It's the Tribes (merged thread)

[tribeguy]

Dr. Tyrell - that is good - but what are the names, specifically of the noble tribes in Iraq, and what role to they play in Iraqi society, specifically?

Another question: what do Abu Umar Al-Baghdad I, II, and III have in common? What can we learn in terms of AQ's recruitment and tribal engagement strategy from this?

Respects,

Sam

Hi Tom:

(I know the answers to these questions - but I ask them to prove the point - which is who cares if I know? The important thing is for "us" to know. Hence this thread.)

I am looking forward to your posts on the noble tribes. There is a good deal of Arabic scholarship on the subject. I promise you that this area will bear fruit, but I caution all that hard and fast rules and inflexible thinking are the enemy.

Iraqi society is incredibly complex, and so are its people. If somebody represents that they are a tribal "expert," or that they "really understand the tribes," think again. That's why I have translated so much arabic scholarship on the tribes, and most particularly their hierarchies. It differs greatly from its western counterpart, and leads to analytical paradigms that are much more incisive, since they are organic to the culture.

Our paradigms and such, whether or not they were part of the institutional culture (I agree, they weren't) still would only bear so much fruit as they filtered through the way that we as outsiders see the Iraqi tribal system.

I am trying to break through that "outsider" barrier. I've had some successes and some failures in that area. Bottom line - I don't have the answers, but I have a lot more questions.

Keep up the good work - stay curious on the subject of tribes. This subject doesn't exist in a vacuum. I have seen that tribalism permeates every aspect of Iraqi society. That's why I started this thread.

I spent 4 years on the ground in Iraq, and will be returning in the near future. I suspect that our paths may have crossed before.


Marc,

I agree that it is a simple concept, until you bring it down to a "what should we do" level of thinking. Just because we think we know a concept doesn't mean that we can apply it.

So, that is the reason that I asked which are the noble tribes of Iraq.

V/r,

Sam

[marct]

Hi Sam,

I agree that it is a simple concept, until you bring it down to a "what should we do" level of thinking. Just because we think we know a concept doesn't mean that we can apply it.

So, that is the reason that I asked which are the noble tribes of Iraq.

Get's us back to Clausewitz doesn't it ? Yeah, I agree that the devil is in the details when it comes to applying the concept. Personally, I don't know who the ones in Iraq are... then again, I've never claimed to have that granular level of knowledge .

The entire issue, though, does raise some interesting points. For example, even without knowing the specifics in an area, and what the actual meaning(s) of those specifics is/are (i.e. what does it actually mean today in terms of operations), if you have the concept, you can get the data either by asking people who know (that's the Socratic in me!) or by looking for structural similarities / analogs. Of course, figuring out what it means is crucial and how it gets transformed is critical to actually using it .

The flip side is getting hung up on concepts and structures that are much less operationally relevant and focusing on them to the detriment of the long term goal. One of the problems that I've noticed with a lot of political / military writing about cultural phenomenon is the implied assumption that culture is static rather than constantly being negotiated (another problem is the naive idea that "We" aren't ruled by it, but "They" are - hah! We should get Rob Thornton in on this one ).

Anyway, I've got to get back to work (sigh).

Cheers,

Marc

[tribeguy]

Hi Sam,



Get's us back to Clausewitz doesn't it ? Yeah, I agree that the devil is in the details when it comes to applying the concept. Personally, I don't know who the ones in Iraq are... then again, I've never claimed to have that granular level of knowledge .

The entire issue, though, does raise some interesting points. For example, even without knowing the specifics in an area, and what the actual meaning(s) of those specifics is/are (i.e. what does it actually mean today in terms of operations), if you have the concept, you can get the data either by asking people who know (that's the Socratic in me!) or by looking for structural similarities / analogs. Of course, figuring out what it means is crucial and how it gets transformed is critical to actually using it .

The flip side is getting hung up on concepts and structures that are much less operationally relevant and focusing on them to the detriment of the long term goal. One of the problems that I've noticed with a lot of political / military writing about cultural phenomenon is the implied assumption that culture is static rather than constantly being negotiated (another problem is the naive idea that "We" aren't ruled by it, but "They" are - hah! We should get Rob Thornton in on this one ).

Anyway, I've got to get back to work (sigh).

Cheers,

Marc

Marc! I can't let you off that easily. Hear me now and believe me in 10 years, the noble tribes are MOST operationally relevant. Hence the question, what do Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi I, II, and III have in common!

The idea of being able to ask those who know invites undisciplined and agenda warped answers, especially in Iraq, which is the land of actual conspiracies - not theories.

Here's what I mean about operational relevance. It's the tribes:

Defeating Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy in Iraq

Creating an insurgency is easier than fighting against one in Iraq, particularly if the grievances used to justify violence remain unaddressed by the Iraqi government.

One such grievance comes from tribal leaders who are ignored by the Iraqi government. Influence, or "wasita," is crucial for tribal leaders to ensure that they receive their share of resources from the government. Tribal leaders who are ignored by the government are shamed, and their legitimacy as sheikhs is threatened. Amongst the sheikh's many responsibilities is to ensure that his tribe is secure, prosperous, and growing. He also must ensure that his tribe is strong and can defend its territories from neighboring tribes who may wish to take resources from his tribe. If the government doesn't recognize a sheikh, what does that say to the sheikh's tribesmen? If the sheikh isn't important, then just how important is the tribesman? What can the tribesmen expect from the government if it doesn't recognize and communicate with his sheikh? Is this the message that the Iraqi government should be sending to its citizens?.....

And finally, (insert deep breath here), our counterinsurgency strategy is linear, and our targeting is essentially a "whack a mole" strategy.

The issue isn't the mole - they are problems, but the problem is actually in parts of the soil that the mole is digging in to screw up the Iraqi lawn.

The soil is the tribal system, and parts of it (some sub tribes) are very sympathetic to AQ and other ACF elements.

Our intel does a great job of who, what, when, and where. That's the essence of whack a mole, but it really applies best to fighting a conventional enemy.

In COIN, why is the key. And individuals are not. Groups, and by that I mean sub tribes, are the key.

Here's a snippet from a recent talk that was held between some "old school" iraqis and their "new school" officers.

Old school: There are sub tribes of the X tribe now in Y location - they are going to make trouble there.

New school: what should we do?

Old school: we need to destroy that sub tribe, entirely.

New school: but that is a violation of human rights!

Old school: if you want the government to stay in power, you have to send a message to the rest of the sub tribal shaykhs not to follow in this direction.

Note that we, the Americans, should just let the Iraqi government do what it must to stay in power.

I do not suggest that destroying sub tribes is what US forces should do. Quite the opposite, it runs against what I believe in.

However, if that is what the Iraqi government has to do, I think we need to just turn a blind eye to it.

What are your thoughts, Marc?

[slapout9]

where is the free first chapter?

[marct]

What are your thoughts, Marc?

At the moment, focused on a presentation I have to give on Tuesday and another on a paper for mid-June. As i said, I'm up to my eyebrows in work right now .

[tribeguy]

Work always gets in the way. Thankfully, my work intersects with my interests. I am sure it does for you as well.

I am looking forward to your posts. Right now I am preparing a top down analysis of the Iraqi tribal system by province, region, Qadha', and Nahiya. While the source data is somewhat dated, I am interested in evaluating it to see where it supports events on the ground.

I just finished translating 'Abd 'Aun Al-Rudhan's encyclopedia of iraqi tribes - it has 14193 sub tribes in total - with locational data included. However, this work will be misunderstood and misinterpreted by those who don't understand how Iraqi scholars study and analyze their own tribal system. That's why I wrote the book.

It's not "my method," but rather, is my attempt to describe theirs. I think it is much more intuitive than our western attempts, having studied those extensively.

The Brits, God bless them, produced a lot of tribal data, but they over emphasized the role of "confederations" and super confederations. At the local level, the major tribal entities are almost dead identities. Sub tribal identity is much more cohesive, but those are much more numerous.

A British scholar with great understanding said that it was their most important yet most difficult challenge to understand and interpret Middle Eastern Tribal systems. He didn't have the benefits of database software, unfortunately. Our challenge is to first understand the nature of the tribes themselves, and then somehow incorporate this into an analytical system that allows for some degree of predictive power such that we can at least identify the myriad of most likely short, intermediate, and long term futures with respect to how the tribal system will interact and react with the governments that purport to represent them.

Again, I am looking forward to your input.
Very Resepctfully,

Tribeguy

[Scott Shaw]

I was able to watch Sam pitch his first class yesterday on his theory. 1. Sam is amazingly intelligent. He is a speaker, writer, and reader of Arabic. 2. His presentation is very animated – he’s excited about this topic. 3. He is very well read on his sources having personally translated many of them.

Yeah – he had a shameless plug for his book and I’ll buy a copy if just to read what he translated since my Arabic reading isn’t so good. If you can get over the plug (and you really should), as davidbfpo above pointed out, he brings a level of specialism that is not found elsewhere that I know of.
His basic point – and Sam if I got this wrong, then tell me – is that there are tribes in Iraq (the Noble Tribes) that drive the society (drive may not be the right word, so I’ll go “Where the Noble Tribes go, so goes the country.)

As far as what Tom Odom says above, the “necessary” of what Sam does can be explained in the question, “What motivates Iraqi X to do what he is doing?” I served as a MiTT Chief for a year in addition to commanding a rifle company in Baghdad. The full tribe name of the Iraqis that I worked with can explain some of what they did (in retrospect since I was not aware of the importance of sub-tribe/clan until yesterday). It’s deeper than just “Mr Maliki” or Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti – what about the albu Nasirs that Saddam belongs to? How do you talk to them? How about the fact that there are Malikis all over the country and their power base is much larger than that of any other tribe cross province (there are more of certain tribes in certain provinces, but cross province – the Malikis take it.

Scott

[Steve Blair]

Interesting, but any close reading of the Army's operations on our own frontier would have pointed out the importance of understanding tribal organization and interior politics. Sad how we always have to reinvent the understanding wheel every few years....

[Tom Odom]

Scott

I appreciate your comments. No dispute on the importance of the tribes.

But as I said before, the premise that everyone is ignoring the tribal aspects of what goes on here in Iraq is wrong and in the context of plugging a book misleading.

Thanks again

Tom

[Scott Shaw]

Tom,

I didn't copy the whole of what I meant to post - what I wanted to get at was at what level are we thinking about tribe/sub-tribe/clan and the effects of it. I really think that at that company/battery/troop level, our guys ought to be thinking about it (thus the need for the company level intel support team - and a smart Commander) to understand motivations. I know that the MNC-I/MND/BCT staffs are, but from what I know of staffs in 2004-2005 from personal experience and from the students I taught as an SGI and from what I saw in 2007-2008, I know that many (and I hate generalizations too) battalion staffs are not. Too bad for us and too bad for our Soldiers - and their families. I just think that extensive tribal knowledge at the battalion and company level goes a long way.

Scott

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

I didn't copy the whole of what I meant to post - what I wanted to get at was at what level are we thinking about tribe/sub-tribe/clan and the effects of it. I really think that at that company/battery/troop level, our guys ought to be thinking about it (thus the need for the company level intel support team - and a smart Commander) to understand motivations. I know that the MNC-I/MND/BCT staffs are, but from what I know of staffs in 2004-2005 from personal experience and from the students I taught as an SGI and from what I saw in 2007-2008, I know that many (and I hate generalizations too) battalion staffs are not. Too bad for us and too bad for our Soldiers - and their families. I just think that extensive tribal knowledge at the battalion and company level goes a long way.

Scott

And I don't disagree with any of that. In fact, I pushed CoIST issues for the past 6 years from my day job at JRTC. The HTS is a step in the right direction with the HTTs but there is work needed there. The system is not a system yet and at that i will shut up.

I believe in the cultural awareness push and all of it. I was an anthro minor; that is one of the reasons I became a FAO in the first place.

Best
Tom

[Hacksaw]

I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer

[slapout9]

Interesting, but any close reading of the Army's operations on our own frontier would have pointed out the importance of understanding tribal organization and interior politics. Sad how we always have to reinvent the understanding wheel every few years....

Absolutely, on another thread we were talking about the Revolutionary War and Indians. George Washington was a land surveyor by trade and he had numerous contacts and knowledge of the Indian tribes that certainly were of benefit during our own Insurgency. But we seem to have forgotten that as Steve points out.

[slapout9]

I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer

Yea, there is another best seller out called Tribes by marketing expert Seth Godin and your sales tactics seem to mimic this book

[tribeguy]

Alcon:

I appreciate your concerns, but a chapter or two out of my book isn't going to get you where we all need to be.

I do post things on my blog at www.theiraqiarabtribalsystem.com, but I am not sure that anybody (anthropologist or not) is really going to understand the fullness of it without some basics that come from actual Iraqi Arabic Tribal scholarship. That's why I wrote the book. We, on the whole, have a partial understanding of the importance of tribes and their relationship to all things relevant in Iraq. This concerns me a great deal.

And I'm not saying that I understand the fullness of it - after having briefed the commander of MND South, as well as a variety of other senior level officers, however, the universal response has been "I wish we would have known about this five years ago." So, while I think most are pursuing a greater understanding of the tribal system, I believe that we are limited by the way that we approach the subject - through our western prism.

For example, Tom posted the idea that he studies the tribes as it is necessary. Well, what Tom believes is necessary might differ substantially from what is actually required. Also, what I think is necessary might be overstated, and it might also fall short. I think that we all need to remain very curious about this subject. Tribalism is one of the most powerful currents in Iraqi history, not just post-Saddam. There are reasons for this that need to be understood before we start trying to put tribalism in some kind of conceptual box. Tom has stated in other posts that tribalism and sectarianism are both important, and I agree with that. There are many scholars that believe that sect and tribe are separate issues - and they are not. The question then becomes, where does tribalism and sectarianism intersect.

That's why I ask the question: what are the noble tribes in Iraq, and what is their role in.....well, everything. It's a subject of study - and it is not something that I can answer even in the most longwinded post here.

Some of the topics that are most germane in the book are: 1) the Arabic Naming Convention and its Application to Tactical Tribal Analysis, 2) the sub tribal naming convention and its application to tactical and strategic tribal analysis, and 3) the identification and management of Iraqi tribal hegemonies at the national, regional, provincial, Qadha, and Nahiya Levels and 4) The relationship between the democratic model of government and the tribal system and who this empowers, and also who it automatically disenfranchises.

Having been involved in operations at the ground level for four years, I am confident that our collective understanding of this (including anthropologists) is insufficient and thus doesn't bring us the really important data that we need to incorporate into our strategies from the corps level to the company level.

That being said, I pose the questions to Tom, as he works for MND-C: What is the relevance of Sunni noble tribes to events on the ground in Baghdad province, from the the FOR to the present? What is the connection between Sunni noble tribes and the insurgency (based on open source stuff only).

I presented some of the answers to this to the class that I gave yesterday. I am so grateful to them for bearing with me through this.

The book is very inexpensive in comparison to the thousands of dollars that I have spent amassing Iraqi and other arabic tribal research. My heart tells me to give the book away, but my wife disagrees. So, I made the book inexpensive, and I trust that everybody else who has written a book that they believe is important would and has done exactly the same thing. Further, writing the book has cost me a substantial amount of money. The copies that I have were the ones that I had to purchase. I'm not in this for self promotion, nor am I in this for the money. I am also not in this to go further into debt. I am sure that anybody can understand this.

Besides, the issue at stake here is the tribes and our efforts in Iraq. I have something to contribute beyond my book, and so does everybody else. Buy it, or don't. But let's talk about the tribes, eh?

What I will do for free is post my provincial analysis of tribal balances of power in Iraq, the data from which was translated directly from 'Abd 'Aun Al-Rudhan's "Encyclopedia of Iraqi Tribes," Dar Al-Ahaliya L-Al-Nashar Wa Al-Tawzi'a, 2007. I am in the process of completing this analysis, and hope to have the intial results by this Friday.

The database that I put together on this allows for me to drill down to Qadha and Nahiya levels as well. My intentions are to build a model of Iraqi society, including the government with the tribal system as its base. Now, this is a top down approach that I hope will assist those who operate in theater in understanding the connections between events on the ground and the broader strategic picture in terms of tribalism and politics.

It's going to take some time, and since this is all going to be open source without the nuisance of copyright issues, I'll be pleased to share it with those who care to actually use it.

That being said, the tribal picture isn't comprehensible without a disciplined approach to the sub tribes vis a vis the sub tribal naming convention- which is the Arab convention, and not our western model. I have found that the Arab method is much more easy to understand, and allows us westerners to distinguish between the thousands of sub tribes that have exactly the same first names.

As for giving what I know without asking the leading questions, I disagree. The questions are the most important thing. Once those questions are understood, I think that everybody is going to own this subject. And that is my goal - that we all own it. The leading questions aren't for me to answer. They are for everybody to answer. I don't have all the answers. I do have some questions that have led to fruitful answers, but those answers aren't permanent, as the tribal system and politics are dynamic. So, the questions are key, and have to be asked and studied on an ongoing basis.


Hacksaw - I am in Leavenworth. Contact me at sam.stolzoff@gmail.com, and I'll send you my contact data. I'd be pleased to help you, now that you mention that you are at the COIN Center. That goes for others who are in Leavenworth. I have a lot of presentations put together that cover topics that are germance to your efforts, may add some nuance to what you already have, and some methods and applications that you all might not.


Thanks for all of your input.

Tribe on!

V/r,

tribeguy

[tribeguy]

Sir,

I have a lot of data on sub tribes with cross border presence, Syrian and Iranian Arab Tribes.

If you have Analyst's Notebook, I can send you some products that I made on that very subject.

I have four years of boots on ground experience, I speak read and write Arabic and English fluently, and have a ton of successful experience in tribal engagement.

Please contact me for more details.

V/r,

Tribeguy

[tribeguy]

True - the Brits had some true genius - Sandeman is amazing. Those who were in charge of Transjordan were also very skilled and shrewd at tribal administration.

Alas, many of those lessons are indeed long forgotten.

We Americans truly want to do the right thing, but we often listen to the wrong people when it comes to getting counsel on tribes.

There are many in academic circles who are discourged from studing tribalism - it's not PC. It's seen as culturally judgemental. So, for the last 50 years, glorious academia has fallen short in tribal studies. Yes, there are some fine works out there, but their scope is generally quite small.

Worse yet, our soft science student corps generally doesn't speak foreign languages, and especially middle eastern ones. So, the chinese wall between academia and middle eastern studies is built with the brick and mortar of our making.

Now, I am not a fan of all things British, but hats off to your brave forefathers (and to you too for raising the point!).

I agree, also, with Tom about HTS. But, good things are happening there - and they are getting much, much better. More on that to follow - the system is starting to emerge on the Iraq side of the house. I am very hopeful in that regard. I'm not too sure about the Afghan side of the house quite yet. The Afghan side works very hard, but the data sets available for them prevent predictive analysis at this point. Predictive capability (or at least educated guestimation) is being developed on the Iraq side of the house, of that I am quite confident.


V/r,

tribeguy

[tribeguy]

Some of the magic in there is fully understanding the connection between the Imam's and the tribes. I've discovered some very interesting things in that regard. Problem is that us Americans, in general, are resting on our laurels when it comes to tribal studies. We still think we know something about the tribes - and we are just getting done with our first step!


I like your thinking, Rifleman. In fact, many sheikhs in Iraq are pushing for the creation of a "house of lords" branch of the government. It's not a terrible idea, and at the very least it would allow for sheikhs to either succeed at positively contributing to the government, or proving once and for all that they can't. Nevertheless, I like the idea of including their voices in the government from an official standpoint - it gives the sheikhs a buy-in to the iraqi government in a way that would make the government uniquely Iraqi. In the end, the government has to represent the population in a manner that conforms with the shape of the population.

V/r,

tribeguy

[Steve the Planner]

I suppose its a little of each.

Like Tom said, we know a lot. All the older tribal references have been pretty exhaustively mapped if you know where to ask. Seen 'em and spent much time debating them with the folks who put 'em together. If you really wanted to track names, its easier to cross-reference the Land Records with the property maps (both are digital), and track the name influences and transfers.

Problem with all these sources is that with some 15-25% of the population in rapid transit pulses since the 1970's (not just our displacements), older printed references (like the old tribal maps) do not reflect the facts on the ground in many of the critical areas (especially the disputed areas). Somebody on the ground better make sure who is where NOW before any serious actions are backed by outdated data.

In September 2008, I assembled all the census data for Central and Northern Iraq going back to the 1930's---Iraqis themselves tracked ethnic and religious info via census, not tribal, until 1980's. The tribal maps were elsewhere but I have digital copies of most. I had to create a complete set of census places/pol/admin maps to connect the data to places and politics, but, once done, it showed very enlightening patterns (up to a point).

Once you followed through on the ground, it often seemed that the parties who knew what they were doing were focused not on tribal issues but on shifting political demographics to beyond a tipping point on a nahia-by-nahia basis. It sometimes seemed random to us, but the real players new how the underlying geo-political/ethnic/religious game is played (Iraqis don't need to be taught gerrymandering---they are hard-wired for it). So, do you follow old, partially relevant data, or the big drivers.

Sam's point about tribes having less influence in cities sort of mirrors the Talabani/Barhzani split in the Kurdish world. Talabani represented the urban (and often educated and technocratic) Kurds, and Barhzani the old land holder class (like the Bhuttos in Pakistan). One is not very tribally oriented, and the other is. The combination of different cultural, social, educational, business and other outlooks between the two (technocrats vs. old land owners), begs the question of how much the tribal (vs. other socio-economic, ethnic) factors are a major driver.

Nonetheless, Iraq is primarily an urbanized population, following similar rapid urbanization (or ruralization of cities) in many areas. This urbanization pattern, and it's inherent result of breaking down tribal links, often goes hand in hand with those things needed to become successful in an urban environment. As an urbanist (an urban planner and economic geographer by training), I am intrigued by the cross-cultural commonalities of the pressures that arise from urbanization (whether in New York in 1880 when immigrants came, or most northern US cities when everybody (and particularly southern blacks) moved to the cities in and after WWII, and the folks that have exploded the populations of cities in places like Iraq, Afpak,etc... How do you keep 'em down on the farm, and what do they need to go through once they arrive?

Yesterday, I attended a talk by Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq), and share her belief that: the tribal thing was overplayed. A knowledgeable Arab explained it to me like coming into New York after the technocrats drove off the Tammany Halls, and offering to boost up the old mafiosi to replace them (a less than desirable step backwards).

Alas, I agree with Sam that the level and quality of information in US hands is far from what it should be. As one who suspects the SOFA will not be supported by the Iraqi public (even with consequences of insecurity), and, therefore, our current time is short, I wish there was more focused and systematic attention to collecting up the information that would be useful later.

Steve

[jcustis]

I don't mean to be wry or flip when I ask this, but why should WE be worried about the tribe context?...so we can advise the Iraqis on the issues inherent with them, or just know what forces are at work?

This smells to me like you think we are still in the lead in Iraq, or should be. If I misread you, my apologies, but I just get this sense of gloom eminating over how little we know about the tribes. I have to ask the question of why (at this juncture) we should care?

Tribalism in general?...got it. Iraqi tribalism?...not so sure it is as relevant as argued here.