Interesting that you'd say this - and put it in bold.from Bill
In my opinion the character of the war has changed from a shooting war to lawfare.
Just quick now went through the countries not appearing on list of those who have ratified 1977 Additional Protocals I & II to the GCs. I didn't find: India, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Thus, a greater freedom of action since those protocals were set up to give insurgents an edge - an example of Lawfare waged with long-term goals in mind.
What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?
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Also interesting is this:
as to which, see this thread for some legal on "pseudo-gangs".from S2MSSI linked article
The lesson of nonstop, no-holds-barred combat -- the army even powered on during monsoons -- was complemented by better use of small, flexible "deep penetration" special forces units, many trained by their U.S. and Indian counterparts. Dressed like the rebels, they went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force.
Last edited by jmm99; 06-01-2009 at 05:15 AM. Reason: add quote & link
I would love to see one, probably under Small Wars Participants (military-other) or under Global and General (international politics), but you sir are the expert in this area, I'll gravitate to where ever you post.What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?
Thanks to those contributing to this thread. I have been doing some research on COIN in different conflicts, trying to evaluate what works the best. I started looking at Sri Lanka as I heard from several friends, "you should look at Sri Lanka, they defeated the LTTE!" And I like this case since it's not tied to the religious issues of AQ and the Middle East.
However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.
Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE? Did they do any of the COIN techniques that are documented in the COIN field manual?
Did they create militias, paramilitaries?
Have amnesty programs?
Increase intelligence?
I'm finding a lot of discussion about the LTTE, it's capabilities, etc, but very little about how the Sri Lankan's did COIN. Maybe they didn't?
Thanks for any suggestions you all might have.
Depends on the context. What wins wars?
That would be largely correctHowever, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.
The Sri-Lankans used military force to destroy the LTTE as an armed group. That is what works.Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I have a forthcoming essay in Joint Force Quarterly on the topic. Hadn't seen this thread, but the essay pretty much tracks Bill Moore's reasons above - the isolation of the LTTE politically, financially, and militarily played the decisive role, the military operation and tactics used were icing on the cake.
I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.
There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.
Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?
You mentioned it yourself:
They allowed LTTE to become a conventional force (see Mao's phase model), built up conventional military power (including a form of "special forces" = airborne) and crushed them in a step-by-step campaign.
That's an equivalet to mobile defense in operational art. Give up ground, allow them to win a payrrhic victory that exposes them to a killing blow.
Good luck finding someone in charge with the guts to even attempt it (voluntarily).
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