Page 3 of 5 FirstFirst 12345 LastLast
Results 41 to 60 of 92

Thread: The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

  1. #41
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by AmericanPride View Post
    I would also argue that Israel's long term aim of peace and security has likewise been undermined by its military successes (particularly 1967,1973, 1982, and 2006).
    Well 67 and 73 were successes because they stopped the nation being annihilated/invaded - so I can't see how that makes them damaging to security. 82 and 06 were not actions of choice either.

    I could suggest that US action since 911 have reduced it's chances of peace and security - but I shall not.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 05-22-2009 at 07:48 AM. Reason: Addenum
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  2. #42
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    But the true impact of this "failed" offensive was a tremendous N. Vietnamese stategic victory back in the US. Did Giap have this as his primary purpose in planning the attack? I don't know. Certainly he hoped for operational success, but I suspect he understood the strategic potential of the offensive as well.
    ... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.

    The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war. This is the basis behind Niel's diagram. We have to do both.
    OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
    I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.

    Quote Originally Posted by AmericanPride View Post
    Bob,
    The Wehrmacht had tremendous tactical successes against the Red Army in the opening phases of the Second World War, but it still did not manage to achieve a decisive or strategic advantage at any point in the conflict.
    Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  3. #43
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2008
    Posts
    511

    Default symbols in targetland (or through the lava lamp)

    This has doubtless been proposed more cogently elsewhere, but would it add needless complexity to suggest that insurgencies in particular may be operating in a culture-specific, symbolic realm that subsumes the political? The symbolic field may be opaque, inaccessible or even inimical to manipulation by outsiders, as much of its cultural resonance may occur offstage from the theatre of operations. Local insurgent leaders may have varying degrees of symbolic coup d'oeil, but even then struggle to maintain control over a feedback loop which operates largely within a cultural unconscious approaching the mythical.

  4. #44
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default We talked about two yesterday...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.


    OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
    I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.


    Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."

    Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.

    I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.

    Reminds me of a story within a Louis L'amour Sackett novel. A determined young man goes to the saturday night dance where the biggest, toughest man in the area takes him outside and publicly and decisively beats him to a pulp. The beaten man goes home, and is told to never return if he knows what's good for him and the large man returns to the dance.

    The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again.

    The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again, but puts up a better fight, and the county tough is less enthusiastic about the fight.

    This continues, defeat after defeat, Saturday after Saturday, until finally, the tough man grows so weary of having to fight this persistent little man every single Saturday that he stops coming to the dance himself, leaving the other victorious.

    Just a story, but for one who is so determined to achieve their goal that they will keep coming back no matter what, the tale of the tape in the end will be who has the most will, not who has the most might.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  5. #45
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Maryland
    Posts
    223

    Default Whoa there, pardner

    The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.

    In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.

    In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.

    An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.

  6. #46
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.
    Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.

    I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.
    To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?

    The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.

    The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.

    If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  7. #47
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default Think about the maoist insurgency model target list..

    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.

    In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.

    In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.

    An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.
    Every operation is "tactical" if assessed by the nature of the task. A B-29 togglling off a nuclear bomb over hiroshima is a "tactical task" But the over all nature of the operation was pure strategic. A savvy insurgent does not go out and seek targets that only offer tactical effect unless he has to inorder to get to those targets with much larger operational/strategic effect. That is why they target school teachers and other low-level government officials over shop keepers and farmers.

    I have covered this before, but whether or not something is "tactical" or "strategic" is not determined by the nature of the task, the platform/weapon used, or the number of stars on the commander's collar. It is determined by the purpose for the action.

    But you're right, I should slow down. I often forget that others need to catch up
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  8. #48
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default The insurgent/guerrilla often wins merely by not losing

    As Eden points out, the old saw about Vietnam is used too often and ignores much of the reality. “Victory in battle” during an insurgency must be viewed very carefully.

    A good example: Ap Bac, January 2 and 3, 1963. While Sheehan, Vann, Halberstam, and others cast aspersions upon the performance of the ARVN, the GVN and Harkins declared Ap Bac to be a “victory.” Technically, using the traditional military definition, since the ARVN initiated the attack on the hamlet and the following day were in possession of it, they get handed the “victory.” But the real win belongs to the VC. In a day of hard fighting against 4 to 1 odds they shot down or disabled five US H-21s and a UH-1B and repulsed a full on attack by an ARVN M113 company. They then successfully broke contact on their own initiative and exfiltrated the scene prior to the ARVN occupying the hamlet. The moral boost and lessons learned by the VC in that fight far out weighed the fact that the ARVN were granted the “victory.”

    Even Khe Sanh has been re-evaluated. Was Giap looking for a victory, or was he engaged in a diversionary battle to pin Marine forces in northern I Corps in order to prevent them from being employed elsewhere during the Tet Offensive? If the former is true, he lost,; if the latter, he won.
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  9. #49
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default The military is one small aspect of warfare

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.



    To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?

    The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.

    The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.

    If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.

    Wilf, for a man as smart and grounded in CvC as you are, I have to admit I find it very interesting your total fixation on the military aspect of warfare. The military aspect is important, certainly, and can either create or lose conditions required for the larger victory, the grander competition; but it is just one aspect of a much larger whole that has no end and no beginning and is woven into that whole in such a manner that it cannot be considered in isolation without drawing flawed conclusions, or attributing undue importance to things that may have been very important to the military aspect, but perhaps merely a supporting effect to the larger political competition.

    But I place far more value on the opinions of those who I know know what they are talking about and see things differently than I do, than I do on those who lack such credentials and merely agree. So I am listening. Don't agree, of course, but I am listening.

    One of my standard positions is that "the military neither starts wars nor ends them, it is just our lot to fight them." We focus on the fight as it is so dramatic, so horrible, so visible; but it is just one aspect of the much larger competition.

    As early as Sun Tzu it was recognized that a commander who had resort to combat to accomplish his ends had largely failed to begin with. The wise State Leader, the wise insurgent leader, the wise general all seek to win through superior thinking and non-violent positioning if possible. This does not make them irrelevant, just perhaps less interesting.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  10. #50
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār View Post
    The insurgent/guerrilla often wins merely by not losing
    OK, but let us state this another way. "The insurgent/guerrilla often maintains his military potential my consistently not suffering decisive defeat."

    Not losing requires tactical skill, and concurrently not wining requires the inability to exploit or build on tactical success. If wining is costing you too much then you are no actually winning.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  11. #51
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Wilf, for a man as smart and grounded in CvC as you are, I have to admit I find it very interesting your total fixation on the military aspect of warfare.
    Well thanks for the compliment.... - likewise, you do not conduct yourself in a way that implies anything but considered and carefully crafted thought, based on some hard won experience.

    Yes, I concentrate on WARFARE as a military/violent activity. My feeling is that warfare is inherently understandable and largely coherent. Nothing much is new. We have vast bodies of evidence.

    I am not that concerned with the Political need which Warfare seeks to address. Politics is enmity, passion, and need. Those are not coherent or particularly predictable or understandable. Example.
    Petraeus:
    "The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists. That's what it had become before the operations conducted in the wake of 9/11. Al Qaeda wants to carry out further attacks on the US and our allies, and we need to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks."
    OK, in reality AQ could have planned and conducted 911, using the brains of a ROTC graduate and a flat in Brooklyn. If AQ gets pushed from A'Stan, they will simply set up somewhere else. The mission as stated by Patraeus is strategically irrational, and based on no actual evidence. - and I don't care.

    You could strongly suggest that the reason the US Govt. attacked the Taliban Regime was to address public demand. It was not an act of Strategy, it was an act of need. - and no less valid. There was no logical reason for the US or NATO to be in A'Stan, other than vengeance.

    Strategy is not rational. Operational and tactical action should be, so I limit myself to the rational.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  12. #52
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default Hey...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Strategy is not rational. Operational and tactical action should be, so I limit myself to the rational.
    Wait a second...square this with your standard closing tag line!

    (Though I completely agree with your assessment of the sanctuary statement and thoughts of the Taliban).
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  13. #53
    Council Member Greyhawk's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2009
    Location
    Georgia
    Posts
    117

    Default I love the smell of conceptual models in the morning...

    ...and this is a good one. Note the three-tier vs two-tier triangles.

    Without definition from the source, one can assume

    a. "insurgents" are local/regional therefore their strategic level is the theater/operational

    b. "insurgents" are part of a larger network (al Qaeda) with a theater/operational "command level" that is inconsequential to the discussion

    c. both

    I say "c". Regardless, the "insurgents" benefit from a more efficient model. If that isn't a "problem" from our POV it should be. The solution (I don't mean to imply that it's simple) is to increase efficiency within ours.

    (I'm also operating from the assumption we're talking more Information Operations and less COIN vs conventional here.)

  14. #54
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2008
    Location
    Olympia WA
    Posts
    531

    Default

    Considering the large amount of tactical planning and changes that the insurgent forces in Iraq went through from '03 to '07, I would argue that the slide does not apply to the average insurgent at all. I feel that most insurgents are fighting a very tactical battle and that they simply use PR as an additional fighting tool. Perhaps for politicos in the insurgent world that slide is true, but it is also true for US politicos, so where is the utility?
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

  15. #55
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
    Posts
    3,947

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Wait a second...square this with your standard closing tag line!
    .
    I can't!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  16. #56
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Posts
    1,188

    Default

    I don't think insurgent leaders have to be totally focused on strategic political theatre. At the street and village level, every insurgent action is seen as either being in direct oppositioin to the occupying force or in reaction to it. Ambush or car bomb, all can be attributed to the occupiers to some degree and that is theatre wherein everyone is a participant no matter how unwittingly - sort of like geography, it is always there.

  17. #57
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default Is that it --

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    But you're right, I should slow down. I often forget that others need to catch up
    or is it that you're on a different road...
    I have covered this before, but whether or not something is "tactical" or "strategic" is not determined by the nature of the task, the platform/weapon used, or the number of stars on the commander's collar. It is determined by the purpose for the action.
    I don't think anyone disputes that, nor do I think most dispute your population centric theory. I for one agree with you on both.

    Where you and I disagree is on your interpretation -- and that's what it is, an interpretation -- versus my interpretation of what happened in Viet Nam. I agree with Eden and Umar Al-Mokhtār, it is too easy to draw wrong conclusions about Viet Nam from the many and very skewed histories out there. We didn't win every battle by a long shot, most US units were marginally trained and commanded and the VC /NVA initiated about, IIRC, 85% of all contacts. Good units -- and there were some -- did better but by and large our tactical ineptitude contributed to our strategic draw.

    It was a political loss, no question, a strategic draw IMO and a series of tactical blunders by both sides.

    That however is an aside and we can disagree on all that as we have before. The factor that leads you to believe you're way out front is that no one is following you on the Road to Grand Strategy. Wilf said it well
    "I am not that concerned with the Political need which Warfare seeks to address. Politics is enmity, passion, and need. Those are not coherent or particularly predictable or understandable."
    We also disagree on practical aspects of that. I suggest that no one really disputes your philosophy though many seem to question either the desirability or the possibility -- or both -- of your proposals to 'fix' the US. Thus the issue is not small war or any war related other than peripherally because national strategy is a political decision and while military aspects must be considered, they are frequently overruled by politicians. Had all military advice been heeded, there probably would have been far fewer wars. As Wilf also noted: "Strategy is not rational."

    That's totally true; it is and must be based on the perceptions and beliefs of those who make strategic decisions. There's nothing wrong with having an opinion on what should be done and how but unless you're one of the shakers and movers -- a Politician, not a military person -- one as a military person can only give advice and that advice should be rational, logical, provable and not subject to personal whim or belief. To inject those latter things into a military capability, probability, possibility question concerning strategic options is, in the opinion of many, not smart.

    It is not smart simply because politicians are devious, want their own way and are quite willing to twist your words and thoughts to achieve their own ends. Provable logic cannot be twisted for very long...

  18. #58
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Considering the large amount of tactical planning and changes that the insurgent forces in Iraq went through from '03 to '07, I would argue that the slide does not apply to the average insurgent at all. I feel that most insurgents are fighting a very tactical battle and that they simply use PR as an additional fighting tool. Perhaps for politicos in the insurgent world that slide is true, but it is also true for US politicos, so where is the utility?
    Reed
    The utility lies just where CavGuy said it does in his original post...to provoke discussion. It's not intended to be all-encompassing (at least I would HOPE that one PowerPoint slide isn't intended to be that way....), but rather to get folks talking and (hopefully) thinking about what the slide suggests and doesn't suggest. He didn't put it forward as being definitive in any way, and we should keep that in mind when we discuss it.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  19. #59
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2008
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    2,706

    Default

    A messy business to be sure. I p-o'd(ok, this happens semi-often, so I forget which ones) some senior officers when I stated that our soldiers were out on the ground giving us an "A+" effort to execute a "C+" strategy.

    So here sits COL Jones crafting strategy to try to bring up that marginal grade, because young men and women are out there giving it their all everyday with SPC Jones holding up that excellent grade. To send our military into harm's way with a flawed strategy, or a marginal plan, or unqualified leaders should be criminal, but of course it isn't. After all, this is complex stuff and reasonable minds can differ, etc, etc.

    This is why what I write here isn't about TTPs, or "what I did in Iraq last summer," or about some regurgitation of the very very flawed understandings of the nature of the threat, the nature of populace-based conflicts, etc.

    I am on a different road. Sometimes it is a bit lonely out here, but while I am quite sure I am not 100% right about anything; I am equally confident that I am on a path that will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future.

    Fixing everything wrong with Iraq, or Afghanistan or Pakistan won't do that; neither will killing every young man who decides (for whatever reason) to put on an AQ T-shirt and pick up a rifle. Besides, we already have 95% of our effort trudging down that well worn path.

    I just want that A+ effort to mean something. And it won't unless we can get our senior leaders to understand that the old models they grew up with are obsolete and that they must approach similar problems in new ways, but that even those new ways must be solidly rooted in sound, enduring principles of conflict.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  20. #60
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default I understand that and applaud you for doing what

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    So here sits COL Jones crafting strategy to try to bring up that marginal grade, because young men and women are out there giving it their all everyday with SPC Jones holding up that excellent grade.
    you can to fix it. However,
    This is why what I write here isn't about ... the nature of populace-based conflicts, etc.
    it does seem as though that gets mentioned...
    I am on a different road. Sometimes it is a bit lonely out here, but while I am quite sure I am not 100% right about anything; I am equally confident that I am on a path that will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future.
    Possibly true -- equally possibly untrue. You may be on that path but many others will have to join you to make that happen. I'm an optimist, big time -- but my concern is that you attract enough folks in the 'right' places to achieve your goal.
    ...it won't unless we can get our senior leaders to understand that the old models they grew up with are obsolete and that they must approach similar problems in new ways, but that even those new ways must be solidly rooted in sound, enduring principles of conflict.
    No one can argue with that -- but I will point out that old models are discarded by senior military leaders only if the new model can be proven better. Military folks are risk averse. Just saying you have the golden solution won't usually sway many -- until you convince them it's their idea...

    Old senior leaders (Mil) are a problem but they rotate out and new ones have learned some lessons.

    However, they are not the big problem. The big problem is the civilian leadership -- or lack of it -- and their too near total disinterest in any effort that "will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future." They like that last part but want it at no cost to themselves or their party. IOW, here you're preaching to the choir; you're proselyting in the wrong place...

    Unfortunately, those young and middle aged senior leaders (Gov, civilian type) are a far greater obstacle to your goal . If your road to a better national strategy (or policy set) fails to remove that road block and gain their support, then you may be indeed be wandering alone in the wilderness.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •