SFA capability is rooted in Individual Talent (part 1)

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Reed, first I'd ask if you remember the "Never give up" sketch (attached)?

You made a great point with -

This is due to both the size of the mission and the nature of training required. Are the SF really good at teaching how to do combined arms missions, or are they good at primarily light infantry and commando ops?

. You can't stop with just combined Arms either, it might be DIV or Corps C2 processes, ministerial development, the establishment of a NCO or officer academy, the establishment of a CTC like capability, or any number of things that go on within a partner's defense establishment. This does not even include the other components of a partner's security sector which might have to be filled by DoD simply because the preferred USG or MNP is unavailable or unwilling.

Ultimately there is a question of capacity - how much Schlitz is in the cooler, and there is a question of providing the right capabilities given conditions and objectives - Bob's World mentioned outdated paradigms - I'd say that with respect to the range of possible conditions you must be able to call on capabilities throughout the total force. This means that sometimes GPF will be supporting and some times they will be the supported, and the same with SOF. Largely I'd say the issue of who supports who is irrelevant - the conditions and objectives should be the determining factor in that decision. However, unless the capability is available, you are stuck with going with what you have - even if it is inadequate in capability and capacity. That is not an answer we should be satisfied with.

While Bob is right there is more to it than just OTERA (Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise), I also think that it is a statement relative to the operating environment, and as such trying to source SFA as a force employment concept from any one source will leave operational commanders coming up short. As a result we may put the policy objective at risk. All I have to go off of is what I read, hear and can consider, but I’d say that we’re not close to finished in Iraq as I just saw a thread on starting up an Iraqi Marine Corps, I saw in the news we’re selling them ARHs, significant FW capability and Armor, they live in a rough neighborhood and still face a significant internal threat. It would appear we are just getting started in Afghanistan, and even when we turn the corner there, supporting the development of their security forces will feel like an enduring mission, there are plenty of SFA related activities globally, with more on the horizon.

I think capacity of any variety is going to be in short supply for a long time – as such it’s a total force ball game – we can either acknowledge it and prepare for it, or we can stick our heads in the sand and keep doing like we have – can anybody tell me what the total number of augmentees currently in theater is – and exactly what they are doing (vs. what the tasking they were requested under?) My point with that question is we are compromising our effectiveness and our efficiencies and moreover we are putting the burden on operational commanders to disassemble one capability and reassemble another – and the evidence is we’ve been doing it for awhile, so why can’t we send them what they need?
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Marc -

For me, I define "talent" as an inborn, hardwired (aka genetic) propensity to find performing some action or operation more easily than other people.

I use the term "skill" to refer, regardless of any talent, to the ability of an individual to perform the actions and operations associated with that skill.

Now, these definitions have some implications that are both a) pretty obvious to anyone with two neurons to rub together, and b) anathema to the PC crowd, since they assume an innate, genetic difference between people.

I think this is an important observation and others have made this with respect to command. Interestingly there is a move afoot to see how some of this can be modeled. Could you for example take the 5 block model and make some qualifications about what education, experience and training constitute them? Could you then quantify this in a mathematical expression? Could you then use that to compare probability of success of one individual with a given combination over another dependent upon conditions and objectives?

It seems that until you can put these capabilities into a model and simulate it in a way which provides justification for making programmatic decisions, relevant anecdotal information by itself will not move the ball forward (much). *Note - this says allot about our bureaucratic culture that we are far more comfortable with a false reality of mean time between failure (MTBF) and probability of kill (PK) ratios (which are themselves based on observation and historical averages) then we are with trusting our senses and intuition (based on our own experiences) simply because we've found a way to mathematically express one and not the other. The equation of how you know a tank BN of X will destroy a tank BDE of Y does not match perfectly to the anecdote of sometimes you are the bug and sometimes you are the windshield.

Again, I'd refer anyone interested in the issue of how our perception of reality influences our judgment to Marc T's excellent website.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I think this is an important observation and others have made this with respect to command. Interestingly there is a move afoot to see how some of this can be modeled.

1. Could you for example take the 5 block model and make some qualifications about what education, experience and training constitute them?
2. Could you then quantify this in a mathematical expression?
3. Could you then use that to compare probability of success of one individual with a given combination over another dependent upon conditions and objectives?

I changed your questions to a numbered format just for ease, but the short (and totally infuriating) answer is "Yes" with a whole slew of caveats.

1. Some of what is listed in the 5 block model is definitely simple to convert to mathematical languages (hey, that's all math is... a collection of languages!). Where we start running in to problems with the conversion is where the "folk psychology" terms do not match biological reality. Let's look at the specific skills listed:



(sorry, my laptop with my graphics editing program is in the shop....)

Okay, I am going to assume that there are reasonably meaningful metrics available for MOS skills, so I won't really touch on them at all.

Experience is quite problematic since it is an outcome of a learning opportunity. In other words, a metric such as time in grade don't mean jack. Some of the best, as in they have some bearing on reality, measures of experience are available using things like a 360 degree evaluation schema.

I'm going to avoid Box 2, 'cause those are categories of skills. What you might think about doing, if you really wanted to follow down the metrics track, is to pull out exact skill sets, in terms of tasks etc. to the point where they can be measured in observable reality. For example, "Marksmanship" is useless as a skill unless it can be circumscribed pretty heavily (hey, I'm pretty good with a throwing knife at 30 feet, or a 303 at 50 yards, but I suck with a pistol!). The other thing about Box 2 is that you are conflating skill sets (actions and outcomes) with perceptual mindsets (especially that "Warrior" stuff).

Understanding Human Nature is unmeasurable. Actually, that's not quite true, but the two key terms are pretty general ("understanding" - in what sense? and "human nature", depends on your cultural / philosophical / ideological models...). Honestly, the best "testing" mechanism I have ever come across was to take a person, grab all their ID, cash, cards, etc. and drop them down in a city they didn't know with $5 for a long weekend (sort of an urban, solo survival trip).

Influencing really depends on a core ability which can loosely be called "empathy", but really refers to the ability to perceive another persons "buttons" and then manipulate them. Use some of the industry tests on sales ability as a metric here.

Negotiating. This is a very frustrating example of a naive folk construct. The concept of "negotiation": implies the existence of agreed upon logics and outcomes which are culturally defined, so I would split this into two skills - "reading" cultural logics and manipulating cultural logics.

Building Rapport. Simplest way to test this is similar to the comments on understanding human nature. The core technique that seems to work the best is "mirroring", i.e. feeding back what the person you are talking to is saying. If you want the folk wisdom version of it, "God gave us 2 ears and one mouth. Think about it!". Regardless, the skill set has been analyzed like crazy in Psychology and, also, by groups that use interogation (I'm sure Jedburgh has some great links...).

Working through an interpreter. Hmm, tricky, but it really comes down to two, seperate skill sets. The first is body language (reading and sending) and the second is building rapport.

Box 4 is, obviously, the key one. On the Teaching skill, I would say, having taught for too long , that the core "skill" is the ability to a) focus communications on the correct sensory channel / learnbing style for your student, and b) knwoing as much as you can about the topic while being extremely open to being wrong.

Coaching is somewaht different since there is an element of control in the matter (i.e. we are coaching you to work with US forces), while Advising, at least in my highly biased view, is actually about enabling your students to become what they can be. Another way of looking at it is that Teaching is training, Coaching is education, and Advising is enabling (skills, education and wisdom respectively).

Culture. Hell, drop em down in the environment with $5 and see how they do. That's the best test available for whether or not you can "understand" the local culture.

Language. There are a lot of metrics out for this, so i won't bother to comment except to note that there is a serious differences between language-for-use and formal language. For example, I can't speak German, but I get along fine in Germany .

It seems that until you can put these capabilities into a model and simulate it in a way which provides justification for making programmatic decisions, relevant anecdotal information by itself will not move the ball forward (much). *Note - this says allot about our bureaucratic culture...

Unfortunate, but true. I hate to say it, but it's a corollary of the scientization of society.

Again, I'd refer anyone interested in the issue of how our perception of reality influences our judgment to Marc T's excellent website.

Thanks for the plug, Rob !

[Ken White]

I think there's a skill set (and / or a talent... ) block missing; Five blocks are cool but I think the third one might be shown as a hopefully existing and embedded set of skills that may need slight -- and only slight, very slight -- remodeling to be move on to the fourth block and be effective as an advisor.

All Officers and NCOs are responsible for leading and training subordinates and use -- or should use -- the skills I placed in Block 3 below, translating those skills to an advisory rather than a command or leadership position will take some adjustment but that should be slight. No need to make it more difficult than it is...

Herewith is plan B:

[John T. Fishel]

when I have to grade finals?!!!!! Wish I'd seen this thread sooner.

Couple of comments:

A lot of wisdom form all you guys who contributed.

In the ideal world, we would not need to use GPF for SFA. but the world is not ideal and to top it off we have SF guys getting "huffy" about the amateurs and GPF guys thinking the SF are prima donnas. SFA really requires SOF/GPF integration - especially SF, CA, and to a slightly lesser extent, PSYOP skill sets. Detailing some of these SOF guys to SFA teams made up largely of GPF might serve us well.

A basic issue here is the institutional military attitude that we can train an officer or NCO to be an effective leader. There really is no institutional recognition that leadership is a talent - and a talent that an individual may have in some circumstances but not in others. IMO we can teach the skills necessary to good leadership and many individuals can take the talent they have and use those skills to enhance it but some leaders are naturally leaders and others are not. Some leaders have talent to lead small units but not GCC; others may be great at leading echelons above reality but only adequate at leading small units. Well SFA and advising are similar. Generally, a good advisor has empathy for other cultures and often that extends from one culture to the next. I recall an Army COL - the ARMA in Peru - who was by training a Vietnamese FAO. He had the empathy to be outstanding in a totally different culture, Peru. My own experience has seen some success as an advisor in Latin America but I would have had trouble adjusting to and being successful in the Haitian culture (based on the research we did there for a study of Operation Uphold Democracy).

My point is, then, Rob's - SFA is mostly the individual. The challenge that we, the USG, face is how to make the most of the individuals, organizations, etc. that we have and how to train and educate for the skills and understandings (the education v. the training component) that will bring out the talents of the individuals available to us. To pick up on Bob's theme, how do we adapt the principles of SF Assessment and Selection to the task at hand for GPF based SFA teams? One of those principles is that soldiers who are not cut out for SF are de-selected without hurting their careers in other branches. Thus, de-selection is an important element.

Enough rambling. This is an important thread and it really shoudl be read extensively in the military and outside.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

You do a beautiful job of explaining why the 'personal in personnel' as missing ingredient, dropped in a quest for efficiency, has not aided our effectiveness.

Everyone of equal back ground cannot do everything equally well. Those who can do most things well may excel in assisting one culture or performing one job but do surprisingly poorly in another...

[Bob's World]

No community has a corner on getting this right or wrong.

I have seared in my brain a meeting between an Egyptian Division Commander (a tremendous gentleman and war hero, who as a young company commander had led the assault across the Suez and employed his Sagger missile teams quite effectively against the Israeli defenders...). His Division had just recently been rated as the best in the Egyptian Army, and his was the first heavy unit to arrive in Saudi Arabia to form the Arab Coalition.

Sitting in front of his huge desk, in a huge and colorful Saudi Hag tent covered with Arabic motifs, carpets covering the sandy floor, incense burning, exotic music playing softly in the background, oceans of tea flowing. The conversation went on for a long time, as we meandered through the requisite pleasantries of family based small talk, all geared toward developing the most critical of elements: trust. I remember being amazed that this great man would have such a conversation with a little Captain like me, when certainly no American Division Commander would do the same. I also remember my boss sitting next to me, who had just arrived in country and I had just met a few days earlier growing visibly more impatient with each passing minute.

Abruptly, my boss interrupted the General and boldly proclaimed: "I'm Major ___ ________, US Army Special Forces, and I'm here to train your Division!"

You could have heard a pin drop. You certainly could see the mask drop over the General's face. "I see," he replied calmly.

Major _______ then pushed a page of tasks that he had worked up in his room by himself back at KKMC across the General's desk. "These are the tasks that I am prepared to train your Division on!"

"Very well, then I believe our business here is concluded." stated the General, as he had his men escort us back out into the blazing sunlight to our vehicle.

As we drove away, Major _______ at the wheel (he loved that little Toyota), a proud smirk pasted on his face. "Damn, I thought he would never shut up, but I took charge of the situation and got the job accomplished."

"Sir, I think you insulted the General..." "Ridiculous!" interjected Major_______. "When you've been around as long as I have, you'll understand that you need to take charge of these situations or you'll never get anything done."

"Yes sir." and I (showing rare wisdom) remained silent for the long ride back to KKMC.


A week later we returned and had a follow-on meeting with the General. It was short and perfunctory. He handed us back the Major's list and stated "these are the tasks that I would like you to train my men on. I will have each of my Brigade Commander's provide ____men beginning next week as you have suggested."

As we walked over to where we were setting up our own tents, the Major proclaimed proudly "I nailed it! He didn't change a single task; I predicted exactly what he needed."

"Sir, (forgetting my earlier wisdom) he's just being polite. He knows the coalition is important, and that he needs the support of the US. He believes you want to train him on these tasks, so if that is the price of achieving that support he will provide the men and submit to what you have suggested...”

"You don't get it, do you Captain Jones."

"No sir, I guess I don't."

[marct]

....

"You don't get it, do you Captain Jones."

"No sir, I guess I don't."

Oh... my! I do hope that the Major is now in some appropriate position... say, latrine officer in Bagram? That style of leadership is what has made the Holy Roman Empire what it is today. [/sarcasm]

[John T. Fishel]

Great story!

Marc, you would make a wonderful "torturer."

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

Hi Ken,

I think there's a skill set (and / or a talent... ) block missing; Five blocks are cool but I think the third one might be shown as a hopefully existing and embedded set of skills that may need slight -- and only slight, very slight -- remodeling to be move on to the fourth block and be effective as an advisor.

I think that may work better. I do agree that the block 3 material should already exist in officers and NCOs (Hades, it should be basic training for anyone in a democracy of any form, but that's another rant...). I suspect that a large part of the problem with the block 3 skills goes back to some of the way that Western cultures have parsed out knowledge into specialized segments, and then confused the culture specific knowledge those generate with universal general knowledge.

Let me just take this one "skill" set of "understanding human nature". In the West, we as a culture area, have avoided introspection and relegated it to increasingly marginalized and controllable sub-groups of "professionals" (philosophers, mystics, psychologists, anthropologists, etc.). As a result, most of our "technologies of mind" (yeah, I know, it's a Foucauldian phrase) are quite poor, say about 2000 years behind some of the more focused groups such as Buddhism.

In the West, we tend to "understand human nature" by assertion, rather than by personal experience. This means that a "professional" group will assert a worldview and then look for supporting evidence. This group also controls the definition of what is and is not "true", as well as setting up all of the testing mechanisms for defining a level of skill. Basically, the game is totally rigged against anyone who is outside of the group and, especially, against anyone who disagrees with that groups assertions about "reality". BW's story just hammers home that point in a way .

Now, being a via negativa type of a scientist, I tend to think that that system is bunk; a system designed to inflate the egos of people who cannot stand to deal with reality.

[marct]

Great story!

Marc, you would make a wonderful "torturer."

Thanks, John ! Back to "ontology" in the title for you.... !

[Tom Odom]

No community has a corner on getting this right or wrong.

I have seared in my brain a meeting between an Egyptian Division Commander (a tremendous gentleman and war hero, who as a young company commander had led the assault across the Suez and employed his Sagger missile teams quite effectively against the Israeli defenders...). His Division had just recently been rated as the best in the Egyptian Army, and his was the first heavy unit to arrive in Saudi Arabia to form the Arab Coalition.

Sitting in front of his huge desk, in a huge and colorful Saudi Hag tent covered with Arabic motifs, carpets covering the sandy floor, incense burning, exotic music playing softly in the background, oceans of tea flowing. The conversation went on for a long time, as we meandered through the requisite pleasantries of family based small talk, all geared toward developing the most critical of elements: trust. I remember being amazed that this great man would have such a conversation with a little Captain like me, when certainly no American Division Commander would do the same. I also remember my boss sitting next to me, who had just arrived in country and I had just met a few days earlier growing visibly more impatient with each passing minute.

Abruptly, my boss interrupted the General and boldly proclaimed: "I'm Major ___ ________, US Army Special Forces, and I'm here to train your Division!"

You could have heard a pin drop. You certainly could see the mask drop over the General's face. "I see," he replied calmly.

Major _______ then pushed a page of tasks that he had worked up in his room by himself back at KKMC across the General's desk. "These are the tasks that I am prepared to train your Division on!"

"Very well, then I believe our business here is concluded." stated the General, as he had his men escort us back out into the blazing sunlight to our vehicle.

As we drove away, Major _______ at the wheel (he loved that little Toyota), a proud smirk pasted on his face. "Damn, I thought he would never shut up, but I took charge of the situation and got the job accomplished."

"Sir, I think you insulted the General..." "Ridiculous!" interjected Major_______. "When you've been around as long as I have, you'll understand that you need to take charge of these situations or you'll never get anything done."

"Yes sir." and I (showing rare wisdom) remained silent for the long ride back to KKMC.


A week later we returned and had a follow-on meeting with the General. It was short and perfunctory. He handed us back the Major's list and stated "these are the tasks that I would like you to train my men on. I will have each of my Brigade Commander's provide ____men beginning next week as you have suggested."

As we walked over to where we were setting up our own tents, the Major proclaimed proudly "I nailed it! He didn't change a single task; I predicted exactly what he needed."

"Sir, (forgetting my earlier wisdom) he's just being polite. He knows the coalition is important, and that he needs the support of the US. He believes you want to train him on these tasks, so if that is the price of achieving that support he will provide the men and submit to what you have suggested...”

"You don't get it, do you Captain Jones."

"No sir, I guess I don't."

Bob,

Two SF Majors went home one after the other for very similar behavior in Rwanda. Basic cultural arrogance toward senior Rwandan officers for one and stupidity in front of a Rwandan-US formation for the other.

The ODB Sergeant Major gave me a group coin in appreciation. He was tired of being embarrassed.

The 2 ODAs left behind under their Captains performed wonderfully and were soon joined by the group XO as a temporary fill. Smooth sailing was the norm afterward.

And to show I am not picking on SF Majors for cultural ineptitude, a 48J fellow DATT got sent home from Goma for similar reasons about a year earlier.

Best

Tom

[Stan]

It's not a rank or MOS thing and never was.

Some folks just do better than others despite the best training available.

Would have to agree with Tom; cultural arrogance not cultural awareness. If it's so simple then why do we have so many failures?

I hated the people I was forced to work with but yet learned their language and culture and used it (literally) to our advantage. Similarly I learned to certify HAZMAT and load pallets for the AF and hated that as well

Bob,

Two SF Majors went home one after the other for very similar behavior in Rwanda. Basic cultural arrogance toward senior Rwandan officers for one and stupidity in front of a Rwandan-US formation for the other.

The ODB Sergeant Major gave me a group coin in appreciation. He was tired of being embarrassed.

The 2 ODAs left behind under their Captains performed wonderfully and were soon joined by the group XO as a temporary fill. Smooth sailing was the norm afterward.

And to show I am not picking on SF Majors for cultural ineptitude, a 48J fellow DATT got sent home from Goma for similar reasons about a year earlier.

Best

Tom

[marct]

Hi Tom,

And to show I am not picking on SF Majors for cultural ineptitude, a 48J fellow DATT got sent home from Goma for similar reasons about a year earlier.

Good ! I suspect that a large part of the problem running around here is that a lot of people don't get sent home for similar actions.

Years ago, Jerry Barkow used to have this travelling roadshow presentation about "Dr. Something-or-other and the Church of Fundamentalist Sociobiology". He modeled his "talk" on the Baptist Revival preachers and televangelists, but his "message" was, as you can imagine, quite different . In it, one of the points he made was that lazyness (aka Sloth) was a Cardinal Virtue (from an evolutionary standpoint) if (and only if) it did not lead to punishments that exceeded the rewards to be garnered.

[Stan]

Hey Doc !
Tom sent him home, not me

Hi Tom,



Good ! I suspect that a large part of the problem running around here is that a lot of people don't get sent home for similar actions.

Years ago, Jerry Barkow used to have this travelling roadshow presentation about "Dr. Something-or-other and the Church of Fundamentalist Sociobiology". He modeled his "talk" on the Baptist Revival preachers and televangelists, but his "message" was, as you can imagine, quite different . In it, one of the points he made was that lazyness (aka Sloth) was a Cardinal Virtue (from an evolutionary standpoint) if (and only if) it did not lead to punishments that exceeded the rewards to be garnered.

[marct]

Hey Stan,

Hey Doc !
Tom sent him home, not me

I can just imagine what your suggestion was !

[marct]

a lot of what we are talking about / around is governed by one, little concept, for which Adolphe Quetelet (the original Q) will rot in hell forever: the concept of the "normal man". Quetelet is the man who is responsible for all Bureaus of Statistics, the concept of clothing sizes, and a multitude of similar sins.

There is also a rather amuzing video on YouTube about "normal".

[Stan]

Well, when he later reported that a "solid shot tank round" went through an adobe hut in Brazzaville I began to really wonder who thought up the acronym UXO

That's true BTW... I read it

Hey Stan,



I can just imagine what your suggestion was !

[Rob Thornton]

Marc, thanks for the insights on the model - I'll carry forward to next week and hopefully put them to use - I'll let you know how it starts off.

Ken, I like the renaming/seperation/addition of the blue block - this may help others see where leader development and education is required, and also where both this and other efforts can beenfit from this approach.

John, - Sorry I tok you away from grading finals - I know that has got to be a hard choice

Highlightng a couple of things from one of John's posts:

A basic issue here is the institutional military attitude that we can train an officer or NCO to be an effective leader. There really is no institutional recognition that leadership is a talent - and a talent that an individual may have in some circumstances but not in others.

The key is to get the right pegs in the right holes which begins with knowing what shape thholes are and what are the shapes of your pegs. The wrong approach is to get a hammer for the mismatches, or to beleive that every hole is so big that any peg will do. Again, are we fulling meeting operational requirements, or just filling them as we drvie down the road to an unknown destination?

The challenge that we, the USG, face is how to make the most of the individuals, organizations, etc. that we have and how to train and educate for the skills and understandings (the education v. the training component) that will bring out the talents of the individuals available to us.

I think John's emphasis on the USG is dead on. I'm going to start up a seperate thread this afternoon to discuss this - but it gets to the developmental nature of SFA, and why in terms of the policy objective and sustainability this is not an exclusive DoD (or even those USG agencies which play a role in developing non military security forces) but must be seen in the broader context.

Best Regards, Rob

John - BTW - I'll do the AMU comp exam work up beginning JUN 1 - it will be good to be done!

[Ken White]

In the West, we tend to "understand human nature" by assertion, rather than by personal experience. This means that a "professional" group will assert a worldview and then look for supporting evidence. This group also controls the definition of what is and is not "true", as well as setting up all of the testing mechanisms for defining a level of skill. Basically, the game is totally rigged against anyone who is outside of the group and, especially, against anyone who disagrees with that groups assertions about "reality". BW's story just hammers home that point in a way .

Now, being a via negativa type of a scientist, I tend to think that that system is bunk; a system designed to inflate the egos of people who cannot stand to deal with reality.

I think this concept is borne out by the stories above. I'm living proof, I discovered long ago that people who did not behave as I wanted them to were just terribly annoying.

Fortunately, at about ten years of service (Not a Major -- but I think the time, age and 'experience' factors are very relevant...) I was in a position to change that for subordinates, improve my peers and properly channel the thinking of my superiors and those with whom I might interface. So, I proceeded to do those things.

More fortunately, after only a year or so, I realized just how wrong I was (Lord knows how much damage I did even in that short time...).

That's a cautionary. Great and illuminating tale, Bob's World. That's another cautionary. Your hero's attitude is entirely too common and, unfortunately, vestiges of it seem to always slip into the upper echelons and thus make our relationships with other nations and forces far more rocky than they need to be.

Stan, of course is correct:

"And to echo Tom and Mike It's not a rank or MOS thing and never was."

Oh, BTW Marc. What's wrong with this?

"...one of the points he made was that lazyness (aka Sloth) was a Cardinal Virtue (from an evolutionary standpoint) if (and only if) it did not lead to punishments that exceeded the rewards to be garnered."

Been my philosophy for years.

Also a good philosophy for he or she who would Advise forces from other cultures...