Lessons Not Learned

[Steve the Planner]

On May 12, 2009, USIP held a conference: The U.S. Occupation of Iraq: What Lessons Should be Learned?

The lead speakers were James Dobbins (Rand) and Stuart Bowen (SIGIR). Also present (and valuable contributors) were Dr. Gordon Rudd, Keith Crane (Rand), and Paul Hughes (USIP).

Summary:

Mr. Dobbins introduced a new Rand study on the history of the CPA: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Mr. Bowen discussed SIGIR's publication: Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.

Both brought interesting observations of what went wrong and why in Iraq reconstruction. One of the more interesting comments by Mr. Bowen, in response to a question about State's new Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, was that it was "still borne." He went on to describe the weaknesses in its creation, authority and structure.

If Bowen is correct, no one should hold their breathe waiting for S/CRS to come on line. His recommendation was that Reconstruction won;t get serious and effective until an Office of Reconstruction is set up outside State and DoD. (Should we hold our breathe?)

Dr. Rudd really brought an interesting perspective. He pointed out that the US's strongest experience was in "liberation" (such as in Italy, France, etc.), and that, perhaps, a focus on that model might have been more appropriate (how to support and reinforce a civilian government). His suggestion that we study those "liberations" for lessons was a unique contribution,

While reinforcing that the military does not want the role of reconstructor, he questioned why, in Iraq and Afghanistan's civilian surges, the US government has not approached actual civilian associations like the associations of civilian city and county managers. Instead, the "civilians" are just foreign service officers and military assignees. Where are the real civilian experts?

I was at an American Planning Association (APA) Conference in Minneapolis last month, and asked why they had not been engaged in the reconstruction effort. They indicated that, although they have a strong presence in Washington, they had no contacts to DoD, State or USAID--- the largest professional association for civilian planning and management couldn't break into the loop.

It's always interesting to watch civilians in these audiences groan as the foibles of CPA and Hard Lessons are explained---as if the high-level mistakes are so obvious and frustrating---but, at some point, it starts to get old. Like when, after all these years, nobody has any serious solutions in progress.

How do we get serious about civilian reconstruction?

Steve

[Benjamin Walthrop]

Kaplan's Department of Everything Else. I agree in principle of the need for an "Office of Reconstruction" (don't like the name but that's just a quibble) IF (and that's a very big if) we as a nation see the need for these activities going forward. The expertise should be drawn from the civil governance and planning expertise that exists around the country (an example being the APA). Where I diverge from Mr. Bowen's narrative is that I believe this organization can and should be stood up under the State Department.

[Ken White]

WORKED. Until Clinton and Maddie dismantled it.

So did USIA -- also dismantled.

[MikeF]

WORKED. Until Clinton and Maddie dismantled it.

So did USIA -- also dismantled.

The decision to move USIA into the State Department makes me want to start doing drugs-specifically LSD. Then, maybe I can understand that rationale.

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

was Jesse Helms' doing. He insisted on dismantling it. USAID is more complex. From a major organization with its own experts and professionals it gradually became a contracting organization providing funds to NGOs for projects. This began in the Reagan years and escalated to the present.

Cheers

JohnT

[reed11b]

was Jesse Helms' doing. He insisted on dismantling it. USAID is more complex. From a major organization with its own experts and professionals it gradually became a contracting organization providing funds to NGOs for projects. This began in the Reagan years and escalated to the present.

Cheers

JohnT

Ahhh, yet another "success" for privatization!
Reed

[Steve the Planner]

I believe it was Paul Hughes (USIP) who suggested that it stay in State but with the caveat that State, in order to prepare to engage in the modern environment for which contingency ops may be more typical than not, will have to be completely restructured from top to bottom to do it.

As somebody just back from the 2007/2008 civilian surge in Iraq and with Afghanistan on the horizon, it seems like these kinds of ideas (rebuild State and or USAID), are possibly good ideas, but, by the time they could happen, would be ready to deal with a problem that may already be in the rear view mirror.

I just don't get comfort from the idea that the US public is going to let this type and tempo of activity/spending/risks continue for too long. So, where is the urgency to streamline some actions that could happen within a real-time schedule?

Steve

[Ken White]

an existential war and Iraq is not that. Be happy Iraq is getting greater realtive priority than did Viet Nam -- things could be worse...

Still it is annoying that a little bit off focused effort could be easily achieved and pay good dividends. Not likely to happen, Congress likes to play silly games about (1) party superiority and (2) reelection -- the needs of the nation come in a distant fourth after their State or District. .

The public -- the majority of it -- is not the problem; a few in the public, the media and Congress can be problematical but I suspect the new Prez has got at least two years free credit.

[BayonetBrant]

Dr. Rudd really brought an interesting perspective. He pointed out that the US's strongest experience was in "liberation" (such as in Italy, France, etc.), and that, perhaps, a focus on that model might have been more appropriate (how to support and reinforce a civilian government). His suggestion that we study those "liberations" for lessons was a unique contribution,

While our strongest recent experiences were in "liberations" I would argue that from 1776-1890s we did a whole LOT of nation-building... namely, ours. It was the military that mapped, garrisoned, cleared, bridged, and secured the open frontier. To say that "we don't do nation-building" is to ignore the history of the US. To say that "we don't do nation-REbuilding" is somewhat accurate.

However, I'd argue that Iraq/Afghanistan is a hybrid of the two. We are rebuilding some infrastructure, but we are also building many new institutions for the first time. That is a significant challenge, and one that everyone seems to be running from because they seem to know it's all going to go wrong and don't want to be stuck holding the bag.

[Steve the Planner]

Ken's point. A little bit of focused effort could be easily achieved and pay good dividends. Nothing is ever perfect, but if you miss a few big ones, or the cumulative effect of a lot of little ones....well, there you go.

I don't think Dr. Rudd was arguing that Iraq was a straight up liberation game, but that were lessons to be learned from that.

In the planning/public administration profession, the little bible is a book called "Implementation." (Authors: Pressman and Wildavsky). It explains their efforts to rebuild Watts after the LA Riots. Full faith and credit of the US Gov (Economic Development Agency, ie Great Society), and buy in from State and local. They explain the unsuccessful fiasco by outlining theories as valid today as then---interagency, for example. On the complexity of joint action and the compounding probabilities of failure, they not that if there are 100 yes/no points and 99% probability of success (a yes) at each point, the cumulative 1% risk is 100%: failure is assured. The book is chock full of the lessons learned then, and forgotten today.

In Iraq, we had a post-Ottoman cultural and governmental structure which had been subject to several major, but half-hearted revisions, reforms over the Two Arifs and Baathist periods. But, underneath it all, it stayed the same---always defaulting to what it knew. Not that different from the US Gov---change the parties but the "system" remains the same.

There, we came with little understanding or appreciation of the system, and set about building a new one (that didn't go all that well, and probably exceeded our time and investment horizon). Another strategy, built around "liberation" techniques, would have been to get the old system up and running, and work to redirect it and transition it to something else. Maybe Turkey was a decent model of a post-Ottoman society that was more compatible with US interests, whereas a half-implemented New England style "democracy" was not.

At the USIP Conference, there was a report where a professor used Iraq to test the theory of whether structure of government is essential to democratic outcomes, ie, whether we had to replace the GoI structure to change the outcomes. His conclusion was, I believe, that it made no difference. Personally, I think he used the wrong data set---studying the Baghdad-centric national government of pre and post TAL instead of using a more fine grained model of government that accounted for services distributed down to the people (local, provincial, and national)--- but, I don't disagree with the conclusion.

But, in my opinion, a successful Iraq, in the end, is going to be based on how it delivers services and prosperity to people, and not on the yardsticks of outsiders. Hopefully, they will devise a basically functioning structure, as we arguably have, and continue to fix/improve, over several centuries of trial and error.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Spent Friday night at Clyde's in Tysons Corner with my Iraq Braintrust.

Between drinks, we discussed the recent WSJ article: Learning a Hard History Lesson in 'Talibanistan' (May 14, 2009) , a sad tale about the external impacts of constructing a new base in Karezgay (Zabul Province), but, in the process, destroying the underground canals (karez) on which area farming depends.

"The karez "are the linchpin of their entire civilization here," says Capt. Paul Tanghe, who advises the Afghan National Army battalion in Karezgay."

In the recent USIP Conference on Hard Lessons, they talked about the billions in mis-directed reconstruction spending---on schools, infrastructure, etc..., but there was not a one of these folks who had solutions. Nor, because their focus is on higher-level programs rather than field-based process, did they really get it.

All it took was what planners & public admin folks routinely do: a scoping process. Followed by a simple site-specific planning/engineering process.

I'm very familiar with the capabilities of a D9 Dozer, and what happens when somebody says "build me a base, fast." But there must be a way to malke small improvements that can make a big difference. (I hope?)

Without some kind of mid-level planning structure, we are always just "doing stuff" like a school here and a school there---pretty soon you built 2800 of them (and spent billions of US taxpayer money doing it), but you don't have a school system, or a well-understood process of how these schools are supposed to be financed, staffed, and maintained into the future.

Lessons to learn.

Steve

[Jedburgh]

....I'm very familiar with the capabilities of a D9 Dozer, and what happens when somebody says "build me a base, fast." But there must be a way to malke small improvements that can make a big difference. (I hope?)....

Here's a piece written three years ago; Analysis of the Karezes at the Gardez FOB. See page 4 for the discussion of small improvements, pages 6-8 for photos of the Karez, and pages 9-12 for diagrams and costs from a previous Karez improvement project.

[Steve the Planner]

Jedburgh:

Shades of Iraq. Every time I found a problem in Iraq in 2008, I could find a report that laid out a simple solution, that often involved local practice (let the locals clear it out).

Usually, the answer was ignored in favor of a USACE project that had been in progess somewhere for the last several years.

The more things change...

Steve