Mainly terrorism in Indonesia: catch all

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 22 Mar 07: Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh

When local elections were held in Aceh on 11 December 2006, conventional wisdom (shared by Crisis Group) was that candidates from the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) would not do well. They might pick up two or three of the nineteen district races, but the biggest prize – the provincial governorship – was almost certainly out of reach. The old Jakarta-linked parties would benefit from deep pockets, established structures and a split in the former insurgency’s leadership. Polls just before formal campaigning began showed GAM’s governor/deputy governor slate – Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar – virtually out of contention. But GAM won overwhelmingly, in what an analyst called “a perfect storm between the fallout from the peace accord and the failure of political parties to understand the changing times”. The challenge now is to govern effectively and cleanly in the face of high expectations, possible old elite obstructionism and some GAM members’ sense of entitlement that it is their turn for power and wealth....

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 4 Oct 07: Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications

Two years after the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Helsinki, the peace is holding – but it is not the peace that many envisioned. The euphoria that swept Aceh after GAM candidates trounced their opponents in the December 2006 local elections is gone, replaced by a sense of gloom that the new elite is not that different from the old, and as many divisions are being created as healed in Acehnese society.

Jobs and contracts are going to the victors: loyalty to GAM has replaced good connections to Jakarta or local army commanders as the key to political and business opportunities. Extortion by ex-combatants is rampant, and armed robberies are on the rise, many carried out by former fighters operating outside any command structure. In some areas – North Aceh is one – former commanders of GAM’s armed wing, now called the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), serve as a virtual shadow government, playing much the same role as the Indonesian military did in the past vis-à-vis civilian officials, although without the clout of an authoritarian state behind them. Journalists have found that many KPA leaders have an allergy to criticism and a sense of themselves as above the law that do not bode well for democratic governance.

The cash that has made new and lucrative patronage networks available to GAM members has also divided a fractious movement still further, deepening divisions at the top and creating new fault lines between commanders with access to funds and the rank-and-file who feel they have not received their fair share. Many KPA members who consider themselves short-changed or simply deserving of a cut take matters into their own hands and exact payments from businesses, contractors and sometimes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or turn to profitable pursuits like illegal logging....

[Jedburgh]

CHD, Jun 08: Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh

....Two peace processes were conducted in Aceh, first, lead by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (from now on HDC) in 1999-2004, and the other by the CMI-Crisis Management Initiative (from now on CMI) and the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (Helsinki negotiations) in 2005. Both created an atmosphere of optimism and reduced the annual number of casualties. The fact that the latter of the two heavily built on the principles agreed upon by the former makes the distinction of the two processes difficult. From the point of view of third party agency, though, they can be separated as the third parties involved, were different. After the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on peace between GAM and the government of Indonesia on August 15, 2005, the conflict has ceased to exist and there has only been a few casualties ever since between the two former conflicting parties.5 While there is a considerable risk of the conflict reoccurring, if economic and political structures of conflict cannot be transformed in time, and if the agreements agreed upon are not honestly implemented, the process to peace can be largely treated as a successful case. Aside with the fact that peace negotiations never involved the parliament, and the lack of commitment of the parliament could become a problem in the legislative implementation of the peace deal, it would be difficult to pinpoint clear problems in the peace process itself that could later be seen as causes, if the conflict reoccurs.....

[davidbfpo]

A little reported insurgency, even if in a strategic location and understandably Indonesia did not want an external media role. This is an update on Aceh, with a podcast:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...ceh-today.aspx

I'd forgotten the eventual peace agreement was signed in Helsinki and without research a sign that Nordic quiet diplomacy worked.

[Mark O'Neill]

The success of Detachment 88 is obviously starting to 'bite' amongst JI. The latest from the alleged spiritual leader of JI, quoted by the Australian Broadcasting Commission this evening (Tues 26 Jun):

http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin"]http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin"]http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin

[SteveMetz]

The success of Detachment 88 is obviously starting to 'bite' amongst JI. The latest from the alleged spiritual leader of JI, quoted by the Australian Broadcasting Commission this evening (Tues 26 Jun):

http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/st...section=justin

Can't get the link to open. I think you have one too many "http"s in there.

[Mark O'Neill]

Can't get the link to open. I think you have one too many "http"s in there.

yep, sorry, works now.

[Jedburgh]

....he's not just complaining about CT efforts, he's considering a run for office:

ISN Network, 9 Jul 07: Courting Sharia in Indonesia

Reports say that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - the reputed spiritual leader of the militant Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and head of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia party (MMI) - is considering running for president of Indonesia in elections scheduled for 2009.

While an estimated 86.4 percent of Indonesia's 234 million citizens are Muslims, most are moderates, and some of Ba'asyir's policies, especially his call for the implementation of Sharia law, could well strike resonant chords among many.

Ba'asyir's MMI is an umbrella organization for groups fighting for Sharia law in Indonesia.

While Ba'asyir denies involvement with the militant JI, he has stood trial and been convicted of involvement in terrorism and the recent arrests of top JI commanders have implicated him in direct involvement in the group's leadership.....

[Mark O'Neill]

....he's not just complaining about CT efforts, he's considering a run for office:

ISN Network, 9 Jul 07: Courting Sharia in Indonesia

JI is definitely a minor rump group compared to many other Islamic parties that have already 'embraced' the democratic process in Indonesia. The idea of Bashir getting a serious run in the presidential elections would appear to be a farcical pipe dream.

For good information about the state of these things I really commend the International Crisis Group's reports on JI to you. Sidney Jones has a hand in these and I do not think that there are too many others with such in depth knowledge.

At the same time, I would try and avoid 99.9% of what Abuza or Gunaratana write about JI. From SE Asia and Indonesia experts I have spoken with , their fame appears to be inversely proportional to their knowledge.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 19 Jul 07: Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict

Most outside observers see only one dimension of conflict in Papua – the Indonesian government vs. the independence movement – but it is much more complex. Tensions among tribal groups and between indigenous Papuans and non-Papuan settlers, as well as competition over political power and access to spoils at the district and sub-district levels, are also important. The issues vary substantially from one region to another. National and international attention has tended to focus on the northern coast and the central highlands, with relatively little on the districts in the south, which have long felt excluded from politics in the Papuan capital, Jayapura....

Good background, also from ICG, 5 Sep 06: Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 16 Jun 08: Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua

....The potential for communal conflict is high in Papua because both sides consider themselves aggrieved. Indigenous Christians feel threatened by ongoing Muslim migration; Muslim migrants feel democracy may be leading to a tyranny of the majority, where in the long term they will face discrimination or even expulsion. Even though there are significant rifts and factions in both communities, especially over competing nationalisms (Indonesian vs. Papuan), the developments in Manokwari and Kaimana may be a sign of more clashes to come.....

Complete 35 page report at the link.

[Dayuhan]

Got this from ICG...

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/region...-in-ambon.aspx

Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon

Clashes on 11 September between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, capital of Maluku province, and sporadic incidents thereafter raised fears of a return to the communal fighting that wracked the region from 1999 to 2002. This time, an extraordinary effort by grassroots “peace provocateurs” and local officials largely kept the violence from spreading further in Maluku. But the unrest triggered efforts by extremists elsewhere to manipulate communal tensions, apparently motivating the bombing of a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September...

Small incidents, but with potential to flare up further. Relevant to regional terror issues as well. The decline in Islamist influence in Indonesia has been closely linked to the decline in outbreaks of sectarian violence. JI and similar groups there (as elsewhere in SE Asia) have had very little success with the global jihad message, or in rallying support behind issues in Afghanistan or the Middle East: the concern is overwhelmingly with local issues. They have, however, very successfully portrayed these sectarian outbreaks as oppression of Indonesian Muslims.

Hard to say whether this outbreak was orchestrated for this purpose (the date could be coincidence) or was simply a recurring flare-up, but it bears watching, as this sort of violence has a direct bearing on local support for and recruitment by extremist groups.

[davidbfpo]

My title will be a familiar theme to SWC, the focus of a new book probably not - Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

This week the Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute launched a new book, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, by a leading authority on Islamic extremism in Indonesia, Solahudin:

Based on a remarkable bredth of original material, Solahudin's book shows how the ideas and form of activism that lead to the Bali Bombings in 2002 have a long and complex history in Indonesia, stretching back to Darul Islam revolt in the 1940s. Solahudin argues that 'al Qaeda-style ideology has been present in Indonesia for decades, long before al Qaeda itself emerged in the 1980s.

There are a small number of links to reviews, a podcast etc on:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...Solahudin.aspx

In a longer Lowy comment 'Is the 'far enemy' off the agenda for Indonesian terrorists?' the author explains how terrorism has shifted to the 'near enemy', notably the police, from the 'far enemy', usually the Western presence. He refers to the impact since 2006 of a Jordanian theologian's writings - a new name for me, Muhammad Al Maqdisi and jihad tamkin. Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

It ends with:

Consequently, a key to understanding terrorism in Indonesia, including whether or not terrorists will again attack the far enemy, is to have knowledge of the local and international political situation and of ideological changes in terrorist circles.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...errorists.aspx

The book is not (yet) on Amazon, it is available from the Australian publisher:http://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/book...aah-islamiyah/

I placed this thread here instead of the Asia-Pacific forum as the book and comments apply far beyond Indonesia. There is a long running thread 'Mainly terrorism in Indonesia; catch all':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=737

[graphei]

First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

Second:

Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

Indonesia isn't just a Muslim majority. It is the world's most populous Muslim country, even beating out Pakistan. I think just under 13% of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia, yet only 83% or so of the population is Muslim. Let's sit and think about that for a second. They are the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, and while they're a majority, they have more religious diversity there than any other Muslim country. Pretty neat! Okay, enough of me geeking out.

Third:
David, you summed this up nicely.

Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

I think there is a tendency for people to look at a group, analyze them, and say "Okay. We know them." This is dead wrong. They change. Frequently. Much the same way grad students vie to study under a particular professor, so too, do they. They have conferences, publish, and talk about how to further their field. Furthermore, I know I'm preaching to the choir when I say it's dangerous to look at one of these groups and assume because we aren't on their list now, we won't be in the future.

Fourth:
I've spent a lot of time thinking about how the non-Arab Muslim world (aside from Iran and Pakistan) largely floats under the radar. This isn't good. Yes, it is important to know what is going on in the Middle East, but to focus on one area to the detriment of the others is short sighted. Case in point: Finding programs to study Arabic required some thinking and planning before 9/11. After that fateful day, they popped up everywhere. Arabic was the 'it' language. Outside of the government, do you know how hard it is to find Urdu? Hell, even Farsi is hard to come by.

Before I get on my soapbox, I'll stop myself and say it takes years to develop any sort of meaningful understanding these cultures. Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

[davidbfpo]

Away from Indonesia now, on the same theme the 'far' or 'near' enemy an article 'Al Qaeda grows as its leaders focus on the 'near enemy':http://www.thenational.ae/thenationa...ear-enemy#full

[davidbfpo]

My title will be a familiar theme to SWC, the focus of a new book probably not - Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

This week the Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute launched a new book, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, by a leading authority on Islamic extremism in Indonesia, Solahudin:

Based on a remarkable bredth of original material, Solahudin's book shows how the ideas and form of activism that lead to the Bali Bombings in 2002 have a long and complex history in Indonesia, stretching back to Darul Islam revolt in the 1940s. Solahudin argues that 'al Qaeda-style ideology has been present in Indonesia for decades, long before al Qaeda itself emerged in the 1980s.

There are a small number of links to reviews, a podcast etc on:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...Solahudin.aspx

In a longer Lowy comment 'Is the 'far enemy' off the agenda for Indonesian terrorists?' the author explains how terrorism has shifted to the 'near enemy', notably the police, from the 'far enemy', usually the Western presence. He refers to the impact since 2006 of a Jordanian theologian's writings - a new name for me, Muhammad Al Maqdisi and jihad tamkin. Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

It ends with:

Consequently, a key to understanding terrorism in Indonesia, including whether or not terrorists will again attack the far enemy, is to have knowledge of the local and international political situation and of ideological changes in terrorist circles.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...errorists.aspx

The book is not (yet) on Amazon, it is available from the Australian publisher:http://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/book...aah-islamiyah/

I placed this thread here instead of the Asia-Pacific forum as the book and comments apply far beyond Indonesia.

[graphei]

First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

Second:

Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

Indonesia isn't just a Muslim majority. It is the world's most populous Muslim country, even beating out Pakistan. I think just under 13% of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia, yet only 83% or so of the population is Muslim. Let's sit and think about that for a second. They are the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, and while they're a majority, they have more religious diversity there than any other Muslim country. Pretty neat! Okay, enough of me geeking out.

Third:
David, you summed this up nicely.

Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

I think there is a tendency for people to look at a group, analyze them, and say "Okay. We know them." This is dead wrong. They change. Frequently. Much the same way grad students vie to study under a particular professor, so too, do they. They have conferences, publish, and talk about how to further their field. Furthermore, I know I'm preaching to the choir when I say it's dangerous to look at one of these groups and assume because we aren't on their list now, we won't be in the future.

Fourth:
I've spent a lot of time thinking about how the non-Arab Muslim world (aside from Iran and Pakistan) largely floats under the radar. This isn't good. Yes, it is important to know what is going on in the Middle East, but to focus on one area to the detriment of the others is short sighted. Case in point: Finding programs to study Arabic required some thinking and planning before 9/11. After that fateful day, they popped up everywhere. Arabic was the 'it' language. Outside of the government, do you know how hard it is to find Urdu? Hell, even Farsi is hard to come by.

Before I get on my soapbox, I'll stop myself and say it takes years to develop any sort of meaningful understanding these cultures. Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

[davidbfpo]

From Time magazine 'Q&A: Indonesia’s Terrorism Expert on the Country’s Homegrown Jihadis', the author of the cited book above:http://world.time.com/2013/08/26/qa-...grown-jihadis/

The last Q&A:

Are you optimistic that Indonesia’s terrorist movement can be eradicated?

They will always be there. They can weather all sorts of changes. They will be there as long as there are people who dream of imposing Shari‘a and people who can be easily recruited. Terrorism relies on these three ingredients: a disappointed people, a justifying ideology and an organization. The challenge is how to prevent it from getting big.

Within the Q&A is an intriguing passage, a practice in counter-radicalisation I have never heard of before, so enlightenment would be a bonus:

How has Indonesia fared in combating terrorism?

The most effective way is to organize a meeting between convicted terrorists and victims. Let them see how their acts affect the victims’ lives and their families’. One example: last year, [jailed JI member] Umar Patek met a man who was badly injured in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. It was an emotional encounter. The terrorist was so shocked that he couldn’t say much, apart from telling the victim, “Please tell others how sorry I am. If they can’t forgive me, I can’t go to heaven.”

[Dayuhan]

First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

I'm looking forward to seeing it as well; neighborhood affairs and all that.

I agree that there has long been a radical core in Indonesia following what might be called an "Al Qaeda ideology". I'd also point out that this group's ability to achieve any influence outside it's core membership has typically been related to sectarian violence within Indonesia, rather than to issues elsewhere. That does not mean, of course, that this small core cannot make a big mess. They can: that is the nature of terrorism. If we're looking at the ability of radical Islamists to gain significant political influence, I'd say that ability relates much more closely to internal Indonesian affairs than to an international Islamist agenda.

Certainly the study of Indonesian history, society, and politics is critical to understanding terrorism in Indonesia. I'd hesitate to base conclusions about "terrorism" generically or in any other market on that study.

Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

I did that, over 30 years ago, but I'm not sure I did myself a favor. There are rewards, in a rather abstract sense, but it wasn't exactly an astute career move!

[davidbfpo]

A news report from August 2014 just found on the Indonesian counter-radicalisation programme; that starts with:

Indonesian authorities have started transferring 170 hard-core convicted terrorists from prisons nationwide to a state-of-the-art facility in West Java.

(Citing the CT body's head) De-radicalisation is a slow process, but we hope we can see results in a few years to come,

Link:http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB.../12/feature-01