Hmm, new words for a more clear message:
I understand Wilf's line as basically "kill the irreconcilables for victory".
My line is "You don't need to kill what's left of the enemy to defeat him."
Killing is an integral part of warfare, but it's usually overestimated in its importance. A military or warrior force that has fought for years won't suddenly have its will broken for fear of their lives. That works differently.
- enemies grew too powerful, numerous
- too many hopes (offensives) were disappointed
- too many days in combat have broken the veteran's utility for offensive actions
- attrition in the most critical group of men (young, healthy, aggressive) by several means (including POW, WIA) had critical influence on the force's ability to succeed in battle
- loss of too much terrain, no chance of further withdrawal
- insufficient logistical support for a long time
- enemy propaganda, internal political agitation
- disillusionment about the own leaders / leading class
Killing is a very usual component, but it's usually not sufficient in itself and there were few conflicts in history that led to total death of the enemy.
I think Wilf would furthermore be unable to show that any force has ever surrendered for exclusively the fear of getting killed otherwise - after having proved its courage in battle before.
There are on the other hand many examples where very different factors have led to victory. This is especially true in conflicts where the loser still had much to lose and thus strived to protect what was left.
In short; it's unnecessary to kill all or most of the irreconcilables. Nominal "victory"* can be achieved with better odds through other means - treating the killing as a side effect, some kind of cost of other actions.
I part the actions of war into three categories;
- supporting actions
- decisive actions
- unimportant actions
The unimportant ones create the huge noise and much of the cost of war. The hope is usually that their sum will help to win a war, but that's unlikely.
A sniper does not need to kill soldiers of an encircled unit that will surrender anyway once its water reserves run out, for example.
To kill much of the enemy (and at a faster rate than he can replace losses) would raise the cost of war and add many problems to the war. This includes the risk of creating resentment by sheer presence of foreigners.
Everyone here knows that polite soldiers in a war zone are the exception, especially in traffic and searching. It doesn't help that the only Muslim NATO ally, Turkey, doesn't provide a large force for the war (I wonder why there's almost no critique of this, but much critique on those who provide many, but not as many as wished auxiliary troops?).
I would be content with the military balance in place - the Taliban are incapable of using about 99% of war's repertoire because of the extreme difference in capabilities. Meanwhile, the foreigners are incapable of about 90% due to logistical, geographical and political issues.
The little remaining combat - minelaying, occasional attacks on outposts, occasional ambushes, harrassing fires - represents a very low level of activity in comparison to other wars. I doubt that much more can be achieved militarily without actually worsening the situation in other regards.
The reason is simple; the initiative is theirs. THEY decide on the intensity of warfare, on the degree of their exposure to their enemies' strengths.
They can reduce their exposure whenever they cannot stand the pain any more. They can increase their activity (and thus exposure) when they have recovered and regained confidence.
Their political strength isn't much in danger when they decide to expose themselves to achieve more in combat.
A fencer in the dark will not succeed to kill all cats around him unless they close in voluntarily.
The "kill" path is a short dead end. It doesn't lead to their defeat.
Other routes whose vector includes partially the same direction may still be open and lead to nominal 'victory',
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*: I doubt that OEF/ISAF will ever be able to claim that they met the most rational definition of victory; they will never be able to claim that waging the war post '02 was better than not to wage it at all.
They may sometime be able to claim a lesser type of victory; the lack of success of the enemy, possibly even meeting the (ill-conceived) political goals for the conflict.
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Originally Posted by Fuchs
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