USINDO: Indonesia’s War on Terror
http://www.usindo.org/publications/r...arOnTerror.pdf
Indonesia’s War on Terror, by William Wise describes the threat from international terrorism and Jakarta’s response. The desirability of law reform and
improving Indonesia’s intelligence capabilities are highlighted.
ICG, 20 May 09: Indonesia: Radicalisation of the Palembang Group
Indonesia has earned well-deserved praise for its handling of home-grown extremism, but the problem has not gone away. In April 2009, ten men involved in a jihadi group in Palembang, South Sumatra, were sent to prison on terrorism charges for killing a Christian teacher and planning more ambitious attacks. Their history provides an unusually detailed case study of radicalisation – the process by which law-abiding individuals become willing to use violence to achieve their goals. The sobering revelation from Palembang is how easy that transformation can be if the right ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a charismatic leader, motivation and opportunity. Another ingredient, access to weapons, is important but not essential: the Palembang group carried out its first attack with a hammer and only later moved to making bombs......
ICG, 24 Jul 09: Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings
On 17 July 2009, suicide bombers attacked two hotels in the heart of a Jakarta business district, killing nine and injuring more than 50, the first successful terrorist attack in Indonesia in almost four years. While no one has claimed responsibility, police are virtually certain it was the work of Noordin Mohammed Top, who leads a breakaway group from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the regional jihadi organisation responsible for the first Bali bombing in 2002. One of the hotels, the Marriott, was bombed by Noordin’s group in 2003; this time, a meeting of mostly foreign businessmen appears to have been the target. The restaurant of the nearby Ritz-Carlton was also bombed.
The attack sets back Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts, but its political and economic impact has been minor. On 23 July President Yudhoyono was declared the winner of the 8 July elections with more than 60 per cent of the vote; nothing about the bombing is likely to weaken his government or prompt a crisis. The impact on the business community, which lost four prominent members, has been devastating, but economic indicators are stable.....
I'm not sure I'd agree that the attacks are a "setback to Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts"... they seem to me less a setback than an indication that the job is not finished.
JI and other jihadi groups have been substantially alienated from the Indonesian public. The deaths of Indonesians and Muslims in terror attacks have not been well received, and the jihadi agenda lacks popular appeal. The general quiet in sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi has removed a powerful recruitment driver. Many JI leaders and members have been arrested and the group has splintered to a large extent.
It must be remembered, though, that JI is not an insurgency, it's a terrorist group. In many ways the group is most dangerous when it is pared down to a small core network of committed extremists. Even with very limited manpower and resources, a group like Top's can still generate very dangerous attacks.
ICG's recommendations make sense, though I would emphasize the need to achieve a permanent resolution to the sectarian conflicts that have provided extremists with their raison d'etre in the past. The Indonesians are on the right track and need to stay on it, but that does not and cannot assure that there will not be more such attacks as the process goes on. Unfortunately the nature of modern terrorism allows even a largely defeated group to make an enormous mess.
ICG, 27 Aug 09: Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base
This briefing examines the linkages among the people Noordin drew on for the 17 July attacks in an effort to understand his support base. It is focused on the local network, mostly on Java, not on the overseas links, as those were still being uncovered as this went to press. It is not about the ongoing police investigation and does not draw on any privileged information from the men arrested since 17 July. It is necessarily an interim study, using the known pieces of the puzzle to help explain why Noordin and his network have not only survived in Indonesia, but in some senses thrived. It is based on press reports and interviews conducted in connection with the current investigation, and extensive reading of documents collected for previous Crisis Group reports.
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