It's the Tribes (merged thread)

[Tukhachevskii]

A brief, disjointed, hurried and all round grammatically suspect (but no less reliable) set of field notes regarding tribes and tribal influence from Yemen (c. 2007). Tribes have often been kingmakers especially in Yemen, but they also constitute a shadow/alternative governance structure often at odds with the “legitimate” Government. Saleh owed his power due to the largesse and support of Sheik al-Ahmar (who was also, in tribal terms, Saleh’s superior given that Saleh’s tribe was part of Al-Ahmar’s Hashid tribal confederation). The Yemeni state doesn’t control anything outside the cities and even then places like Aden have a mind all their own (due to it being a Yemeni Socialist Party stronghold). Although to all intensive purposes (King of Queens reference there for all you fans) Ali Abdallah Saleh (be careful how you pronounce that last one) may appear to be a ‘typical’ Arab dictator in fact his power is severely limited to the cities. De facto control in the hinterlands, especially the lawless east opposite the Rub-Al-Khali desert is tribal controlled. The Tribal Shura Council, although lacking legislative authority, wields tremendous power for the above reasons and can rarely be ignored. The GPC / Tribal relationship has often paid dividends in the past (Saleh would never have defeated the South or achieved Union without them) and is currently useful in bolstering his armed forces in the Sa’ada war up north given the unreliability of certain sectors of the army.

However, the relationship is politically volatile especially when it came to Saleh trying to extract funds from the US for his supposed counter-terrorism effort (which the Ttribes saw as betrayal of Islam and which even the Al-Houthi insurgency in the North managed to capitalise on). Saleh cleverly ensured that the Political Security Organisation (’Amn As-Siyasiia) allowed key prisoners to escape thereby satisfying the tribal sense of sharafi’ (honour). This is the same PSO that is now largely staffed by ex-Iraqi Ba’athists! (I believe Iraq wants them back for trial). The relationship has benefitted the tribes in many ways such as when they insisted that Saleh turn the schools over to fully clerical/Islamic control (he had wanted them partially secular) when unification was finally achieved in 1994 (after the tribes helped Saleh destroy what was left of the South and the YSP’ military apparatus which, incidentally, still exists in the form of disgruntled ex-servicemen angry about the non-payment of their pensions which were promised when Saleh threw them out and replaced them with his own sycophants).

The Al-Ahmar led Hashid confederation briefly flirted with parliamentary politics by creating the explicitly Islamic (Hizb Al-) Islah reform party which included a wing led by sometime Bin Laden confidant Sheik Ali Az-Zindani (who is very well respected amongst all of Yemen’s Tribes, bar the Zaiydi’s up north). Even though Islah remains largely dominated by Tribal elders the Al-Ahmar Hashid Confederation is still inclined to throw its support behind whomever it considers useful financially and politically thus acting both constitutionally and extra-constitutionally to derive the most benefits and ensure its demands are met. Given that the tribes are overwhelmingly pious (or fundamentalist, depending upon your angle) Muslims those demands are obvious. Indeed, Zindani’s right wing of the Islah party and Al-Ahmar’s Hashid Confederation (amongst others) supported the creation of an extra-judicial morality police, along similar lines to that in Saudi, to patrol the godless streets of the cities (traditionally Saleh’s sphere of influence) even though, legally, they have no power to do so (the government has not stopped them).

Both Saleh’s presidential party the GPC (General People’s Congress) and the former ruling party of South Yemen (and now Yemen’s real opposition party) the Yemeni Sociality Party flirt with and court the tribes to varying ends; the 2006(?) presidential elections were contested by Islah and YSP in unison even though Shiek Al-Ahmar publically announced his Hashid confederation would “morally” support Saleh. Al-Ahmar died in December 2007 leaving leadership of the Hashid confederation to his son, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, who is known to hate Saleh but who is pragmatic enough not to break with him entirely in return for largesse and financial rewards which, given the role of tribal levies (10,000+) in the continuing Sa’ada war is going to be substantial.

[Tukhachevskii]

Tribal leaders in Iraq eventually realized that Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups came with the intention of taking away tribal leaders’ authority. This suggests to a counterinsurgent fighting an Islamic extremist group that in the event that no other viable authority exists, finding a viable way to empower tribal leaders against the insurgents may be most wise from a cultural perspective. Taking authority from a tribal leader without compensation is a recipe for disaster, as this certainly played a role in the rapid growth of the Sunni insurgency in 2003.)

I found the excerpt on the whole very interesting but it was the above proposition that caught my eye. I think one of the things we tend to forget is that structures are constantly in flux with elements of both order and disequilibrium present. Although it may make sense to empower local elders/sheiks/clan leaders this may merely stoke the fires (or dampen them, but that's a contextual issue). What I mean is that if we look at Yemen (tribes) and the Caucasus (Clans) part of the appeal of the Wahhabi style of Islam was that it bypassed the elderly, rigid and largely ossified chains and networks of authority and loyalty which the young felt stifled by.

In Yemen the threat of AQ Yemeni/Southern Arabian branch is precisely in its ability to appeal to the dissaffected youth who feel constrained by the tribal system. Similarly, young people in the caucasus found their clan based systems of obligation to be politically, culturally and economically stifling. Having to bow to pressures of "elderly elders" who usually bowed to Russian government requestes or saw loyalty to Mosocw as traditional/acceptable meant those same eleders/sheiks were seen as collaborators. The flattening or equalising force of Wahhabism which stressed the indiviual's submersion into the will of Allah and thereby removed any mediating authority was greatly appealing. Thus, a relatively unexamined aspect of the Wahhabi phenomenon is it's demographic underpinnings fuelled by a population explosion of dissafected youngsters who feel constrained by tribes/clans and who thurst for freedom under Wahhabism (it is not, contra Fromm, of Muslims desiring to escape from Freedom but, rather, that they seek social freedom through the levelling effect of Wahhabism).

It was this, IMO, that forced tribal elders in Iraq to counter AQ; that they would lose control of their own cadres and thus their own systems of nepotism, patronage and influence. This is also, I recall, one of the reasons that Saddam kept an eye out for Sunni extremism. Gievn that he was suppressing, incorporating and balancing the tribes the last thing he wanted was for an alternative non-tirbal source of mobilisation which couldn't be bought off. Interesting excerpt nonetheless, is the book widely avaliable?