SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)

[jmm99]

populace-centric counter-insurgency ...

from Slap
Insurgency does not work against a ruthless op pent who will kill anybody and destroy anything to win. So if the King supported the Indians against the White Boy invaders he stood a good chance of winning. Not a guarantee but a good chance. The Indians if supported and advised had no qualms about killing anybody not wearing a Red coat and Burning anything not flying the Union Jack.

extermination - which is indeed a tried and true method.

Assuming all those Indians (we should check out the actual numbers) were united vs the "white boys", virtually all of the latter (Rebels, Neutralists and Loyalists) would probably have united against the Indians. At best, the King would have gained a wasteland - and a bunch of united Indians who would say: we can beat these guys ! Insurgency No 2 ! Hey, UBL said something like that after HE beat the SovComs.

The Brits did try to employ another group - the African-Americans, with varying results. That is another story - about the promises of the Declaration of Independence (believed by many whites to apply to blacks) being left by the wayside once the threat was over.

--------------------
Why Bob,

What a nice invitation to enter your world. I'll bring my wife and we will never think of leaving and going back.

[slapout9]

Posted by jmm99

extermination - which is indeed a tried and true method.

Assuming all those Indians (we should check out the actual numbers) were united vs the "white boys", virtually all of the latter (Rebels, Neutralists and Loyalists) would probably have united against the Indians. At best, the King would have gained a wasteland - and a bunch of united Indians who would say: we can beat these guys ! Insurgency No 2 ! Hey, UBL said something like that after HE beat the SovComs.

The Brits did try to employ another group - the African-Americans, with varying results. That is another story - about the promises of the Declaration of Independence (believed by many whites to apply to blacks) being left by the wayside once the threat was over.


You very well could be right but, I thought it was the best SFA type option.

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - probably worth me addressing the use of functional:

When Rob sent me his PPT he told me it was functional so I thought the problem was to choose the best available force in the AO and then do the DLOPthing as SFA, which I still believe was the Indians.

In this case functional only meant addressing the functional capabilities required to support the development of sustainable capability and capacity of a particular FSF to generate, employ and sustain given conditions and objectives. I tried to identify what key capabilities would be required such as the various types of teams while keeping their composition relative to their intended function.

What we often do is look to our existing menu first, then plug the available capabilities into the holes - the problem is we often have not done the work to determine the shape, size or depth of the hole and we wind up with a bad fit - hence the idea of "filling" a requirement vs. "fully meeting" requirement.

This functional design does not mean you that you will be able to fully meet the requirement - it would be nice, but those capabilities may be committed elsewhere, not resident in sufficient capacity in your force(s), or simply not an option. However the functional requirement does not go away, and knowing where you have or have not fully met the requirement allows you to know where you are accepting risk, and put measures in place to either mitigate or watch it more closely so if need be you can reallocate resources.

It is also useful I think in looking further out and beginning a conversation with those who generate capabilities to identify when and how much of a discreet capability you may require so it can be developed in a holistic way and accounted for across the DOTMLPF and policy. In an era of thousands of individual replacements in theater doing a myriad of tasks that were not anticipated in a manner that allowed them to be generated as capabilities matched to functional requirements, I think a functional breakdown of the capabilities required to enable a chosen operational approach could help us both reduce the risk to the policy objective and retain balance in our capability generator.

So the function is not really in terms of you picking the right potential FSF to achieve your objective (in the case of the functional design .ppt), but in terms of matching the required capabilities on your end to develop sustainable capability and capacity in the partner FSF. Now - in an operational design if your end were to prevent the American colonies from gaining an independent state you might have a LOE where you were looking for a partner FSF - and in this case you might rest upon (some of) the indigenous tribes of North America and support the development of capability and capacity in their FSF. But... back to the law of unintended consequences - you better have your ends firmly in mind because as stated, once you develop those sustainable capabilities and capacities they may be used in ways you did not anticipate to ends which run counter to your own.

This is I think one of the values in an operational design in that it helps identify a range of possible outcomes, and where interests converge and diverge. From my read of history neither side was ever really interested in getting past the generate and employ functions wrt the indigenous N. American tribes to be used to support their own ends. To do so would not have supported their own ends - this is something I think many indigenous leaders figured out in due time and as such only bought into the bargain as far it supported some of their own immediate ends.

This brings us back to one of Marc's issues with the lack of a grand strategy - I think you have to balance your desire for an immediate solution to your problem with the needs of your partner's in order to create a broader overlap of what is tolerable and why. What you are looking for ultimately is something more sustainable with less costs so that it goes back under the domestic political radar. Unfortunately, this means often going slower or making a better investment up front so that you don't have to go back and re-do something you did inadequately or poorly under pressure to get things moving (or pressure to reduce risk in other areas). This goes back to one of my original comments that the road to efficiency is through being effective.

Where functional design supports this is by identifying what right and "right sized" capabilities are needed to meet operational requirements based on conditions and objectives. Unfortunately, we tend to gravitate toward addressing the pressures we perceive as the immediate ones and "satisfice" with sub-optimal capabilities without fully understanding what risks that creates to the policy objective, or to the capability generator as a result of indefinitely having to source ad hock capabilities until either we exhaust ourselves (again Thucydides provides a great example where the Athenians melted down their reserve in Athena's armor to coin talents), or lose our will - or wait for the situation to resolve itself.

Time to go get a run in - Best regards, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, like I said if I get a big crayon I will color out of the lines. jmm99 asked what would I do as the King. Since Kings get pretty pissed off when their power is questioned...if he could find an indigenous force and support it through SFA process I thought that would be a good application of applying your functional assessment process and show that it might be feasible. By doing what you just listed in your above post. It was an example of how to use your very good systems maps to calculate the stuff and people required to do the mission.

Did not mean it to be a real world option....however thinking about it overnight and listening to some of the objections I am not so sure anymore. A lot of the objections were more assumptions especially since my objective would have been very simple train an indigenous force to do as much damage as possible (St. Carl do him damage in a general way). Deny the spoils of rebellion against the good king....maybe they would knock that stuff off and start being good little subjects of the crown.

[Rob Thornton]

Slap - its all good - this is a good environment to tug on stuff.

I was thinking about it later this morning and considered that given we have quite a bit of historical information and analysis – could we look at a broader operational design from the British perspective? You’d have to start by identifying the problem correctly and lining it up against your desired ends. It would be interesting because it may lead you t o a better understanding of the range of outcomes, and the possible policy adjustments you might make to achieve the one closest to your own – not sure that is something King George would have wanted to hear, but it is still useful – and pragmatism is not without precedent.

It may in fact lead you to compromises that do not involve favoring indigenous populations over your colonists, but involve greater political and economic compromise, and then later greater cooperation with those former colonists in political, economic, and military matters – such special relationships are also not unheard of.

However, let us assume for a moment that the King’s object in view was irresistible and he was willing to faithfully establish a policy with the indigenous N. American tribes – what is on the table? Is it within the possible boundaries of those nations with contiguous contact with the colonies, or is it more broad and also with nations who are in contiguous contact with Canadian colonies – keeping in mind this is somewhat an arbitrary distinction given indigenous cultures, etc.

OK – so England’s campaign design calls for security LOE that requires the development of FSF (indigenous N. American tribes) capabilities and capacities to a point where they can both participate in operations with British and Loyalist forces, and ultimately where they can sustain those capabilities and capacities – e.g. generate, employ and sustain them.

You (as the King) decide to appoint a British TF under a general officer who has the right qualities, experiences, attributes and experience to work with the indigenous nations, and the Tories (as they will become you future legitimate Colonial security forces. You now have to go through your assessment methodology (organizational, operational environment, and institutional) and with the understanding that you are supporting the development of capability and capacity in a FSF that may not have much in common with your own requirements – you must bilaterally establish developmental objectives. Out of this you start to align how you are going to align your own efforts in terms of the developmental tasks of Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build and Advise to help them achieve those objectives. You are also going to have to consider how you may need to assist them by providing operational support (such as movement or basing) and tactical support such as artillery (BTW there is a good example of “assist) during employ in Robert Morgan’s bio on Boone where British cannon were employed to support indigenous force raids on KY settlements).

Ultimately (arguably concurrently) you have to also put in place the economic and political framework that secures your objective – this may mean restraining your colonies from westward expansion and violations of your other agreements with the various indigenous peoples, sustaining the new requirements of the indigenous FSFs who may not have the ability to sustain their new capabilities and capacities – but are veterans at employing them, or keeping in tune with new indigenous political leadership who may consider y9ur former arrangements as null based on their desires, or their understanding.

Ultimately you may decide that it is just not worth it, and would not prevent the inevitable anyway - and since you have other colonies, troubles on the continent and the perception that because you have little in common with the indigenous American tribes – it is better just to accommodate what colonists were asking for and avoid the additional uncertainty and expenditure. – and maybe you work to coopt the colonists into your overlapping tolerances.

So you could look at it in a number of different ways, much depends on how wedded you are to the objective.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Ultimately you may decide that it is just not worth it, and would not prevent the inevitable anyway - and since you have other colonies, troubles on the continent and the perception that because you have little in common with the indigenous American tribes – it is better just to accommodate what colonists were asking for and avoid the additional uncertainty and expenditure. – and maybe you work to coopt the colonists into your overlapping tolerances.

Best, Rob

Point 1.What you just wrote is what I thought Step one of Grand Strategy should be. Using your excellent systems mapping methodology......sketching the external environment (AO) these factors would/could have become apparent. As opposed to just confining it to 3 rings. To start you have to map the system as it is! Then begin to map it as you want it to be and that becomes your plan if it proves feasible.

Point 2.Francis Marion-The Swamp Fox was one of Americas greatest guerrilla fighters during the Revolution and he fought like and with the Indians against the UK because they failed to co-opt them allowing the opportunity for the Colonists to do so. Some Green Beret stuff going on there So either way the indian indig population was a factor that would have had to have been dealt with and should appear someway somehow in the Design process whichever side you are on. At least that is my opinion.

[jmm99]

we have to be careful not to mix levels here - I could see Slap and I were doing that yesterday. A picture speaks a 1000 words - so I attach my thoughts in one below.

Slap introduced me to Warden's rings (went back and searched for Slap's cite of what he considered the best article, which is linked here). From that, I took Figure 1 in the chart below.

Warden's rings are a targeting model; and so, they feed into the Operational Requirements ring of Geoff Corn's model (which is on the national policy level). LTC (ret.) Corn is now a law prof, but as a JAG officer was involved in high level military and international law issues, including developement of SROEs, etc.

I hope the following will clear up any confusion. The two models can be used together. For that matter, any operational model can be tied in at Corn's Operational Requirements level. So, also various models feeding into the Diplomacy, etc. ring and the Law ring. So, Corn's model is one way of looking at things if you're at the NSC-JCS level of planning.

[slapout9]

Theme from The Swamp Fox.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NT-3V3Lv-so

[slapout9]

we have to be careful not to mix levels here - I could see Slap and I were doing that yesterday. A picture speaks a 1000 words - so I attach my thoughts in one below.

Slap introduced me to Warden's rings (went back and searched for Slap's cite of what he considered the best article, which is linked here). From that, I took Figure 1 in the chart below.

Warden's rings are a targeting model; and so, they feed into the Operational Requirements ring of Geoff Corn's model (which is on the national policy level). LTC (ret.) Corn is now a law prof, but as a JAG officer was involved in high level military and international law issues, including developement of SROEs, etc.

I hope the following will clear up any confusion. The two models can be used together. For that matter, any operational model can be tied in at Corn's Operational Requirements level. So, also various models feeding into the Diplomacy, etc. ring and the Law ring. So, Corn's model is one way of looking at things if you're at the NSC-JCS level of planning.

That is what Warden calls the fractal analysis. There is never just 1....5 rings model. It would start with Grand Strategy...to Strategy....Operations( may be alot of these)......down to tactical(a whole buch of these) but they should all link back up to your ultimate objective(s)

[jmm99]

Here are some quotes from the article you cited, "FUTURE ROLES OF AIR AND SPACE POWER IN COMBATTING TERRORISM" (1997), which is here.

From chap.1, Introduction

Design

The paper begins with a brief overview of US national policy to combat international terrorism and the Department of Defense (DOD) counterterrorism policy. It then applies Colonel John Warden’s system model to analyze a state-sponsored terrorist organization and identify its centers of gravity. Next, the paper discusses the current, traditional roles of air and space power in combatting terrorism, and divides them by phase of application. The paper concludes by suggesting future roles and applications of air and space power in the battle against terrorism, and recommends some areas for future study.

I read this as saying: We start with a national policy model (Corn's rings or some other model); and then, if we are in the Operational Requirements area (in Cornian terms), we develop a targeting model (Warden's rings or some other model). That model (once developed) feeds back into the national policy model (in Corn's model, into Operational Requirements) - where, if the targeting model is not rejected at gitgo, changes may or may not have to be made in the overall national policy model. So folks concerned with the other two of Corn's rings have to go out and check the various bases for their ring. They come back with yays, nays or need changes. And the process goes on..........

The article seems to employ that sequence:

Chapter 2 US Policies to Combat Terrorism

National Policy

Current US policy on countering international terrorism was first fully iterated in the Reagan Administration and has been reaffirmed by every president since. It follows three basic rules:

* The US will make no concessions to terrorists
* The US will treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law
* The US will apply maximum pressure on state sponsors of terrorism

The Clinton Administration added a corollary to these rules: helping other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. This is sometimes addressed as an example of US Government cooperation with other governments in an international effort to combat terrorism, while at other times it is included as a fourth rule of policy.

Chapter 3 Targeting a Terrorist Organization (from whence Figure 1).

Chapter 4 Current Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism

Chapter 5 Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism

Chapter 6 Conclusion

There is an effective response to terrorism: a coherent national strategy integrating all the instruments of power to combat terrorists and their sponsors. The US has this, but its effectiveness can be improved and the options available to the NCA expanded.

As a component of the military instrument, air and space power already contributes to our nation’s current counterterrorism capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations counterterrorist forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures.... [continues on with their pitch]

The point being that Warden's rings are part of the Operational Requirements (the "military instrument" in these authors' words - i.e., part of military strategy, operations and tactics). Corn's rings are one way to illustrate "all the instruments of power". I like them. Others may have an even better graphic means of conveying the concept.

I can see how Warden's rings are used as a targeting model. I fail to see how they (at least in the form given in Figure 1) can be used to illustrate the interplay and necessary compromises at the national policy level (NSC-JCS).

[slapout9]

I read this as saying: We start with a national policy model (Corn's rings or some other model); and then, if we are in the Operational Requirements area (in Cornian terms), we develop a targeting model (Warden's rings or some other model). That model (once developed) feeds back into the national policy model (in Corn's model, into Operational Requirements) - where, if the targeting model is not rejected at gitgo, changes may or may not have to be made in the overall national policy model. So folks concerned with the other two of Corn's rings have to go out and check the various bases for their ring. They come back with yays, nays or need changes. And the process goes on..........

The article seems to employ that sequence:

(NSC-JCS).

jmm99, you seem to understand it perfectly, so I am not really sure what your question is.

[jmm99]

the Warden rings model is part of the Operational Requirements ring in the Cornian model (or for that matter in any national policy model including non-military inputs). Or, phrased another way, the Warden rings model is not intended to be a national policy model, but is intended to develop inputs into a segment of that model.

I think of the Corn model as including some very broad inputs. The "Law" ring includes many different people in many systems (e.g., you and me in the justice system), and various kinds of law. It could, without much problem, be expanded to include that part of our societal structure (many systems) which is evolutionary and which changes slowly. The "Diplomacy" ring encompasses more changeable aspects - subject more to the election cycles and political wind shifts.

You could use both models in the law enforcement context. The police models (for police strategy, operations and tactics) fit into Operational Requirements. There you could use the Warden model or anything else you wanted to use. The other two rings depend on the jurisdiction (e.g., State of Michigan, County of Houghton, City of Hancock), where the "Law" is fairly stable, but local politics (the "Diplomacy" ring) is often not.

A change in one ring probably requires changes in the other rings (clearly so where they intersect). E.g., today's decision in Montejo.

Court overrules Michigan v. Jackson
Tuesday, May 26th, 2009 10:09 am | Lyle Denniston
....
Splitting 5-4, the Supreme Court on Tuesday overruled its 23-year-old ruling in Michigan v. Jackson on the rights of a criminal suspect in police custody who has asked for a lawyer. The Court did so in Montejo v. Louisiana (07-1529), in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia. ...
....
The Court had signaled in late March that it was considering overruling the Jackson decision, a decision designed to assure that the right to a lawyer is not lost during police questioning of a suspect they are holding, resulting in a confession to the crime. The Court ruled there [Michigan v. Jackson] that, once a suspect has claimed the right to a lawyer, any later waiver of that right during questioning would be invalid, unless the suspect initiated communcation with the officers.

Michigan v. Jackson, as an ironclad rule, seemed dumb to me. This moves the test more to a totality of circumstances approach - IMO a good thing.

Written opinion will probably come later today or tomorrow.

This change in the "Law" ring will require some changes in the Operational Requirements ring - and also in the "Diplomacy" ring (How will the local politicians handle it or spin it ?).

[slapout9]

the Warden rings model is part of the Operational Requirements ring in the Cornian model (or for that matter in any national policy model including non-military inputs). Or, phrased another way, the Warden rings model is not intended to be a national policy model, but is intended to develop inputs into a segment of that model.

No,no,no. I see the problem now. Let me see what I can find that I can put up on the board. It is most definitely a national model or any model that is it's greatest benefit.

[Bob's World]

JMM,

As a huge skeptic of models in general (more of a principles guy myself...), and of applying Air Force targeting strategy to anything that I don't want destroyed, here are my thoughts on these two models working together:

In the Warden rings I see a fair breakdown of who or what you need to be aware of/engage; but it does not offer any clues based on an understanding of the nature of the problem what the nature of that engagement should look like. In other words, you may go out and kill someone who you probably should have invited over for lunch; or you may develeop a lot of infrastructure that has little to do with the actual grievances (causation) of the particular populace you are working within.

Then I slide over to the other model, and if this is developed by a team that is very savvy on the nature of insurgency, versed in the local populace where they are engaging, and also supported by not just intel, but some really good polling; this could be the feeder that then suggests the "how" to feed the Warden model.

(My 15 minute analysis and writeup sitting in an airport, so grade me on a curve please. and no dinosaurs!) (No shot at Ken intended)

[jmm99]

Will await your research.

[Bob's World]

I think the BL is that there is a missing link. Something needs to feed in an understanding of both the local populace and any insurgent/terrorist networks (with their unique motivations addressed), and feed that into your targeting models so that you know what might work to achieve your ends. The Cornholes model would then provide your limits as to how far you could go without getting outside your legal authority.

The three would then work together. May turn out you need to ask for more authorities. (though my experience and study is that the more authority one has to act without constraints, the less likely they are to develop a successful COIN program). Or it may turn out you have authority to do far more than what actually needs to be done to be successful (less is always more for the intruding party - gotta avoid that damn Legitimacy monster.)

The COG-based targeting models for CT and COIN that I offered a few months back could work to provide this needed third input.

[jmm99]

(but my wife is just a huggy-wuggy person, who for some strange and unfathomable reason likes airborne types)

Geoff Corn's[*] graphic model is simply demonstrative evidence of some things that have to come together - puts a picture in your head, so that the principles do not become lost in verbosity.

Examples of his recent writings are:

Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict (2006), download from here.

Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror (2008), .pdf here.

Lots of principles discussed in those articles, as you wearing your lawyer's coif will appreciate.

He discusses the three ring diagram (p. 46) in the second article as follows (footnotes omitted):

ROE have become a key issue in modern warfare and a key component of mission planning for U.S. and many other armed forces. In preparation for military operations, the President and/or Secretary of Defense personally review and approve the ROE, ensuring they meet the nation’s military and political objectives. Ideally, ROE represent the confluence of three important factors: Operational Requirements, National Policy, and the Law of War. This is illustrated by the diagram below.

[diagram posted above]

It is particularly important to note while ROE are not coterminus with the laws of war, they must be completely consistent with the laws of war. In other words, while there are laws of war that do not affect a mission’s ROE, all ROE must comply with the law of war. This is illustrated by the diagram above, which reflects the common situation where the authority to use force provided by the ROE is more limited than required under the laws of war. ....

Both of you are aware that the illustration is an ideal model:

BW
Then I slide over to the other model, and if this is developed by a team that is very savvy on the nature of insurgency, versed in the local populace where they are engaging, and also supported by not just intel, but some really good polling; this could be the feeder that then suggests the "how" to feed the Warden model.

The practical question is where the feeds come from - one ring (as I am using the Cornian model) is military; the other two are civilian. Regardless of where the specifics (e.g., as in your illustration above) come from, the results must be consistent within the relevant intersection of the three input rings.

There is no magic to this construct - it is simply a visualization tool.

(Watch out for them velociraptors !)

-----------------------------
[*]

Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law. Prior to joining the faculty at South Texas, Mr. Corn served as the Special Assistant to the US Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters, and Chief of the Law of War Branch, US Army Office of the Judge Advocate General International and Operational Law Division. Mr. Corn also served as a member of the US Army Judge Advocate General’ Corps from 1992 - 2004. Previously, he was a supervisory defense counsel for the Western United States; Chief of International Law for US Army Europe; and a Professor of International and National Security Law at the US Army Judge Advocate General’s School. Mr. Corn has served as an expert consultant to the Military Commission Defense team, and has published numerous articles in the field of national security law. He is a graduate of Hartwick College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and earned his J.D., highest honors at George Washington University and his LL.M., distinguished graduate, at the Judge Advocate General’s School. He frequently lectures on law of war and national security law topics.

PS: BW - as to your second post, it's beginning to sound like the main inputs are into the Operational Requirements ring - although some of them could well come from the civilian rings; or from civilian agencies included in the OR ring. At some point, you could end up with a multi-dimensional Olympic Rings structure - in which result, the principles would be lost in graphic verbosity. As you well know, simple diagrams work best with juries (and judges for that matter).

[Ken White]

(My 15 minute analysis and writeup sitting in an airport, so grade me on a curve please. and no dinosaurs!) (No shot at Ken intended)

This dinosaur's * five minute analysis agrees totally with your fifteen minute analysis.

...The COG-based targeting models for CT and COIN that I offered a few months back could work to provide this needed third input.

That, too...

* Motto: Proudly and happily Jurassic -- as I look at the mess you kids have made.

[Ken White]

(Watch out for them velociraptors !)

rapture than raptors...

[slapout9]

The Cornholes model

BW...the Cornholes Model? I don't know that one.