How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE

[jmm99]

appear to be valid points that should be examined before some civilian (say JMM) sends you and Moore on an "intervention" - which if this civilian had any say would be a rare event. They seem to me to be more national security policy issues - so a fair topic for both the political and miltary sides.

That having been said (first do a good political area study pre-intervention), another concurrent examination must be whether the incumbant government has examined those same points - and what did it conclude.

I'd also add some factors based on the population's (and its sub-groups') perceptions of security, opportunity and ideology vice the incumbant and the insurgent - and let's go back and add into the mix Niel's factors (and Dayuhan's, and Bill's, and whoever else wants to enhance the area study).

Now, if the incumbant government and the putative intervenor are on all fours after examining all the relevant factors in how and why the insurgency will be targeted politically and militarily, then intervention might be a "go". But, if any material differences exist between the incumbant and the putative intervenor, intervention is extremely questionable. History teaches us that those differences are more likely to grow worse over time - leaving the intervenor locked into the very possible illegitimacy of the incumbant (Tim Lomperis' "illegitimacy lock"; e.g, Vietnam).

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Independent of critical examinations by the putative intervenor of the incumbant and the insurgent, the putative intervenor should also conduct a critical examination of where the incumbant country fits into the pecking order of the intervenor's enlightened self-interest - and the overall plusses and minuses of intervention.

Here is an example:

In October 1951, the student conclusions to their study of US policy in Southeast Asia were presented to the college. Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major US involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially, Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the US forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia, the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Strait of Malacca and populous, richly endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily, the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for US forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military agression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographic conformation combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically, the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvatages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel ["-iel", not "-ial"] military aid.

"US Policy in Southeast Asia". Reports of Student Committees #13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 1951), cited in Bruce Palmer Jr, The 25-Year War (1984) - with HT to Ken White for suggesting this book.

Regards

Mike