Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.
As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...