...or something approximating it, to allow us to be both faster at the intel collection cycle, and more precise once we go kinetic.
What does the Law of War say about this, considering we'd be pitted against AQ in the process?
...or something approximating it, to allow us to be both faster at the intel collection cycle, and more precise once we go kinetic.
What does the Law of War say about this, considering we'd be pitted against AQ in the process?
as exemplified here - I presume.
Been ruminating about that topic (the pseudo-irregular combatant vs the irregular combatant) myself. A bit complicated, I fear, since the theory and practice as to the irregular combatant has not been well explored. Add "pseudo" to that and you are on the cutting edge.
Since there are quite a few historical examples out there, discussion of hypotheticals based on them should not be an OpSec issue.
Basic Wiki stuff is here.
You come up with some interesting questions. The one about sheep-counting kept my pool team occupied for a while.
Until 5minutes ago, I never knew what Pseudo Operations were but I’ve been in favor of the concept since 9/12/01. Thanks for the education; I especially enjoyed the story about Srgt Herman Hanneken.
US and in particular, most in the US Congress, think about the idea when it comes out that we have done that. It will come out, it always does...
I don't think the law has nearly as much bearing on the inadvisability of that on any significant scale as the factor I cited. Nor do I think a broad discussion of the techniques and effort on an open board is particularly wise.
Pseudo or "Counter-gang" operations have been part of the majority of the UK COIN ops in the 20th century.
The problem is that Counter-gang operations are not just one type of op. They are essentially HUMINT, with a kinetic end-state, but when and where has to be judged very carefully.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Not exactly Kitson's pseudo-gangs, but why haven't we begun an indigenous force consisting of defected/captured former insurgents willing to switch sides? Seems to have a successful track record in the past.
The Awakening/SoI movement was something along these lines, but most SoI's weren't former insurgents.
Is there a legal prohibition in the past years that keeps this from happening?
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