Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[davidbfpo]

Makes you ask, as I often do, if something strategically dangerous, can be tactically useful.
Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

Wilf,

I think those who have a short-term view would see drone attacks as a tactical success and meeting the imperative for taking action (shared by many actors). With their limited strategic horizon, or situational awareness, such actors do not consider the fuller picture and risks of operational or strategic failure.

Staying with the Pakistani historical example; given the frustration with Pakistani in-action drone attacks appear an option and who say in 2006 would have objected to the impact on radicalising the FATA tribes? Striking the No.2 in AQ would be too tempting.

All from my armchair faraway.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

IISS has an interesting article on drones that I saw referenced at Abu Muqawama. It provides some technical detail as well as insight into operational roles and operators.

[slapout9]

New issue of Air and Space Power Journal...whole bunch of stuff about Drones in it. Also article about the Army and there expanding use of aircraft,link is below.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/a...cles/apje.html

[Ken White]

Air Force centric views, to be sure -- but it's an AF magazine so that's to be expected. I particularly enjoyed the rather parochial graphic below from "The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Unhealthy Choice for the Joint Operational Environment" which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations. There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

My point in citing these things is to question whether the USAF really wants to get in the business of supporting an ODA in a minor contact per the quoted article scenario; yes, it's a TIC but it is imminently possible that the operation that was canceled may have been far more important from the Operational and thus Joint standpoint. Another article in the journal also cites the Army's use mortars and artillery support but both miss the point that given the potential of greater geographic dispersion than has been the norm, that fire support will not have the range and pressure will be on the AF -- or someone -- to reliably provide fire support...

Pressure not applied by me or by the Army -- pressure applied by Congress and the Mothers of America.

The AF solution of central control of limited assets is inimical to an effective solution to the problem. It is undeniably efficient -- it is not effective.

Hopefully, someone will realize that attitude toward CAS is a large part of the reason why the AF has some of the lack of respect they seem to endure...

[Entropy]

which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

I think you're reading to much into that. All AF tasks fall under one of the 12 Air Force core functions (Yes, they changed again recently, global strike is gone - yes the AF need to reinvent the wheel at any opportunity is annoying). Conventional air-to-ground stuff s now categorized under "global precision attack" and that includes CAS.

One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations.

Not sure how you're getting that perception. There's joint CAS doctrine now and the Army fully intends to train its own controllers to Marine/USAF (now joint) standards. Last I heard, the 13F MOS was designated to fill this role. The problem for the Army, based on what I read a year or two ago, is getting personnel trained. I haven't heard much since then, though I recently read that the UK, Australia, Netherlands and Canada all have schoolhouses now and are training and deploying qualified JTACs.

There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

That depends on what you mean by "control" CAS.

[Ken White]

On the Global Precision Attack, forgive me but years of pentagram watching have taught me to be leery of any service (all the services are guilty of this) innocently couching their mission sets in new terms. Assuming they are not challenged away by others, suddenly, a few years later you get a "...that's MY job; you leave it alone." We'll see.

Not sure how the switch to joint for terminal controllers is progressing. There was some Army resistance on the rationale that it was too much on the 13F plate (foolish); the personnel bureaucracy was rebelling at having to identify and select personnel and divert them to training and they set the standards high which will make selection even more difficult (valid but probably over cautious); they've got to get a school up and running (very valid); and, lastly, the bean counters gripe about having to equip these Army folks to 'support an AF mission' (that's also dumb but bean manipulators are like that...). Hopefully, it'll get sorted and get going, not really critical now but it could be in the future.

Having said that, do recall I said a Squad Leader -- not a 13F. That is an intra Army turf battle probably driven by AF concern on excessive dropping of stuff on friendlies -- no worries though, if we get in a big war, it'll be back to first Co Cdr and JTAC 13Fs -- then to Platoon Leaders and after a year, it'll be down to Squad leaders again.

I meant terminal attack control; that means requesting and pointing (given ROVER and, more importantly, other stuff in the pipeline, it's even easier than it used to be) -- the pilot will do the controlling. Airborne FACs can help but they aren't always available. Infantry folks used to call in air and direct strikes all the time -- until it got to be a peace time budget and turf issue. Last one I called was in June of '68; two sets of Fox 4s at 200 feet or so and two A4s at 50 feet, all with nape and HE -- right bird for the job helps. I know, I know, those days are gone, Angels 15, PGM, Litening AT, Sniper XR, the rotating shifts at Creech, etc, etc. Good stuff, life is mo' better -- until you run out of 'em...

[William F. Owen]

I have the greatest curiosity as to why the "Drones" are being used all. Bearing in mind the circumstances of their employment, and the lack of air defence, why are they deemed better than a manned aircraft - and by that I mean the right manned aircraft. An P-3 can fire AGM-114, and carry a much higher resolution sensor.

Now, I can see quite a few good roles for UAVs, but they are pretty specific and mainly a function of political concerns. Yes there are sound operational reasons, but personally, I can't see it in the circumstance we are discussing.

[Mark O'Neill]

I have the greatest curiosity as to why the "Drones" are being used all. Bearing in mind the circumstances of their employment, and the lack of air defence, why are they deemed better than a manned aircraft - and by that I mean the right manned aircraft. An P-3 can fire AGM-114, and carry a much higher resolution sensor.

Now, I can see quite a few good roles for UAVs, but they are pretty specific and mainly a function of political concerns. Yes there are sound operational reasons, but personally, I can't see it in the circumstance we are discussing.

You cited a certain platform: Work out the accurals on a P-3 and crew.............. and that is without getting one 'lost'. 'Robot spuds in' makes a far better headline for any government than '13 aircrew die a horrible death' , even before one calculates any other costs

Cheers

Mark

Mark