MIke - I think you are pretty much on the money. I tried to tackle this in the thread on planning, training and organizing for SFA, and in a supporting way on the thread on the fundamentals of SFA.
In the Plan/Train/Org doc I tried to illustrate how the five block model can be used by commanders and leaders to evaluate the talent and aptitudes of their folks to organize. This gets to your point about figuring out who is more cut out for sustained and direct interaction with the FSF, and who you trust to be your agent of influence in supporting the FSF.
Jake was spot on with his medic anecdote (I had a similar anecdote on our Nat'l Guard E-4 medic who performed at multiple levels to include what I'd seen in Medical Plat PSGs and PLs - for those interested see the SFA Case Study). This also gets back to something Neil, Dave Kilcullen and others have been saying about COIN- don't constrain yourself solely to rank, position or pedigree, but instead look to talent and ability. Use the tools available to see yourself in light of the requirements of the mission. To do so we have to get smart on the mission, and that was why I referenced the fundamentals. You have to understand some of this in order to effectively plan, train and organize.
You are right about there being a unique set of dynamics to leading or working within a small team of advisors that require certain skills, attributes, willingness to not be "the man", willingness to facilitate competing opinions, and other unique dynamics . I'd say allot of this has been chronicled in a number of places, and leveraging the JFK SWC would be a huge benefit to understanding how we might better incorporate this into our total force.
One of the things we have to get over is the fear of adjusting DOTMLPF to reflect what is actually happening in the operational environment. If we could better capture some of what is going on, we might find that it is in fact in line with our desired objectives of furthering institutional adaptability, and institutionalizing it in ways that make it sustainable.
It is kind of a paradox where our narrative on this objective seems confined to keeping it constrained to something we can manage under familiar terms. It seems kind of like we are willing to acknowledge that we know where we need to be, but are very uncomfortable with the risk in getting there. However, I'd say the cat is out of the bag, and we've correctly identified and sold this as the way forward, so civilian leadership will accept nothing less. Time will tell.
Best, Rob
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
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