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Thread: COIN Reading Lists (merged)

  1. #21
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Big props to COL (Ret.) Bill Darley who put this thing together and pushed through funding (thanks for the assist Dr. Jack!) from CAC to make it happen, and to the Mil Review staff for compiling it. It's a well balanced compilation of the best Military Review articles on COIN over the past two years.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
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  2. #22
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    Armor Magazine, Sep-Oct 08: Counterinsurgency: Selected Works
    The U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, would like to thank the editor and managing editor of ARMOR for their agreement to publish this special counterinsurgency edition. Several months ago, the COIN Center and staff of ARMOR agreed that the time was right to consolidate in a single edition a selection of the most valuable and instructive recently published articles on the use of armor in a counterinsurgency environment. These articles will provide units preparing to deploy a quick overview of the “best practices” associated with the use of armor in a COIN environment and perhaps lay the groundwork for future doctrinal revisions.....
    Counterinsurgency: Selected Works

    Welcome to the Counterinsurgency Century
    by Retired General Donn Starry

    Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain
    by Captain John C. Moore

    Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf
    by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White

    Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations
    by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps

    Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar
    by Major Niel Smith

    The Roots of Insurgent Warfare
    by Captain Christopher L. Center

    Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler
    by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, and Major Geoffrey A. Norman

    Platoons of Action: An Armor Task Force’s Response to Full-Spectrum Operations in Iraq
    by John P.J. DeRosa

    A Report on the 11th Armored Cavalry in Southeast Asia 1969-70
    by Colonel Donn A. Starry

    The Battle of Suoi Tre: Viet Cong Infantry Attack on a Firebase Ends in Slaughter When Armor Arrives
    by First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick

    Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh
    by Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia

    The Battle of An Bao II
    by Captain Timothy J. Grogan

  3. #23
    Council Member Pattonmat89's Avatar
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    Question Books for beginner COIN people

    I paged through the threads about books on here, but I didn't exactly find what I was looking for. Specifically, I'd like recommendations on good introductory books for COIN. Note two things, please:

    1. I already own FM 3-24. I bought it two years ago, and it came along with me to college.

    2. I'm in college. So I prefer free things. Free things are nice.

    Any other recommendations on books that relate to this sort of thing are welcome (history of radical Islam, history of Afghanistan, etc.).

    Thanking you in advance.
    "Don't discuss yourself, for you are bound to lose; if you belittle yourself, you are believed; if you praise yourself, you are disbelieved." -Michel de Montaigne

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  4. #24
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Not the answer to the exam question but...

    I would suggest you start with Clausewitz on War. Get the Howard Paret translation. THis is THE standard. Yes, it's heavy and not easy to understand, but COIN is merely a style of War. if you don't understand war - and very many do not - then you won't understand COIN at the level that is actually required.

    After, that a liberal spread of Mao-Tse-Tung, Kitson, Julian Paget (if you can find any) - those are the British Army classics, and of course, William Gwynne's Imperial Policing. - again out of print, but there are copies out there.

    Hope that helps. Actually reading this board, will equip in way that many would and should pay money for!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  5. #25
    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    Default USMC Small Wars Manualfrom the 1940

    USMC Small Wars Manual Available in soft copy for free. More of a TTPs and users' guide than a theoretical base, but much can be infered from what they chose to document.

  6. #26
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    If you do a search you can find Roger Trinquier's work online.

    Just be sure to keep it in perspective.

    This site also has an extensive library of resources, and a number of links to other sources.

  7. #27
    Council Member Starbuck's Avatar
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    T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc). He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.

  8. #28
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    Modern Irregular Warfare (originally published 1972).

    http://www.wlym.com/pdf/iclc/modernwarfare.pdf

  9. #29
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Starbuck View Post
    T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc).
    I have great deal of difficulty in believing T.E. assisted in developing any tactics at all, despite that which he claims. The Jordanians certainly make no claim to his expertise, other than he knew how to use explosives. Command detonated IEDs had been widely used in the Boer War, against rail networks.

    The real power behind T.E. was General Allenby and a small team of British Intelligence experts who told him what to do and when to it. T.E. was actually only a small part of far larger picture, conceived and executed by that small team. There is ample evidence to suggest Lawrence was wise after the fact, and greatly "gilded the lily," which the OPSEC controls of 1927 as quite happy for him to do, in order to disguise the other means used.

    He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.
    I'd take T.E. with a huge pinch of salt. He's another poster boy for the post modern avant-garde, that was as bad in 1930's as they are today.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  10. #30
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    Wilf as usual is spot-on and has it right with the recommendation to read Clausewitz first!! Ironic though that FM 3-24 chose to leave Clausewitz off of the classics bibliography list in the back of the manual. The purpose of this action was to bludgeon the American Army out of its perceived "conventional mindset."

    Also strongly suggest reading CE Callwell's "Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice." The intro in the University of Nebraska edition by historian Doug Porch is superb.

  11. #31
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default The Hows and Why of People's War

    Patton,

    I've been given some thought to this question as of late. Specifically, we've been debating how to teach the institutional army about COIN. I learned from On the Job Training followed with my current academic pursuits. With that in mind, I'd suggest starting with the basics of how and why.

    1. To answer the Why, I'd recommend two books.

    A. Why Men Rebel- Ted Gurr
    B. Revolutionary Change- Chalmers Johnson

    Summary of Gurr...

    Amazon Review
    In this book, Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence.
    Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."(p.24) http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680


    John T. Fischel SWJ summary- excerpt from another thread
    1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
    2. Neither do those who are doing well.
    3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
    Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
    It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

    COL Bob Jones adds

    A couple of points worth considering:

    In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.

    Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).

    COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.

    Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of these populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.

    Summary of Johnson...

    CHPT 8 PG 156-157

    "by demonstrating through apparently indiscriminate violence that the existing regime cannot protect the people nominally under its authority. The effect on the individual is supposedly not only anxiety, but withdrawal from the relationships making up the established order of society. .... usually has the opposite effect of calling people's attention to the seriousness of the situation and encouraging them to support any strong reassertion of authority"

    "..provoke the ruling elites into a disastrous overreaction, thereby creating widespread sentiment against them. ...transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things."


    More to follow...

    Mike

  12. #32
    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Default The How and Why continued...

    To understand How men rebel, you gotta go with Chairman Mao...

    Here's a quick summary with a little help from Dr. Gordon McCormick and David Kilcullen...

    KEY POINTS*:

    1. In this ‘game’ of IW, the goal of the state or counter-state is control of the populace. The counter-state is an organization that seeks to take over the responsibilities of the state. The counter-state can be a tribe, gang, insurgent, terrorist, or drug lord.

    2. Control is dictated by the perceived security level of the populace. In this type of conflict, control is often coerced as the state and counter-state battle for the physical and psychological so-called “hearts and minds.”

    3. If the government stops providing essential services, security, and governance to the populace, then the counter-state will fill the void. For example, an area in Iraq where coalition forces mass in large FOBs and the government does not govern. These areas are often dubbed “denied areas.”

    4. The point at which the state cedes an area to the counter-state is defined as the break point. This break point is “achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of administrative and governing institutions” (McCormick, 1999, pp. 26-27).

    * These key points are a portion of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model from his seminar on Guerilla Warfare. Dr. David Kilcullen used the model to introduce his conflict eco-system.

    ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION:

    Chairman Mao set the ultimate playbook for the counter-state. The Vietcong, NVA, Hezbollah, Hamas, JAM, and Al Qaeda adapted it for their own purposes.

    1) Clandestine Organization

    2) Psychological Preparation of the People
    (a) Propaganda
    (b) Reduction of Prestige
    (c) Peasant Resistance
    (d) Destruction of the Opposition

    3) Expansion of Control
    (a) Destruction of the Oppression
    (b) Land Reform as a Tactic of the Party

    4) Consolidation of Power
    (a) Paramilitary Forces
    (b) Mutual Surveillance
    (c) Movement Controls

    In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Mao Zedong's seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare,[4] has been widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap, whose "Peoples War, Peoples Army"[5] closely follows the Maoist three-phase approach, but emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the population in conjunction with guerrilla forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerril...e_Maoist_model)

    I hope this helps...

    Mike
    Last edited by MikeF; 01-29-2009 at 03:25 PM.

  13. #33
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    Default Patton, in a blatant effort

    at self promotion, I'd recommend my own (with Max G. Manwaring) Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, OU Press, 2008 (paperback edition) which is a "reasonable" price.

    Cheers

    JohnT
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-29-2009 at 06:00 PM. Reason: Added link.

  14. #34
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    RAND has many many things on line, including Galula's first person account of his time in Algeria. And it's all for free.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-29-2009 at 06:04 PM. Reason: Added link.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

  15. #35
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Cmon Guys

    Gian and WILF...

    While I too enjoy an occassional perusal of St Carl's treatment on war, we might consider the context of the request... Soph in College with no personal reference point for the nature of warfare.

    Directing him to Carl first is akin to telling a young child to learn the history of the Jewish nation by picking up a copy of the Old
    Testament and following the story.

    Can it be done, yeah but....

    I think its a poor place to direct a neophyte "first"...

    Live well and row
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  16. #36
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I highly recommend:

    "1776" by David McCullough.
    Very successful insurgents like Mao and Ho Chi Minh studied this insurgency very closely. This one year snapshot really does a great job of covering the play by play of a government making bad decisions in the face of a dissatisfied populace, and the resultant insurgency. Plus everyone needs to refresh themselves on who we are as Americans, and by studing the errors of our British "parents," we can hopefully break the cycle and not make the same mistakes they did as we find ourselves in very similar situations today.

    Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice David Galula's

    From theory to strategy to operations to tactics. A guy who gets it does a great job of breaking it down.

    Lastly, unless you are a hardcore academic, I strongly urge you not to attempt to read and understand Clausewitz. This is in no way a criticism of my Prussian friend. To understand insurgency you must first seek to understand fundamental human dynamics, and THEN to understand war. The reasons why states wage war against each other and the dynamics of that are very different than the dynamics of why a populace wages war against its own government. This is one reason why conventional military forces often start off on the wrong foot when tasked to deal with an insurgency. They do what militarys do: Defeat the Threat. So I will respectfully disagree with WILF and COL G. as to "Clausewitz first."

    (By the same token, I would never recommend to a Lieutenant or even a Captain to read Clausewitz either. Read what is relevant to your success at the level you are at. Read classics like "Platoon Leader" and "Company Commander"; hell read "Devils in Baggy Pants" and other great reads on small unit actions and leadership. Then read Galula and think about how you apply those leadership skills to an insurgency).
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-29-2009 at 08:54 PM. Reason: Added links.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  17. #37
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Hacksaw View Post
    Gian and WILF...

    Soph in College with no personal reference point for the nature of warfare.

    Directing him to Carl first is akin to telling a young child to learn the history of the Jewish nation by picking up a copy of the Old
    Testament and following the story.

    Can it be done, yeah but....

    I think its a poor place to direct a neophyte "first"...
    Not to pile on, but to really understand St Carl, one ought to read and understand Hegel first, since On War is largely a practical application of the Hegelian dialectic to the world of human conflict, representing one instantiation in the world of human activities of the dialectic movement by which the Absolute Ideal becomes concrete--again not a task I'd recommend to your average college sophomore, especially one who may be embarking on this endeavor as a solo venture.

    Have you guys read Hegel's Logic or Phenomenolgy of the Spirit ? It makes reading Carl seem like a cakewalk.
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

  18. #38
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Sheesh. I read Clausewitz when I was

    a Corporal in 1952. Who knew I'd offend so many people. To make matters worse, it was the 1940s Maude translation and not Wilf's recommended Paret edition (after my time...).

  19. #39
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    Default COIN Reference Online

    For today's (and likely a LOT of tomnrow's) relevance, go to this site and search for "Milestones": http://web.youngmuslims.ca/

    Tons of people have actually gone to Amazon and bought this...the great thing about the site, above, it you can also get links to places where people discuss Qutb. To me, that is even more valuable than the having a book between two pieces of paper.

    As someone already mentioned, RAND has a lot of free info.

    Another place, obvious, but strangely not often thought of is google books:

    http://books.google.com/books?q=coun...G=Search+Books

    This should get you to it.

    Keep in mind that books are, by nature overcome by events. Therefore, if I were you, I'd also look at online journals, magazines, and such. These are much more timely, especially for college paper purposes. If you decide to suck it up and actually BUY some books (VERY highly recommended), I'd go to Barnes and Noble right now...they were having a HUGE sale on books, and a LOT were COIN-related.

    One of the problems you will constantly run into is that the entire notion of COIN--most especially these days--is constantly gainining more and more of a database. Much of it is crap...the key is to find vetted authors. So, to develop good papers and good ideas, you will need to include research on the authors who write all of this stuff.

    Do not let any of this discourage you, though. Keep in mind that many of the BEST practioners of COIN (and I'm begginning to HATE that term, by the way) were not even military men. In fact, a significant amount of insight can be gained through anthropological venues...probably even BETTER than the majority of "COIN Expert" books out there.

    More than anything else--IMHO--the study of insurgency is about people and societies, and NOT about military arts. In fact, many who are/were acknowledged military experst have fallen (and will continue to fall) short when confronted with an insurgency dynamics.

    One final note. As you look through all of this, you will likely begin to find more and more on "irregular warfare." Don't let this distract you because you risk getting lost in endless discussions of what, exactly, that term means.

    Good luck!

  20. #40
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Brins View Post

    Do not let any of this discourage you, though. Keep in mind that many of the BEST practioners of COIN (and I'm begginning to HATE that term, by the way) were not even military men. In fact, a significant amount of insight can be gained through anthropological venues...probably even BETTER than the majority of "COIN Expert" books out there.
    Curious, who would you cite as civilian "best practitioners?" Case examples?
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
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