SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Marc

Keep in mind though that I was ref. CENTCOM's response to Peter's question - and it was oriented as you noted to the specific mission in Afghanistan. I do think it requires a regional perspective to really consider the capabilities and capacities required - and moreover to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time. AfPak is a good example, however more broadly - what are the requirements to enable a strategy for interdicting enemy recruiting, traiing and basing grounds abroad, and how can you disrupt or interupt their movements (both physical and others) between locations - this quickly gets into all oj our USG resources, and is contingent to a large degree on muli-lateral support.

As such, I think there is a signifcant component of developing partner security forces to this end, however there are other areas that must be considered as well.

You are correct in bringing up the unique nature in each set of conditions and that sustainable security can take multiple forms - however they must be weighed in light of the outcomes you can tolerate.

Marc considered:

This tightness of focus will, IMHO, cause the adoption of some seriously flawed assumptions for SFA. The one that is running around in my head right now is the flawed assumption that "nationality" is the pre-eminent component of identity (vs., say, kinship, ethnicity, religion, etc.). If we assume that a lot of SFA is taking place in so-called "fragile states", i.e. ones that never really developed a strong, unitary "national character", then it strikes me that this is a fatal flaw, since those other elements of identity (think of them as the bases of motivational factors)

This can't be just about SFA (although as a developmental activity its a great place to discuss it) - this is much more broadly the issue of all the actions we take to achieve a policy end. I will say that design supports considering this more broadly and the risks associated with one COA over another (of which one may be doing nothing as to not make things worse).

Lets asssume that design uncovered the issues you brought up - but your requirement to extend security in order to deny safehaven remained. The process of design may lead you alternative ways of doing this, and requirements that pop out of the SFA LOE and into the governance and/or economic (or whatever LOEs you are using in your campaign design). There might be a requirment for political accomodation with a tribe that is currently excercising a form of self government - but which might support some assistance in other areas. The possibilities are as numerous as the range of conditions, however our tolerance may not allow us to accept all of them.

SFA is really a force employment concept to support whatever ends are decided on, the process of campaign design though is what is supposed to frame how you can best achieve those ends. e.g. it may tell you that if you extend security in this area, you need to consider what are the implications to the adjacent areas. It may telll you that at the moment the conditions do not support a preferred COA, but you may be able to do other things that shape the outcome in the meantime - e.g. if country X says "no way" to your assistance - maybe he'll accept support from somebody else who is willing or desires your assistance. We often get myopic in the way we approach a problem and don't look at the alternative ways to solve it because it does not seem direct enough - design supports identifying the correct problem and then looking at that problem from multiple perspectives to consider the range of possibilities.

WRT to SFA - Design lends itself well to it because of the nature of development which may include a siginificant timeline where conditions can be greatly altered based on interaction. This I think is really beneficial when trying to establish a rational for generating one capability over another.

Hope that answered you questions - I'll forward you the UNCLASS design guide based on the work I did. Its not perfect - really more of a functional design, but it does get at the logic wrt identifying requirments.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Bob's World said:

If you have defined the problem incorrectly, no matter how terrific your answer is to flawed analysis, you will have to be very lucky indeed for it to achieve your intended effect.

I do not disagree. This is why I think design is the way to go. Now it may not change the nature of the policy, but it may provide the operational commander the analysis to argue for a different end, or at least argue for patience.

As for it being the flaw in SFA as a concept - I'd say that SFA is just a force employment concept - e.g. a set of capabilities which enable a given operational appraoch or COA.

SFA developmental objecitves are set within that, and the definition states that SFA should be part of a comprehensive whole of government approach - that is unless you already had a good enough partner in other areas and were just adding some new capabilities (e.g. not a stability op) and might not need it.

I'd add that the goal of SFA is to create sustainable capabilities and capacities in security, and that requires instituional development along with the teeth. This gets to why the assessment methodology must include an organizational assessment, an operational environment assessment and an institutonal assessment. You have to have all three. If the institutional assessment tells you for example that the ministries will not be capable of supporting the capability and capacity you are developing, then either set your sites lower, or be prepared to pony up for temporary successes which you bear the burden of sustaining (or you could cut your losses).

Perhaps we need look no further than OIF to consider the challenges associated with instituion building - I think employing something like design would help us navigate that better. WRT OEF - we just said that the Afghan security forces needed to be doubled - is this in light of them being able to do what they need to do? Using design could we have seen that earlier. Or is it just a matter of changing our objectives? What are the requirements for the partner govt. to sustain a force of that size? Could design help there?

Finally I'd note that we don't always get to pick the end - or shape the conditions, we just have to find a way to bring it a conclusion we can live with. If design is done before hand - other choices which result in options that allow us to consider how bad we really want it (and size accordingly) may be possible, but all to often we miss the boat - as Ken White noted on another thread - "fire breaks and prevention make life easier" - otherwise we have to make some tough choices.



Best, Rob

[Bob's World]

Rob,

You're doing great work, and I assure you, there are leaders at SOCOM far senior and smarter than I that hang a great deal of hope on SFA. I just think they look at it very differently than it is being looked at within the conventional force. They see all the shades of goodness from a career of doing this business, and know how horribly limiting our current funding and authorities are for getting out and engaging with and building relations with security forces around the world. SFA is a vehicle to enable FID to rise to the next level, a level more appropriate for the world as it exists today. The actual training is only about half of the benefit.

Marc,

I was fortunate to attend conference on "Grand Strategy After War" hosted by Duke University, with many notable speaker/attendees like Dr John Gaddis of Yale, and Dr. Kratzner of Stanford. After a couple days of discussing grand strategy, I asked "Does Grand Strategy require a threat?" It was something these guys really hadn't considered because it has always been crafted as such. The "politics of fear" and all.

This is part of what is mentally slowing us down today. The world remains a dangerous place, but no matter how hard we try to get some state or some non-state to play "threat" for us to allow us to apply the old model and make the old strategies work, it just doesn't make sense. Today the things that threaten your nation the most are not other states and not non-state UW guys like bin laden. It is this globalization empowered and connected mix of "things" going on all over the world. At the middle of all of those things are people. People empowered like never before, people connected like never before.

Deterring the Soviets really when all was said and done only required that we deter one man. Today "deterrence" means deterring people everywhere. Infinitely more complex. Requries bold new thinking and bold new approaches. Bigger hammers won't do it. More security will never be enough security. It means we must not only be strong, but we must also be good. We've not been so good of late. Justified by the Cold War for a while, but then just running wild during the Clinton years, then justified by GWOT, but now once again that has worn thin.

Remember when the use of military force by the US was a rare and very big deal?

Most Americans don't.