How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE

[Bob's World]

Haven't been on this thread in a while.

Mike: Killing the civilians of some enemy state in war is very different than killing non-combatant elements of one's own populace in COIN. This is one of the reasons why I distinguish that COIN is the actions of a nation to resolve it's own internal insurgency (not an intervetion) and that COIN is much more a civil emergency than war.

Sri Lanka waged war against their own populace, and if what TBD lays out is true, there will be consequences. Not from the international community, but from the Tamil populace. This insurgency is perhaps suppressed, but the more brutal a government is in the suppression of internal revolt, the more certain and and the more bloody the blow back will ultimately be. Sure, elements of the Sri Lanka populace waged war against the government, but a government must be like a father attacked by a son. Sure you can just beat his ass and justify it by his attacking you first, but that ignores what drive a son to attack his father, and also ignores the consequences of a ### for tat retaliation.

Our COIN doctrine sucks. It is a doctrine written by Colonial masters and Containment controllers. It is time for an update. FM 3-24 offers some pop-centric tactics, but leaves it within that colonial/containment context, so remains a fatally flawed approach.

[Bill Moore]

There is no doubt that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces won "this" war against the LTTE, and they did so using tough tactics (there are many such examples in history). I spent a few weeks on three separate occassions in Sri Lanka and worked closely with their military. The country was in economic shambles (probably still is), morale was low, the hate that many (not all) Sri Lankan officers had for the LTTE was palpable. It was also understandable after years of brutal fighting. As stated elsewhere war itself can radicalize the opponents, and it is quite understandable why this happens.

Bob is right, "if" the Sri Lankan government fails to integrate the Tamil people (which is what they need to do to consolidate their victory), then it is likely we will start seeing the embers of a new resistance. Often overlooked in this conflict was that the LTTE brutalized its own people to suppress other Tamil resistance groups, so defeat of the LTTE doesn't necessarily mean all Tamil resistance groups are defeated. The remains of those who were suppressed by the LTTE could very well be organizing their clandestine structure now, and there is still a large and active Tamil diaspora that they can reach out to for support. The last thing the Sri Lankan government needs to do at this point is provide a spark to gas by continuing to ignore the alleged crimes and continued suppression of the Tamils. The government is in a tough position with hostile NGOs in the country that have already formed their opinions. It will be interesting to see how this plays out over the next few months. Unlike our approach where we attempt development during the fight (which hasn't worked), now is the time that the Government should be pushing development into the Tamil community. Not only development, but a common vision for a peaceful Sri Lankan where all the citizens enjoy its benefits. They need a spiritual leader that can ease the level of hate between the Singalese and Tamils, or this won't be possible. It is easy for us to sit back and criticize, but if you lived there and were traumaized by the war year after year, I don't think your feelings towards your enemy would magically disappear overnight. I don't like gay, leftist terms, but for lack of a better phrase there needs to be some sort of healing process.

[jmm99]

I've ever argued that killing the civilians of some enemy state in war is the same as killing non-combatant elements of one's own populace in COIN.

I've no idea what will happen in Sri Lanka's future. My lawyerly crystal ball (always cloudy and cracked) went out the window effective 1 Jun - and my suits went into two large garbage bags and will be hauled away tomorrow (garbage day). Etc.

Cheers

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

don't throw your suits away! Just read the latest issue of Fortune Magazine and they had a couple of pieces on "retirement" coaches. One of the free tidbits shared was that retirees stop shaving, getting decent haircuts, and quit dressing for success, and this leads to less self esteem, etc. Not sure I'm buying it, but I'm going to shave next week, and dress for success at least once a week to ensure my self esteem doesn't dip into the red.

[TDB]

Link to said documentary and related information. Available to watch for international audiances too. www.channel4.com/srilanka

I think there is a lot to be said about the point made above. In the aftermath of the conflict the government had two routes they could go down, enfranchise the Tamil population thus helping to bring them on side (not as simple as that but I think everyone will know what I'm getting at), or brutally suppress them therefore preventing them from organising any form of armed resistance again. After years of brutal war and constant attacks from LTTE suicide bombers, hardly a vote winning tactic, the government obviously opted to the latter as in their minds they could care less for these pesky people to the north.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

I know that "we had to destroy the village to save the village" is widely accepted as a sound COIN practice (see current Clear-Hold-Build tactics that are the rage in Afghanistan); and that history is indeed replete with examples where some government defeated some insurgent organization; buying stability for some period of time, but always with insurgency springing up again somewhere among the populace.

Perhaps a new location, different segment of the pop, or different leaders/ideology. But there is always one constant: A government that has not much changed in how it governs, and that believes that it "defeated" the insurgency so need not change. Our good allies in the Philippines are the modern poster child for this; the Algerians as well.

Facilitating this is the belief that insurgency is something that is brought to the government, that causation rests in the dark hearts of "malign actors" or some evil ideology, or some insidious external plot. While all those things may exist one must always come back to the common thread, and that is the government itself. As you often point out, even when the insurgent wins, it typically is by a party that is only too quick to take up the same bad practices of the government they took down, and soon too find themselves subject to some growing insurgency.

So no, I continue to reject your version of history, and believe that causation radiates out from government onto the populace, and that insurgency is a reaction to such governance. COIN is the reaction to the reaction by a government that is unwilling to recognize that they really don't need to counter anything so much as simply listen to their populace and make some minor, but essential modifications of how they govern.

Yes the government of Sri Lanka "defeated" the Tamil Tigers, but in so doing I suspect have steeled the resolution of the Tamil people to their cause and inflamed perceptions of ill-will toward the government. Perhaps they can overcome the tactics applied to design and implement changes of governance that effectively resolve this insurgency, but until such time, this is a "suppression" rather than a "win."

If this were war, your assessment would probably be accurate, but this is insurgency, and that is a very different animal altogether.

[Bill Moore]

In the case of Sri Lanka, I'm not sure where we disagree? I am making the same points, but adding the fact that the level of hate between the Tamils and Singhalese was so thick you could cut it with knife, and that time of emotion frequently trumps reason.

Not all insurgencies are due to a failure of government, but the insurgency and then civil war in Sri Lanka was clearly a case of the government failing, and now it failing to consolidate its hard earned victory.

[davidbfpo]

News of this political conflict appears rarely, so I offer this as an update.

From an Indian commentator on security issues and I've added text in italics to help to explain:

...Tamil Nadu is still hosting 114 refugee camps for 68,606 Sri Lankan Tamils. The UPA (Indian political party, currently in government)also made the mistake of bracketing Lankan Tamil issues with the LTTE. They failed to fathom the Tamil's emotional bonds with the diaspora. The mainland Tamil population, despite its revulsion after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, started getting alarmed by the Rajapaksa regime's excesses (Sri Lanka Prime Minister}. They were also upset with New Delhi's ambivalent attitude towards the UN sponsored enquiry on war crimes. Lankan Tamil discontent resulted in the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) controlling 24 local government councils in the North/East (in Sri Lanka) after the July 2011 elections. The Rajapaksa family, which made this a prestige issue, could win only three councils through their Freedom Alliance (UPFA). They now say that the TNA is acting like the LTTE.

Link:Sunday October 16, 2011 http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/foreign-policy-must-make-sense-at-home-in-india