The Conventional, SOF Debate in OIF.

[SSG Rock]

I have been involved in several debates concerning OIF. The latest involved a retired SF Captain (USAR) who is of the opinion that we could have conducted the war in Iraq, from phase 1 forward with fewer troops. He seems to be of the opinion that conventional forces get in the way of the special forces in this kind of war. When I point out the obvious to him, he pulls rank on me and states, what would an NCO know about campaign planning? I'm no campaign planner, but I'm not stupid either and I have had the good fortune to work with people who are experts in campaign planning and well versed in special forces too. Allow me to paste his comments from another discussion board here and please, do comment.

"Through the seizure of Baghdad and for a month or two following that? Mostly yes (except for introducing the entire 5th SFG into the landscape). Beyond that? Nope. As mentioned, I would have introduced the 5th SFG into the AO and they would have stayed there. Working with locals, building Iraqi defense forces, snapping up terrorists and Hussein cronies.. not through overwelming presence, but smarts, guile and working with the locals. I would have reduced conventional forces to two or three Brigades (UAs as rapidly as possible). One from the 101st with lots of helo capability, one a Stryker Brigade with a heavy battalion along. There job would be to be a reaction force to bring the hammer if the SOF assets or Iraqi forces needed assistance. CA and Psyop battalions also deployed. Air assets in Kuwait and Qatar. No non-helo assets permanently in Iraq until their security forces are sufficient to defend those assets.

Now, what the heck do I know. I'm trained to run UW, I know what it takes to do it effectively, and what it takes to stop it. And it isn't a lot of troops that are needed to stop it. It's getting the fish to deny the sea."


Granted that UW is the bread and butter of SF, but this war is too big for SF to tackle alone isn't it? With the luxury of hindsight, it seems to me that had we deployed more troops in the outset commanders would have been able to control key terrain and built up areas rather than fighting through or bypassing them. My epiphany came the evening I turned on the TV and saw the looting in Baghdad. Thousands of giddy Iraqis in an orgy of pillaging and looting, skittering back and forth in right before the eyes of seemingly overwhelmed and bewilderd Soldiers. As an NCO, I know what a confused Soldier looks like and our troops appeared to me to look like Soldiers who realized there was something wrong with this picture, but lacked guidance. Perhaps they were told to do nothing? In a press conference when asked about the looting I saw Mr. Rumsfeld shrug his shoulders when asked about the looting. I think that was the day we began to lose the initiative and we experienced quite a free fall there for awhile. I feel that we are winning the war, but I can't help but wonder if we could not have done it smarter. Would more conventional troops have been a good thing or not?

Your comments?

[jcustis]

QUOTE: One from the 101st with lots of helo capability, one a Stryker Brigade with a heavy battalion along. There job would be to be a reaction force to bring the hammer if the SOF assets or Iraqi forces needed assistance.

It seems he may be thinking the the Afghanistan model would have transplanted equally to the Iraq area of operations. We will never know for sure, but I tend to agree with some of the smart folks who have asserted that the fabric of Afghani society made for good SF operations, but Iraq was/is a completely different proposition.

I do agree that more agile forces should have been employed, but the requirement to gain and hold key terrain required a certain footprint. A handful of brigades does not meet that requirement. The quote also leads me to believe that he never set foot in the nasty expanse that is western Al-Anbar Province.

[SSG Rock]

I don't know for certain. But this person currently lives in Thailand and since he seems hesitant to discuss his personal experiences I have deduced that he was on active duty last from the 1980-84 time frame and that his operational experience was predominently in Central America. I do not beleive that he has ever been to Southwest Asia.

[jcustis]

Then I would have to respectfully have to say that he doesn't know what he is talking about, regardless of whether he was trained to run UW.

[SSG Rock]

There does come a point when you have to cut bait. But I'd sure like to some good points in before I abandon the discussion.

[jcustis]

A couple of points I'll throw out:

1. SF forces are great for developing the capablities of an indigenous military force, and that comes at the point of picking sides. What sides would have been chosed had internecine fighting broken out immediately between the Shi'a, Sunnah, and Kurds. Three brigades would have been hard pressed, and it takes like a division (-) to manage Baghdad alone right now?

2. Could we have sustained the employment of SF forces for the almost three years we have been in Iraq, taking into consideration the demands in Afghanistan? It's a simple matter of looking at troops to task. I don't know the composition of 5th Group, but we are not talking about an inexhaustible supply of teams to continue engagement with the populace for an indefinite period of time. At some point the big green machine, as cumbersome as it may be, has to assume some of the responsibilities inherent in re-building a country. SF simply can not do it alone, in my opinion.

3. An SF element went into the town of Ar-Rutbah near the Syrian/Jordan border and executed probably a classic mission to make contacts, organize local governance and basic services, but it was before the insurgency built up its steam. By the time my unit arrived (two rotations after the 82nd Airborne) the town had slid into a nest of low-level insurgents who would kill the mayor just as easily as they would have killed a Marine. Without a sustainable Iraqi Security Force structure (which by the way DID GO AWAY once Saddam fled), I think it's highly improbable that any number of SF personnel could have maintained security for long. If your discussion partner had his way, the result may have been a hodgepodge of reaction forces tied down everywhere, and getting absolutely nothing accomplished.