How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE

[jmm99]

from Bill
In my opinion the character of the war has changed from a shooting war to lawfare.

Interesting that you'd say this - and put it in bold.

Just quick now went through the countries not appearing on list of those who have ratified 1977 Additional Protocals I & II to the GCs. I didn't find: India, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Thus, a greater freedom of action since those protocals were set up to give insurgents an edge - an example of Lawfare waged with long-term goals in mind.

What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?

-------------------------------
Also interesting is this:

from S2MSSI linked article
The lesson of nonstop, no-holds-barred combat -- the army even powered on during monsoons -- was complemented by better use of small, flexible "deep penetration" special forces units, many trained by their U.S. and Indian counterparts. Dressed like the rebels, they went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force.

as to which, see this thread for some legal on "pseudo-gangs".

[Bill Moore]

What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?

I would love to see one, probably under Small Wars Participants (military-other) or under Global and General (international politics), but you sir are the expert in this area, I'll gravitate to where ever you post.

[CWOT]

Thanks to those contributing to this thread. I have been doing some research on COIN in different conflicts, trying to evaluate what works the best. I started looking at Sri Lanka as I heard from several friends, "you should look at Sri Lanka, they defeated the LTTE!" And I like this case since it's not tied to the religious issues of AQ and the Middle East.

However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE? Did they do any of the COIN techniques that are documented in the COIN field manual?
Did they create militias, paramilitaries?
Have amnesty programs?
Increase intelligence?
I'm finding a lot of discussion about the LTTE, it's capabilities, etc, but very little about how the Sri Lankan's did COIN. Maybe they didn't?

Thanks for any suggestions you all might have.

[William F. Owen]

Thanks to those contributing to this thread. I have been doing some research on COIN in different conflicts, trying to evaluate what works the best.

Depends on the context. What wins wars?

However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.

That would be largely correct

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE?

The Sri-Lankans used military force to destroy the LTTE as an armed group. That is what works.

[Cavguy]

Depends on the context. What wins wars?

That would be largely correct

The Sri-Lankans used military force to destroy the LTTE as an armed group. That is what works.

I have a forthcoming essay in Joint Force Quarterly on the topic. Hadn't seen this thread, but the essay pretty much tracks Bill Moore's reasons above - the isolation of the LTTE politically, financially, and militarily played the decisive role, the military operation and tactics used were icing on the cake.

[CWOT]

I have a forthcoming essay in Joint Force Quarterly on the topic. Hadn't seen this thread, but the essay pretty much tracks Bill Moore's reasons above - the isolation of the LTTE politically, financially, and militarily played the decisive role, the military operation and tactics used were icing on the cake.

I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.

There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.

Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?

[Fuchs]

External funding is unimportant if you have control over a closed economy with no goods imports. In that case money import is really just paper import.

India helped Sri Lanka to embargo LTTE and the LTTE blockade runners were defeated by a Sri Lankan small fast boat armada (built in the country iirc).
They had sunk the last LTTE weapons & ammunition smuggling ships just months before the final battles.

That didn't mean much more than a weaker conventional posture of LTTE, though. Sri Lanka could as well have won (with more bloodshed) by focusing its resources on the army.

[Cavguy]

I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.

There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.

Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?

There was no pop centric COIN campaign, as others have observed. In 2005 "COL Karuna" and a sizeable group of fighters left the LTTE and reconciled with the government. Accounts differ on the scope of the impact, but it began to fracture the LTTE and exposed fractures within the LTTE's leadership.

People act as if the campaign from 1983-2005 wasn't harsh enough. Some of the brutality of the 90s exceeded what was used in the final offensive. It was "conventional" since the late 1980s. The difference was the isolation of the LTTE, cutting its logistical and financial ties, the 2005 Tsunami, internal fragmenting of the LTTE, a much improved Sri Lankan army and navy, and very significantly - the adoption of China as a benefactor, financer, and protector of Sri Lanka against western concerns about such pesky things as "human rights.

Fuchs, for all your hyperventalating about civilian casualties in the Apache video, I find it somewhat amusing you seem to be such a fan of the LTTE's brilliant operational art which killed thousands of civilians unnecessairly in the process, and hold it up as a paragon of "mobile defense".

[Fuchs]

However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE?

You mentioned it yourself:
They allowed LTTE to become a conventional force (see Mao's phase model), built up conventional military power (including a form of "special forces" = airborne) and crushed them in a step-by-step campaign.

That's an equivalet to mobile defense in operational art. Give up ground, allow them to win a payrrhic victory that exposes them to a killing blow.
Good luck finding someone in charge with the guts to even attempt it (voluntarily).