SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)

[Bob's World]

or we'll get nothing done...

Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what...

More importantly, as JMM noted:Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.

Until the Department of Defense was created...

"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

In other words, the organization conducting UW (the French in the American Revolution with the Rebels, or the British in the American Revolution with the Indians, or the Americans in GWOT with the Northern Alliance, etc) may act VERY conventionally themselves, as may the force they are manipulating to serve their mutual objectives.

The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.

[jmm99]

"5.1 France and Great Britain on the Eve of American Independence" - at the end, but it did start that way with Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co (the $2000 suit folks).

But then came Saratoga and French recognition of the new nation-state and its government:

The Continental Army put Beaumarchais' supplies to good use. The defeat of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army on October 17, 1777, to Horatio Gates at Saratoga, was a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War. It was won by American soldiers, even if 90% of the gunpowder used had been supplied by and paid for by France, and was used in French M 1763-66 pattern (Charleville) muskets, which by then had become standard in the Continental Army. The victory at Saratoga proved to the French that the American rebellion could be sustained with a possibility of success.

News of Burgoyne's capitulation reached Paris in the evening of December 4, 1777; on the 17th Vergennes promised to recognize the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, with or without Spanish support. On January 30, the king authorized the Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat Conrad Alexandre Gérard to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and a secret Treaty of Alliance on his behalf. On February 6, 1778,Gérard carried out the order and Deane, Franklin, and Lee signed for the United States.

By these treaties, France offered "to maintain … the liberty, sovereignty, and independence" of the United States in case of war between her and Great Britain. France promised to fight on until the independence of the United States was guaranteed in a peace treaty. All the United States had to do in exchange was not "conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained.

Not unlike Astan (USSR 1979- & US 2001-) in these respects: UW > new govt > CW. The last type of warfare turned out rather badly for the Sovs.

And looking back, by the time the French assistance, whether conventional or unconventional, had ended, France had spent livres 1,000,000,000; and was on its way to bankruptcy and the French Revolution (hmm ... similar to the USSR).

Are there some lessons for today ?

Final thought:

Since it is Memorial Day, we might want to remember the French sailors and soldiers, whether conventional or unconventional, who made the difference at Yorktown. All in the same boat together - colonialement.

(from above link)

From Yorktown's ruins, ranked and still,
Two lines stretch far o'er vale and hill:
Who curbs his steed at head of one?
Hark! The low murmur: WASHINGTON!

Who bends his keen approving glance
Where down the gorgeous line of France
Shine knightly star and plume of snow?
Thou too art victor, ROCHAMBEAU!

John Greenleaf Whittier

PS: Tyrrell, somewhere (in looking at my wife's genealogy), I have William Johnson as part of the Ulster Shane O'Neills (Shane = John). If you have anything on that, drop me a PM. And, BTW, my ancestor Nick (Aubry dit Francoeur) also squared off against Johnson's troops in 1755 - Baron Dieskau's Defeat at Lake George. You won that one; but we took the Windmill.

[slapout9]

It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

[jmm99]

from Slap
That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

in some cases (e.g., Guatamala 1954), civilian agency based warfare (if you want to call disinformation and destablization "warfare"). BTW: Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co were civilian.

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

Long-term negative blowback from short-term operational success.

[jmm99]

Here we have a listing (more focused on upstate NY, but including other NY units, with brief mention of units from other states) of: NY Frontier Loyalists; Downstate Loyalists; and Other Loyalists.

Note that, for the much greater part, these were authorized units (that is, regular units within the Laws of War of that time, and probably still today) - soldiers of the Crown serving their King as British citizens.

Certainly, the RW was more a civil war than anything else, as you can see by following the various links here (including Tyrrell's ancestor), and here.

PS: The source of much US Ranger (SOF) mythology is the unit known as Rogers' Rangers of the French & Indian War. What is not generally well known (see in link "Other Loyalists") is that the RW Queen's Rangers was a regiment originally raised on August 16, 1776 by the same Robert Rogers.

Command passed from Rogers to Lt. Col. Christopher French in 1777, followed by Major James Wemyss of the 40th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at Germantown. The Queen's Rangers achieved its greatest fame (or notoriety, depending on your viewpoint) under the leadership of John Graves Simcoe, first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada. Simcoe took command of the Rangers on October 15, 1777.
...
The unit was later placed on the Regular British rolls as part of the "American Establishment" in May 1779 and renumbered as the First American Regiment.

The Queen's Rangers were stationed in New York until sent to Charlestown in April 1780, returning to New York in June. The Rangers returned to south in December as part of Arnold's expedition to Virginia. After this they became part of Cornwallis' army, eventually surrendering at Yorktown.

and from Wiki:

At the outbreak of the American Revolution at Lexington and Concord, former Rangers were among the Minutemen firing at the British. After these events, Robert Rogers offered his help to the commander of the Colonial Army, George Washington. Washington refused, fearing that Rogers was a spy because Rogers had just returned from a long stay in England. Rogers was infuriated by this and did indeed join the British--forming the Queen's Rangers (1776) and later the King's Rangers.

So, should we look at Rogers via British law and politics (a patriot), or via American law and politics (a traitor) - or should we simply ignore law and politics, as some might suggest ?

[slapout9]

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

jmm99,
No, because the situation was to unstable to take the risk. But that is based on hindsight. Plus everything is a system to me. I don't care if they have uniforms or don't. I look at the effect being achieved, if they perform the functions of a soldier that is all I need to know.

Wilf is right when he says we have to many words for what are essentially Infantry operations actually EBO (Effects Based Operations) to me. Just my opinion, which is why I push systems thinking, makes things a lot simpler and clearer.

[jmm99]

from Slap
No, because the situation was to unstable to take the risk. But that is based on hindsight.

agreed on this one - the "hindsight" point (where everything is 20-20 ).

Serious question, how do you evaluate the systems (plural) in play during the RW ? And to what end result or results ?

I look at it as a lawyer and see at least two: British Crown (including the Loyalists) and the Rebel Americans (with France as a co-belligerent).

But, I'm not into systems analysis as a formal discipline. Thus, the question, which seems pertinent to that with what Rob started this thread.

[slapout9]

agreed on this one - the "hindsight" point (where everything is 20-20 ).

Serious question, how do you evaluate the systems (plural) in play during the RW ? And to what end result or results ?

I look at it as a lawyer and see at least two: British Crown (including the Loyalists) and the Rebel Americans (with France as a co-belligerent).

But, I'm not into systems analysis as a formal discipline. Thus, the question, which seems pertinent to that with what Rob started this thread.

Have to go do my honey do list Will answer shortly.

[Bob's World]

If I were to apply design to this particular problem set (not to SFA...that is just one potential solution or line of operation that I could shape to apply to some aspects of the larger problem once I had achieved a fuller understanding through the design process), I may well start by simply writing the three parties ID'd my JMM99 on a big whiteboard in a triange formation about 3' apart. Circle each.

Those three big circles could be connected by arrows running each way, with description of the nature of the enagement/perspective each way.

Then go ahead and Cluster around each node the key sub-parts, with their particular perspectives that made them unique. Attempt to connect these as well with the same identification of the perspectives/relationships on the lines. Key individuals and groups.

Then step back and look at it for a while and discuss it with your team. Not looking for solutions, just trying to gain an understanding of the dynamics at work.

Add environmentals. Economic, political, cultural, etc.

It's a journey. You add layers of information to your initial simple model increasing the complexity of data so that you can begin to work your way back to a simple, but far more accurate, understanding of the nature of the problem(s).

You may have began the drill with the mission of "prepare an SFA campaign build capacity and capability in the American security forces so that they can defeat the British and secure their independence."

By the time you have worked through the design process you may well have determined that such capacity is not the missing ingredient at all, and in fact a very different action of policy or perhaps a military action, etc is actually what will achieve your intended purpose.

Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.

The purpose of design isn't to figure out how to apply a particular wrench, it is to understand the complex internal workings and relationships that make up a fully functional vehicle. May turn out it just needs gas.

But I would recommend strongly against simply dragging the driver out of the vehicle and jumping in with the guys family and driving off. No matter how poor of a driver he may have been, or how poorly he may of been maintaining the vehicle such actions are rarely appreciated and sure to produce unintended difficulties...

[jmm99]

the posts are moving so fast today it's hard to keep up.

Good point on bias, perception, etc., and:

Some of this I think is what we often call surprise, but may just as often be willful ignorance in that either we did not believe what we were seeing, or that we disregarded the evidence in favor of predisposition.

Recently, Ken and I had a little sidebar re: Chinese POWs in Korea (late Oct 1950) and FECOM C2's refusal to recognize the threat they posed. Knew I'd seen the story before; and lo and behold, in Fehrenbach's This Kind of War (p.315) is a Wide World photo (7 Nov 1950) of Ned Almond (Ken's Corps CO) talking to one of them, big as life (actually, the Chicom is pretty small). Almond knew they were Chinese; but Willloughby disregarded reality in favor of the dogmatic perception of Tokyo HQ.

Agreed, it usually is not that clear; and your job (to something I can relate) is like a hot day on a 200 yd bench rest range where the scope picture looks more like a fishbowl of roiling water.

------------------------
Hey, as to Laura Secord, here's a Wiki. She illustrates a point about civil wars - and probably relevant to Astan. Laura's husband James (officer in Loyalist Butler's Rangers) was a relative (distant cousin) of my wife's ggg-grandmother. The Secor (Secord; originally Sicard) family was of French Huguenot ancestry (Ambrose Sicard coming to NY in the 1600s). During the RW, the family split into Loyalists (James, etc.), Neutralists and Rebels (my wife's side). New York was a mess of conflicting people.

I don't know where you put all that into a plan. Hire a Pashtun genealogist, I suppose.

Tis a complicated world you have to plan for. We do appreciate it (which is why we sent you and pay you the big bucks :).

[Rob Thornton]

Originally Posted by jmm99

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities

. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

I think this is what design can do for you. It does not mean that it will, it just means that as a investigative, learning tool , design can help you more accurately identify points of friction, convergent and divergent points, tolerance levels, etc.

JMM's point about the world of full spectrum planner and in an ideal world is a good one. The GIGO model is a good place to start as what you learn often depends on the knowledge that you been begin with - this is an area we could probably do better in if we cultivated multiple form of engagement that could feed a learning model vs. the natural types of compartmentalization we seem to enforce. However, there is also the issue of the willingness to learn and acknowledge natural bias - this is no small cultural issue as often the desire and pressure to just do something often overrule better judgment -e.g. just because we can does not mean we should.

The last question JMM asks is the reality of policy. Many times the policy requirements (CvC - the attraction to the object in view) are so great as to be immediate. Some of this I think is what we often call surprise, but may just as often be willful ignorance in that either we did not believe what we were seeing, or that we disregarded the evidence in favor of predisposition. Ken has made the point in many other threads about the poor decisions ref. US AID and USIS. I bring this up because of the discussion on other threads about "networks of networks" - multiple organizations doing multiple things on multiple levels touch different networks and can thicken them. Provided the information is analyzed for relevance to strategic (and operational if an operation is underway) questions, the ability to shape the conditions may be greater then if we wait to the point where its a contingency and positions are hardened (Means + Will = Resistance).

Also Marc T - who was Laura Secord?

[Ken White]

"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...

The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.

Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere.

I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.

So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US???

[Bob's World]

Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere.

I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.

So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US???

I started off with a reply to you, then switched gears into a tutorial for the broader SWJ audiance. Realized it looked like I was preaching to the choir, but certainly wasn't the intent. Doing pushup now....


As to your question though: Both. We absolutely wanted the French to renew their war with England so that England couldn't focus so much attention on us.

Goes back to mapping all this complexity out in the design process. A whole lot of time spent on understanding the problem saves a whole lot more time and energry pursuing sadly flawed COAs.

Back in the days before GPS I learned the hard way that spending at extra 5 minutes plotting my next move twice, and studying the map for the type of terrain and vegetation I was likely to encounter, looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away. Yet I always saw other guys do a quick plot, ruck up and move out.

I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.

[jmm99]

sayeth the honorable Chinese gentleman: "It seems there may just be three independent constructs (of Initial Grand Strategy) in one armed conflict, with adaptations and changes to come. Obviously, a product of the inscrutable Western mind."

We should have Geoff Corn in this discussion (crediits there for the basic three ring intersection, which I keep using for stuff).

Who is screwing (conning, assisting) whom ? That is the question, sayeth the Bard.

[jmm99]

from BW
Back in the days before GPS I learned the hard way that spending at extra 5 minutes plotting my next move twice, and studying the map for the type of terrain and vegetation I was likely to encounter, looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away.

and it provided an opportunity to smoke a Camel (parental guidance - from my dad, love of maps & charts - and smoking Camels).

But, life is easier and no get lost by sticking to local swamps. But, if you have to go into a furriner swamp, then this makes sense:

I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.

where I will stop - cuz a rant is about to gush forth about a few furriner swamps.

[Rob Thornton]

Bob's World wrote:

Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.

If it comes down to confusing FID with SFA ala wrenches, then I think we're missing the point. Recently some folks came up to participate in a BCBL experiment with the guidance " when someone says SFA you say FID", after we were done they understood that when FID is called for as a mission based on its definition - then call it FID. FID is still a very useful construct.

If we are going to use this analogy, then SFA might better be described as the range of sockets for building sustainable security forces capability and capacities with the missions and authorities as the wrench - and at least with respect to our policy objectives - the USG as the head mechanic. In this analogy - you may or may not own the garage, but you are sure to have to work on many types and makes of vehicles, and under a variety of conditions - as such SFA is about having the right tool(s) available at the right time. FID is still very relevant as a policy tool when the objectives and conditions require it as a mission - as such it might be considered in this analogy as the way the mechanic works on the car, or the end his work supports .

We may just have to agree to disagree - which is OK - ultimately the distinction matters far less then being able to fully meet the operational requirements in this area, and there is more preventing us from doing that then just terminology.

Best, Rob

PS- JMM - good stuff on Laura Secord - I got interested in her after I heard her story. The Canadian perspective on North American military history is one we don't get much of down here.

[slapout9]

sayeth the honorable Chinese gentleman: "It seems there may just be three independent constructs (of Initial Grand Strategy) in one armed conflict, with adaptations and changes to come. Obviously, a product of the inscrutable Western mind."

We should have Geoff Corn in this discussion (crediits there for the basic three ring intersection, which I keep using for stuff).

Who is screwing (conning, assisting) whom ? That is the question, sayeth the Bard.

Close but no cigar. just popped in nemeorial day BBQ is almost over and I will explain my point later, but really good stuff so far.

[slapout9]

Here goes. There is your system....the enemy system(s) and the system in which the conflict/event will take place. You should start with the largest system and work down. If you did this the security force I would support would be the INDIANS!!!

The 3 rings map is good, (ASCOPE or Warden;s Rings would have been better)I would have drawn a LARGER circle around all of them and start putting in what is already there(you would have found the Injuns this way). This is a common error to skip the largest system and get right down to the ops and tactics. But I have a 3x5 (really) card to follow on Grand Strategy to catch myself.

The problem started on step 4 not the best place to begin. But I don't know how the Army does Design.

Burp....full of BBQ.

[Rob Thornton]

Bob's World wrote:

My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.

Here we do agree. Building sustainable capabilities and capacities of foreign security forces that do not represent a legitimate authority by may buy you some time, but probably will not in itself resolve internal political problems.

Context Matters -

Although that may not have been your objective - I say may not because your objective may have nothing to do with defeating an insurgency - but may be in fact to offset a regional actor, disrupt transnational LOCs, create additional capacity in a partner. Once you increase sustainable capability and capacity it may get used in a number of ways, some you probably did not anticipate -here again design may help you look at the range of possible outcomes and even if the policy course is set, at least you will have a better idea of what might be on the horizon.

WRT to the design guide here - this case this was mostly a functional design, meaning that while it did lay out some elements of an operational approach, the details of what to do and why have to come from the hard work of doing a full blown operational design (this is where you inject context) complete with all the relevant LOEs.

Part of the reason I thought a focus on identifying the functional requirements was useful is because it helps you consider the organizational, environmental, and institutional requirements of the FSF to generate, employ and sustain. It seems we often get caught up in a "generate enough for us to employ" loop since it suits our immediate objectives while not looking at the long term requirements.

One of the things that does come to light using operational design for any LOE is the issue of contingent objectives - e.g. you get to points where its unlikely the next thing you want to accomplish in one LOE can occur until there is progress in another LOE -could be economics, could be politics or governance. Doing this ahead of time in an operational design would seem to support unity of effort across the USG and multinational partners.

This may be one of the reasons (there are others) we seem to be having a hard time meeting operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are doing this on a large scale and by extension one where our internal political clock has such an impact. I'm not sure we fully understand this issue of contingent development in its operational context. In smaller operations where the footprint is small and largely flys under the domestic political radar (meaning its not threatening anyone's re-election), and where normal USG support has not been subject to the type of contingency where it is truncated or diminished to the point where we now feel compelled to act immediately - the issue of contingent development has more time to surface and be addressed. When it is a matter of the converse, such a misstep can result in a major set back that makes further development more difficult as both internal pressures compounded by enemy activity, and regional politics as well as our own domestic politics compound the issues.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

I started off with a reply to you, then switched gears into a tutorial for the broader SWJ audiance. Realized it looked like I was preaching to the choir, but certainly wasn't the intent.

Us elder statespersons are s'posed to dispense all our hard earned wisdom...

looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away.

Agree with all that save the pace count and azimuth -- never used the former and only very,very, rarely the latter. Study that map well enough and you don't need such marginal aids, the terrain will guide you.

I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.

Agreed. Time and politics permitting...

No on can ignore time constraints (real or imposed). You and I can ignore politics. Governments cannot.