Lessons Not Learned
On May 12, 2009, USIP held a conference: The U.S. Occupation of Iraq: What Lessons Should be Learned?
The lead speakers were James Dobbins (Rand) and Stuart Bowen (SIGIR). Also present (and valuable contributors) were Dr. Gordon Rudd, Keith Crane (Rand), and Paul Hughes (USIP).
Summary:
Mr. Dobbins introduced a new Rand study on the history of the CPA: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
Mr. Bowen discussed SIGIR's publication: Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
Both brought interesting observations of what went wrong and why in Iraq reconstruction. One of the more interesting comments by Mr. Bowen, in response to a question about State's new Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, was that it was "still borne." He went on to describe the weaknesses in its creation, authority and structure.
If Bowen is correct, no one should hold their breathe waiting for S/CRS to come on line. His recommendation was that Reconstruction won;t get serious and effective until an Office of Reconstruction is set up outside State and DoD. (Should we hold our breathe?)
Dr. Rudd really brought an interesting perspective. He pointed out that the US's strongest experience was in "liberation" (such as in Italy, France, etc.), and that, perhaps, a focus on that model might have been more appropriate (how to support and reinforce a civilian government). His suggestion that we study those "liberations" for lessons was a unique contribution,
While reinforcing that the military does not want the role of reconstructor, he questioned why, in Iraq and Afghanistan's civilian surges, the US government has not approached actual civilian associations like the associations of civilian city and county managers. Instead, the "civilians" are just foreign service officers and military assignees. Where are the real civilian experts?
I was at an American Planning Association (APA) Conference in Minneapolis last month, and asked why they had not been engaged in the reconstruction effort. They indicated that, although they have a strong presence in Washington, they had no contacts to DoD, State or USAID--- the largest professional association for civilian planning and management couldn't break into the loop.
It's always interesting to watch civilians in these audiences groan as the foibles of CPA and Hard Lessons are explained---as if the high-level mistakes are so obvious and frustrating---but, at some point, it starts to get old. Like when, after all these years, nobody has any serious solutions in progress.
How do we get serious about civilian reconstruction?
Steve
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