1-3 are bang-on.

1. The mass of the civilian population of Iraq and Afghanistan outmasses the opposing forces, and whomever can add the mass of the population to their side outmasses the opposition.
2. America does not have enough serving native/trained speakers of Arabic, Dari, and Pashto who have professional credentials in politics, planning, agriculture, medicine, infrastructure and who understand the cultural context of the problems and solutions intertwined in the conflict.
3. GoI and GoA have native speakers of Arabic, Dari, and Pashto who have professional credentials in politics, planning, agriculture, medicine, infrastructure and who understand the cultural context of the problems and solutions intertwined within the conflict.

The strength is in learning to work with GoA so that they can do their part. Why, for example, isn't an appropriate Afghan the intermediary?

Are the wrong voices being heard? Or the right voices silenced? Or, as likely, does the American Bureaucracy move so fast and busy that it forgets who its audience should be, or bewilders the hell out of them.

Problem I have is that when we start throwing billions everywhere without focus or metrics, we may be muddying up the water hole too much---induced corruption, bureaucratic confusion, collateral damage, etc...

So how to get the Afghan voice to the surface????

Steve