Building an Iraqi Marine Corps

[jcustis]

- well, this civilian's outside opinion is worth about .001 but every time I see Iraqi army troops on TV, they come across as somehow hesitant or something, a little light on their feet so to speak, reminds me of the ARVNs of S. Viet Nam, not a lot of grit but there are bound to be some solid Iraqi units, just not enough of them. I don't have any answers but I wonder how many Iraqi soldiers are in it for the pay check, steady income for the family? I would think an Iraqi Marine Corps would seek to instill some esprit de corps, pride in sacrifice and ability with the paycheck being secondary.

Across my two later deploys, I came to believe that the number of guys in for a meal tix was about 75-90%

[davidbfpo]

Perhaps the Trucial Oman Scouts, which became the UAE Defence Force in 1971, are an example to examine? A small force with a reputation, note mainly locally recruited and some expat officers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trucial_Oman_Scouts

Closer to visit and not so long ago.

davidbfpo

[Xenophon]

Congratulations on getting that job and know that I am green with jealous rage. That's a dream job for someone who takes being an advisor seriously. (You'll see how rare that is soon enough.)

I spent a year on a MTT with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st IA in 2008. I'll let you know the issues we had with the Iraqi Army which will probably be pretty similar.

First off, you mentioned uniforms. The IA have an official uniform but don't provide enough, if any, of them to the jinuud. You'll see them with old style woodlands, both knock off and real digitals of both desert and woodland MARPAT, along with the army gravel driveway digitals, and even flight suits. By now they've probably got frog suits as well. Anything military-esque they can acquire they wear. Your problem won't be designing a uniform, it will be getting enough so that they can wear only that and nothing else.

Second, the US Military has passed on its addiction to motorized ops to the IA. Getting them to do ops dismounted took some serious wasta and only the experienced, intelligent officers would consider it. If they're going to be light infantry, they need to walk.

Third, the NCO corps in the IA is in its infancy, it will be worse in a freshly stood up Iraqi Marine Corps. Hopefully you have a strong senior enlisted Marine on your team who can focus on developing them through their senior leadership. We wanted to set up a "battalion SNCO academy" but couldn't due to high optempo and weak SNCO leadership on the MTT side.

Speaking of leadership, the officer in the Iraqi military is everything. Nothing will get done unless it's through them. Focus on encouraging a strong officer corps and developing the NCOs and everything else will eventually fall into place. I realize these are both "big picture" issues but hopefully your MTT chain of command will listen to your observations and suggestions from the ground level. (If they're anything like mine, they won't)

As for building an ethos, personal leadership is everything in Arab culture, and the Iraqi Army has been pretty bad at this. If you convince the officer and NCO corps to lead from the front, share hardships and danger with their jinuud, and not take advantage of the privileges of rank, they will become different than the IA and be stronger for it. (For example, field grade officers in the IA have personal servants drawn from their unit, elevate their relatives and ensure they are paid whether or not they are official members of the unit, and skimming money from the jinuuds' pay is almost pervasive.) The best way to do this is through example, second nature for Marines, and again focus on the officers. Once they are square, it will trickle down eventually. The Reaganomics of Leadership, if you will.

[Mark O'Neill]

to the MiTT in question, but I have to say that I think Iraq needs a Marine Corps as much as it needs Saddam to rise from the grave.

What ever happened to adhering to the 'successful and unsuccesful practises' that was an annex to a chapter right near the front of FM 3-24. Anyone else recall the advcie about 'creating local forces in your own image'?

I spent some time in Basra during COTK in 08. What I saw even back then seemed to suggest that the relatively infant capacity of the Iraqi Navy, supported by elm of the IA, the Border police and the NP could more than meet any 'marine' requirement in a nation that has an almost laughably small littoral.

-Mark

[Xenophon]

Mark O'Neill:

Definitely agree that Iraq does not need a Marine Corps, especially now. But I'm pretty sure they did have one under Saddam so it's natural for the current Iraqi leadership to want one now. Might as well support it as best we can.

Anyway, the more Iraqis we can get gainfully employed and pointing their guns at bad guys vice good guys, the better.

[Ken White]

to insure a long life is to have competing military forces so no one gets excessive power. Hence the Iranian Armed forces and the Pasdaran; the Saudi Armed forces and the National Guard; and in Iraq, the the Police / Border Police / ERU and the Army / a Marine Corps.

Hmm. We have a National Guard...

[BayonetBrant]

Hmm. We have a National Guard...

Yep - the one that's enshrined in the Constitution. According to our founding document, the National Guard and the Navy are mandatory - the rest of you (Army, Air Force, Marines) are merely optional.

[Ken White]

Yep - the one that's enshrined in the Constitution. According to our founding document, the National Guard and the Navy are mandatory - the rest of you (Army, Air Force, Marines) are merely optional.

The Guard slickly got itself named the Militia by Statute.

Navy's legit, though...

[Steve Blair]

Actually the Marines are enshrined in public law if memory serves...along with a mandated minimum organizational strength. And I'll stop derailing now....

[Ken White]

Bringing up the point the slickness of the USMC getting itself enshrined in law was easily as good as that of the Guard. Now, question is, can the IMC can do the same thing?

We're totally back on thread...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES, Subtitle A - General Military Law, PART I - ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 13 - THE MILITIA

Sec. 311. Militia: composition and classes

-STATUTE-
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied
males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section
313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States
and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the
National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are -
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard
and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of
the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the
Naval Militia.

I guess "grabass" militia wasn't appropriate for (b)(2).

Yes, I know, I know, took us off thread. So, to answer Xenophon and Mark:

While Iraq certainly doesn't ‘need’ a force of Marines it absolutely has need of a navy. While Iraq was never, nor needs to be, a maritime power with the capability to project naval power beyond the northern Gulf, they do need forces afloat to patrol their coast and secure the two off shore oil platforms (Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) which pump approximately 1.4 million barrels per day and account for 85 to 90 percent of the gross domestic product for the Iraqi nation). The Iraq Navy performs this service and need naval personnel trained in VBSS operations and personnel to man their oil platforms. It seems they have decided that instead of sailors who crew their patrol craft perform VBSS they have a specific group trained in it: called Marines. Which happens to be one of the missions British and US Marines of yore performed, back in the days of sail, which I think Ken may remember…

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Capt Ortiz’s biggest challenge, IMO, is not in adequately training these Marines to perform their assigned duties. He's no doubt got an outstanding handle on that. I think it will be harder to inculcate them with a certain esprit-de-corps that will last past the departure of the US Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines.

We’ve done this before in Thailand (1932), Korea (1949), the Philippines
(1950), Vietnam (1954), with influence on the formation of the Taiwanese Marines. The RTMC, ROKMC, VNMC, and ROCMC emblems were directly influenced by the USMC eagle, globe, and anchor.

[jcustis]

I sat back and pondered on this today, and then thought hard about an email I sent to my old bosses when describing what had changed in Iraq this last go around, from when I served with them in 2003 and 2004-5, respectively.

I think it all starts with getting the officers on board. Like it or not, the deal with officership in the Iraqi Security Forces can be a fickle thing. If you want the esprit de corps to well up, you have to ensure that the leaders get their heart into it, first and foremost. As you work towards that end, be careful to avoid rushing headlong into the abyss that gets presented by the senior leaders and even junior grade guys (who are long in the tooth in terms of time in service) who might drag their feet, or want to do it a different way. You will have to use plenty of carrots, but I think you've already recognized that aspect of the issue. Just remember that a large part of the answer may already lie in the way the Iraqis used to conduct business in pre-OIF, but we just need to ask the right guys. Even in the main formation of the 3D IA, I saw esprit in action prior to a combined operation when I witnessed company commanders issuing final coordinating instructions to their men.

I offer that you need to get in touch with two types of Soldiers (yes, the US Army type). The first is someone with SF or SOF background who has trained any of the various SWAT-esque CT elements currently operating. Second is a psyop guy who has spent time supporting these SF/SOF trainers/advisors with products, specifically recruiting posters, and other media. Although I think the mission they do sometimes gets skewed in favo of formations the Iraqis don't need, the die is already cast in your case, and you have your mission. I think those guys have historically done a good job developing an ethos akin to what you are looking at, and like the lightbulb, they had plenty of failures before they got it right.

Finding those types of guys are no small task, so I recommend that you research some of the members here who serve in ACU, have the outreach ability based on where they currently work (ROb Thornton, Cavguy, and Bob's World come to mind), and have an interest in helping guys like yourself.

This might not be a Marine-ish problem after all, and the heavy lifting may already be done. Good luck either way, and I hope that the Marine I put you in contact with has already provided some assistance.

[Backwards Observer]

Mesopotamia had kind of an MC back in the day. Eat the apple...

[USMC MTT]

I want to thank everyone for their contributions so far. Some of the leadership of the IqM Bn we are advising has experience in dealing with Marine MTT's from their time in the Iraqi Army 1st Division . This experience makes them very receptive to my team and has made the rapport building much easier. Additionally, since we are the 1st MTT dedicated to their Bn, the leadership seems hungry to repeat their past experience with MTT's and feel that our presents help to enhance their unit. They are eager to train and we are in the process of developing a 6 week training package that will enable their leadership to train their subordinates.

The method we have followed in concert with the the Iraqi's has been:

1. We have conducted a historical study of past experiences training Arab militaries and forming Marine Corps world wide. The advice given on this blog has enabled us to conduct research on a wide range of historical examples. Based on this research and conversations with our Iraqi counterparts, we have come to the conclusion that using some of the Bedouin qualities of toughness, discipline, bravery and loyalty will be the best way to create a unique ethos. We have found that this is a historical background that the majority of IqM's know, admire, and can relate to.

2. We have developed a survey that we will conduct on randomly selected IqM. The questions were developed with the IqM leadership and we will use the findings to refine our ethos building ideas.

3.We are in the beginning stages of building the POI with our Iraqi counterparts. The good thing is that the leadership has bought into the concept, has been listening to our inputs, and has been driving the planning.

While we have started off on the right foot, we still have a long ways to go and the actions taken will be the true measure of effectiveness.

I would like to thank everyone for their contributions and we will post our plan and other products in a few weeks.

We look forward to reading future postings; all your inputs have been a tremendous help.

V/R
Capt Ortiz

[William F. Owen]

Based on this research and conversations with our Iraqi counterparts, we have come to the conclusion that using some of the Bedouin qualities of toughness, discipline, bravery and loyalty will be the best way to create a unique ethos. We have found that this is a historical background that the majority of IqM's know, admire, and can relate to.

Good call. If you can get a copy of John Glubb's "War in the Desert". He was a British Officer who worked with and commanded the Arab Legion who were essentially Bedouin. His insights maybe useful.

One small issue that does spring to mind based on British experience of such units, is make sure, if possible that all the US personnel associated with the hands on training/admin/support of the unit, wears the same uniform as those in the unit. Historically this seems to matter. One less difference perhaps?

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

would no doubt be useful, there were factors of his success that cannot be replicated by the US: Glubb was fluent in Arabic, was posted to Iraq in 1920, joined the Arab Legion in 1930, assumed leadership of it in 1939 and was with the Legion another 17 years. The man spent 36 of his 41 years in uniform serving in Arab countries. That length of commitment to a foreign unit by an individual has not, in my knowledge, ever been done by any member of the US military.

One thing the British colonial service did well (and which the US does poorly) was to create and nuture "native" units. They did this often by speaking the language and being posted to a country for many years. The US military has rarely ever done that, for a variety of reasons.

T.E. Lawrence's success is also a good example and his 27 Articles is a very concise "how to" of the unique challanges in advising Arab units.

[IqMTT]

Capt Ortiz,

I'm not sure if you're still monitoring this thread, but I will be deploying to pick up you mission very soon. My team is currently in PTP and the training schedule has been so condensed and packed with the basics of deployment that we really haven't had time to sit down and think and talk about the mission. I was wondering if there were any lessons learned in the past year+ from this post that you can pass on. If you'd like to PM, I can give you my NMCI address and we can go high side from there if necessary. Thanks.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

Capt. Ortiz appears to have last visited just after his last post, but if you access the Public Profile there is an option to send an email - without his email address being revealed. Good luck.