SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)

[Bob's World]

If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it) it might look like this - end = deny sanctuary to X-national extremists, ways = Afghan Security Capability and Capacity, means = OTERA (SFA as a force employment concept).

This better than most gets to what is probably the biggest rock in my craw about SFA: It is premised on this VERY VERY flawed equation being true.

If you have defined the problem incorrectly, no matter how terrific your answer is to flawed analysis, you will have to be very lucky indeed for it to achieve your intended effect.

This is a very Threat-Centric perspective. Build the capacity of host nation security forces to (presumably physically) deny sanctuary to extremists and you win. I can't think of a single historic example of where this has achieved more than just a temporal effect. One has to address underlying causes of such populace-based conflict in order to achieve an enduring effect. Security is a supporting effort.

I would offer as a far more effective strategic equation: End ="Good"* Afghan Governance free from perceptions of US legitimacy = vastly reduced US footprint with complete subjugation of remaining US military operations being in support of Afghan security forces = focus on development of afghan governance as main effort with at least a half of foreign assistance to that end coming from (hold your breath - )Iran.

Key is to understand that "good governance" as used by me does not mean "effective" on some objective measurement of services, but subjectively how the populace feels about the governance. Populaces will rise up in insurgency when they perceive a major problem that they also perceive that they have not legimate means to resolve. So, success does not come from massive efforts to "fix" governance and battalions of "metrics" gathers; instead it comes from addressing perceptions, polling populaces to understand and facilitate host nation efforts to address their concerns, and ensuring that reliable mechanisms to address grievances exist.

One can graph out every single populace's relationship with its respecitve government on a simple x-y graph; with "violence" on the y-axis and "poor governance" on the x-axis. Most would plot in a big scatter in the lower left hand corner, but trending upward on the violence scale as one moves outward on the poor governance scale. To take a country like afghanistan and simply suppress the insurgent without addressing the conditions of poor governance merely artifically moves it staight down on the y-axis without moving back on the x-axis. Once that artificial suppression is removed (take Yugoslavia, for example) the violence will rapidly shoot straight back up to a high level.

As an interesting side note:
from a recent Gallup poll conducted in Afghanistan:

Single Greatest Problem for Afghans today (open-ended answers):

1. The Economy (41%)

2. Unemployment (16%)

3. Security (12%)

4. Rising and high living costs since international community presence (8.5%)



Lack of Leadership Alternatives:



Most Trusted Person in Afghanistan:


1. Karzai (25%)

2. No one (22%)

3. Ramazan Bashardost (7%)

4. Younus Qanoni (7%)

5. Ali Ahmad Jalali (6%)



Most desirable election outcome:



Who should be in charge of Afghanistan?:

1. New government (53%)

2. Foreign Forces NATO/ISAF (26%)

3. Present Government (10%)

4. Other (5%)

5. Clerics (1%)

6. Taliban (1%)



Importance and Popularity of Iran



How important for Afghanistan is a strong relationship with ____ country?


1. Iran (59%)

2. US (50%)

3. India & Pakistan (both on 45%)


Which country do you feel closest to? (open-ended answers):

- 41% of all responses put Iran as most admired country

- 62% have family connections in Iran

- 35% of Afghans would move to Iran as their first-choice destination


Role of the Taliban:

Is the Taliban having a negative effect on the country?

- Yes: 78%

Is Pakistan supporting the Taliban?

- Yes: 53%

US approval Rating:

- Even Split: 48% approve ; 48% disapprove

[marct]

Hi Bob's World,

This better than most gets to what is probably the biggest rock in my craw about SFA: It is premised on this VERY VERY flawed equation being true.
....
This is a very Threat-Centric perspective. Build the capacity of host nation security forces to (presumably physically) deny sanctuary to extremists and you win. I can't think of a single historic example of where this has achieved more than just a temporal effect. One has to address underlying causes of such populace-based conflict in order to achieve an enduring effect. Security is a supporting effort.

You know, I think we agree on a lot of things (especially the importance of perception). I would, however, like to take your comment and, since I really believe that battlespaces are much larger than tend to be generally discussed, toss it into what I believe is one of the primary battlespaces for all current and (immediate) future US conflicts: the homeland political debate.

I would argue that ever since the Crimean War, one of the key battlespaces is homeland politics. This, BTW, is much more than a simplistic concept such as "national will" since it should be taken as a dynamic model.

So, I would suggest that for the US home population, at least for those who vote and are involved in the political process, about the only way to get them to agree to a war is to wave a bloody flag and induce fear. This absolutely requires three things:

1. the existence of a credible "threat";
2. the perceived belief that that threat could "hurt us"; and
3. a political-military strategy that "guarenbtees" that the homeland voting populace will not get "hurt".

This final point becomes crucial when we are talking about how SFA is packaged. I would argue that it must be packaged as threat-based due to political considerations at home. Let me take this a step further, and note that the "threat", at least in the political battlesphere, doesn't have to be a physical threat; it can be a "threat to propriety". For a recent example of this type of threat, look at how the role of women in Afghanistan has been constructed in the Western media to both justify and further military intervention in Afghanistan. Even though I disagree with a lot of what he writes, Max Forte has a really good analysis of this up on his blog.

Think about the problem-centric position you are taking (which, BTW, I happen to agree with !). Can you imagine trying to "sell" it politically? Try the following rhetorical argument on for size and see how it flies:

I know! We have an unemployment rate of roughly 8%, but our national secruity requires that we invade X! Terrorists based in X have attacked our interests abroad, and the only way we can stop these mad dogs is to ensure a 100% employment rate in X!

Ya know, it ain't gonna sell . So what is the US left with? An argument on "principle"? Sorry, but that isn't going to cut it either (Darfur anyone?). In the only battlespace that counts for most politicians, then, it has to be threat-based. And what, pray tell, do you think that these self-same political gurus will do to generals who disagree or who frame campaigns in terms they don't like?

[/rant]

Sorry for the rant and the sarcasm, but sometimes they are the best way to make a point. In this case, and because the US military is sub-ordinant to civilian political control, that means that the politicians define the campaign master narrative, not the military folks who a) have to carry it out and b) probably know a lot better than the politicians.

[slapout9]

[QUOTE=Bob's World;72310]
Key is to understand that "good governance" as used by me does not mean "effective" on some objective measurement of services, but subjectively how the populace feels about the governance. Populaces will rise up in insurgency when they perceive a major problem that they also perceive that they have not legimate means to resolve. So, success does not come from massive efforts to "fix" governance and battalions of "metrics" gathers; instead it comes from addressing perceptions, polling populaces to understand and facilitate host nation efforts to address their concerns, and ensuring that reliable mechanisms to address grievances exist.

TE]

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

[Bob's World]

[QUOTE=slapout9;72326]

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

I think of the presence of "poor governance" as causation.

I think of the spark that falls on a populace experiencing poor governance as motivation.

We tend to focus on the spark. Leaders, ideology, etc. Without the existence of causation such motivation is benign. But the spark is what is on the surface, what is easy to see, to measure. We focus on the spark. It draws the eye.

The key is to remove the fuel. But the fuel is made up of our own failures, and to remove the fuel you must first not only recognize the fuel but take responsibility for it. This is why most COIN efforts are either failures or long drawn out affairs. Because insurgency happens when governance fails, and most governments would really just prefer to blame the problem on the spark or the portion of the populace in flames.

When some other country is experiencing this, it comes to your door as well if you are perceived as the source of legitimacy of that failed government. This is the true root of GWOT. Failed governments across the Middle East, populaces experiencing poor governance, and the US seen as a major source of legitimacy of those governments. The US seen as an obstacle to achieving good governance.

[Ken White]

One thought might bear a deeper look...

I agree generally with your three post-Crimean things but strongly believe that in the US the threat need not be that credible for most; the ability to hurt us is subject to many vagaries; and -- define 'hurt.'

We don't categorize that easily. I know many that would subscribe totally to your descriptions; I know as many or quite probably more who don't need those things. We're a rather belligerent crew for the most part...

That said, there's no question in my mind that domestic politics drive our wars nor is there any question that the recent ones have seen what you say postulated or used by the whoever was in charge (to one degree or another and even if very flakily for the last few Presidents...). So I agree that's been the method here -- I just do not agree that, for the US, going to war absolutely requires those things.

Bob's world asks a good question:

"Remember when the use of military force by the US was a rare and very big deal?"

His answer is also good -- most American do not remember such a time.

This probably is not a good place for my anti Goldwater-Nichols rant...

[Bob's World]

In August of 1990 I signed in to 2/5 SFG at Ft Campbell, KY, a brand new SF Captain fresh from the Q Course. The place was a bee hive of activity as the Iraqi Army had just rolled into Kuwait the week prior.

At one point in my in-processing I stood in the battalion Doc's office shoulder to shoulder with a Sergeant First Class, both of us with our asses bared in preparation for the dreaded Gamma Globulin shot the Doc was preparing for us.

SFC A. turned and looked at me, eyebrow raised,and asked "so, you're just signing in?"

"yes"

"Son of a b_____!, he muttered as he shook his head in mild disgust. "Of all the dumb luck. I've been here 12 years waiting for this, and you come in and get it on day one."

At the time the only guys in 5th SFG with CIBs were a handful of senior NCOs and warrant officers. Times have changed. Neither one us realized as we stood there leaning up against the wall taking that dose of peanut butter-like GG in our backsides that we were standing at a transition point in time.

The Cold War was officially over, we just didn't realize it yet. We were just excited to be getting our chance.

Some people visualize the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. I visualize a bare office with beige brickblock walls and metal furniture and a conversation with a couple of great NCOs.

[marct]

Hi Folks,

First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for .

This is part of what is mentally slowing us down today. The world remains a dangerous place, but no matter how hard we try to get some state or some non-state to play "threat" for us to allow us to apply the old model and make the old strategies work, it just doesn't make sense. Today the things that threaten your nation the most are not other states and not non-state UW guys like bin laden. It is this globalization empowered and connected mix of "things" going on all over the world. At the middle of all of those things are people. People empowered like never before, people connected like never before.

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

Slap, I would certainly agree that that should certainly have a place in it.

I do, however, think that it is crucial, at least for me since I have a tendency to go from A to T without bothering with intermediate steps, to lay out exactly how I view these things. First, I view Grand Strategy as operating in a global environment. Ideally, it should also have some decent, long term (50-100 year) goals that can best be described as Philosophical - "Principles" as it were which are (hopefully) shared by both the military and the political spheres and, ideally, with the majority of the population.

Second, threat categorization, at the Grand Strategic level, needs to distinguish between competitors and opponents. Competitors agree to play by (very) roughly the same rules, while opponents reject those rules. NB: I am talking about rules of competition, not Grand Strategic goals.

Third, and again on the threat categorization level (i.e. "perception"), since no one will agree to play be exactly the same rules (otherwise we could just resolve conflicts via poker games), we all have to be aware that most of the players involved in the Great Game are not nation states: some are supra-national NGOs (e.g. the Red Cross / Red Crescent, various religious organizations, trans-national corporations, etc.), some are regional or local [sub-national] NGOs, while some are communities of interest / practice. What this means is that the de facto reality of NGOs (in the broad sense) as players must be recognized and they have to be held to account to play by the rules. So, if we adopt Slaps suggested Motive Means and Opportunity model, it needs to be applied here.

Fourth, Bob's World is exactly correct that changes in primarily communications technology, coupled with rapid changes in production technology (the economic and perceptual core of Globalization) are generating most of the perceptual difficulties at the Grand Strategic level and the lived reality difficulties on the ground. Central to this problem are two bits of culture lag: unequal changes in distribution technologies and cultural perceptions of scarcity.

Let me touch on the first one of these. Distribution technologies have not kept pace with communications technologies. In effect, anyone can "see" or "experience" (vicariously I admit) a lifestyle that most cannot access physically. This ability of individuals to perceive will, in many cases, also lead to a comparison of that perception with a perception of their daily lives. This comparison, in turn, leads to several things.

• First, a perception that the State (i.,e. their government) has "failed" them because a) they don't have it and b) they are constantly being bombarded with messages that say it is the State's responsibility to provide them.
• Second, the possibility of a perception that the State cannot provide these resources because it is being "opposed" / "oppressed" by some other State or interest group.
• Third, the possibility of generating focused anger and hatred of another State based on jealousy.

These potential reactions leave a populace open to manipulation by politicians (loosely speaking to include religious "leaders" as well).

Let me touch on the "scarcity" issue, now, since it is actually much more dangerous. Let me start by saying that even since, roughly, 200 years after we, as a species, developed horticulture, we have been perceiving resources as scarce. If critical resources are "scarce", then it stands to reason that each social and cultural group has to figure out how best to allocate them - this led to the development of social stratification and "command" economies (i.e. the Temple States in Sumeria, Mohenjo-Daro, Knososs, etc.). One of the crucial things that happened during this period was that the concept of access to resources was conflated with social status (which ties in to all sorts of other things...).

Today, "scarcity" of resources is still assumed to be tied in with social status and "power" (loosley construed in the Galbraith sense of the term). However, many of the resources themselves are not scarce - the supply is artificially manipulated to induce scarcity (various agricultural Planning Boards in Canada are a good example of this, as is the production of oil). This artificial scarcity is used to maintain and enhance the social status and access to resources of various sub-state small groups as well as States themselves (OPEC anyone?). The maintenance of artificial scarcity also extends into R&D efforts (e.g. delays in the production of hydrogen fuel cell technology [from the 1970's], delays in the use of mag-lev technology [late 1970's], etc.), and also into the production and support of social movements that help to increase resource scarcity (e.g. the anti-nuclear technology groups).

This brings me to my final point about Grand Strategic perceptions, and that has to do with how the rhetoric and principles of a Grand Strategy are played out in everyday life. Let me give a really simple example from the advertising world: Nabob coffee. Nabob has declared as one of their Grand Strategic principles that "fair exchange" is one of their principles. Recently, at least in Canada, they have begun advertising their strategic alliance with the Rainforest Alliance (Coalition? Sorry, seniors moment...). They are selling a product that many Canadians buy, coffee, and showing how buying their version of it leads to improving the lived reality of the workers who produce that coffee, both as individuals and as communities. While they are also making a nice profit on the deal, that particular "message" has a value add for the Canadian consumer since most of us happen to think helping other people out, especially if it doesn't cost us much extra, is a pretty good thing to do.

Shall we compare this with the US political rhetoric in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in light of other locations such as Darfur, Rwanda, the Congo, Nigeria and Kenya (okay, most civilians have little idea what's going on there, but they will shortly)? The near instantaneous communications technologies which enabled, and were required by, globalization mean that actions in the world are pretty darn hard to hide while, at the same time, guarenteeing that statements made "on principle" will be compared with actions in perceived "reality".

What this rather rambling post is really aimed at is that at the Grand Strategic level, the "talk" and the "walk" have to be in line with each other. Furthermore, and this has more applicability at the Strategic and Operational levels, the communications-distribution-production realities have to be kept in mind of the global population. This doesn't mean you can't shoot the "Bad Guys", it just means that you can't claim to be the "Good Guys" while simulataneously doing "Bad Things". (Gods, I hate that type of simplistic rhetoric! ).

Let me draw out one, specific, SFA example, by way of bringing the talk back to Rob's original post. In FM 3-07-1, there is a really brilliant observation that says:

2-1. ....Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success.

What, and this is not a rhetorical question, is going to be done if the FSF is perceived by the local populace as illegitimate or as a "necessary evil"? This is why I have been harping on the Grand Strategic level stuff, since how those principles are constructed will impact on how an SFA mission deals with problems of FSF legitimacy.

[Rob Thornton]

Marc said:

First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for .

I've always thought the thread must go where the thread goes - and that it is not a bad thing. Most of the time the discussions circle around because there was some point in the initial posts that sparked the wandering. Its kind of like collective cogitating - its healthy.

Ken made a point that has been on my mind of late - how long before we can't remember when we were not at war? We're fast approaching a decade of war - the pursuit of policy by other means does not lend itself well to being labled as "contingency operations abroad"

The SECDEF and the CJCS (and many other senior leaders) have made it a point to attempt to shape expectations in public speech by saying both we've got a significant way to go in both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan, that we should expect things to get harder in Afghansitan now that we are significantly investing more in the outcome, and that due to global conditions and our interests we will likely see more conflict on the horizon. I'm not sure that their efforts have really sunk in - anywhere.

With respect to SFA (which is one of the things I'm get paid to think about), what does this mean? I've been reading the thread started by Capt Diaz on supporting the development of an Iraqi Marine Corps (although perhaps with a more limited mission than our own) and I'm thinking - there is a significant capability that may have less to do with COIN and more with respect to protecting Iraqi interests in the Gulf, and possibly even protecting their interests abroad against piracy. Certainly the conventional capabilities that are brought to the Iraqi military with F-16s and M1s, while both have been useful in COIN, are also of great value beyond COIN (I think any good FW MR platform and MBT would indicate this). These efforts also don't absolve us from current SFA efforts in building IA, IP, NP and other ISF to combat their internal threats (and those who sponsor and support them) - I submit we'll be there in significant capacity for some time, although increasingly on the terms of the HN govt.

In Afghanistan the USG and the Afghan leadership recently estimated that they needed double the number of indigenous secuirty forces...The number of what was it 400K was significant, however think about what those numbers mean in Afghanistan in particular where the conditions (many of the cultural ones that Marc outlined & just the sheer geography of the place) are not necessarily going to facillitate moving the FSF to become competent, confident, committed, and capable. I submit this will feel like an enduring effort and may well extend beyond the current administration, even if there is a second term. Ken is right, the influence of domestic politics, or a reaction to some new crisis could change that, however just consider it.

For a member joining the US military right now who intends to make it a 20 year event, 1/2 of their shelf life will be spent at war. Several more national security strategies may be written at war, several QDRs will pass at war - already our "futures" experimentation can not escape the influence of our current fight, and I suppose the list goes on about things that will happen at war. I've not included the other events that may occur as a result of terrorism - that being the use or threat of violence to influence a political outcome vs. a man made disaster which would seem to divorce it from the influence of politics. I've not included the many other reasons wrt fear, honor and interests which might require the use of military force or forces to secure an end - I've really just covered a couple of the major efforts under way - I did not talk about HOA or OEF-P or the countless number of other things that are capturing our attention

If there is a chance that through use of design we can better identify the correct problem, consider the range of possible outcomes, capture the requirements and align our DOTMLPF policies and programs to be more effective, perhaps we can: better support the operational commanders; reduce risk to the policy objective; and through effectiveness we can reduce risk to those Title 10 functions (man, equip, etc.) we are seeing stressed form almost a decade of war with no designated hour in which we will not be at war.

This really is a good discussion, regardless of where it goes - and as I've said in other places its through the tension of discourse we really learn.

Best, Rob