Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[davidbfpo]

I am aware that for a few weeks now the issue of drones has been a "hot" topic within 'The Beltway', possibly inspired by the NYT reporting. Incidentally very little of this public policy debate appears on my "radar" here, even if Italy is acquiring drones with weapons - which comes up in the linked podcast.

Thanks again to CWOT and his article, which ends with:

Counterterrorism remains a challenge and no perfect blend of tools, policy and options can be outlined – for in all scenarios there will be risks, costs and unintended casualties. But I encourage those critics to ask two questions as they rightfully critique U.S. counterterrorism options:

If you advocate the end of counterterrorism policy, option or tool (drones being only one example), what are the consequences and resulting effects of your objections?

The U.S. should and will pursue terrorists around the world. The U.S. should protect its values while protecting its citizens. If you are not comfortable with how the U.S. conducts its counterterrorism, what counterterrorism strategy would you be comfortable with? And would that strategy protect U.S. citizens while suiting your values?

Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=685

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll adds his views, the catalyst appears to be a new book:

Kill or Capture....by Daniel Klaidman, a former deputy editor of Newsweek.

The more recent addition of Klaidman’s reporting, however, calls attention to one area... that 'capture is not feasible'.

(later) Even more disturbing is the evidence in Klaidman’s narrative suggesting that the Obama Administration leans toward killing terrorism suspects because it does not believe it has a politically attractive way to put them on trial.

He ends with the really hard question, a political one:

Is “kill or capture” a policy, or are the words just a screen for politically convenient targeted killings?

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...r-capture.html

[OccamsRazor]

Yes - I suppose that's a rather broad hypothesis, but I hope that I explain my stance a bit clearer here.

Also, if you haven't checked out Current Intelligence, it has some interesting analysis that tends to complement SWJ.

I'd be interested in hearing any feedback on the article.

Bill

[Polarbear1605]

I agree with what you state but in my opinion we are getting back to a fundamental debate that either we use the Rules of Law or the Laws of War in the War on Terrorism. Recognizing that neither is a perfect fit, you have to make a call and once you make that call you adapt that system (work to change either the Rules of Law or the Laws of War) to the War on Terrorism. To a certain extent, I think we saw this immediately after 9/11 in the Bush administration. They picked the Laws of War and then extended the Executive Branch powers in an attempt to cover some of those gaps. Of course the SCOTUS, pulled those powers back or limited them in a couple of SCOTUS Cases (e.g. - Whoever-vs- Rumsfeld). Good examples of the Executive and Judicial Branch working in contention … like it should. I have also seen arguments that the Bush administration was not consistent with this approach and agree. Of course then we have Congress and our two party system. Picking one of two non-perfect systems means the opposition party will always rail against the picked system on the basis of the other. For example, when a drone pilot kills a bad guy and “others” a case for murder (elements of proof) can be made using the Rules of Law. Intent is certainly there along with a plan and bodies. Under the Laws of War both the target and the collateral damage can be justified under the principle of military necessity.

[OccamsRazor]

I think in many ways you're correct. You can probably make this fit into that construct - the "which rule of law do we use" debate.

If anything, I think it's an interesting butterfly effect. You make certain declarations and actions about due process domestically, and all of a sudden you don't have any type of working system for foreign HVTs.

What's an administration to do? Keep calm and carry on - fire up the drones - much like the Bush administration did with Gitmo, until it reared up and backfired in the second half of his presidency.

I think it's likely that this may do the same.

[slapout9]

I think Drone Strikes are Maneuver Warfare, and like Colonel Wyly says "War has no truck with rules" it is just a fight for survival.

[jmm99]

I can't answer the question asked (as the title of this thread) because I don't have the foggiest idea what rationales drive the Obama administration to do what they do.

I can say firstly the drone strikes (and implicitly all direct action taken against HVTs) are based on the Laws of War. See this post, A timely response from the Obama Administration, in the Drone Paradox thread. Just a snip from LA Koh's statement:

[I]t is the considered view of this administration…that targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war….As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks….[T]his administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

- First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

- Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In U.S. operations against al Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.…

Both legal and practical aspects are covered more fully in this thread, HVTs/Political Assassination, and its many links.

I can say secondly that our detention policy is also firmly based on the Laws of War - e.g., take a look at these posts in the War Crimes thread (all on page 12):

222 - Obama DoJ "refines" the standard for detention !!

223 - Statements about the new standard ...

225 - DoJ Memorandum re: detention

226 - continuation of DoJ memo ...

227 - Well, George, if you are asking my opinion on this ...

The key statement in this package is from #226:

Moreover, the Commentary to Additional Protocol II draws a clear distinction between individuals who belong to armed forces or armed groups (who may be attacked and, a fortiori, captured at any time) and civilians (who are immune from direct attack except when directly participating in hostilities). That Commentary provides that “[t]hose who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.” See ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), ¶ 4789.

(emphasis added). Thus, both direct actions and detentions have the AUMF as their base and are clearly based on the Laws of War.

The Rule of Law (domestic laws, whether in the US or in foreign countries) has nothing to do with either direct actions or detentions.

How did the Rule of Law get into this discussion ? Because folks in the Bush II and Obama administration wanted, or felt it necessary, to go beyond detention and prosecute crimininally. The criminal prosecution approach (going back to the Clinton administration) could go either of two routes: military commissions (Bush II prime choice) or Federal courts (Obama prime choice). In either, the procedures (due process) are spelled out.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

O'Hara aka OccamsRazor has an article at SWJ linked by SWJBlog, Drone Attacks and Just War Theory (link to pdf). Its BLUF:

Final Thoughts

The principles of distinction and proportionality are integral to the premise that wars should be conducted in a limited fashion. Derived from theologians in the just war and natural law traditions, these principles have made their way into statutory law, as exemplified by Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. But what is the best way to interpret these provisions? Does one trust the ICRC guidance, or guidance provided by either hawkish or pacifistic legal scholars? This paper‟s answer was to evaluate which perspective best fit the construct of JWT. While perhaps not always the perfect answer, it is a useful guide in sorting through the various interpretations of distinction and proportionality held in international law. Now, more than ever - with the Obama administration‟s use of targeted killing so prevalent - does this dialogue about drone attacks need to occur.[111]

111 See Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, Drones Batter Al Qaeda and Its Allies Within Pakistan, N.Y. Times, April 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/wo...ef=instapundit.

This thread seems more appropriate for this article than the Drone Paradox thread (which deals more with the military and political aspects) - and it is O'Razor's thread.

Some general articles on "Just War Theory" (which has a large theological component):

Just War - Wiki

Just War Theory - IEP

JustWarTheory.com (many links to multi-variant sources)

War - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Principles of the Just War

The concepts governing a "just war" can certainly vary - even within the same religious tradition. E.g., compare these Roman Catholic resources:

The Just War Theory: A traditional Catholic moral view

Catholic Just War

There Can Be A Just War: Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas

There Can Be A Just War: Teaching of St. Augustine

Thus, no easy answers exist here; and one must credit Bill for tackling this subject (which I would duck).

Speaking of tackling, how many days to go until Navy beats Army ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Damn the lawyers anyway!

We say we are "at war" so that we can invoke wartime authorities to do things that would not be allowed if we were "at peace" and operating under law enforcement authorities. Not only would we not be able to do these drone strikes, but arguably would have to pack up our tent in Afghanistan and go home from there as well.

Yet logic tells us that we are not really at war. If we were in the beginning, the ends that justified that status have long been met. So while we open ourselves up to the tremendous strategic risk of "losing a war," we don't dare call it over for concern over the tactical risks of losing wartime authorities....

Hmm. We've made a sticky mess of this.

Personally, my vote is drop the war facade. We really don't need it. Anyone who really needs killing will still get killed, and we will have set the legal and strategic framework for moving on to a broader approaches that are less likely to violate the sovereignty of others in ways that tend to validate the very points that AQ makes about the US to fuel acts of terrorism against us in the first place.

Constraints can be good. It was the lack of constraints in Iraq and Afghanistan that got us so deep in those two theaters, and it was the presence of constraints that kept us from overreacting in places like the Philippines and Indonesia. Constraints help one to make the right decisions, while the lack of constraints often enables poor decision making. The US has been operating without effective restraint for too long now. Since about 1989, in fact.

I remember when it was a big deal when the U.S. violated another nation's airspace, or dropped a bomb on some sovereign nation or another. We should make it a big deal again.

[gbramlet]

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...i025538D16.DTL

I read a comment on this topic on LWJ claiming Sharabat Khan was "good Taliban", and had attempted to liberate Afghanistan from ISI control. Wasn't aware that there was a tiered system within the Taliban based off your level of "good" and your priorities. These guys should really issue badges out so we don't mistake them...

Grant Bramlett
http://www.bramlist.com

[Bob's World]

The Taliban are not, and have never been the enemy of the United States. IAW principles of Pashtunwali they refused to give up AQ to the US when we asked them to, so we put our weight behind their enemies, lifting the Northern Alliance into power.

Now the Taliban hold the keys to Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Pakistan. That is an essential, and too often overlooked fact.

It is not within the Government of Afghanistan's power to deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda.

It is not within the Government of Pakistan's (or the ISI or their Army for those who demand granting the government amnesty for the actions of its arms, and to also grant sanctuary from consequence to those arms as well) power to deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda.

The mission given to the U.S. by the President is:

“to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

Now maybe it is more effective to build Afghanistan into a modern State, while suppressing that element of their populace that is not particularly down with the form of government put together by Mr. K and his friends.

Maybe it is more effective to disrupt the balance between India and Pakistan by destabilizing the shaky hold that the Pakistani government has on the reins of power there.

Maybe. Personally, I think it is probably smartest to go straight to the Taliban and cut a deal with them. That does not mean giving them the keys to Kabul, as many will immediately jump to. But it does mean not dedicating ourselves to denying them the opportunity to once more engage in the political process of their own country.

This should be fairly obvious, but clearly it is not.

[carl]

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...i025538D16.DTL

I read a comment on this topic on LWJ claiming Sharabat Khan was "good Taliban", and had attempted to liberate Afghanistan from ISI control. Wasn't aware that there was a tiered system within the Taliban based off your level of "good" and your priorities. These guys should really issue badges out so we don't mistake them...

Grant Bramlett
http://www.bramlist.com

The Pak Army/ISI are the ones who should be issuing the IDs. Good and bad Taliban is their concept. "Good" attack us and the Indians. "Bad" attack things in Pakistan. The trouble with the idea is the good work with the bad who work with the good who are buddies with the bad and they all believe in about the same thing anyway. The ISI think they can control the whole thing and keep track of who is good or bad. In the past they have used our drones to kill bad Taliban. Apparently they are upset that our guys slipped the leash for once and killed some of the good Taliban.

Bob's World: It might indeed be a good idea to talk to the Taliban, though which part you would talk to may cause a bit of confusion. It would help us peel them away from the Pak Army/ISI. The trouble is of course, all the top leaders of Taliban & company live in Pakistan and if they tried talking to us they would get picked up right away, as happened in early 2010.

Also which part of the Taliban are sheltering AQ, the good or the bad? If it is the bad, why should they care what happens in Afghanistan?

I have a question. Does Pashtunwali require the host to allow the guest to murder others while he is a guest? That is what essentially happened in 2001. AQ wasn't running and seeking refuge, they perpetrated an outrage while they had refuge. A rather big difference.

[Bob's World]

"good" and "bad" are assessments that are not particularly helpful; unless by "good" one means willing to work with us toward mutually beneficial ends.

When we decide some guy or his organization is "beyond the Pale" we mostly serve to limit our own options. The real key is to identify and reconcile key issues rather than people. Some of these guys are never going to get a seat at the table, but that does not mean that a guy they trust from their organization or a related one cannot carry their issues to the table.

[carl]

The "good" and "bad" refer to how it seems the General sahibs view Taliban & company. Good quickly turn to bad in the eyes of the Pak Army/ISI if they show signs of bolting the reservation. So from our standpoint if somebody showed signs of wanting to seriously talk independent of their masters at GHQ, to us they would be good; to GHQ, they would be bad and they would get picked up quickly making the whole thing moot.

[Pete]

Well before 9/11 the Pakistani government tolerated paramilitary organizations that are willing to take the law into their own hands, particularly over the long-simmering feud with India over Kashmir. When particularly outrageous acts of terrorism took place the response of Pakistan's government would usually be to detain a few people for a few days and then let them go. There was a period in 1999 or 2000 when it seemed that Pakistan and India might go to war over Kashmir because of incidents there.

[SWJ Blog]

Bin Laden mission signals the end for the Predator drone

Entry Excerpt:

Today’s Washington Post discussed how the CIA used a stealthy drone – the RQ-170 Sentinel – to collect overhead imagery and signals intelligence on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The RQ-170 was dubbed “the Beast of Kandahar” after it was spotted at the nearby military airbase as early as 2007, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology. Intelligence preparation for the bin Laden raid demonstrated the requirement for a persistent overhead reconnaissance platform that also had to be stealthy. This requirement for the bin Laden mission foreshadows a rapid change in required drone capabilities, which implies a need to change the government’s current drone investment plans. After just coming into their own, the Pentagon and CIA should consider ending purchases of the non-stealthy Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk drones and redirecting those funds to their stealthy drone successors.

Click below to read more ...



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[SWJ Blog]

Advisers Urge Military to Rely Less on Drones, More on Expertise

Entry Excerpt:

Advisers Urge Military to Rely Less on Drones, More on Expertise - Eli Lake, Washington Times. BLUF: "Military operations in Afghanistan rely too much on intelligence gathered by unmanned drones, often exclude important publicly available data and do not focus enough on the recruitment of human agents, a Pentagon report says."



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[SWJ Blog]

Global Race to Match US Drone Capabilities

Entry Excerpt:

Global Race On to Match US Drone Capabilities by William Wan and Peter Finn, Washington Post. BLUF: "More than 50 countries have purchased surveillance drones, and many have started in-country development programs for armed versions because no nation is exporting weaponized drones beyond a handful of sales between the United States and its closest allies."



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[SWJ Blog]

Does U.S. Drone Use Set a New Precedent for War?

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[SWJ Blog]

Drone Wars? Not Quite.

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