Plan,Organize and Train for SFA

[Rob Thornton]

Given one of the question posed on the AAB thread by a SWJ Council member (JKM) I thought it might not be a bad idea to post a document I have been sending out to units inquiring how they should plan, organize, train and to their ability educate when preparing to support the development of FSF (Foreign Security Forces).

This is rough document and I apologize for any grammatical or technical issues. I've gotten good feedback from units and others on it though. What we wanted to do is show how those planning tools we already use can be adapted to support SFA. This is a take on analytical planning methods such as the MDMP (Military Decision Making Process).

There is a section on how to organize based on conditions and a section on how to look at your resources within your unit and identify those who might better serve as advisors than others, there is a section training, and there is a smaller section on education.

There are now some good AARs floating around on those units who have been successful in these mission and if possible I'd recommend you get your hands on them - most however are in .ppt format and as such may lack the context that goes with briefing them. I welcome any feedback, and where possible we will roll it into the making of the guide I described on the Fundamentals of SFA thread in the "Working with Indigenous Forces" category here on the SWJ Discussion Board.

As with all things if its useful use it, if not scrap it - or help inform what might be changed.

Best Regards, Rob

[abngriz95]

Rob,

I read your document on how to Plan, Organize and Train for SFA, but I think you made a critical assumption that the BCT staff would only be conducting the SFA Mission and not full spectrum operations to include COIN operations.

Your suggested staff organization and the development of external integration cells might impede the BCT's ability to conduct FSO. I would submit that the SFA BCT needs to maintain its combat force capability and continue to generate target sets. The continued targeting process may be used to generate confidence targets for the FSF or police forces by going after low-hanging fruit. Meanwhile, the BCT and SOF elements would retain the capability to conduct unilateral missions against HVTs. I am using the current state of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for my premise of unilateral missions.

I enjoyed the article because it gives BCTs augmented for SFA a point of departure and I thank you for taking the time to write the article.

MAJ Jason D. Adams

[William F. Owen]

Rob mate,

As someone who is somewhat pre-occupied with force generation and force development issues the aspect of this paper that strike me between the eyes is, that it seems to view SFA as some type of distinct military activity, and not merely the conduct of normal military activity.

Now this is how it appears to me. I may be wrong, but surely SFA should be a mere subset of the all the fundamental force generation and force development activities for the US Army?

I understand the need to be sensitive to cultural impedimenta, but the British Empire went around the world training and raising some pretty good armies all based on how the British Army, was trained, equipped and organised. To my mind, the British saw little or no difference between training and raising local forces and their own. The Romans took a similar view.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi guys ,
Good comments. Again this is one of those things where conditions and objectives drive the requirements. This document was done up with the conditions in mind that unit was supporting the development of a FSF was the primary mission, and where constraints would impede their ability to do things unilaterally (and might even detract from the primary mission). Given the range of conditions a unit might support the development of a FSF (which change both by geography and over time) a unit needs to account for that.

Will said:

that it seems to view SFA as some type of distinct military activity, and not merely the conduct of normal military activity.

Now this is how it appears to me. I may be wrong, but surely SFA should be a mere subset of the all the fundamental force generation and force development activities for the US Army?

this s a good observation in that it really is about force generation, but it is about the force generation of someone else's (the FSF's) capability and capacity. In many cases the same types of things we do to generate our own forces applies as every security force does three fundamental things - they generate, they employ and they sustain - although the degree or effectiveness to which they do them may differ. There are some distinctions though which gets into the purposes to which we generate, employ and sustain security forces (consider military vs. police or other security forces), and there are some conditions of the specific environment which apply. Perhaps the biggest thing is the idea that you are not generating forces to achieve your ends, but supporting the generation, employment and sustainment of someone else's forces to an end which may not completely synch with yours. It may sound like a minor distinction, but it is a mind set shift.

I think its worth considering the purposes to which the British and Romans supported the development of FSF. Was it with the intent that they would ultimately be mostly self sustaining and might be employed outside of their purview and to an end which they could not directly control, or were they developed to protect their direct interests, with the necessary controls and oversight built into the program? I think you raise a great point, and that the differences may have both a cultural distinction and a political one. Training indigenous armies to largely mirror your own is probably useful if you plan on controlling them and making use of them in other fights, but how effective is it if your objective is to make them more effective in their own environment?

It is probably also worth exploring this question with respect to other security forces since we've found ourselves responsible for border forces, national police forces, regular police forces and one or two others - is their a danger modeling FSF development on yourself if your functions are distinct, either right now, or ultimately. There are no standard answers for the most part, conditions cause us to consider what is right at them moment, but we should have an idea of how these forces are intended to be employed as we support their development and as we seek to change the conditions. While conditions for example may call for a police force that is more paramilitary in for the moment based on the enemy, when the conditions change will that police force remain more paramilitary, or will it be able to adapt to a role more in keeping with regular policing? These are some of the questions that leaders supporting the development of FSF are faced with.

abngriz95, good comments (and I'd like to emphasize them because they are important) - I guess I'd say its what you noted at the bottom, its a point of departure, and that is really how I hope planners and leaders will see it. Like anything else, we cannot and should not take templates and place them over our own unique conditions - we have to do the hard work of mission analysis that involves thinking hard about the range of possibilities, the nature of how the conditions will change requirements and then we have plan, organize and train accordingly. I see too many folks looking for the way, vs. a way which can be adapted, or simply used to stimulate thought.

From my own experience I've noted when unit leaders missed critical opportunities when conditions changed either because they were not given the authority to reorganize and change their approach when they thought it a good idea, or because they were constrained by their processes and were only looking for those specific things which they had identified, not those things which actually occurred.

JKM had asked the question on the AAB thread will units bring all their MTO&E with them, I would say when planners lay out the range of conditions they may encounter, and then leave some room for the unexpected, they will come up with a good answer for their commander. There may be constraints and directives, but as those appear a suitable alternative needs to be provided and available that supports both the primary mission set, and a range of other possibilities.

I would submit that the SFA BCT needs to maintain its combat force capability and continue to generate target sets. The continued targeting process may be used to generate confidence targets for the FSF or police forces by going after low-hanging fruit. Meanwhile, the BCT and SOF elements would retain the capability to conduct unilateral missions against HVTs.

I think our abilities to do targeting are a great thing and that where possible we should be integrated with the FSF who often have unique targeting capabilities of their own based on HUMINT, and supporting their development of their own processes which help them more effectively leverage those capabilities.

I am using the current state of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for my premise of unilateral missions.

Again, I'd like to emphasize that conditions are changing all the time, and the development of some FSF in a given are may be more advanced then others, and that the conditions in a given area may require more or less assistance in these areas than in others. This is where the assessment methodology is so critical (see the fundamentals thread in the working with indigenous forces area), conducting an organizational assessment and an environmental assessment allow you to look at the strengths and weaknesses of that FSF, and of that FSF in its operating environment. This allows you to consider how changing conditions may change the character of the FSF organization. These are not hard assessments, they are in fact the types of tools we use to see ourselves. These assessments should influence your planning and execution (the latter because the assessments should be continuous).

One thing I did not mention in the document was the impact of FSF supporting institutions, or lack thereof. Ultimately this is where the sustainability of FSF comes from. We've got allot of work to do in this area, and that may be the next thing we work on after the HB/Guide I made mention of at the beginning of the two threads.

There is also significant work to be done in the education, leader development and personnel practices that support the development of FSF. SFA I think is rooted in individual capability not, collective capability. The organization is just the framework on which to hang these capabilities and provide the enablers, support and sustainment functions which support the conditions and objectives. I don't think there is a one size fits all, and often trying to shoe horn a size 12 capability into a size 6 capability can result in making things worse - we have to be more flexible, and to do that will require more work inthe leader development and education areas. I was planning on starting up another thread on this on Monday - I think its the critical area for SFA, and may help us from looking for solutions based on how easy they are to program. The answer here is providing the "right sized" capability given the conditions and objectives.

Thanks for tasking the time to read and comment, we should never quit learning, or avoid it because it does give us our preferred answers.

Best Regards, Rob

[Bob's World]

Rob,

Did you send this to any SF units, or to USAJFKSWCS for comment? I only ask, because while this is "new" to much of the force, it really is bread and butter for the SF community.

For those that see SFA as a means to develop Host Nation surrogates to do fighting so that we don't have to use Americans for the same, really miss the essence of this program.

SFA will never achieve its full potential until it is enabled by two things:
1. Authorities to train with both HN military and civilian law enforcement security forces (the current JCET and SMEE authorities are terribly limited on both counts);

2. And a line of programmed, flexible, multi-year funding. (most current funding programs are rediculously rigid and are limited to a single budget year).

Once we have those two enablers (which I see as the main point of SFA, creating a sub-category of FID that allows us to seek these new authorities and funding more suited for the nature of our post-cold war engagement with the security forces of other nations).

Next is to understand the Primary Purpose of such Engagement. SFA in particular, and FID in general, are not intended to do what many mistakenly call the indirect approach, but is really merely developing capacity in others to go out and execute the direct approach. This is an ancillary benefit of such engagement.

The training conducted and the skills produced are all well and good, and can be conducted in many cases far more effectively by conventional forces than by SOF. But the primary purpose is to gain access to a country and its security forces, and to build enduring relationships through persistent engagement. This is where SF excels. Until the conventional force is given back to the GCCs, and also put into a true regional orientation like our SF forces are, we will never be able to accomplish the primary purpose with them.

Best case for employment would be to send out an SF ODA, aumented by a company or battalion of conventional forces (tailored to the mission at hand) to conduct SFA. The SF commander would remain focused on the strategic mission, the big picture; while the conventional commander would focus on the tactical mission at hand.

This will require a major paradigm shift within the conventional force; but to be honest, it is this kind of paradigm shift that makes up the most important changes that the conventional force must adapt to in order to become more capable at what is being called "Irregular Warfare." The focus for IW impact has been on major equipment items, and changes of training. But it is this same inability to grasp the essence of what IW is all about that goes to why conventional forces aren't particularly suited to execute SFA by themselves. They focus on the wrong thing.

An SF general and a Marine general got into a discussion about this on FID. The Marine general's position was that his men were fully qualified to go out into theater and conduct FID, even though they had no training or experience in FID itself (though were undeniably expert in the tasks that they were planning to go out and teach).

"Fine," says the SF general, "and I'll send my guys out to conduct training on how to fly helicopters."

"That's rediculous" retorts the Marine, "you have no training or experience in rotary-wing operations!"

"Exactly." replies the SF general


Point of this short (but true) exchange is this: SFA/FID aren't as easy as they look, and the most important skills and experience required aren't the ones being passed on.

[Boot]

An SF general and a Marine general got into a discussion about this on FID. The Marine general's position was that his men were fully qualified to go out into theater and conduct FID, even though they had no training or experience in FID itself (though were undeniably expert in the tasks that they were planning to go out and teach).

"Fine," says the SF general, "and I'll send my guys out to conduct training on how to fly helicopters."

"That's rediculous" retorts the Marine, "you have no training or experience in rotary-wing operations!"

"Exactly." replies the SF general

You know the more I get into this, the more I realize how much SF types don't understand how Marines are developed and trained.
I do know that a team of Marines has recently returned from SOUTHCOM AOR in which they were carrying out a true FID mission and weren't MARSOC.
SF doesn't have a patent on this. Am I saying that a basically trained Marine can execute at the level an ODA team can? No. Am I saying that it does takes experience and maturity, some specialized training to execute a FID mission. Yes.
One thing I have noticed is the SF types like to point to their way of doing things as the standard, one in which I don't necessarily disagree with, however to take the stance only ODA can do it, well is myopic at best. There are missions that do take detailed specialized training that are high end and really demand very highly trained people to do so.
What puzzles me is this constant, well lets put an ODA team in the lead, because that's what they do. Well I would submit that just because you are an SF soldier, it doesn't mean that you are an effective advisor.
As far as the GO illustration, the Marine is right, Marines have done this type of duty and are doing it as I type this. Are some better than others? Sure. Would it be beneficial to screen the members of the teams a little tighter and train them better, you bet, but its not like SF are the only force in this world he can do this. Using the helicopter example is poor at best, how do you get experience and training?
I will remind you that we did write the Small Wars Manual, and refer you to the NY Times article on the 2 young Marines in Afghanistan. Would they benefit from better training before going to Afghanistan, sure, but it is what it is.
Lastly why are we doing this? (GPF), because the SECDEF said so.


Boot

[reed11b]

Rob mate,


I understand the need to be sensitive to cultural impedimenta, but the British Empire went around the world training and raising some pretty good armies all based on how the British Army, was trained, equipped and organised. To my mind, the British saw little or no difference between training and raising local forces and their own. The Romans took a similar view.

Wilf,
Did the Brits or Romans raise forces to act independently or to supplement there own forces in a particular role? The weakness I see in US SFA is that we create "teeth" units that rely on American logistical, communication and fire support. We need to be able to create teams that can train to use indiginous resources or be prepared to shell out a lot more $$ in defense aid. I would opt for option one myself.
Reed11b

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Mike - please feel free to pass along anything useful, I hope we'll have something a little better by about the end of June in one complete thought.

Its interesting you bring up rapport and relationships, one thing we are trying to get across to unit commanders is that their advisors are are a primary means of influence and rapport building. I think trust comes from matching actions to narrative (doing what you say and being there when you are needed), and being able empathize or at least share and understand a perspective. It does not necessarily mean you have identical objectives, but that everyone should know where you basically stand and what your reactions will be.

On the issue of my take on the differences between FID and SFA - I'll give you my take on SFA in that it is the capability to conduct the fundamental development tasks of OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild, Advise) for the purpose of building sustainable capability and capacity in FSF. The conditions and objectives may characterize it as FID or to some other policy end - as conditions and objectives change, then the characterization may change.

Its worth considering that once a capability and capacity is built we may have little influence over how it is employed, so its a good idea to consider the developmental objectives in a broader sense then just a bilateral one.

SFA ends when that desired capability or capacity is achieved, but if new capabilities or capacities are desired or required then the tasks of OTERA are undertaken again. I don't see them as competing or contradictory, but as complimentary. It simply provides us a framework to group these FSF development activities to achieve a policy end.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

One thing worth including in the document may be that of relative combat power, but with a twist on development. In one of the case study interviews the BSB SPO had referred to the transition teams as IBUs i.e. "Itty Bitty Units". At the time I had only thought of it in the context of his logistical problem and a concept of support for the outlying small units he had to sustain.

Recently though it popped up in a different context, a CDR saw the advisor teams he inherited as a supply burden and did not see them as a tool of influence or as a means to support the development of the FSF. Basically what he saw was 11 guys who he had to be responsible for and who he did not fully understand how to employ.

This got me thinking about how might a unit CDR "sees" his advisor teams. We have concepts for who "fights" what and for what is battle tracked - they are built around echelons. BDEs fight/employ & track companies, BNs fight/employ & track platoons and companies fight/employ & track squads and sections and while I know digital tracking allows a different perspective, in terms of admin such as senior rating, readiness, QTBs, etc. we are still conditioned to think along the two levels down model.

While in terms of "combat power" or the ability to accomplish a tactical task like seize, clear, defend, an advisor team is something akin to a section or a squad, in terms of the adviosr team's potential to influence and develop a FSF it may be the most important unit in the BDE CDR's organization, and as such the selection criteria for his advisor teams based on individual capabilities may be the most important organizational decision the CDR makes. This requires the CDR have an understanding of the fundamentals of SFA, and at least wrt to the LOE that includes developing sustainable capability and capacity in the FSF, that mission success equates to that partner's ability to generate, employ and sustain.

I think that until CDRs understand that, the advisor teams will often still be seen and resourced as something they "have to support" vs. "the organization that can best facillitate mission accomplishment" wrt to supporting the development of the FSF. This is true regardless I think no matter if a BDE falls in on advisor teams, or if it is organic to the BN. This is not a question of who owns what, but of relative value based on understanding the requirements of the mission. Providing guidance and action that clearly elevates the importance of the advisor team when conducting this mission to at least the level of the rifle/tank company/troop will probably help the CDR get the most out of his advisor elements. I know that in some cases CDRs have come to this conclusion in mid tour, but understanding it during planning, training and organization could put the unit on a better operational footing from day 1 in country.

Best, Rob