Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[davidbfpo]

Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales:Is Barack Obama killing too many bad guys before the U.S. can interrogate them? is an article in FP: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._tell_no_tales

It is a good read and this is a 'taster':

Hold the applause. Obama's escalation of the "Predator War" comes at the very same time he has eliminated the CIA's capability to capture senior terrorist leaders alive and interrogate them for information on new attacks. The Predator has become for President Obama what the cruise missile was to President Bill Clinton -- an easy way to appear like he is taking tough action against terrorists, when he is really shying away from the hard decisions needed to protect the United States.

And ends with:

The fact that Obama's administration no longer does this when it locates senior terrorist leaders today means the president is voluntarily sacrificing intelligence that could protect the American people -- and that the U.S. homeland is at greater risk of a terrorist attack.

I trust that this aspect of CT has been fully debated inside government, although I am sceptical that any leader living in the FATA could be captured for interrogation.

Hypothetical scenario: the Nigerian bomber-to-be is id'd in a Yemeni city, shortly before he starts his journey to what we now know was Detroit. Attempt to capture or strike with high explosive?

[William F. Owen]

Hypothetical scenario: the Nigerian bomber-to-be is id'd in a Yemeni city, shortly before he starts his journey to what we now know was Detroit. Attempt to capture or strike with high explosive?

Give me the briefing pack and I'll give you an answer....
Since he'll turn up at an airport, it seems like that might be a good place to give " 'im a tug" - a phrase I'm sure David is familiar with!

[tequila]

Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales:Is Barack Obama killing too many bad guys before the U.S. can interrogate them? is an article in FP: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._tell_no_tales

It is a good read and this is a 'taster':

I disagree - the article has little value except for partisan talking points. Note that complete and utter lack of any sort of question of whether or not snatch missions are even feasible. He simply asserts that they are not being tried or even considered because the President does not value intelligence for unknown reasons.

Thiessen's expertise comes via his experience as a speechwriter rather than an intelligence professional, and the title of his book gives his perspective. He is a torture advocate, and his primary problem is that Obama has ended the practice.

[S-2]

"Plus the author and group doing the polling are not fully id'd."

You reference a survey conducted by Ms. Farhat Taj of the Univ. of Oslo and a non-profit group called AIRRA (Mod's note their webpage is:http://www.airra.org/home/). Ms. Taj is an pashtun womens rights specialist and researcher from FATAville whose work is rapidly morphing into a crusade for the use of drones. I've had numerous e-mail conversations with her and she's done some interesting op-eds in the Pakistani dailies. Here are some of them to include the original survey-

Drone Attacks: A Survey-The NEWS March 5, 2009

Analysis: Drone Attacks-Challenging Some Fabrications NEWS Jan. 2, 2010

ANALYSIS: Drone attacks and US reputation-DAILY TIMES Feb. 6, 2010

Her cry was picked up by one op-ed columnist of whom I'm aware in Pakistan named Irfan Husain. His editorial is also worth the read-

Howling At The Moon-DAWN Irfan Husain Jan. 9, 2010

Ms. Taj contends that she's access to FATA IDPs inside camps in NWFP as well as other sources via phone. It makes for interesting reading. Still, I appreciate her perspectives and find that some of our leading voices in military academia to lack certain knowledge of target effect and populace reaction. In short, the area is highly isolated so claims of collateral damage and threats to Pakistani sovereignty strike me as fallacious and somewhat skewed.

Only the taliban know for certain who's been killed. Our intel have some idea. I doubt anybody else lacking special access has a clue.

Thanks.

[William F. Owen]

Ms. Taj contends that she's access to FATA IDPs inside camps in NWFP as well as other sources via phone. It makes for interesting reading. Still, I appreciate her perspectives and find that some of our leading voices in military academia to lack certain knowledge of target effect and populace reaction. In short, the area is highly isolated so claims of collateral damage and threats to Pakistani sovereignty strike me as fallacious and somewhat skewed.

When has ever killing the enemy ever been counter-productive?
Until serving officers and other other academics gather the collective balls to start questioning these "leading voices", about the rubbish they peddle, they frankly deserve to conned.

[S-2]

"Until serving officers and other other academics gather the collective balls to start questioning these "leading voices", about the rubbish they peddle, they frankly deserve to conned."

Well William, I've e-mail with one at U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School who's a department chair who's opposed named John Arquilla. His buddy Tom Johnson is opposed. Killcullen gave the classic testimony before Congress last April about only killing 12 HVTs and, I believe, Andrew Exum. Most seem to either fear some paktunwali-based backlash or violations of Pakistani sovereignty. The former seems overstated and the later duplicitous given the violations of Pakistani sovereignty by OBL, Haqqani, Hekmatyar, and Omar nevermind the various, chechyan, uighars, uzbeks and others scattered throughout FATAville.

Ms. Taj is embittered at the abandonment of the FATA people into the hands of these animals by the GoP. I suspect that's true. Most are aware of the devastation to the tribal maliks and I believe that represents only the tip of the iceberg there.

In anycase, I believe there is a subtle but discernable shift underway among the Pakistani polity from blatant opposition and into some more neutral ground. Most self-serving and largely a function of H. Mehsud's whacking. I spend a fair amount of time on a Pakistani defense board which caters to a rather "vibrant" crowd. We're hated but they're not often really sure why except that's the way it's supposed to be...oh, and Israel.

Thanks.

[William F. Owen]

Well William, I've e-mail with one at U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School who's a department chair who's opposed named John Arquilla. His buddy Tom Johnson is opposed. Killcullen gave the classic testimony before Congress last April about only killing 12 HVTs and, I believe, Andrew Exum.

I'll fully confess to not knowing the who said what or when, - but I cannot for the life of me work out how someone contends that killing your enemies (people who would kill you) is counter-productive because this breeds "more enemies," or "drones = cowardice" or any of the other "wonderfully insightful because it's counter-intuitive" twaddle gets peddled. If about end-state, not style!
Killing the enemy leadership is a sure fire proven, works 9 times out of 10, if done well, useful. The only time it could backfire is if you are killing people who are not your enemies.
IIRC some genius actually said, we shouldn't kill the enemies leaders becuase that leaves no one to negotiate with... seriously....

[Fuchs]

I'll fully confess to not knowing the who said what or when, - but I cannot for the life of me work out how someone contends that killing your enemies (people who would kill you) is counter-productive because this breeds "more enemies," or "drones = cowardice" or any of the other "wonderfully insightful because it's counter-intuitive" twaddle gets peddled. If about end-state, not style!
Killing the enemy leadership is a sure fire proven, works 9 times out of 10, if done well, useful. The only time it could backfire is if you are killing people who are not your enemies.
IIRC some genius actually said, we shouldn't kill the enemies leaders becuase that leaves no one to negotiate with... seriously....

The world seems to be more difficult than that.

Let's take the leader assassination thing:
The paralyze effect is only temporary. It's in a long conflict only valuable if you can exploit is well.
The loss of competence effect is considerable, but you may also have the adverse effect if you kill a leader who's relatively incompetent.
You lose your understanding of the enemy's habits, preferences, ability and possibly even intent. You need to re-learn about the opposing mind because a new mind replaces the old one.

Finally one complication that should be very familiar in your neighbourhood; the replacement leaders tend to be more extreme, aggressive and young than the original ones.


So yes, killing an enemy leader may actually be counter-productive.
Imagine Alexander had killed Darius in the first battle; someone better, less cowardly, might have replaced Darius and bested Alexander in the next battle.


Killing leaders is no surefire thing to anything if the enemy organization has prepared for this contingency. Think of the thousands of officers lost in battle during the World Wars. Organizations can often replace such losses - and even raise the competence level while doing so.


Furthermore, I subscribe to the Hydra theory in regard to Afghanistan.
It's a bit complicated, though. I dislike the whole high visibility approach to the meddling in AFG. To have many troops in place, to let them patrol, fight and kill adds arguments to the enemy's arsenal.
It would be much tougher to agitate against infidel foreigners if the villagers had never seen a foreigner or a bomber's contrail.
The more we intervene the more troubles are added to the problem (and the more we become their enemy instead fo merely an exogenous influence) and the lesser the efficiency of our intervention.

To kill more enemies isn't necessarily leading to a significantly better end state anyway. Few (para)military powers of history seem to have lasted till their point of total destruction.
The German military of 1945 had more tanks, aircraft and submarines in its arsenal than in 1939. The tremendous attrition of almost six years warfare was often overestimated in its significance. The exhaustion of the important age group (young, healthy males) by late '42 (physical and psychical exhaustion) coupled with the enemies' superiority in material and personnel quantities caused the turn of the war (just as in 1918). The absolute power of the German military (measured in hardware and personnel quantity) didn't really decline significantly in 1941-early1945.

The exhaustion is linked to attrition AND replacements - any move that adds more to replacements than to attrition is not going to help.

The physical destruction of Taliban may be necessary for the mopping up phase, but it would likely be a minor contributor to a turn of the war's course.
Meanwhile, the troubles associated with pushing up attrition may very well prevent such a turn.

[Rex Brynen]

There's no clear and unequivocal answer to this issue--the impact of leadership assassination (whether by drone or otherwise) is entirely contextually dependent.

On the positive side, it not only causes attrition of those who (may have) shown considerable skill in order to rise to their current level of command, but it also frequently causes a degree of internal paralysis as the organization concerned assesses how its security might have breached. In highly compartmentalized organizations, some information may be lost with the target. It may also send signals about who has the upper hand, or about the reach of the instigating country/organization, that have morale effects on the organization or the general population. It can deter.

On the other hand, it can backfire. It can be seen by the local population as a violation of local sovereignty. It can cause radicalization. It can be used as an aid to recruitment. It can have unforeseen second and third order effects. It can result in even more skilled leaders emerging, as Fuchs notes (Hizbullah/Nasrallah being a case in point). It can cause ###-for-tat killings, an expansion of the geography of confrontation, or uncontrolled escalation.

I can think of cases where the death of a leader had devastating consequences on an organization (Savimbi/UNITA, Zarqawi/AQI). It would have been pretty good too if someone had taken Hitler down before 1945. I can think of cases where assassination paid major operational dividends, but also somewhat strengthened the target organization politically (Ayyash/Hamas, Mughniyah/Hizbullah). There are cases where the operational effect was marginal, but the countervailing PR gains for the targeted organization were substantial (Israel's 1973 assassination of three PLO leaders in Beirut; Yassin/Hamas, or for that matter the PFLP assassination of Rehavam Ze'evi). There are cases where the diplomatic cost of the assassination outweighed the potential gain (Mishal/Hamas). There are cases where the short-term operational effects benefited the attacker, but there were unforeseen longer-term effects that offset these (Khalil al-Wazir/Fateh).

The point here is that this where diplomats, intel analysts, politicians, and perhaps even lawyers ought to earn their pay by doing some solid analytical thinking about costs, benefits, precedents, and contingencies, rather than reflexively adhering to the position that leadership assassination is always "good" or "bad."