Results 1 to 20 of 92

Thread: The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

Hybrid View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #1
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Posts
    1,127

    Default The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

    All,

    Attached is a slide I use during my presentations that usually engenders quite a bit of discussion (which Is why I use it - to stir the pot).

    This is why (in my view) we have hard times with COIN/SO/etc. Failure to understand the nature of the beast.

    Like all slides there is a heavy dose of generalization. Obviously Ahmed the RPG gunner in AQI isn't necessarily consumed with the political strategy, but his leaders are.

    A simple application of this slide is the ongoing debate over the Predator strikes in AfPak and ongoing collateral damage issues. There are many more examples.

    Again, slide is meant to provoke discussion, pro and con. So discuss!

    Niel
    Attached Images Attached Images
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

  2. #2
    Council Member AmericanPride's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Location
    "Turn left at Greenland." - Ringo Starr
    Posts
    965

    Default

    Cav,

    This reminds me of a component of my argument to include class analysis (and a rethinking of Clausewitz) into COIN. In the conventional fight, the political leadership makes the decision to go to war just once -- and so the military is intently and exclusively focused on the "Tactical". But the insurgent makes that decision to 'go to war' every time he decides to act violently; every attack is a new "declaration" of war so-to-speak because the militant/insurgent/terrorist is, in essence, a political-soldier (whereas in contrast the American soldier is just that, a soldier). So the whole focus is on the political cause, or the "Political Strategic Theater". This is because the political object precedes the military/violence means used. The problem IMO is that the military is taking the lead on addressing a political conflict, and so we are in some ways putting the cart before the horse.
    When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot

  3. #3
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Niel, I couldn't have done it better! Really great slide!!!!!
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  4. #4
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Marc's right, that is a great slide and I also agree with American Pride;

    "...because the militant/insurgent/terrorist is, in essence, a political-soldier (whereas in contrast the American soldier is just that, a soldier)."
    I agree with his entire comment but that senetence is key. It's true and we should never, ever forget that -- as we sometimes try to do...

    It is also unlikely to change. His comments concerning conventional versus COIN thinking are correct with respect to most but not all US Forces and I suspect that will always be true; we are probably not as a collective psychologically willing to adapt to the political and public face / relations efforts needed for us to essentially fight the Insurgent on his own terms.

    I believe that efforts to attempt such adaptation for most of the force will actually be very counterproductive. One should also remember that not all fights against non-state actors or seeming insurgents are actually counterinsurgencies...

    The Slide itself illustrates a conundrum that is not at likely to be addressed in the near term. I do not say rectified because I do not think that the dichotomy is really a problem or that we need to adapt our action to mirror the Insurgent model. We absolutely need to be aware of the difference and to develop counters for it but aside from Special Forces (not SOF in their entirety) no significant 'adaptation' is required of most units. What's required is simply acknowledgment of the difference and the development of strategic and operational flexibility to counter that. What we lack at this time is that flexibility and that is difficult to develop in a large bureaucracy. Difficult is not impossible.

    Best way to fight a fire is with a suppressive agent, a different compound or process that deprives the fire of the oxygen it requires. Another fire, a backfire will sometimes allow a temporary gain but it will rarely extinguish the original fire.

    Of course, good firebreaks and fire prevention are vastly superior to and easier than fire fighting.

  5. #5
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Sep 2007
    Location
    West Point New York
    Posts
    267

    Default

    Niel:

    At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

    But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

    Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

    some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

  6. #6
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Hi Gian,

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics.
    Honestly, when I looked at the slide, I didn't interpret it that way; I viewed it as a heuristic to get discussion going. Now, that interpretation is certainly one possible one, but I don't think that it is the only one.

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war.
    I would agree that that is one possible implication, but I think there are many others. One the broader issue of "should" the US invert their position, that would be insane. That isn't to say that the US should not widen the top of their pyramid, but how that would be done is a totally subject to negotiation. For example, it is quite possible to define as tactical certain population-centric basics without inverting the triangle.

    For me at least, I saw the slide as a great way of comparing conceptualizations of conflict without implying any required responses.

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  7. #7
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    223

    Default A third thought...

    I really should be working, but a third point occurs to me.

    3. Again from a structural point of view, the pyramids may look like they do because the insurgent has a severely limited menu of tactical options to choose from, a slightly wider range of operational styles to work within, and far greater liberty to define an overall strategy than his conventional opponent. At least from a military viewpoint, the COIN strategy is defined by political masters and can only be changed or modified with great effort. Operational options in COIN are often constrained by host nation concerns, resource constraints, requirements to integrate with other agencies and allies, etc. On the other hand, the conventional forces normally have a wide variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to choose from. So it may be as simple as the fact that humans tend to focus on those things they actually have some control over. As my sainted grandmother said, "when there is no option, there is no problem."

  8. #8
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Posts
    1,127

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    Niel:

    At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

    But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesn't get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focuses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

    Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symmetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

    some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.
    Sir,

    Good point. This slide (as you can see), doesn't give the answer, and neither does the discussion of it.

    What it attempts to do is highlight what the average Stage 1/2 insurgent is doing in a broad sense. Ahmed the IED emplacer is not thinking in these terms. But his leadership knows that his IED strikes and attacks have political value far more than their tactical value.

    Examples:

    * COP Wanat battle. Tatical US success (assault repelled with heavy Taliban casualties) 9 US KIA. Political/Strategic victory for Taliban (can inflict pain on coalition, coalition weak/unprepared). Goal is to demoralize USA and also show local populace Americans are vulnerable despite technology. (among possible others). We tout our tactical success, and wonder why no one cares. (See also: Tet offensive)

    * Any given week, A-Stan. TIC situation results in JDAM drop. Taliban clames XX civilians killed. US says they were all bad, or at least most of them. US believes its reports, locals believe the Taliban. Truth is muddled. Advantage: Insurgent, because it is the local people's perception that really counts. (Though US's matters too)

    * Insurgent places IED on Route Tampa in Iraq, destroying one of 20 5k fuelers. Is he trying to halt fuel shipments to CF in Iraq? No. He doesn't have that capability (though Sadr tried in April 2004, and failed). He videotapes it and uses it as a recruitment video. US people worry about vulnerability of our soldiers and seeming inability to halt these IED attacks. Home support dwindles, attack by attack. We are tactically successful because my M1 tank still gets gas every day, and the other 19 fuelers made it in.

    Solutions:

    Depends on where you are. But do we always understand things in this light? The first step on an appropriate solution is understanding the problem. We have tended to look at enemy attacks from the S2 perspective about "What are they trying to do to us tactically?" (i.e. Close MSR Tampa). Less often we ask "What is the enemy trying to accomplish pol/strategically by this action".

    It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

    It isn't "Where is the enemy"

    It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

    Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


    ===

    The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

    But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

    Niel
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

  9. #9
    Council Member Brandon Friedman's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Alexandria, VA
    Posts
    71

    Default

    Niel,

    I think you're on target with this. This gives me an excuse to post my favorite quote from Mao. In my view, it's relevant here:

    “There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”

    -- Mao Tse-tung
    Not sure if it's still the same way, but one of the problems I encountered in Iraq was the disdain soldiers had--especially leaders--for truly trying to understand the domestic political situation on the ground. Lots of times they'd finger-drill it during briefings, but you could tell they weren't really interested. Granted, this was back in 2003.

  10. #10
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Posts
    4,818

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

    It isn't "Where is the enemy"

    It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

    Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


    ===

    The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

    But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

    Niel
    Cavguy,
    You got my vote. The motive is everything, I would add why did it will lead to who did it and how does he/she benefit from the action.

  11. #11
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default Insurgency within an insurgency

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    Niel:

    At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

    But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

    Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

    some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.
    As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

    The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

    Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

    The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

    Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  12. #12
    Council Member Oredigger61's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2010
    Location
    Gainesville, VA
    Posts
    10

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    ...( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government)...
    Bob, is this typology written up anywhere?

  13. #13
    Council Member Firn's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Posts
    1,297

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

    The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

    Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

    The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

    Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...
    I enjoyed this post and share some feelings with you, which I echoed before. Just wanted to add that this revolutionary-resistance dynamic is often an intrinsic feature of many small wars. It is in fact even present in states and western military forces, were the primary object of many is not a lofty and distant politcal goal.

    Firn

  14. #14
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Posts
    1,127

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Niel, I couldn't have done it better! Really great slide!!!!!
    I should come clean that I didn't make this slide.

    My boss stole it from a Brit General who briefed something like it, came home, and had us adapt it at the COIN center. The inverted triangles work well.

    Great thing about the army is that plagiarism isn't frowned upon.

    Niel
    Last edited by Cavguy; 05-20-2009 at 09:27 PM.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

  15. #15
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    I should come clean that I didn't make this slide.

    My boss stole it from a Brit General who briefed something like it, came home, and had us the COIN center. The inverted triangles works well.
    LOL - whatever, it works .

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Great thing about the army is that plagiarism isn't frowned upon.
    I never would have guessed (hey, I read FM 3-07-1 and a lot of stuff looked very familiar )!
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  16. #16
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    223

    Default Two thoughts, slightly related

    1. I wonder just how much thinking our opponents do on any level. Those who rise to the top ranks of the current crop of insurgents seem to me to be consummate politicians. They excel at fund-raising, deal-making, patronage, and intimidation - the same skill set you find in Congress or mafioso. Like many successful politicians, they do not seem to have much strategic sense, and their operational skills seem aimed at achieving personal rather than 'organizational' goals. Look how long it took the bad guys in Afghanistan to attack one of the coalition's true vulnerabilities: its supply lines. Moreover, they don't seem to recognize that both their tactics and operational styles are typically self-defeating; terrorism, especially, rarely works and most often creates the very conditions that will lead to its defeat (or abandonment as a tactic). Finally, they don't have the C2 to either implement or sustain a coherent strategy or operational style. In Afghanistan, we often spent long hours trying to impose a pattern on events to figure out what the bad guys were trying to do; I came to the conclusion that they weren't entirely sure either.

    2. Some of the reason for the inversion pictured may be structural. I believe that the ratio of leaders/thinkers/decision-makers to foot soldiers in your typical insurgency is much higher than in conventional forces. This may not seem the case due to the hordes of staff officers and subordinate commanders in western armies, but they are not really setting policy or operating independently. Guys in caves with twenty hard-cores and a hundred stringers or part-timers are making their own tactical, operational, and sometimes strategic decisions in a way our battalion/brigade/regional commanders are not.

  17. #17
    Council Member marct's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ottawa, Canada
    Posts
    3,682

    Default

    Some good points, Eden.

    On your first point re: politicians and not thinking, how is that different from the West? On your second point, I think you have a really good observation here.

    I have a suspicion that part of the reason why the differences are there is how some (not all by any stretch of the imagination) insurgent groups define their battlespaces. From what I have seen, a lot of the definition, at least for AQ and similar irhabi groups, the primary battlespace is defined as the media, which the tactical / geographic (physical space) is of secondary concern. That might be because they lack the skills and troops, but it may also be because they realize that the best way to defeat the US is to get the American people to order a withdrawl; a "lesson" in tactics from Vietnam.

    At the same time, and keeping with the idea of differing topologies of and emphasis on battlespaces, the US forces are, on the whole, as hampered in mediaspace as AQ is in Afghanistan - i.e. there are severe structural limitations on actions in mediaspace.
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  18. #18
    Council Member Oredigger61's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2010
    Location
    Gainesville, VA
    Posts
    10

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    All,

    Attached is a slide I use during my presentations that usually engenders quite a bit of discussion (which Is why I use it - to stir the pot).
    Going back to the OP, here is a link to a construct I developed over 30 years ago.

    http://mallardblue.web.officelive.co...evolution.aspx

    This links to the narrative, the embedded link at the top of the narrative leads to the construct in graphic form.

    I also found the "Supplemental Reading" Syllabus for the course titled "Political Warfare Studies." That is what the Navy's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Orientation Course morphed to be over the six-year period 1974-1980.

    Here is the reading list.
    1. "Essay on Revolution" from the Syntopicon, Great Books of the Western World
    2. "Politics Book V" Aristotle
    3. "Of the Dissolution of Government" Locke
    4. "Of These Things That Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth" Hobbes
    5. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" Bernard Fall

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •