Have you guys read Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife?
Have you guys read Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife?
Fantasy
It is simply a fantasy to believe that small SF units would have been able to stabilize Iraqi’s urban areas. A small footprint only consisting of SF would have resulted in the insurgents simply elevating the conflict to a war of movement in a matter of weeks. Even now the insurgents are able to mass into elements of greater than a 100 fighters when conventional forces are not present to suppress this. Unfortunately we don’t have “enough” conventional forces present to suppress this type of activity throughout Iraq.
SF ODAs would have quickly been overwhelmed by the irregular enemy threat shortly after the conventional Iraq Army collapsed. This wasn’t Afghanistan; SF for the most part didn’t have a liberation element to work with. The only locals they could work through, by and with for the most part were the Kurds. The Kurds are a destabilizing element in several parts of Iraq, so the bottom line is that option was not viable. The only viable security force as we transitioned into phase IV was U.S. conventional forces, and we obviously needed more, not less. It is nice to think we could have won over the Iraqi people with small elements and carrots, but it is also simply fantasy.
All that said, I must agree with my brothers regarding the dismal performance of “some” of our conventional forces whose actions definitely set back our ability to stabilize certain regions by months if not longer. The lessons on how to conduct business in an insurgency type environment have been out there for several years, and while not easy, they definitely are not rocket science. As I stated previously, some units are doing fantastic and others are challenged. For the most part it comes down to leadership. I still don’t understand why our educated officer corps in many cases can’t grasp (or implement) the simple concepts of counterinsurgency, so maybe the answer is for the conventional forces to be much more selective on who they promote to lead our soldiers?
soup with a knife....
I just heard about that today as a matter of fact. Plan on checking it out.Originally Posted by NDD
Bill, you are on target with your assessment in my opinion. Conventional forces have kind of bumped around in the night for awhile. Seems to me the Marines did a pretty good job addressing this earlier than the Army did. But, thankfully, I beleive we are seeing progress. Also, I think the our leadership development for conventional forces officers should include a healthy dose of counter insurgency. Maybe thats being addressed in the schoolhouses now, I'm not sure. But there is plenty of information out there in the various lessons learned websites. Also, BCKS is up and running and is a great consolidated collection of lessons learned etc. If you have an AKO account you can access BCKS.
Don't taze me bro!
BCKS has dedicated sections for COIN, Stability Ops, CA - and OIF/OEF specific resources and discussion...
Rock,
While I disagree with many of his conclusions, the book addresses many of your questions. Be forewarned - it will probably frustrate you based on what I have read in this thread.
Mr. Moore makes good points. You actually have to have an indigenous force in order to lead one.
Troops will generally do what they are told and follow the examples they are given. The Brits used conventional forces in Malaya. I think the trick is getting them on the same page and following the program. I believe the Brits achieved this by requiring all the incoming leadership to attend the jungle training school, where I suspect UW topics were the order of the day.
Anyway, get the book - well worth the purchase price and very pertinent to the subject at hand.
For the record, I am not an Anglophile - I severed diplomatic relations with the English in 1776.
Sounds good...
I do plan on giving it a look. I'll google it up.
You've already read it huh? Have you commented on it anywhere? I'd be interested in your thoughts especially.
I did find this link, which is an update the author wrote as an addendum and to update some of the misconceptions in his original work. It seems that the author wrote the book before deployment to Iraq, and after having lived through the experiences he had previously written on found that he didn't get it all right. This is also a pretty good primer.
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/567702.html
Last edited by SSG Rock; 05-17-2006 at 07:28 PM.
Don't taze me bro!
Yes, that preface is in the edition I have. His changes in the later preface closely mirror my criticisms of the book itself. All in all it is a good piece of work. The problem I believe is the subject matter - to do it justice would take volumes and that was obviously not the author's intent.
I would have rather seen a comparison between Malaya and El Salvador. But the book isn't bad at all.
What we are conducting in Iraq now is I believe FID - with obvious exceptions of course. FID is a very complex issue and I have never seen what I would consider to be the definitive work on it. If anyone has any suggestions, I would love to hear them.
Fid
I know I shouldn't say anything, but isn't that (FID) like re-orienting an indigenous force that doesn't exist (Saddam's old army and government). Don't you really need a host country first?
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