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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    This slide isn't telling the Army to think/develop the strategic plan. But it is suggesting that simply focusing "in their lane" on tactical/operational actions has political/strategic/military effects, and that tactical successes can cause the strategic plan to fail.
    So if you are saying "doing stupid things is counter-productive" then I'd agree. Who would not? This applies to all forms of conflict. The whole point of the Tactical-Operational-Strategic construct is that actions in one/each generate effects in the others. Yet Corporals cannot really have strategic effect. They can only make Strategy more difficult by undermining it.

    It also suggests that one's tactical actions in a COIN environment should be viewed broader on its overall effect on the objective than simply by its tactical results.
    Agreed, but all tactical actions have to viewed in a broader context. Commander's intent if nothing else.

    "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield ... Yes, but it is also irrelevant".
    And if the US Armed Forces had stayed in RVN, like they did in Korea, the NVA could never have won. High casualty rates, which lead to the sapping of the will to fight/endure, is what caused the US to abandon its commitment to RSVN. Own high casualty rates were, in part, the result of tactical actions and decisions.

    "Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."


    On a serious note, it doesn't suggest tactics are unimportant. It does suggest it is only important within the broader context of the objective. which CvC I am sure would agree with.
    CvC sure as hell would. Tactical success is no less important in Security Operations than Combat Operations. I strongly object to the idea that "tactical success can be counter-productive." If it is in anyway counter productive it is not tactical success!

    The circumstances under which the successful and legitimate killing or capture of enemy is "counter-productive" are so small that I doubt they could be usefully codified.

    If the enemy makes you believe that doing him harm, will somehow do you harm, he's won! - and you have no legitimate recourse to armed action. - EG: Ghandi - and Ghandi was not an insurgent! He used Politics, without warfare - so not a military problem.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 05-21-2009 at 03:22 PM. Reason: Lysdexia
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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