Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[SWJ Blog]

Unfounded Drone Fears

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[SWJ Blog]

The Drone Delusion

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[SWJ Blog]

Iranian Video of Alleged U.S. Drone

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[SWJ Blog]

Drone Worrier

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[SWJ Blog]

What Drones? Philippines is Not Afghanistan

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[SWJ Blog]

Why There's Nothing Illegal about CIA Drone Pilots

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[SWJ Blog]

Necessary (Perhaps) But Not Sufficient: Assessing Drone Strikes Through A Counterinsurgency Lens

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[CWOT]

SWC members: I made a post at my blog today reference the debate over the use of drones, which has reached its zenith this week. I've cross-posted some of the points here from the entire post and would enjoy the intelligence discussion of all those wise folks here at Small Wars. Here's the introduction and the policy recommendations are at this link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965

"The much anticipated Department of Justice memo authorizing the use of drones to target Americans....scratch that. A white paper from the Department of Justice outlined what might be the U.S. government's position with regards to the killing of Americans via the use of unmanned drones.

Twitter erupted with claims that this memo provided the President unprecedented powers to kill any American, anywhere, for any reason. Well, I read the memo, and I'm fairly certain that is not what it said. (I think @blakehounshell was the first to point this out.) However, in reading this memo, which may or may not exactly detail U.S. policy, I did identify four important points for Americans if they want to avoid getting a warhead to the forehead.

Americans, if you are trying to avoid being transformed into a red mist;

--Don't join al Qaeda outside the United States- Who knew that if you are an American and you decide to join al Qaeda that you might get smacked in the face with a Hellfire missile. Unbelievable, the nerve of the American government to hold a grudge for so long. Can you believe the Executive Branch would be willing to kill members of the terrorist organization, including American members, that committed the largest terrorist attack in history on American soil? Absolutely absurd! However, simply being a member of al Qaeda won't necessarily get a drone sortie on your hut.

--Don't become a Senior Leader of al Qaeda overseas - Even more shocking, if you are an American citizen and you join al Qaeda, and then later, you become one of the senior leaders of that organization, you might just wake up to a mouthful of hell's fire! Unbelievable! To think that you could join a terrorist group and openly advocate for the killing of your fellow citizens, and then be so good at promoting terrorism against your homeland that you would be honored by al Qaeda with a promotion....to think you could then be killed for that promotion. I can't imagine. Who are these barbarians?

--Don't actively plan to kill or actually attempt to kill Americans - It turns out that if you are an American and you join al Qaeda overseas and then you plan to kill or actually try to kill Americans, you could get shot in the face with a missile. Ridiculous. What right do U.S. citizens have to try and prevent terrorists from attacking them? Surely if you join al Qaeda, recruit a guy off the Internet, and then help wrap his junk with explosives before setting him off to take down an airplane over Detroit on Christmas day, you should be allowed to hide out overseas and enjoy another opportunity to try a better, more sophisticated attack against the U.S., right?

-- Don't make it difficult to be arrested - This is where the white paper gets completely ludicrous. It seems that if the U.S. government cannot figure out a way to arrest you since you've joined al Qaeda, been promoted, tried to attack the U.S. and have been hiding in a failed state with no functioning law enforcement, they will then maybe send a drone after you. How insulting! How is this possibly fair to American terrorists that join al Qaeda?

Unlike the folks I witnessed on Twitter suggesting this document provides the President unbounded power to kill Americans, I see the inverse - a legal opinion particularly crafted to pursue one Anwar al-Awlaki. As has been seen in other public domains, Awlaki, an American, served as the head of external operations for AQAP in Yemen (a senior leader position), was being considered for promotion to head of AQAP (a more senior position) and was actively participating in plots to attack the U.S. (See Underwear Bomber). This uniquely qualifies him for targeting according to this white paper. The question should now be: what other Americans could be legally targeted by the U.S.? Adam Gadahn maybe? The list seems to be fairly short and not expansive in the way suggested by drone conspiracy theorists.

Drone critics - what do you want? - see policy recommendations here: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965

[jmm99]

My take (strictly hypothetical), from here.

Strikes (whether drone or other air, or boots on the ground direct actions) can be divided into two catagories, depending on what is known and unknown re: the target.

A "personality strike" is one targeting an individual whose identity and past and current activities are known. When the strike is conducted, those making the decision to engage are primarily concerned with (1) the degree of confidence that the particular individual is present; and (2) the extent of collateral damage that can be tolerated. UBL and al-Awlaki, for example.

A "signature strike" is one targeting an individual (or individuals) whose precise identity is (precise identities are) unknown or uncertain. Instead, the individual or individuals must match a pre-identified “signature” (a behavior set) that the targeter links to terrorist activity or association.

I expect we'll be hearing much more about "signature strikes".

The signature strike matrix below is strictly hypothetical (presented as a quote only to set it off):

A Signature Strike Matrix

(1) Individual(s) Planning Attacks

(2) Individual(s) Transporting Weapons (not incl. legal weapons ?)

(3) Individual(s) Handling Explosives

(4) Individual(s) in Terrorist Compound

(5) Individual(s) in Terrorist Training Camp

(6) Military-Age Male(s) in Known Terrorist Activity Area

(7) Individual(s) Consorting with Known Militants

(8) Armed Man(Men) Traveling (on foot)(in vehicles) in Terrorist-Controlled Area

(9) Individual(s) in Suspicious Camp located in Terrorist-Controlled Area

(10) Group(s) of Armed Men Traveling Toward Conflict Area

(11) Individual(s) Operating a Terrorist Training Camp

(12) Individual(s) Training to Join a Terrorist Group

(13) Individual(s) Facilitating a Terrorist Group

(14) Individual(s) in Terrorist Rest Facilities (Safe Houses)

Discuss, if you wish, the plusses and minuses of the matrix as written

- as well as

(1) the test you would use to include a factor (e.g., "more likely than not", "reasonable certainty", "high degree of confidence", etc., etc.);

(2) whether you would include or exclude each factor separately without considering the other factors (strict "must stand on its own" test); or would you aggregate all factors supported by some evidence, even where each such factor would not "stand on its own" ("conditional probability"); and

(3) whether other factors should be added to the matrix.

This doesn't require legalese.

Regards

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

Long time no see. I think you defined both pretty well and have a reasonable matrix for signature strikes. to me however, the issue is not one of legality but rather one of effectiveness, Both kinds of drone strikes suffer in two areas:

Dead insurgents or terrorists who have been blown to bits cannot provide much if any intelligence. You certainly can't ask them any question so there is absoulutely no HUMINT to be gained.

Second. there is every likelihood that these strikes - both kinds - will kill some civilian non-combatants and both combatants and non-combatants heve friends and relatives who are sure to be pissed off. so, the question then is how many more bad guys do you create with each drone strike? Do you kill more than you create? or the reverse? In other words, what are the costs v. the benefits of the program - on both issues?

I have no moral qualms about killing bad guys with drones and even with some of what we euphemistically call collateral damage. But I do think that this tool can be and has been very over used to our detriment.

Cheers

JohnT

PS The prior analysis of how not to get killed by a drone if you are an American is spot on - with the qualification in #1 that if you join AQ in the US you should not leave the country and should surrender to the FBI when they com knocking on your door. (No hellfires here but certainly a hail of bullets is most likely. )

[jmm99]

I've stayed in plain sight.

from JTF

Dead insurgents or terrorists who have been blown to bits cannot provide much if any intelligence. You certainly can't ask them any question so there is absoulutely no HUMINT to be gained.

Second. there is every likelihood that these strikes - both kinds - will kill some civilian non-combatants and both combatants and non-combatants heve friends and relatives who are sure to be pissed off. so, the question then is how many more bad guys do you create with each drone strike? Do you kill more than you create? or the reverse? In other words, what are the costs v. the benefits of the program - on both issues?

I have no moral qualms about killing bad guys with drones and even with some of what we euphemistically call collateral damage. But I do think that this tool can be and has been very over used to our detriment.

Agree; except as to this: "... and has been very over used to our detriment." The "jury" is not yet in on that.

As far as the Bureau of Investigative Journalism is concerned, the first drone strike was "to our detriment" - as if that "esteemed body" gives a damn.

Regards

Mike

PS to PS: "hail of bullets" - not probable, but I'll admit the possibility (e.g., Ruby Ridge). Almost all FBI arrests of terrs in US have gone off without bullets flying (several hundred cases).

[CWOT]

Thanks for your excellent comments.

I've posted a question on the efficacy of drones, related to this post, if anyone is interested. Here's the link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5JGSVMC

Do "Drones Kill al Qaeda" or do "Drones Make al Qaeda"?

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=977

[CWOT]

The past week has brought a flurry of debate sprinkled with intermittent anger over how the U.S. utilizes unmanned, armed drones to target al Qaeda members around the world. After I wrote the post, “Americans: If you don’t want to get killed by a drone, avoid these 4 things!”, I received a flurry of hate mail (of which a fraction actually dealt with drone policy) and some positive discussion. The debate on whether the U.S. should use drones to kill al Qaeda members hinges on two separate points of contention.

--Legal/Moral: Can the U.S. legally use drones to engage al Qaeda members (American or non-American)?
--Efficacy: Do drones eliminate more al Qaeda members than they create?

Today, I’ll focus on the latter question and save the legal/moral/ethical debate for later.

So are drones effective? Osama Bin Laden noted in his internal documents the devastating impact of drones on al Qaeda in Pakistan. However, Gregory Johnsen, Jeremy Scahill and other Yemen journalists/analysts see drones not as the great killer of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but instead the primary radicalizing force for new recruits to AQAP. So which is it? Do drones eliminate al Qaeda or do they create al Qaeda? I’d love to hear your thoughts.

Please cast your votes on the efficacy of drones and the results should show up after you cast your ballot. Note, this question is only about the efficacy of drones – save your moral/legal arguments for later. And no hedging! Is it worth continuing drone operations or not? Don’t qualify with “Sometimes” or “Depends on the conditions”. Assume that regardless of the context, the drone program will be conducted in roughly the same way with the same results.

Here is the link to the survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5JGSVMC

And here is the link to the post at Selected Wisdom: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=977

[davidbfpo]

To lose a weapons system is expected, this many is startling:

Almost 450 drones operated by the British military have crashed, broken down or been lost in action during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last five years, figures reveal.

The Ministry of Defence has disclosed for the first time the five Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems used in the conflicts and the number that have perished due to pilot error, technical faults or the undesirability of retrieving them from hostile areas.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/fe...ry-drones-lost

An interesting contrast to CWOT's latest threads on using (American) drones.

There is a long running main thread on drones, into which this will be merged one day: 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385

[SJPONeill]

It's a bit misleading as the article user perished and crashed interchangeably. While at the large NATO Class II/III end of the scale these may be close to one and the same, in the Class I mini/micro/nano categories, a crash might be something from which the UAV is picked up dusted off and relaunched, possibly not even requiring any repairs.

What this article chooses to ignore is the large number of hobbyist remote control air craft already operating freely in the UK, and most other Western nations, that have similar if not higher incident rates. Most military operated UAS are constructed to higher and more consistent standards than their hobby equivalents; and their operators are also trained to higher and more consistent levels.

I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

[davidbfpo]

I agree with this:

I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

I added the post as reliability of drones appears on SWC sometimes and it is part of the debate at home over drones.

[Fuchs]

Back in the 80's and 90's part of the sales pitch for drones was that they didn't need to have the super flight safety required for manned aviation. Less redundancy and less costs of testing were supposed to be major advantages of drones.
The focus on being able to use tiny spotter drones and extremely long endurance drones (with Global Hawk as gold-plated example or giant proportions) is only about a decade old. Previously, drones were widely understood to be expendable, and I think we still understand the tiny ones are indeed still expendable.

[carl]

I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

I don't know if it is fear mongering or not, but the article serves a useful purpose, to highlight the fact that drones crash a lot. They can't help but crash a lot given the limited view of the world the drivers have, the lag time between control input and response, what appears to me (viewing from the outside) to be limited control response, they are underpowered and the drivers have zero kinesthetic (sic) feedback. They are going to be crashing a lot until all those things are fixed.

And of course sometimes they decide to go walkabout. I'll never forget the bemused look on the face of a battle captain once. I asked him what was up and he said "The drone." "Oh yeah. Where's it going?" "We don't know exactly, but it's on its way."

[davidbfpo]

A NYT article Drone Pilots Are Shown to Have Stress Disorders, which refers to a new DoD report:

In the first study of its kind, researchers with the Defense Department have found that pilots of drone aircraft experience mental health problems like depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress at the same rate as pilots of manned aircraft who are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The study affirms a growing body of research finding health hazards even for those piloting machines from bases far from actual combat zones.

Note the DoD report is not readily found, that maybe because it is due to presented at a conference this week.

Link to NYT article:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us...it_th_20130223

[davidbfpo]

In July 2012 the University of Surrey's Centre for International Intervention held a conference 'Hitting the Target?" How New Capabilities Are Shaping Contemporary International Intervention'; I am sure there are plenty of similar conferences elsewhere.

There is something different about this as the principal academic comes from the 'Critical Studies on Terrorism' school:

The workshop’s objective was to explore how new selective precision strike capabilities available to military and intelligence forces are shaping approaches to international intervention. It aimed to be a forum for dialogue between different academic disciplines, as well as between academia and policy-makers/practitioners.... it became apparent that the principal focus would be on the increasing offensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, or “drones”, a topic of increasing public debate as well as policy relevance.

There are some PPT on a link.

The conference is in partnership with RUSI, with an event next month in London, to launch a report and is decidedly optimistic that:

Military action in Mali, Libya and elsewhere have demonstrated the continuing, critical reliance on advanced technological capabilities in modern Western intervention.

Link:http://www.ias.surrey.ac.uk/workshop...ion/report.php

Link to RUSI event (for members):http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E511BB3D16FB0F