Sri Lankan COIN strategy---"a difficult model to adopt"
A good short article in the paper Sunday covered the fact that in the LTTE COIN, "[They] were not worried about collateral damage…So in many regards it's a very difficult model to adopt." Some great ethical and strategic debate should come from the last push of this conflict, which is being deemed as successful despite the heavy civilian casualties in the end surge. (Below is the print article with some snippets from the original author’s submission not published in the print version).
“Other lessons are either unique to Sri Lanka or would be politically unpalatable in other societies, including the high civilian and military death tolls and alleged human rights violations. The United Nations and many human rights groups repeatedly called for a cease-fire so civilians caught in the crossfire could flee the conflict area -- calls the government largely dismissed. Because Rajapaksa's base was the nation's Sinhalese majority, there was relatively little domestic pushback over the deaths and displacement of ethnic Tamil civilians. The government restricted the access of international media and independent humanitarian groups, making it difficult to report what was going on. The lesson of nonstop, no-holds-barred combat -- the army even powered on during monsoons -- was complemented by better use of small, flexible "deep penetration" special forces units, many trained by their U.S. and Indian counterparts. Dressed like the rebels, they went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force. Cutting supply lines, creating faster and more mobile special forces units, going after financing and hitting jungle hide-outs are additional strategies applicable to other insurgency battles, experts said. At the same time, the Tigers' scope made them a bigger target. For years, they parked freighters at sea and ferried arms, oil, food and other supplies into ports they controlled. In recent years, the government destroyed seven of these mother ships, reportedly with the help of satellite intelligence from India and the United States, and made better use of small, maneuverable, heavily armed "Arrow" vessels.”
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/n...,7880875.story
chicagotribune.com
Sri Lanka's defeat of the Tamil Tigers offers lessons for other countries fighting insurgencies
By Mark Magnier
Tribune Newspapers
May 24, 2009
NEW DELHI -- Sri Lanka's victory last week after a 25-year battle against the Tamil Tiger rebels represents a rare government success story in the global fight against insurgencies.
Even as leaders in Colombo declared a national holiday, military planners and analysts around the world have begun scrutinizing the war for lessons on how to fight Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other lethal militant groups.
For more than two decades, the conflict in Sri Lanka had neither side strong enough to overcome the other.
That changed three years ago, when the Sri Lankan army adopted more mobile tactics, overhauled its intelligence system, promoted young commanders and steadily hemmed in one of the world's most ruthless and innovative rebel movements. At its peak, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, as the Tigers are formally known, controlled one-third of the country; had its own army, a navy and nascent air force; and served as a role model for insurgencies worldwide with its pioneering use of suicide vests and female suicide bombers.
Last week, the army displayed in triumph what it said was the portly, bullet-riddled body of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Arguably the most important factor in ending the stalemate was the political will to do whatever it took. In a supreme irony, President Mahinda Rajapakse was elected in November 2005 by a 1.9 percent margin after Prabhakaran urged Tamils to boycott the election. Rajapakse made military victory over the Tamils a cornerstone of his administration and signaled to the military it could get whatever resources it wanted simply by asking.
"They did everything a general dreams of," said retired Indian Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, a commander of the Indian peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. "Unfettered resources and no political interference."
The military budget quickly grew by 40 percent a year and the army by 70 percent to 180,000 troops as it added 3,000 a month, compared with 3,000 a year previously -- drawn largely from poor rural Sinhalese attracted by relatively high wages.
With more soldiers, the army was able to hit the Tigers on several fronts simultaneously, breaking with years of hit-or-miss operations.
"Before the army would take territory then move on, allowing the LTTE to come back," said military spokesman Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara. "That changed, and we hit them on all four fronts so they could no longer muster all their resources into one place."
Some lessons are transferable, experts said. "Sri Lanka provides a case study," said Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore.
Other lessons are either unique to Sri Lanka or would be politically unpalatable in other societies, including the high civilian and military death tolls and alleged human-rights violations. The UN and many human-rights groups, for example, repeatedly urged a cease-fire so civilians caught in the crossfire could flee the conflict area, calls the government largely dismissed.
"They were not worried about collateral damage," said Ajey Lele, a military analyst and ex-Indian wing commander. "So in many regards it's a very difficult model to adopt."
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
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