The Insurgent View vs. US Military View

[reed11b]

The utility lies just where CavGuy said it does in his original post...to provoke discussion. It's not intended to be all-encompassing (at least I would HOPE that one PowerPoint slide isn't intended to be that way....), but rather to get folks talking and (hopefully) thinking about what the slide suggests and doesn't suggest. He didn't put it forward as being definitive in any way, and we should keep that in mind when we discuss it.

OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed

[slapout9]

OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed

Now that is some Strategic Thinking...good job reed....you have got to be a Sergeant to write and think with that kind of clarity

[Steve Blair]

I didn't take the slide to be absolving us of anything. I took it as a much more generic piece. But to each his own.

I agree with many of your points, Reed. But it's also important (and often, IMO, overlooked) to realize that we arrived as an occupying force for all intents and purposes. Not a role we've traditionally cared for, so I think a number of the factors you point out were swept under the rug or simply ignored because they didn't fit the "best case" planning. Number of lessons to be taken away there, but I also think that Cav's slide is intended to get folks thinking about those kinds of things beforehand. It may not work, but it's worth a try.

[Bob's World]

I'll be in good company though. A whole lot of what is considered military gospel today was dusty, unread and unpublished notes back when the author was alive.

But as I say, the one thing that is truly new under the sun is the volume and speed of information available around the world today. This little note will potetially be read by friend and foe alike around the world within seconds of my hitting send.

Like my favorite uncle (enlisted grunt, 27th Regiment, WWII) told me one fall when I confessed that I had shot at a buck but missed, "welll Bobby, you won't ever hit anything if you don't put any bullets in the air."

Just putting a few bullets in the air...

[Bob's World]

OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed

Reed,

Your knowledge of what occurred is right on. The slide, however is right also. Recognize that it is a generalization and not an absolute, and intended to get a US tactical audience to understand that the guy they are in a firefight with, or hunting down was sent out with a different purpose than they were, and so will react differently than they will to similar circumstances.

But you are absolutely right that there was no insurgency (active phase one insurgency that is) in Iraq due to the suppressive efforts of Saddam's government. We set it all in motion with our regime change operation. Which is why I say we are not conducting COIN in Iraq, but are conducting "post-regime change FID."

To my way of thinking, there are three broad categories of Insurgency, and you have described one. I believe all three exist in Iraq, and none of them include AQ. AQ is not conducting Insurgency in Iraq, they are conducting UW.

There is Resistance (as you describe, those who rose up to drive out the invader/occupier US). There is Separatist (the Kurds, who want to break a piece of the old Iraq off for a new Kurdish state), and there is Revolutionary (both Sunnis and Shia have a go at this; those who reject the current government and want to change it).

But back to the Pyramid. The wise insurgent understands his tremendous tactical disadvantage. So he maximizes his strengths. He hides among the populace, he uses information operations, he targets and disrupts low-level symbols of the government. Not because he wants to wipe out school teachers, mayors and tax collectors. Because he wants to achieve one of the three strategic effects above.

We think we can win by attrition. Kill his fighters and kill the fight. (I am not a fan of the strategy, because those fighters all come from the very populace whose support you are attempting to gain). We need to get a little more strategic ourselves. Target the causes of insurgency and not the symptoms of it. Obviously so long as we are occupying the country this is hard to do with those who are of the Resistance. One more reason to not try to fix the entire government and make it effective. Focus on goodness, focus on communicating that and your clear intent to leave. Make your actions reflect your words. Put the host nation to the fore and let them clearly demonstrate they are in charge, and get the F out.

So yeah, you are right, but so is CAVGUY. Focus on where your understanding overlap and work out from there to where you don't. Too many start by focusing on where they disagree, and there really isn't anywhere to go from there.

[slapout9]

Military Review Article from 1974 on how to Analyze an Insurgency by Roger Darling of the US State Department, this article ties a lot of points made here all together.

Insurgency is a System with 5 main processes.

1-Cause process........Bob's World
2-Intimidation process
3-Resource process
4-Guerrilla action process
5-Collective Psychological process......Cavguy's slide

http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/e...00002/art4.pdf

[Ken White]

But you are absolutely right that there was no insurgency (active phase one insurgency that is) in Iraq due to the suppressive efforts of Saddam's government. We set it all in motion with our regime change operation. Which is why I say we are not conducting COIN in Iraq, but are conducting "post-regime change FID."

Agree there was no insurgency -- partly because there was no government to insurge against...

Mostly because of that. What caused the insurgency to develop was, in order of importance to that start:

- A massive Intelligence failure on our part. Saddam told us what he was going to do; arm everyone, release all the prisoners in the jails and go to guerrilla warfare.

- A failure on the part of then CinCCent and the Army to well outline the problems foreseen and, possibly, to allow egos to get in the way of the limited intel that did point to a possible guerrilla fight.

- A failure for over 22 years by the leadership of the Army to really address the issues of IW and the occupation of a foreign nation; this failure led to a failure to have doctrine readily available and to train for those contingencies. This led to Reed's accurate summation of an Army that stood by and twiddled its thumbs and then overreacting as usual and firing at any and everything too promiscuously.

- The CPA and its errant stupidity merely solidified the three foregoing issues and exacerbated all those problems. The installation of the interim government and the subsequent election turned Saddam's IW fight into an insurgency, plus. Got to add in the criminal mischief, the sectarian feud, tribal enmities and all the other things that coexisted with the insurgency.

The first item, Intel failure, is possibly an overstatement but not by much and the error(s) are hard to attribute. The second two items are flatly military error. The fourth item is political and out of the purview of the Armed Forces.

I emphasize that because it was a factor in Korea, in the Congo, in the Dominican Republic in Viet Nam and will always be a factor that the Armed Forces cannot control.

We think we can win by attrition. Kill his fighters and kill the fight. (I am not a fan of the strategy, because those fighters all come from the very populace whose support you are attempting to gain).

You're closer to decision points than I am but I do not get that perception. I do agree that some want to do that -- and I suggest part of that started from somewhere near your current home and the rest came from senior people who've been marginally trained and educated over the past 25 years (the training and education are improving, and rapidly -- but that does not excuse the lapses of senior Flag Officers and civilian leadership from 1975-2002 (with a few rare exceptions like Shy Meyer and John Wickham who the others merely waited out...). My perception is that the majority of the Army (and I include senior folks) does not believe that.

Other'n that, I agree with you...

[Spud]

Sir, all

just like to say thanks for what is probably the most intriguing set of posts on this forum to date (could have something to do with me starting my COIN elective at Staff College shortly )

[slapout9]

Bob's World has often talked about the Civil Rights Movement but many here may not be familiar with it in the way Bob is talking about. Below is the 1963 letter from the Birmingham jail written by Martin Luther King while he was in jail. I highly suggest everyone read it and I think Bob's comments may become clearer.

Among the highlights are MLK's entire Strategy of non-violent Civil Disobedeance....has nothing to do with pacifism. Including the 4 step Strategy Process and The story Bob told about the guy that looses all the fights but wins the war. It is not just a story....it was a planned tactic and the people were specially selected to survive such an event.

Again I encourage everyone to read it as there are numerous lessons about COIN contained in it. And now without further adue MLK Letter From The B'ham(that how we do it down here) Jail.

http://abacus.bates.edu/admin/office...lk/letter.html


Damn it almost forgot the music....The Birmingham Jail

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFPFk...eature=related

[Backwards Observer]

It is interesting to compare the letters of previous great men to the four compass points of bull honky we are subject to in the 21st century.

[Chinghis Khan's letter of invitation to Ch'ang ch'un]

//[p.37] Heaven has abandoned China owing to its haughtiness and extravagant luxury. But I, living in the northern wilderness, have not inordinate passions. I hate luxury and exercise moderation. I have only one coat and one food. I eat the same food and am dressed in the same tatters as my humble herdsmen. I consider the people my //[p.38] children, and take an interest in talented men as if they were my brothers. We always agree in our principles, and we are always united by mutual affection. At military exercises I am always in the front, and in time of battle am never behind. In the space of seven years I have succeeded in accomplishing a great work, and uniting the whole world in one empire. I have not myself dis- tinguished qualities.

But the government of the Kin is inconstant, and therefore Heaven assists me to obtain the throne (of the Kin). The Sung to the south, the Hui ho to the north, the Hia to the east, and the barbarians in the west, all together have acknowledged my supremacy. It seems to me that since the remote time of our shan yü such a vast empire has not been seen. But as my calling is high, the obligations incumbent on me are also heavy; and I fear that in my ruling there may be something wanting. To cross a river we make boats and rudders. Likewise we invite sage men, and choose out assistants for keeping the empire in good order. Since the time I came to the throne I have always taken to heart the ruling of my people; but I could not find worthy men to occupy the places of the three (kung) and the nine (k'ing). With respect to these circumstances I inquired, and heard that thou, master, hast penetrated the truth, and that thou walkest in the path of right. Deeply learned and much experienced, thou hast much explored the laws. Thy sanctity is become manifest. Thou hast conserved the rigorous rules of the ancient sages. Thou art endowed with the eminent talents of celebrated men. For a long time thou hast lived in the caverns of the rocks, and hast retired from //[p.39] the world; but to thee the people who have acquired sanctity repair, like clouds on the path of the immortals, in innumerable multitudes. I knew that after the war thou hadst continued to live in Shan tung, at the same place, and I was always thinking of thee. I know the stories of the returning from the river Wei in the same cart, and of the invitations in the reed hut three times repeated. But what shall I do? We are separated by mountains and plains of great extent, and I cannot meet thee. I can only descend from the throne and stand by the side. I have fasted and washed . I have ordered my adjutant, Liu Chung lu, to prepare an escort and a cart for thee. Do not be afraid of the thousand li. I implore thee to move thy sainted steps. Do not think of the extent of the sandy desert. Commiserate the people in the present situation of affairs, or have pity upon me, and communicate to me the means of preserving life. I shall serve thee myself. I hope that at least thou wilt leave me a trifle of thy wisdom. Say only one word to me and I shall be happy. In this letter I have briefly expressed my thoughts, and hope that thou wilt understand them. I hope also that thou, having penetrated the principles of the great tao, sympathisest with all that is right, and wilt not resist the wishes of the people.

Given on the 1st day of the 5th month (May 15),1219.

http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad...changchun.html

[Oredigger61]

Military Review Article from 1974 on how to Analyze an Insurgency by Roger Darling of the US State Department, this article ties a lot of points made here all together.

Insurgency is a System with 5 main processes.

1-Cause process........Bob's World
2-Intimidation process
3-Resource process
4-Guerrilla action process
5-Collective Psychological process......Cavguy's slide

I taught this for six years at the PHIBSCOLCORO as senior Army representative and course manager for the, then, COIN course.

Small world

[davidbfpo]

Oredigger61,

Welcome aboard, an interesting bio too. Have you a link to the cited Military Review article, even if 1974 pre-web? Secondly what was PHIBSCOLCORO? You will not some of our resident sages cite 're-inventing the wheel' regularly, so a 1974 article comes as not surprise.

[Oredigger61]

The document is preserved in the counterinsurgency library at this link:

http://www.counterinsurgencylibrary....+of+Insurgency

I managed to stay at the Navy's Amphibious School, Coronado during a time when the Army was encouraging folks not to move; I was there for six years and taught COIN the entire time.

A few comments on Darling.

He had the terminology wrong and he figured that out. Insurgency is, in reality, revolution. Darling republished his article a couple years later as, IIRC, "Revolution Examined Anew." He didn't change a word in the article, however.

The more important part of his construct is the "dynamics." The casual and intimidation processes combine as a dynamic of social political participation. Add the resource process to create a dynamic of preserving/gaining resources for the revolution. Add the guerrilla action process to create a dynamic of allowing the government (the other side) the opportunity to dissipate its resources. If that happens then all processes combine into a collective psychological process that drains the government (the other side) of its resources--social, political, economic, and military.

Terror is a tool in two processes: intimidation and guerrilla action. The target is different in each. In the first, the target is the movement's supporters and the populace to guarantee assured participation. In the latter, the target is specifically, and deliberately, the government.

Our lead terror expert was Brian Jenkins. We flew him out twice to tape him and then used the tape. We taught at least ten two-week courses a year.

As I read back through this thread I think the participants get it, but let me state the revolutionary objective explicitly. Revolutionaries do not organize to win, they organize to give the other side, the government, every opportunity to lose.

Further, if a revolution is qualitative (American, Chinese, Russian, Vietnamese, Cuban, e. g.) the revolutionaries know exactly how they are going to govern.

You can't wake up one morning and say, "hey, we've won, now what do we do?"

I have our course handbook from the 1970's and have the goal of getting it uploaded in some fashion. I don't want to use my current website as I want to leave that devoted solely to 9-11.

Thank you for the interest.

Miles Kara

[Rex Brynen]

Terror is a tool in two processes: intimidation and guerrilla action. The target is different in each. In the first, the target is the movement's supporters and the populace to guarantee assured participation. In the latter, the target is specifically, and deliberately, the government.

I think the instrumental (as opposed to rather reflexive and unthinking) use of terrorism serves much broader purposes than "intimidation." It can also be used as an acte de presence to signal arrival on the stage of political-military contestation; as a way of increasing domestic support through inspiration (rather than intimidation); and, closely related to this, as a way of maintaining "market share" in context of competition with other like-minded insurgents.

Terrorism can also be used as a calibrated signal to outside actors or mediators, not only to discourage/punish them for supporting the government, but also to mean such things as "include us in the peace negotiations or we'll make things messy."

Finally, it can be a way of maintaining support from external patrons in exchange for continued support--the sort of "gun for hire" model exemplified by the Abu Nidal organization, for example.

---

Oh, and welcome aboard, Oredigger61!

[Oredigger61]

Rex, yes on all counts.

Darling wrestled a bit with his terminology and settled on "intimidation." His larger construct was the dynamic of social-political participation and he had to account for both the positive (causal) and negative (intimidation) components of that.

Terror is a tool across the spectrum. Quality organizations use it judicially to further organizational goals. Little is happenstance in an organization that knows what it is doing.

The net outcome of the causal-intimidation dynamic in an quality organization is organizational unity, or the appearance thereof to the population. There is a negative or coercive component to, as I said, gain assured participation.

One of my best Colorado School of Mines geology instructors was from McGill. Wished I could remember his name....

[marct]

Hi Miles,

The document is preserved in the counterinsurgency library at this link:

http://www.counterinsurgencylibrary....+of+Insurgency

Thanks for the link!

I have our course handbook from the 1970's and have the goal of getting it uploaded in some fashion. I don't want to use my current website as I want to leave that devoted solely to 9-11.

You shouldn't have any difficulty with finding a place that would host it for you if you hold copyright or if it is in the public domain. I'm pretty sure that it could be posted up here at the SWC if you wanted. On a related note, I would really like to see it if possible, especially since I am teaching a course in counter-insurgency this summer.

Cheers,

Marc

[Oredigger61]

Marc, thank you.

I'll sort out the copyright and intellectual property issues. Much of the student handbook is my writing and the course no longer exists in its previous form, if it exists at all.

Darling was just one of three primary sources we used. The other two were Tom Grassey and David V. J. Bell.

Darling republished his article as "Revolution Examined Anew," part of "A Trio of Articles on Third World Revolution and Development." That trio was published by Lectures-Seminars, 9907 Vale Road, Virginia, 22180. Don't know if that business still exists. No city was given, but that zip code is Northern Virginia. The copyright is by Roger Darling, 1974, and we reprinted with his permission and the permission of "Military Review."

Tom Grassey is now Dr. Tom Grassey, Capt, USN, Retired, PhD, and former editor of the "Naval War College Review." He published "Some Perspectives on Revolution" in the NWCR, Winter 1977 edition, p 19-29. We reprinted with permission. I haven't found a public link to his article.

Grassey's PhD is in contemporary theories of justice. He drew heavily on Aristotle in his article, but also took the time to define the groups in a revolutionary situation and the way they acted. One of Grassey's key points to us was the concept of proportional justice and the distribution of justice, and that, according to Aristotle, justice consisted of treating equals alike and unequals differently, in proportion to their relevant differences.

That led us to David V. J. Bell for a teachable model. David's book should be available in most college libraries. He wrote, "Resistance and Revolution" (York University), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1973.

Let me know if you need more information.

Miles

[marct]

Hi Miles,

Thanks for the references, and I'll see if I can track down copies of the NWCR article. I actually have two COIN courses to design, one at 2bd year and one at 4th year/graduate level. I'm still playing with ideas on how to organize them and what to use. I do know that one of the things I really want to work in is the historical and social dimensions, so I may well be starting it off with Sertorius, since the information on Kahmose and Ahmose is so poor . Basically, since I have to do a lecture version first, I am leaning towards a thematic or functional focus for each lecture and trace it through time, with the last part relating to current operations.

Cheers,

Marc

[Oredigger61]

Marc,

I was not adverse to throwing in a few Milton references to my introductory hour.

Another approach with the advanced class is to bring in the American Revolution. There was an ABC special called "Suddenly An Eagle" starring Lee J. Cobb that was a great teaching vehicle for the processes of revolution and counter-revolution. It came out in the bicentennial era; don't know if it is at all available.

Miles

[Firn]

I think when discussing this issues it is important to keep in mind what the specific actors wanted and why they used violence to reach their goals. I will try to keep it short and rough. It is of course my very personal opinion.

a) The founders and most prominent members of the Taliban claimed that they want to create a religious model state, out of the shattered reality of Afghanistan (and other regions as well). To reach this idealistic goal in a war-torn and violent Afghanistan violence was a considered to be a necessity.

b) The USA wanted to revenge 09/11 and to punish those who supported an ideology which claimed to revenge the misdeeds of the West and especially the USA against the Islamic world. To do so in a foreign country a good deal of violence was needed.

After the rapid sweep across Afghanistan for many in the USA 9/11 had been revenged to a large extent. The Taliban lost on the other hand their hold over a land they considered theirs. The existence as an organisation and as individuals was greatly threatened. But many won that struggle for survival, could regroup and had a very clear aim nearby to fulfill their political ambitions.


If we consider this very simple construct it makes pretty much sense that the former have a far greater focus on the political aspect as the latter. The Taliban fight for a clear political goal in a region which they consider to be their homeland. The USA (and many other countries) increasingly tried to give the impression of doing some good in a far-away land. For most Americans and Europeans it quickly became a forgotten war, supported by meager ressources.


Firn