How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE

[Cavguy]

I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.

There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.

Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?

There was no pop centric COIN campaign, as others have observed. In 2005 "COL Karuna" and a sizeable group of fighters left the LTTE and reconciled with the government. Accounts differ on the scope of the impact, but it began to fracture the LTTE and exposed fractures within the LTTE's leadership.

People act as if the campaign from 1983-2005 wasn't harsh enough. Some of the brutality of the 90s exceeded what was used in the final offensive. It was "conventional" since the late 1980s. The difference was the isolation of the LTTE, cutting its logistical and financial ties, the 2005 Tsunami, internal fragmenting of the LTTE, a much improved Sri Lankan army and navy, and very significantly - the adoption of China as a benefactor, financer, and protector of Sri Lanka against western concerns about such pesky things as "human rights.

Fuchs, for all your hyperventalating about civilian casualties in the Apache video, I find it somewhat amusing you seem to be such a fan of the LTTE's brilliant operational art which killed thousands of civilians unnecessairly in the process, and hold it up as a paragon of "mobile defense".

[Fuchs]

I did actually an analysis without emotions.

Wars tend to create many civilian casualties, that's why I reject all wars of choice and dislike that my country is allied with aggressive nations that break our alliance treaty at will. My country had very serious experiences with great wars, wars of choice and overly aggressive allies.

About the video; it was a policing situation to me, and I despise the idea that a helicopter would be allowed to fly over a megacity blasting people at will just because someone suspects weapons in a grainy image.

[Rex Brynen]

Some of the Iraq/Sri Lanka comments above imply that pop-centric COIN was the key to turning the situation in Iraq around. While it might have helped, I'm not at all convinced that it was the most important factor at work in Iraq--all of which raises the important question of what it is we should, and should not, be trying to learn from the Iraqi experience.

(I'll add this to my ever-growing list of "threads I should start when I have the time.")

Now, back to the war in Sri Lanka. With absolutely no sign that the Sri Lankan government will take major steps to address Tamil grievances, what are the chances of a substantial resurgence of violence in the next decade? Who wants to suggest odds?

[CWOT]

People act as if the campaign from 1983-2005 wasn't harsh enough. Some of the brutality of the 90s exceeded what was used in the final offensive. It was "conventional" since the late 1980s. The difference was the isolation of the LTTE, cutting its logistical and financial ties, the 2005 Tsunami, internal fragmenting of the LTTE, a much improved Sri Lankan army and navy, and very significantly - the adoption of China as a benefactor, financer, and protector of Sri Lanka against western concerns about such pesky things as "human rights.

Thanks, That was the impression I had as well, but it seems from a couple articles, from uninformed journalists I think, that there were 'lessons learned' for COIN in the Sri Lanka case.

The Tsunami, I had seen a reference in one article that this helped the government, I assume the provision of aid which was diverted to the Sri Lankan military for further military efforts. Is that right? It makes sense. And I imagine that it probably turned popular support towards the government as well, as they needed aid and the LTTE probably wasn't receiving the windfall of aid from outside governments.

[Cavguy]

Thanks, That was the impression I had as well, but it seems from a couple articles, from uninformed journalists I think, that there were 'lessons learned' for COIN in the Sri Lanka case.

The Tsunami, I had seen a reference in one article that this helped the government, I assume the provision of aid which was diverted to the Sri Lankan military for further military efforts. Is that right? It makes sense. And I imagine that it probably turned popular support towards the government as well, as they needed aid and the LTTE probably wasn't receiving the windfall of aid from outside governments.

The Tsunami was one of the game changers between 2004-2007. Basically, Aid was largely prevented from reaching Tamil areas by the Sri Lankan government because it would not let funds reach the LTTE. Those areas never recovered, with the attendant effects.

I am still waiting for someone to show me how the Sri Lankan government changed the intensity (vice efficency) of its tactics and use of "brutal" force. The whole conflict was insanely brutal, especially during the 90's until the 2001 cease fire.

[CWOT]

Thanks for the responses. This helps as I've been caught between hearsay and reporting, neither of which have given me much to go on. I think the reporting must be weak because of Sri Lanka's repression of journalists in the region and control of the media. Which would influence the degree to which the COIN concepts would be accurately described.