This sounds like the thesis to your book, which is what folks like me wanted to hear from your first post on the subject, rather than just the broad-brush claim that we don't pay enough attention to tribes. Now that wan't hard was it?
And please, please do not bristle at criticism. It doesn't get anybody anywhere around these parts. YOU brought up the topic of being a buck sergeant, as if Ted was attacking you over that fact. Maybe I am incorrect in this perception, but if you feel that passionately about what you have to say, you also need to remember that you will always have many detractors, both real and imagined.
Best of luck, but keep pushing the premise of your thesis to us. That will help me understand better why you think you have methodoligies that exceed the standard, or are going to allow us to understand aspects of tribes in ways that can benefit our warfighting efforts.
One particular question I have that I do not believe I asked well the first time is this: If we are attempting to end even our supporting role to the Iraqi govt and military, what does a deep understanding of the tribes gain us? As we apply fewer tactical and operational resources to the issues Iraq faces, and delve further in the political and strategic, aren't we talking more along the lines of diplomacy, and not lines of operation that a RCT or BCT commander would be concerned with (assuming the counterpart Iraqi Bde Cmdr even permits the US commander to send his troops off the FOB)?
In a post-SOFA Iraqi state, what does this tribal expertise gain us, when we are not in the lead over there?
How does this insight stack up against our commitment to the central government? I'm not certain I understand whether you are advocating a closer relationship with the noble tribes, or simply pointing out realities that you believe we do not see, to our peril when it comes to analysis of the situation with the tibes, who they might be supporting, who is getting courted by AQI/ISI, and who we need to interview/interrogate next.
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