Hey Reed, first I'd ask if you remember the "Never give up" sketch (attached)?
You made a great point with -. You can't stop with just combined Arms either, it might be DIV or Corps C2 processes, ministerial development, the establishment of a NCO or officer academy, the establishment of a CTC like capability, or any number of things that go on within a partner's defense establishment. This does not even include the other components of a partner's security sector which might have to be filled by DoD simply because the preferred USG or MNP is unavailable or unwilling.This is due to both the size of the mission and the nature of training required. Are the SF really good at teaching how to do combined arms missions, or are they good at primarily light infantry and commando ops?
Ultimately there is a question of capacity - how much Schlitz is in the cooler, and there is a question of providing the right capabilities given conditions and objectives - Bob's World mentioned outdated paradigms - I'd say that with respect to the range of possible conditions you must be able to call on capabilities throughout the total force. This means that sometimes GPF will be supporting and some times they will be the supported, and the same with SOF. Largely I'd say the issue of who supports who is irrelevant - the conditions and objectives should be the determining factor in that decision. However, unless the capability is available, you are stuck with going with what you have - even if it is inadequate in capability and capacity. That is not an answer we should be satisfied with.
While Bob is right there is more to it than just OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise), I also think that it is a statement relative to the operating environment, and as such trying to source SFA as a force employment concept from any one source will leave operational commanders coming up short. As a result we may put the policy objective at risk. All I have to go off of is what I read, hear and can consider, but I’d say that we’re not close to finished in Iraq as I just saw a thread on starting up an Iraqi Marine Corps, I saw in the news we’re selling them ARHs, significant FW capability and Armor, they live in a rough neighborhood and still face a significant internal threat. It would appear we are just getting started in Afghanistan, and even when we turn the corner there, supporting the development of their security forces will feel like an enduring mission, there are plenty of SFA related activities globally, with more on the horizon.
I think capacity of any variety is going to be in short supply for a long time – as such it’s a total force ball game – we can either acknowledge it and prepare for it, or we can stick our heads in the sand and keep doing like we have – can anybody tell me what the total number of augmentees currently in theater is – and exactly what they are doing (vs. what the tasking they were requested under?) My point with that question is we are compromising our effectiveness and our efficiencies and moreover we are putting the burden on operational commanders to disassemble one capability and reassemble another – and the evidence is we’ve been doing it for awhile, so why can’t we send them what they need?
Best, Rob
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