIN and FID migrated to SF over the years, so not only did SF provide specialized COIN/FID support, they also supported basic infantry skills training which some would argue (like me) that isn't the ideal use of a specialized force, but there are times when it is appropriate.

Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.

[Ken White]

Did I spell that right...

This is a great comedy.

We aim to please...

Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.

True, it all works out...

[Boot]

Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.

I just can't believe that anyone in the services or DoD would let these things influence thinking! D:(note: laced with laughter)


Boot