Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[davidbfpo]

Forwarded by an observer: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.ht...3d&k=40024&p=1

It is very well written and full of facts, although I note it slid over the fact the drones fly from a Pakistani airfield.

Yes, drones are an option and on reflection IMHO useful when successful and the local political impact is minimal. Now maybe the time to reduce their use, as David Kilcullen mooted.

Have they changed the Pakistani Army's stance on confronting the Taliban plus? Or, assisted the Pakistani government in creating the conditions to make decisions?

I think not. Conclusion: Tactically useful and strategically dangerous.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Conclusion: Tactically useful and strategically dangerous.

Makes you ask, as I often do, if something strategically dangerous, can be tactically useful.
Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

[slapout9]

Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

You old systems thinker you that is exactly right, it all has to align together or it you will just create another/bigger problem.

[SethB]

I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

I'd be interested to hear you expand on this, if you don't mind.

[davidbfpo]

A non-SWJ member's response to my viewpoint was:

1) Armed UAV (drone) attacks can only be of tactical significance and are unlikely to lead to strategic gain.

2) The downstream effects of Damadola far outweighed any possible gain (and there was none). A few days after the strike, a Pakistani Taliban leader called a meeting and asked for volunteers for suicide missions. Sixty-five young men put their hands up; a bit later a young soldier in the Frontier Corps shot an American officer at a bi-lateral border meeting. His family came from Damadola. He had no option under the code of revenge in Pushtun lore. (Damadola: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damadola_airstrike )

3) In the beginning the use of UAVs in Pakistan was a one-sided (US) attempt to decapitate the al-Qaeda leadership taking no account of the downstream effects mentioned above and breaking a US law of no targeted assassination except in time of war (the author is not a lawyer).

4) That said a Predator over the Yemeni desert targeting a verifiable target with no risk to civilians can be justified. In fact the mission in 2002 that killed an AQ operative also impressed the Yemenis with its precision and careful targeting. So the downstream effect in this case was positive.

5) Finally when in Peshawar in 2008 perfectly sane, educated and reasonable Pakistanis living under Taliban threat spared no air in rejecting the use of combat UAVs on the grounds that they helped a then growing Pakistani Taliban to become more radical and to recruit.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Makes you ask, as I often do, if something strategically dangerous, can be tactically useful.
Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

Wilf,

I think those who have a short-term view would see drone attacks as a tactical success and meeting the imperative for taking action (shared by many actors). With their limited strategic horizon, or situational awareness, such actors do not consider the fuller picture and risks of operational or strategic failure.

Staying with the Pakistani historical example; given the frustration with Pakistani in-action drone attacks appear an option and who say in 2006 would have objected to the impact on radicalising the FATA tribes? Striking the No.2 in AQ would be too tempting.

All from my armchair faraway.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

IISS has an interesting article on drones that I saw referenced at Abu Muqawama. It provides some technical detail as well as insight into operational roles and operators.

[slapout9]

New issue of Air and Space Power Journal...whole bunch of stuff about Drones in it. Also article about the Army and there expanding use of aircraft,link is below.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/a...cles/apje.html

[Ken White]

Air Force centric views, to be sure -- but it's an AF magazine so that's to be expected. I particularly enjoyed the rather parochial graphic below from "The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Unhealthy Choice for the Joint Operational Environment" which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations. There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

My point in citing these things is to question whether the USAF really wants to get in the business of supporting an ODA in a minor contact per the quoted article scenario; yes, it's a TIC but it is imminently possible that the operation that was canceled may have been far more important from the Operational and thus Joint standpoint. Another article in the journal also cites the Army's use mortars and artillery support but both miss the point that given the potential of greater geographic dispersion than has been the norm, that fire support will not have the range and pressure will be on the AF -- or someone -- to reliably provide fire support...

Pressure not applied by me or by the Army -- pressure applied by Congress and the Mothers of America.

The AF solution of central control of limited assets is inimical to an effective solution to the problem. It is undeniably efficient -- it is not effective.

Hopefully, someone will realize that attitude toward CAS is a large part of the reason why the AF has some of the lack of respect they seem to endure...

[Entropy]

which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

I think you're reading to much into that. All AF tasks fall under one of the 12 Air Force core functions (Yes, they changed again recently, global strike is gone - yes the AF need to reinvent the wheel at any opportunity is annoying). Conventional air-to-ground stuff s now categorized under "global precision attack" and that includes CAS.

One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations.

Not sure how you're getting that perception. There's joint CAS doctrine now and the Army fully intends to train its own controllers to Marine/USAF (now joint) standards. Last I heard, the 13F MOS was designated to fill this role. The problem for the Army, based on what I read a year or two ago, is getting personnel trained. I haven't heard much since then, though I recently read that the UK, Australia, Netherlands and Canada all have schoolhouses now and are training and deploying qualified JTACs.

There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

That depends on what you mean by "control" CAS.