The Conventional, SOF Debate in OIF.

[ProxyAccount]

To avoid retreading of what was discussed elsewhere and to avoid misunderstandings/misrepresentations of any discussions, perhaps it would be best to post what amounted to be the proposition that was affirmed by SSG Rocks's opposite.

I don't believe that Greenhat is arguing that our transformed forces cannot successfully operate in an unconventional war [edit: as was pointed out, they are successful], but that their current implementation is sub-optimal, ponderous, and will cost more in the lives of our men than is necessary. The greatest obstacle to fighting and winning an unconventional war is not configuration, but in training and mindset. While our transformed forces are certainly more flexible and agile than before, they are still trained with a conventional warfare mindset. In unconventional warfare, the denser the population center, the more difficult it will be for them.

By contrast, the guerrilla thrives in dense population centers. They can move without fear amongst noncombatants, find safe shelter with ease, wait in relative comfort, and strike without notice. Forces that patrol neighborhoods, handle peacekeeping missions, garrison bases, and secure areas in population centers, are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla tactics.

Could transformed units be mentored by Special Forces? It sounds good, but OJT in densely populated areas doesn't seem reasonable and the training of conventional elements sounds like it would tie up significant SF/SOF resources that could have been used to train indigenous forces. Conventional, transformed forces are best used (and perhaps mentored) in sparsely populated areas. Perhaps they would be best used to patrol the border of Iraq, as opposed to patrolling neighborhoods. Conventional forces could certainly be used to train and accompany the new Iraqi military on certain missions, but it shouldn't entail operations in cities. Such population centers are the waters where the unconventional warfare operators are best suited for.

In other words, once the Iraqi conventional units quit the field, operations in urbanized areas would have probably been best left to SF/SOF units, instead of relying on conventional tactics to keep the peace. Whether Phase I should have had more conventional units or not was rendered mute once the situation changed into an insurgency. At that point, less is more, with unconventional units taking the lead in certain areas.

[SSG Rock]

To avoid retreading of what was discussed elsewhere and to avoid misunderstandings/misrepresentations of any discussions, perhaps it would be best to post what amounted to be the proposition that was affirmed by SSG Rocks's opposite.



In other words, once the Iraqi conventional units quit the field, operations in urbanized areas would have probably been best left to SF/SOF units, instead of relying on conventional tactics to keep the peace. Whether Phase I should have had more conventional units or not was rendered mute once the situation changed into an insurgency. At that point, less is more, with unconventional units taking the lead in certain areas.

It is not an easy thing to change gears in such dramatic fashion. What were we to do with conventional forces after phase 1? Send them home? Deploy them farther out in the desert to sit in the safety of sand berms and bunkers? Rumsfeld said it best himself, you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you wish you had. The reality on the ground dictated that conventional forces adapt to a UW envrionment. It is my understanding that for the most part, conventional forces have never been the force of choice when it came to fighting the insurgency, that was left up to TF21 and other SF/SOF units. The role of the conventional forces has been and is one that is evolving. The bottem line reality is that conventional forces must become proficient in a UW environment. This is not to say that conventional forces will, should or could ever become as proficient as SF in UW, but that they have to be proficient in helping to create an environment condusive to SF operations. To do this they must understand what SF does, and be able to participate when necessary. I have never suggested that conventional forces be the primary fighters in built up areas, that is indeed best left to SF. But withdrawing conventional forces from built up areas would result in deterioration of the situation in those urban areas, how can SF possibly bring the insurgency in Baghdad under control without assistance of conventional forces, let alone an entire country? SF and conventional forces must fight together in the same areas at the same time. Finding the proper force mix, correct levels of integration and division of tasks is what we have been struggeling with and I think have to large measure successfully addressed and it should get even better.

Until the IA is up and running our conventional forces will have a role to play in Iraq. It may not necessarily be in fighting the insurgents, but there are hundreds of other tasks that they can perform which will free more of our SF/SOF personnel to dedicate their efforts to their core mission.

[Larry Dunbar]

What were we to do with conventional forces after phase 1?

I think I can help explain, or perhaps give another perspective, what the extra troops could be use for. When one country goes kinetic against another country, there are a series of events that can be use toward a successful campaign. Except when the US military was containing Russia, the US military seemed to use a strategy developed by Col. Boyd called PISRR, which means Penetrate, Isolate, Subvert, Reorientation, and Reharmonize. Roughly the campaign goes something like this. First you Penetrate your enemy’s country. Then you Isolate the government from its people (in Iraq’s case it simply meant Isolating Saddam from his people). Then you Subvert the Iraqi people by reorient their government towards our government’s way of thinking. The last R is for Reharmonize the nation towards its new government. Re-harmonization happens as the government starts to function under its new orientation and the people follow.

You use those “extra” troops in the reorientation phase of the PISRR movement. Unlike we did in Iraq, you don’t stand-down the government of the nation you are trying to Reharmonize. You reorient the government to your way of thinking. I am not quite sure how to do this, but one way I imagine is: you can get any military to pay attention to your way of thinking by paying them and keeping them with food and supplies. I believe this is something our conventional forces understands and could have accomplished. I believe solders pay transcends language barriers and culture. Our conventional forces could have enabled government officials to keep the support coming to the new Iraqi military forces. Standing an American GI behind Iraqi government official would help to reorient them to our way of thinking. If not, an attitude adjustment would have been in order.

If we had put our conventional forces in charge of tasks that consisted of getting Iraqi government officials to do their jobs, reorientated to the US military standards, I believe it would have taken all extra conventional forces to accomplished this. These tasks could then move out to mayors, clerks, and other government official in all parts of the Iraqi government. I think it would have taken a lot of troops.

I believe something happened like this after Germany fell during WWII. Suddenly in Germany none of the mayors, clerks and government’s officials were Nazis. They were simply pawns of the Nazis movement, or so they say. It may have been true, but it may also have had something to do with an American GI standing behind them with a rifle. I think ex-Saddam officials would have claimed something similar.

But then, during Reorientation it doesn’t matter what their implicit laws are (those beliefs inside their heads) as long as they function to our explicit rule-sets. Re-harmonization comes later and really involves the people of the nation you are trying to build and not those in positions of power.

I believe the amount of troops to use was never in question (no general goes to battle with too few troops, troops are something you can never get more of in time for the battle). What was in question was the battle plan. Did we want to go into Iraq with A PISRR movement or something else? If Saddam had used WMD’s there would have been fewer people to handle in Baghdad, so maybe the thought that they would receive us as liberators doesn’t seem so far fetch, as it does to me now. Also, because the outcome of a war cannot be known, there is an element of chance in any battle plan, so theoretically any plan could work. It may be safe to say we can learn from any battle but it is hard to judge.

Besides the element of chance, planning for a war represents an Observation, Orientation, Decision making and Acting (OODA) movement, also developed by Col. Boyd. If your enemy knows you well enough, they can enter into your orientation and control your decision-making. As an example, if they know you will be using a high maneuver orientation, such as a Blitzkrieg, they will know the importance of information. They will know the extreme measures needed to gain information and the extreme pressure that will develop to use those extreme measures. Not only that, but the enemy will also understand how public outcry will develop in the case of possible indiscretions of interrogators. I believe one such enemy entered our planning of the Iraq war. That enemy was Iran and they entered our loop through ex-Iraqi patriots beholden to the ways of Iran.

In many ways, the war in Iraq is a continuation of the war between Persians and Arabs. I don’t know a lot about their struggle, I think it has to do about Islam. Persians think anyone can become a prophet and the Arabs say no they can’t. Shia’s are the dividing line. Iran is using the Shia as pawns in their war with the Arabs. It would be like playing a game of Chess and your opponent uses not only their pawns but yours as well. If I am not mistaken the Persians invented chess. Anyway, the Iranians are still in our loop. What ever we do against Iran, because Iran is still in our decision making loop, Iran already knows the outcome.

[SSG Rock]

The idea that conventional forces are a detriment in an UW environment is one that I simply reject. With our troops engaged in conducting a counter insurgency and nation building (or rebuilding) the task is beyond the ability of SF/SOF to handle alone. Obviously there is a premium on our SF forces due to their expertise in fighting a counter insurgency, the more our conventional forces can pick up for them the better.

PISRR is a challenge for us due to the cultural and religious differences. Having spent time in the region myself, I can tell you that they simply do not hold the same values as we do. You might as well be talking to an alien from the far side of the universe. The cultural, political and religious gaps are that wide. I'm not sure how effective we can be in trying to convince the Iraqis to see things our way, to set up their government they way we think it should operate. Perhaps if we spent more time in trying to find out how they want to set it up we will get there faster with a better chance of it sticking, standing the test of time. With the insurgents ability to fight both above and below our threshold of conventional capability we would be better served by admitting that America's political system culture, values and military might are not the answer to winning the political and ieological dimension of this particular counterinsurgency. And there is no reason we should think we can win an ideological struggle over the future of Islam or the Arab world. But, if we recognize that by contrast, our Muslim and Arab allies may well be able to and work with them and not against them we may win the struggle or better stated, assist our allies in winning. Hopefully it has sunk in to our national civilian leadership that our foreign policy can have a major and often unforseen, negative impact in aiding counterinsurgency and counter terrorism. But, Iraq demonstrates that local, tribal, ethnic and religious issues have to be fought out by our allies. The U.S. can help, but we cannot win or dominate the battle for hearts and minds. Only our regional allies with the right relgion, culture and most importanly legitimacy can cope with the increasing ability of ideologically motivated enemies, to locate the fault lines that can divide us from the populace by creating increased ethnic and political differences. We are getting there, I think this is the strategy we have finally adopted after stumbling around like a bull in a china shop. I'm not sure what this has to do with the SF/conventional issue, perhaps that our conventional forces are now properly focused on training, advising and providing a secure environment for nation building, allowing SF to do what they do best conducting COIN Ops.

[NDD]

Have you guys read Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife?

[Bill Moore]

It is simply a fantasy to believe that small SF units would have been able to stabilize Iraqi’s urban areas. A small footprint only consisting of SF would have resulted in the insurgents simply elevating the conflict to a war of movement in a matter of weeks. Even now the insurgents are able to mass into elements of greater than a 100 fighters when conventional forces are not present to suppress this. Unfortunately we don’t have “enough” conventional forces present to suppress this type of activity throughout Iraq.

SF ODAs would have quickly been overwhelmed by the irregular enemy threat shortly after the conventional Iraq Army collapsed. This wasn’t Afghanistan; SF for the most part didn’t have a liberation element to work with. The only locals they could work through, by and with for the most part were the Kurds. The Kurds are a destabilizing element in several parts of Iraq, so the bottom line is that option was not viable. The only viable security force as we transitioned into phase IV was U.S. conventional forces, and we obviously needed more, not less. It is nice to think we could have won over the Iraqi people with small elements and carrots, but it is also simply fantasy.

All that said, I must agree with my brothers regarding the dismal performance of “some” of our conventional forces whose actions definitely set back our ability to stabilize certain regions by months if not longer. The lessons on how to conduct business in an insurgency type environment have been out there for several years, and while not easy, they definitely are not rocket science. As I stated previously, some units are doing fantastic and others are challenged. For the most part it comes down to leadership. I still don’t understand why our educated officer corps in many cases can’t grasp (or implement) the simple concepts of counterinsurgency, so maybe the answer is for the conventional forces to be much more selective on who they promote to lead our soldiers?

[SSG Rock]

Have you guys read Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife?

I just heard about that today as a matter of fact. Plan on checking it out.

Bill, you are on target with your assessment in my opinion. Conventional forces have kind of bumped around in the night for awhile. Seems to me the Marines did a pretty good job addressing this earlier than the Army did. But, thankfully, I beleive we are seeing progress. Also, I think the our leadership development for conventional forces officers should include a healthy dose of counter insurgency. Maybe thats being addressed in the schoolhouses now, I'm not sure. But there is plenty of information out there in the various lessons learned websites. Also, BCKS is up and running and is a great consolidated collection of lessons learned etc. If you have an AKO account you can access BCKS.

[Jedburgh]

Also, BCKS is up and running and is a great consolidated collection of lessons learned etc. If you have an AKO account you can access BCKS.

BCKS has dedicated sections for COIN, Stability Ops, CA - and OIF/OEF specific resources and discussion...

[NDD]

Rock,
While I disagree with many of his conclusions, the book addresses many of your questions. Be forewarned - it will probably frustrate you based on what I have read in this thread.

Mr. Moore makes good points. You actually have to have an indigenous force in order to lead one.

Troops will generally do what they are told and follow the examples they are given. The Brits used conventional forces in Malaya. I think the trick is getting them on the same page and following the program. I believe the Brits achieved this by requiring all the incoming leadership to attend the jungle training school, where I suspect UW topics were the order of the day.

Anyway, get the book - well worth the purchase price and very pertinent to the subject at hand.

For the record, I am not an Anglophile - I severed diplomatic relations with the English in 1776.

[SSG Rock]

I do plan on giving it a look. I'll google it up.

You've already read it huh? Have you commented on it anywhere? I'd be interested in your thoughts especially.

I did find this link, which is an update the author wrote as an addendum and to update some of the misconceptions in his original work. It seems that the author wrote the book before deployment to Iraq, and after having lived through the experiences he had previously written on found that he didn't get it all right. This is also a pretty good primer.

http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/567702.html

[NDD]

I do plan on giving it a look. I'll google it up.

You've already read it huh? Have you commented on it anywhere? I'd be interested in your thoughts especially.

I did find this link, which is an update the author wrote as an addendum and to update some of the misconceptions in his original work. It seems that the author wrote the book before deployment to Iraq, and after having lived through the experiences he had previously written on found that he didn't get it all right. This is also a pretty good primer.

http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/567702.html

Yes, that preface is in the edition I have. His changes in the later preface closely mirror my criticisms of the book itself. All in all it is a good piece of work. The problem I believe is the subject matter - to do it justice would take volumes and that was obviously not the author's intent.

I would have rather seen a comparison between Malaya and El Salvador. But the book isn't bad at all.

What we are conducting in Iraq now is I believe FID - with obvious exceptions of course. FID is a very complex issue and I have never seen what I would consider to be the definitive work on it. If anyone has any suggestions, I would love to hear them.

[Larry Dunbar]

What we are conducting in Iraq now is I believe FID - with obvious exceptions of course. FID is a very complex issue and I have never seen what I would consider to be the definitive work on it. If anyone has any suggestions, I would love to hear them.

I know I shouldn't say anything, but isn't that (FID) like re-orienting an indigenous force that doesn't exist (Saddam's old army and government). Don't you really need a host country first?

[Bill Moore]

What we're doing is FID like, but it isn't FID, because Iraq as a nation doesn't exist yet. We're doing a regime change, and we don't have a lot of doctrine on that, so we falling back on FID principles, perhaps incorrectly.

[jcustis]

FID meaning???

[Bill Moore]

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (One government assisted another with its internal security, so does this apply in a Stateless condition? I think this is much more than a play on words, but the essence of our troubles is we still haven't even properly defined it, nor understand the nature of the type of fight we're in).

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN

[SWJED]

Small blurb in the Washington Pulse section of June's National Defense magazine - Special Operators No Longer Travel Light.

Special operations forces are not what they used to be. Case in point is the growing use of heavy armored vehicles by SOF units, relates John G. Grimes, the Defense Department’s chief information officer. The rapid spread of concealed roadside bombs and remotely detonated explosives as weapons of choice against U.S. forces means SOF troops can no longer deploy with just their suitcases, Grimes says. Now, they want Bradley and Stryker armored personnel carriers. “We are shocked at how the SOF community is looking for these hardened vehicles. Before they just would go out there and integrate with society. The whole structure is changing.”

[NDD]

What we're doing is FID like, but it isn't FID, because Iraq as a nation doesn't exist yet. We're doing a regime change, and we don't have a lot of doctrine on that, so we falling back on FID principles, perhaps incorrectly.

Mmm, I agree that it is nascent (hopefully not still born) but I disagree. I believe it is indeed FID. W are attempting to defend the internals, such as they are. What I don't think we are succeeding as well at is the other objective of FID - the "selfish" one.