The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

[Gian P Gentile]

Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

[marct]

Hi Gian,

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics.

Honestly, when I looked at the slide, I didn't interpret it that way; I viewed it as a heuristic to get discussion going. Now, that interpretation is certainly one possible one, but I don't think that it is the only one.

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war.

I would agree that that is one possible implication, but I think there are many others. One the broader issue of "should" the US invert their position, that would be insane. That isn't to say that the US should not widen the top of their pyramid, but how that would be done is a totally subject to negotiation. For example, it is quite possible to define as tactical certain population-centric basics without inverting the triangle.

For me at least, I saw the slide as a great way of comparing conceptualizations of conflict without implying any required responses.

Cheers,

Marc

[Eden]

I really should be working, but a third point occurs to me.

3. Again from a structural point of view, the pyramids may look like they do because the insurgent has a severely limited menu of tactical options to choose from, a slightly wider range of operational styles to work within, and far greater liberty to define an overall strategy than his conventional opponent. At least from a military viewpoint, the COIN strategy is defined by political masters and can only be changed or modified with great effort. Operational options in COIN are often constrained by host nation concerns, resource constraints, requirements to integrate with other agencies and allies, etc. On the other hand, the conventional forces normally have a wide variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to choose from. So it may be as simple as the fact that humans tend to focus on those things they actually have some control over. As my sainted grandmother said, "when there is no option, there is no problem."

[Cavguy]

Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesn't get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focuses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symmetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

Sir,

Good point. This slide (as you can see), doesn't give the answer, and neither does the discussion of it.

What it attempts to do is highlight what the average Stage 1/2 insurgent is doing in a broad sense. Ahmed the IED emplacer is not thinking in these terms. But his leadership knows that his IED strikes and attacks have political value far more than their tactical value.

Examples:

* COP Wanat battle. Tatical US success (assault repelled with heavy Taliban casualties) 9 US KIA. Political/Strategic victory for Taliban (can inflict pain on coalition, coalition weak/unprepared). Goal is to demoralize USA and also show local populace Americans are vulnerable despite technology. (among possible others). We tout our tactical success, and wonder why no one cares. (See also: Tet offensive)

* Any given week, A-Stan. TIC situation results in JDAM drop. Taliban clames XX civilians killed. US says they were all bad, or at least most of them. US believes its reports, locals believe the Taliban. Truth is muddled. Advantage: Insurgent, because it is the local people's perception that really counts. (Though US's matters too)

* Insurgent places IED on Route Tampa in Iraq, destroying one of 20 5k fuelers. Is he trying to halt fuel shipments to CF in Iraq? No. He doesn't have that capability (though Sadr tried in April 2004, and failed). He videotapes it and uses it as a recruitment video. US people worry about vulnerability of our soldiers and seeming inability to halt these IED attacks. Home support dwindles, attack by attack. We are tactically successful because my M1 tank still gets gas every day, and the other 19 fuelers made it in.

Solutions:

Depends on where you are. But do we always understand things in this light? The first step on an appropriate solution is understanding the problem. We have tended to look at enemy attacks from the S2 perspective about "What are they trying to do to us tactically?" (i.e. Close MSR Tampa). Less often we ask "What is the enemy trying to accomplish pol/strategically by this action".

It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

It isn't "Where is the enemy"

It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


===

The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

Niel

[Brandon Friedman]

Niel,

I think you're on target with this. This gives me an excuse to post my favorite quote from Mao. In my view, it's relevant here:

“There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”

-- Mao Tse-tung

Not sure if it's still the same way, but one of the problems I encountered in Iraq was the disdain soldiers had--especially leaders--for truly trying to understand the domestic political situation on the ground. Lots of times they'd finger-drill it during briefings, but you could tell they weren't really interested. Granted, this was back in 2003.

[slapout9]

It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

It isn't "Where is the enemy"

It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


===

The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

Niel

Cavguy,
You got my vote. The motive is everything, I would add why did it will lead to who did it and how does he/she benefit from the action.

[Starbuck]

Cavguy might have done well to put "reflector belts, property books and sideburn length" at the very base of the pyramid right below "tactical". In any given organization, there are going to be those who trivialize and "don't get" the big picture, as well as those who won't be able to think for themselves--as Col. Gentile mentions, there will be those who blindly slap templates of Ramadi over a map of Helmland.

The question is, how well is the Army promoting strategic thought? I would argue that we have gotten much better at challenging our leaders to see the greater strategic and political picture in recent years, but there are some communities that haven't experienced this phenomenon.

Coming from the aviation community, I think that we in particular have yet to experience this renaissance in strategic thought as our land-based bretheren have done. I don't think I've ever heard anyone in the aviation community use terms like "sectarian violence", "money as a weapons system", "commander's emergency relief program", and I think I can count on one hand the number of times I've heard the term "information ops".

The only times I've heard a grand operational overview of Iraq or Afghanistan was from decidedly non-aviation units. If you do an intelligence overview briefing for aviators and begin talking about sectarian differences, you'll typically see a bored aviator raise his hand and ask in an annoyed voice, "I just want to know if there are any MANPADS in the area".

Some areas of the Army, unfortunately, still fit the triangle diagram.

[Bob's World]

This is also how I describe the role of SOF, which goes to why the conventional forces often misunderstand us as well.

I don't know how many times I heard a Flag officer at PACOM or PACFLT say "You SOF guys out there doing your tactical stuff." or words to that effect.

I would then have to explain, that you judge whether or not something is tactical, operational or strategic, not by number of stars on the commander's collar, and the nature of the task,, but by the nature of the purpose.

Absolutely, tactical tasks executed by the wise insurgent are done with operational/strategic purpose intended. Similarly, when you get into a situation where your SOF guys are doing tactical tasks for mere tactical effect, you have lost the bubble on where/how you should be employing them. On the surface it may look the same, but the difference is tremendous.

[William F. Owen]

The question is, how well is the Army promoting strategic thought? I would argue that we have gotten much better at challenging our leaders to see the greater strategic and political picture in recent years, but there are some communities that haven't experienced this phenomenon.

Why would anyone in the Army do Strategic Thinking? It's none of your business, except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

The top of the slippery slope for the implied reasoning is "We shouldn't be here. We shouldn't be doing this" - which is the current mind-set of some senior British Officers - so no surprise.

“There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”

-- Mao Tse-tung

Mao was not a genius (his mistakes cost millions their lives) and this shows why. The military implements policy, it does not make policy. The competence of a military is something that limits or enhances policy. There is a body of opinion that strongly suggests that Mao was misreading Clausewitz (which he read) when he was stating this.

THE SLIDE
Ok, so what does this tell us? In terms of action and effect, what can you extrapolate from that slide, in terms of different actions?

I'm pretty sure the Tamil Tigers would not agree with it. Tactical incompetence lost them their base areas and a lot of other things.

Most insurgencies have to opt for symbolic success because they cannot gain real success. Most insurgencies are limited to tactical actions with perceived and symbolic meaning. I see that more as a "So what" observation than anything really insightful. If they gain symbolic advantage by blowing up tankers, then stop giving them targets. If you can't, then deal with it.

The British Armies response to 4 very large IED's on the border in 1978/9, was to stop 95% of military road movement on the border with the Republic for 16 years. Not rocket science.

[Cavguy]

Why would anyone in the Army do Strategic Thinking? It's none of your business, except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

This slide isn't telling the Army to think/develop the strategic plan. But it is suggesting that simply focusing "in their lane" on tactical/operational actions has political/strategic/military effects, and that tactical successes can cause the strategic plan to fail. It also suggests that one's tactical actions in a COIN environment should be viewed broader on its overall effect on the objective than simply by its tactical results.

THE SLIDE
Ok, so what does this tell us? In terms of action and effect, what can you extrapolate from that slide, in terms of different actions?

See above. This slide isn't meant to be a solution, as I mentioned to COL Gentile. It's meant to be a framing slide, thought/discussion generator for issues later in the presentation. One can view it as a reflection of the famous quote of the NVA General to Harry Sumners (although some dispute its accuracy ) - "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield ... Yes, but it is also irrelevant".

I'm pretty sure the Tamil Tigers would not agree with it. Tactical incompetence lost them their base areas and a lot of other things.

"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."



On a serious note, it doesn't suggest tactics are unimportant. It does suggest it is only important within the broader context of the objective. which CvC I am sure would agree with.

Niel

[William F. Owen]

This slide isn't telling the Army to think/develop the strategic plan. But it is suggesting that simply focusing "in their lane" on tactical/operational actions has political/strategic/military effects, and that tactical successes can cause the strategic plan to fail.

So if you are saying "doing stupid things is counter-productive" then I'd agree. Who would not? This applies to all forms of conflict. The whole point of the Tactical-Operational-Strategic construct is that actions in one/each generate effects in the others. Yet Corporals cannot really have strategic effect. They can only make Strategy more difficult by undermining it.

It also suggests that one's tactical actions in a COIN environment should be viewed broader on its overall effect on the objective than simply by its tactical results.

Agreed, but all tactical actions have to viewed in a broader context. Commander's intent if nothing else.

"You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield ... Yes, but it is also irrelevant".

And if the US Armed Forces had stayed in RVN, like they did in Korea, the NVA could never have won. High casualty rates, which lead to the sapping of the will to fight/endure, is what caused the US to abandon its commitment to RSVN. Own high casualty rates were, in part, the result of tactical actions and decisions.

"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."

On a serious note, it doesn't suggest tactics are unimportant. It does suggest it is only important within the broader context of the objective. which CvC I am sure would agree with.

CvC sure as hell would. Tactical success is no less important in Security Operations than Combat Operations. I strongly object to the idea that "tactical success can be counter-productive." If it is in anyway counter productive it is not tactical success!

The circumstances under which the successful and legitimate killing or capture of enemy is "counter-productive" are so small that I doubt they could be usefully codified.

If the enemy makes you believe that doing him harm, will somehow do you harm, he's won! - and you have no legitimate recourse to armed action. - EG: Ghandi - and Ghandi was not an insurgent! He used Politics, without warfare - so not a military problem.

[J Wolfsberger]

... except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

I think this gets to the point of Cavguy's (really excellent) slide. If "war is the continuation of politics by other means," the traditional, institutionalized response of most Western armies is that "we do war, not politics." That's probably an inevitable outgrowth of the idea of military subordinated to civil authority, and the strict non involvement of serving military in political affairs. If that is the cultural paradigm, it will carry over to the battlefield, where the military will focus on combat and leave the political dimension to the politicians. I think that is Col. Gentile's point:

This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

Our adversaries, on the other hand, view this as a political struggle, and a "totalitarian" one at that. There is nothing off limits, if it will further the desired political goal. Their military actions may be determined by operational or tactical concerns, but the strategic goal has little to do with troops in the field or territory conquered.

How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?

[William F. Owen]

How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?

We/you need to teach what war is to officers when they first join, and keep beating it into them, year after year.

You now have an Army that views COIN as something different from WAR, and has to make up a silly language using words like "Complex", "Human Terrain" and "Hybrid", because no one learnt to walk before buying a Honda 750. - and this is merely my opinion. If someone can tell me I am wrong I would be heartened!

[Ken White]

...If that is the cultural paradigm, it will carry over to the battlefield, where the military will focus on combat and leave the political dimension to the politicians.

Seems to me that would be advisable. We have tried the 'Soldier as Diplomat' routine for about 60 some odd years now -- how well has that worked out for us?

Diplomacy is essentially a positive effort -- to achieve a desired outcome with minimal cost to own side. Warfighting is a negative effort, the intent is to destroy at a minimum the will of the opponent. Mixing the two creates conflicts of intent, interest and outcome.

Bob's World pointed out yesterday that use of force by the US used to be very rare and that many today do not recall those days. Our excessive application of force in recent years has done us no favors and is certainly partly the responsibility of DoD for playing around, often by default, in matters not their concern. That has not really been beneficial for the nation -- or the world.

...the strategic goal has little to do with troops in the field or territory conquered.

True. I think there's a message in that.

How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?

Well, we're not doing at all well on your first item -- and have not for many years. On the second, I'd suggest that if it gets to a need for COIN, State has already failed -- they need to stop the COIN fight before it starts if at all possible.

There may be an intermediate approach but Americans in general do not do 'intermediate' well. Something else entirely is possible but improbable as, if there were a better solution, someone probably would have found it in the last few hundred years.

People or groups of people should endeavor to do what they do best. Coordination of effort can be successful, fragmentation of effort invariably creates confusion and promotes poor performance, the infamous seven 'Ps.'

[Brandon Friedman]

Mao was not a genius (his mistakes cost millions their lives) and this shows why. The military implements policy, it does not make policy. The competence of a military is something that limits or enhances policy. There is a body of opinion that strongly suggests that Mao was misreading Clausewitz (which he read) when he was stating this.

William,

Show me a leader that understands neither the domestic political motivations on the ground, nor the political landscape back home, and I'll show you a leader that doesn't have enough information to make the right decisions in a COIN environment.

Likewise, to suggest that senior-level military officers don't play a role in formulating policy is incorrect. They testify before Congress all the time and are expected to assist Members in crafting their own views. If they don't understand the political dynamics at play, then they can't offer their best advice. If Petraeus didn't understand the politics on both sides of the ocean, would he have been as successful in Iraq?

In theory, politicians formulate policy and the military implements it. But in reality, politicians don't typically know enough to make informed defense decisions without military input.

[William F. Owen]

In theory, politicians formulate policy and the military implements it. But in reality, politicians don't typically know enough to make informed defense decisions without military input.

Can't argue with that. As Ashkenazi said, "Do not ask for my opinion. Tell me what you want done, and I'll tell you if it is possible." - He is helping construct policy by informing people as to the limits of the military instrument. I think we all understand this.

Soldiers have to know enough, not to do those things which are counter-productive to the political intention, so Rules of Engagement? Mao's "Point for Attention." etc etc, and MacArthur being relieved of Command in Korea.

[Bob's World]

Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...

[Oredigger61]

...( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government)...

Bob, is this typology written up anywhere?

[Oredigger61]

Bob, is this typology written up anywhere?

Bob, did you see my earlier question up thread?

[Bob's World]

Sorry, yes. I've worked through it a few times in various threads here on the topic. Have also incorporated into at least one paper.

In a nutshell, many efforts at describing insurgency seem overly complicated. I am reminded of a painful experience in College when I took integration calculus for the first time. I was completely overwhelmed by the incredible complexity, and every problem was a blur of complex equations or situations to be converted to complex equations. I didn't know where to start, and I didn't have a firm grip on what I was trying to accomplish, and I didn't have a firm grasp of the reduction formulas and high end algebra and geometry required.

The following term I was sitting in the library with my nemesis the calculus book, when suddenly it dawned on me that for all of the surface complexity, there were really just three types of problems, and step one was to identify which type of problem you were trying to solve. Then as I mastered the reduction formulae and my algebra and geometry skills, it all became quite simple and I ended up earning the highest score in the class.

I think that insurgency is much like this. The complexity in front of one's face is overwhelming; and many sent in to deal with an insurgency also lack proficiency in the basic skills required for such operations

So I set out to see if there were logical "types" of insurgency. As I looked at it there were three. Others have come up with larger numbers, but I think those can be reduced down to the three that I use.

1. Revolutionary: When an element of the populace seeks to overthrow/change the current government through illegal means

2. Resistance: When an element of the populace seeks to throw out an external force that has either forced itself upon them, or come in invited and overstayed its welcome.

3. Separatist: When some segment of the populace seeks to break some portion of the state off from the parent and form a new state.

These may occur in combinations. For example, in Afghanistan, I see the Senior leader Taliban insurgency as a revolutionary movement that is rooted primarily in the perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government and the lack of trusted and certain processes for the populace to effect legal change of that government (Causation); supported by the AQ UW operations; and employing a fundamental Islamist ideology (motivation). This is the aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved in order to bring peace to the country.

Beneath and within this is the much larger rank and file resistance insurgency of average Afghans, who care little about governance, but who care deeply about the presence of foreign invaders in their homes. They also feel deeply about the duty to safeguard their homes and families, and to have the pride that comes with earning a day's wage for a day's work. They are also Sunni Muslim, so the Islamist message speaks to them. They fight because the coalition is here and because they are paid to do so. This is good, honorable, Pashtun work. Far preferable to simply living on the coalition dole.

Solve the revolutionary "parent" insurgency, and then we can take actions in conjunction with the newly legitimized government of Afghanistan to reduce troop levels; stop the pay and motivation to resist, and all get back to our normal lives. The resistance insurgency largely fades away simply because we fade away, and be cause or narrative becomes more believable with a government perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace in office.


Until then, we are largely protecting and feeding a massive Ponzi scheme that would make Bernie Madoff proud. Fix that first. Small, local ponzi schemes are very afghan; the big national one fed by coalition "investors" is not. It lifts the money up and out of the country, instead of distributing it back among the people at the local, district, and provincial levels.