How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE

[Bill Moore]

Bob, my shots are directed at your argument, not you. I think the argument that we "need" to always address the underlying root cause is dangerously misleading. Sri Lanka is another example of where the world is continuing to pay for bad British decisions (not unlike most of the Middle East). Tamils were imported to Sri Lanka to work the tea plantations and given some degree of preference. This gets at my opposition to the "its the tribe stupid" strategy (if you dare call it a strategy). When your policies drive a wedge between peoples, the underlying issue is hate and greed, not poor government (governments can contribute to the level of hate as Hitler's party did, but it can't extinguish the level of hate / greed, as we saw in our own reconstruction efforts in the south after the Civil War).

There was no amount of good governance after the conflict started that would bring the conflict to an end in Sri Lanka, and one side had to win, or the people would have continued to suffer for more years if the war continued to drag out without a decisive victory (no matter how short lived it may be).

War amongst peoples is rarely if ever rational, it is based upon emotion, not simply some government policy. Those colonized hated their colonizers. After the colonizers left there were (and many continue) many battles for power, but not so much over failed governance, it was just that some other group wanted to be charge so they could steal from the people.

The issue wasn't good governance and very few people are fighting for it, they're fighting for their tribe, group, religion, region, etc.

Every conflict is different, but I would argue in wars amongst people very few are about good governance for the collective whole, but rather what's in it for their group. We can support this baboon level of society by playing tribal games, or we can try to instill western forms of government, but I suspect both will backfire. What will work, has been proven to work, is defeating our enemies in battle, and we all know that victory (all victories) are short lived affairs.

[Dayuhan]

Might make sense to think less of "good governance", which carries with it our implicit assumptions about what is or is not "good", and think instead of "perceived good governance". I may define "good governance" as "governance by me", or as "that form of bad governance that is best for me", or as "governance by anybody but these &%$#@"... in each case, what I have to offer is unlikely to fit your definition of what's "good", but it might fit mine... at least until I get it, anyway!

[Bob's World]

Well, I will not argue against the hard cold facts of "might makes right," even a country like the U.S. that sees itself as a shining example goodness leans heavily on "or we'll destroy your economy or kick your ass." as the tag line when we engage others.

But what you offer is an endless cycle of bloody conflict without end; and I think we can do better than that by thinking more about why conflicts start rather than about how to suppress the next uprising. Taking your argument to the logical conclusion, an advisor to the government of Sri Lanka should tell them the current victory is a half measure, and that they will only have stability when they have killed or driven off the island every last Tamil. Of course that leaves 60,000,000 very pissed of Tamils just a few miles away in India...

But as you say, these things are complicated, and indeed, shaking off the disruptions caused by generations of Western Colonialism is at the heart of many of the insurgent conflicts we've seen since, oh, about the beginning of Western Colonialism. But in Sri Lanka there are two distinct groups of Tamils as I understand it: those who have lived there for centuries and those who were imported to work the tea; but regardless, the fact is that they are all there now and must learn to live together as a nation if they want the cycle of violence to end.

When I say "must" address conditions of Poor Governance (defined as perceptions from the perspective of the insurgent segment of the populace, and often irrational to the counterinsurgents perspective, and possibly quite disconnected from fact as well); I don't mean we are compelled to engage to fix it. Much of this type of conflict is really none of our business and we set ourselves up for international terrorist attacks when we take one side over the other. No, I mean "must" as in if one wants to see true resolution of the problem they must address the roots and not just attack the symptoms.

I suspect if I looked at the Sri Lanken Constitution I would find a document that allows or perhaps even drives the type of discrimination that fuels this conflict. I suspect that if I look at the laws and polices of the government in general I would find the same.

So, my perspective and advice to the government and people there remains the same:

"The current victory is just a suppression of the symptoms of insurgency. The true insurgency is not the LTTE who you have defeated, but rather lives in the hearts and minds of the Tamil people who perceive that the governance of Sri Lanka as applied to them is poor. They may not accept your legitimacy, so look hard at how you fill governmental positions and ensure that it is a process that all have an opportunity to participate in and shape. They may feel that the rule of law as applied to them is not just. Look to your justice system and assess it carefully as to if it is biased against or for some groups over others, or if it is untimely, or too harsh, or too easily manipulated, etc. They may feel that they do not receive equal respect and opportunity as a matter of status. Human biases are natural, so laws must be enacted and enforced that protect against such abuses, whereas many of the laws you have enacted since independence have actually codified them. Fix this. Lastly, build off ramps for insurgency. True insurgency is about politics, and while it is impossible to create a society where all is harmony and everyone agrees on the big issues, it is not impossible to create governmental systems that ensure that every segment of the society has an equal and fair representation in the government, and that change can be affected in regular, certain, and trusted ways. The Tamils are a minority, so pure democracy will always leave them out. Consider modifications such as we employed in the US to protect against the dangers of democracy, such as the balancing equal representation by region, as well as equal representation by populace to ensure that critical regional issues are not run over by a larger populace in another region. As to the Tamils, you need to push for these changes as well, but you will not likely succeed through violence. The LTTE elevated your cause and showed that you have the will and ability to fight, now it is time to take your argument to the media, to the courts, to the streets in peaceful demonstration. To employ a type of pressure for governmental evolution through non-violent tactics that history shows are more likely to yield the results you seek."

Yes, every insurgency manifests uniquely based on all of the many factors at work. But they all involve people, and they all involve some group that is grossly dissatisfied with their current lot under the current government; and there are indeed commonalities in that fact. I'm sure I don't have it exactly right, but I am equally sure I am digging in the right location.

Besides, even if I am wildly wrong, there are thousands of others out their selling threat-centric and population centric techniques for addressing the symptoms of insurgency, so that's pretty well covered. The fact is that the symptoms must be managed, and there is merit in both of those camps, so I am fine with the content of their work, I just don't think it can actually resolve an insurgency though. I think there is room for at least one to dig for the roots.

[davidbfpo]

I know very little about how Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE in Sri Lanka, so my comment is directed at the diaspora faraway - yes, in Europe.

The police in London appear to have been surprised by the numbers mobilised to protest outside Parliament, when the offensive reached a peak. See the BBC reports on the start: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8007858.stm and at the end: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8056441.stm

There remains the issue of fund raising within the diaspora, whether coerced or not is a moot point. An issue that affects other countries, even in places like Switzerland.

I do wonder how the diaspora will be effected by learning what has happened since the LTTE's military defeat. Can that feeling be transferred to non-LTTE activities?

A big snag is that the diaspora Tamil communities speak a language that few outsiders speak or understand and there is plenty of "room" for a knowledge gap.

[Dayuhan]

Yes, every insurgency manifests uniquely based on all of the many factors at work. But they all involve people, and they all involve some group that is grossly dissatisfied with their current lot under the current government; and there are indeed commonalities in that fact. I'm sure I don't have it exactly right, but I am equally sure I am digging in the right location.

I also think you're digging in the right direction, but there are some roots in the hole. For one... I think it's true that insurgency is almost always based on popular dissatisfaction and popular perceptions of bad governance. It would be a huge mistake, though, to assume that any given insurgent group or set of insurgent leaders represents popular aspirations, that their agendas have anything to do with the will of the people, that their leaders have the interests of the people in mind, or that they negotiate (if they do) on behalf of the people. More often insurgent leaders are trying to leverage popular anger to support their own agendas and their own desire for power.

In these cases addressing the governance issues may remove the incentive to fight and gradually erode the support base and rank-and-file fighter base of the insurgency. It will not convince leaders to modify their demands or agendas, because all the leaders want is power, not something easily compromised.

The case of Sri Lanka appears to represent something analogous to what we've seen several times in the Philippines: defeating an insurgent group does not eliminate the causes of insurgency, but it does open a window of opportunity for government to step in and produce some results, a window that probably cannot be opened any other way. If the government fails to exploit that window, more fighting is likely down the line, as has always been the case in the Philippines.

Military victory in these cases should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a necessary means to an end. It doesn't resolve the issues, but it creates space that government can exploit to achieve resolution. If government fails... back on the wheel, and the losers, as always, are the people.

[Bob's World]

The rise of an insurgent group should be seen by government primarily as a clear metric that they are missing the mark in major way. The government should then exercise the rule of law in a just fashion with the illegal actor (the insurgent), while as the same time focusing on what it is they are doing wrong and need to address.

In no way does the rise of an insurgent group mean that that group is the solution to the problem of poor governance. Too few George Washington's, and far too many Adolf Hitlers out there who emerge to take advantage of these situations. Again though, it is best I believe to see insurgency as a condition that exists within a populace, and not an organization that rises to take advantage of that condition. The organizations that rise may be worse than the current government. It is the condition that is important and must be addressed. A government that refuses to evolve, that refuses to recognize and address the condition of insurgency deserves what it gets; sadly it is the populace that loses out, as they are the ones caught in the middle, and often have one bad government defeated only to be made subject to one that is worse.

[Dayuhan]

A government that refuses to evolve, that refuses to recognize and address the condition of insurgency deserves what it gets; sadly it is the populace that loses out, as they are the ones caught in the middle, and often have one bad government defeated only to be made subject to one that is worse.

Evolution or revolution, take your pick...

Unfortunately, the people who run many governments threatened by revolution are, in effect, dinosaurs, and would not survive evolution. They would rather try to suppress a revolution and take the risk of losing than submit to an evolutionary process that they (often accurately) believe would inevitably lead to their extinction.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

The rise of an insurgent group should be seen by government primarily as a clear metric that they are missing the mark in major way. The government should then exercise the rule of law in a just fashion with the illegal actor (the insurgent), while as the same time focusing on what it is they are doing wrong and need to address.

It appears that your in view there is an acceptable political solution for all governments under attack by an insurgent group. An arrangement that somehow addresses all the core issues of all potential belligerent groups. An arrangment that will void the need and desire for conflict; and if a government doesn't identify this arrangment they failed to govern well.

I don't think these arguments stand up to examination. Simply look at the extreme right movement in the U.S. with their fantasy of overthrowing the U.S. government, so they can develop a segregated society and kill off all the Jews. The likes of the Aryan Nation, KKK, etc. have clearly stated their beefs against anyone not white and Christian, and they see a Jewish conspiracy in every story. While admittedly a lame movement, none the less how should our government address their core issues?

In Iraq the Sunni extremists want to establish AQ's version of Sharia law, which really means they just want to run the show and exploit their people, since the vast majority of AQ in Iraq are simply criminals. The various Shi'a groups supported by Iran also want to run the show, and of course the Kurds want their own homeland in the midst of this madness (perhaps the only legitimate political claim). A government that fails to address all these underlying conditions is not a failure in my book, but if they fail to defeat those who are violently opposed to them then they will definitely fail.

If you're a government leader or advisor in a developing nation and maybe 10-15 percent of the populact wants to install a Marxist government by implementing a violent over throw of the government, the government has obviously failed, because they only satisfied 85-90 percent of the populace. Should the government offer an olive branch to the Marxists? Shold they offer a shared power arrangement with the Marxists? Should they simply admit they're right even if the majority wants nothing to do with them, hell just go ahead and dissolve the current government (which again has obviously failed)?

Addressing underlying issues is hardly a new idea; however, in many situations it remains in the realm of wishful fantasy. All issues in the world do not evolve around government, but all governments have responsibilites to protect the integrity of their State and protect their citizens. If we disregard the value of actually commiting to the fight or either severing our relationship with a failed government (yes there are bad governments, we all agree with you), we'll instead linger in a perpetual stalemate that results in generations knowing nothing else but conflict and hate. Make a tough decision now or a tougher decision later, but get off the middle ground, it is not decisive. Our efforts to wage a kinder type of war has resulted in prolonged suffering and misery for millions.

The hatred in Sri Lanka runs deep on both sides of the ethnic divide. Does anyone think that Prabakaran and his LTTE organization would have laid down their arms if the Gov of Sri Lanka outlawed discrimination against Tamils and let them have some (not complete seperation from the State) politicial autonomy? Do you really think most Tamils wanted to live under the brut Prabakaran? The military solution was appropriate based off the behavior of the LTTE during previous ceasefires. Peace was not their objective.

Government policies can't mandate people's feelings, and we all know the government is not always the answer. During our reconstruction efforts in the South after our Civil War our government mandates failed to address the deep rooted racism, hate and fear among peoples. The only way to bring any degree of peace and a slight protection to the blacks living in the South was to employ sufficient security forces (which we never did). It still took over a hundred years of bloodshed to address many of the main racial issues in our country, but many still exist. The truth in general is rather simple and sad, people fear and sometimes hate other people that are not like them. How many places are we going to deploy our forces and how many years will they stay there to address the issue of hatred?

Sri Lanka's military victory was a tough earned victory that definitely qualifies as a victory. I too suspect another Tamil separatist movement will emerge in time, but that seems to be the natural course of history in countries with deep seated racial issues. If we really want to help, we need to get off the war crimes kick, and assist the Government render aid to the Tamils.

[Cavguy]

The Sri Lankans won, you can't steal their victory with promises of a future conflict, so their military victory doesn't count. It definitely counts. I too suspect another Tamil separatist movement will emerge in time, that is the general path of history in conflicts with deep roots.

Exactly. The LTTE was soundly defeated, and with it the Tamils hopes for a separate state. It also left them isolated, impoverished, and exhausted. My essay was an attempt to briefly capture what happened. Some writers imply that Sri Lanka won because they woke up one day and decided to use "at all costs" tactics. Baloney. They were using those from the start, by 2007 they simply got the upper hand in resources to win due to their own improvements and the LTTE's self inflicted wounds.

Bob is right, of course the Tamils can rise again, and they may. The LTTE's refusal to abandon its objectionable tactics (suicide bombing, chemical bombs, terror) deprived the Tamils of a crucial requirement - external political support. By 2005 the Tamils had no allies other than their expats, no champion in the international community because of the character of their campaign.

Any future Tamil insurgency would have even less chance of a "conventional" victory given the government's increased strength. A transition to political (even non-violent) insurgency vice military may have a better chance of success if it attracts international sympathy.

[Bob's World]

My point is that the LTTE in Sri Lanka has been defeated; but that the conditions of insurgency are probably even stronger than they were before.

We need to not confuse the two. I agree that extreme, violent groups must be dealt with, and often they must be dealt with harshly; but my point is that in so doing one must understand that the group they are dealing with exists because the conditions of insurgency exist and feeds upon those conditions and that the defeat of the insurgent group is a very different thing from the defeat of the conditions of insurgency.

The majority viewpoint sees insurgency from the perspective of the counterinsurgent as something caused by the insurgent, or perhaps even caused by some malevolent outside force (conducting UW) that comes in and radicalizes a populace to turn against them.

This is wishful political BS. I believe that one takes a much healthier and more accurate perspective when one sees insurgency not as an organization that rises against the government, but rather as a condition that exists within the perceptions of some segment of the populace due to the actions (or inactions) of the government. Populaces do not fail governments, it is governments that fail populaces.

Certainly this condition, these perceptions of poor governance are exploited by those with their own agenda. Inside actors with bad intent will attempt to use them to rise to power. Outside actors will come in and conduct UW, and employ PSYOP to "radicalize" the populace in enhancing the conditions of insurgency by building on the already existing perceptions of poor governance. States do this. AQ does this as well. But none of it takes root if the perceptions of poor governance, if the conditions of insurgency do not already exist in spades.

So, the LTTE is defeated. Great, and so what? What happens next? If everyone is too busy celebrating the great victory and thinks they are somehow "mission complete" simply because the initial military operation is over (sound familiar Iraq vets?), then they are in for a harsh surprise, probably sooner than later.

Defeat of the insurgent group is like crossing the LD, you still have to get to the objective in order to win. In insurgency the objective is addressing the conditions of insurgency, and that onus rests firmly on the civil government. My assessment is that the government of Sri Lanka is not ready to do for the Tamil segment of its populace today what the government of the U.S. did for its African American populace in the 60s. Make real concessions, make them the law of the land, and enforce those laws. It still takes time. The U.S. has not completely resolved the conditions of insurgency related to our problem, but it gets better every day. I don't think Sri Lanka even understands what they need to do and why they need to do it. Celebrating their defeat of LTTE does not help in that regard.

My opinion, and it does stand up to historical challenge.

[Bill Moore]

I agree that extreme, violent groups must be dealt with, and often they must be dealt with harshly; but my point is that in so doing one must understand that the group they are dealing with exists because the conditions of insurgency exist and feeds upon those conditions and that the defeat of the insurgent group is a very different thing from the defeat of the conditions of insurgency

.

Hard to disagree with this statement, it is quite logical as far as it goes, but you didn't really respond to my questions above. A lot of insurgent groups are violent minorities (not necessarily talking ethnic group), so does the government really need to address their extreme views or defeat neutralize the group?

In some cases what you're arguing is very applicable (the Philippines and Sri Lanka both being good examples), but in other situations a minority with extreme views whipped into violent revolt by internal or external leadership is not a failure of government in my view.

Every situation is different, and in some cases it is more appropriate for the security forces to be the main effort to quell the problem, in other cases it will take more of a holistic approach that addresses legitimate grievances.

I think we're simply talking past one another, because my point isn't that the military is always or even normally the best approach to quelling an insurgency, but on the other hand I think we tend to downplay the importance of force intelligently applied. Where we may disagree is that I think security force pressure (again intelligently applied) on the armed insurgents is valuable, and something that I don't think we're doing as well as we could be in Afghanistan. I also am against re-writing history to force historical events conform to our views, so I always welcome your counter arguments. We're going to be doing this for many years, so if we can do it more effectively I'm all for it.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Nah, we're just forcing each other to clarify their points. I suspect it is helpful for others who are watching us lock horns.

Evil or selfish men will step up to lead insurgencies when the conditions exist and the same goes for governments and now, non-state actors like AQ, who will swoop in to conduct UW for their own purposes as well.

Poor governance opens the door for change...what that change will be depends upon who steps up to the plate.

[Dayuhan]

Evil or selfish men will step up to lead insurgencies when the conditions exist and the same goes for governments and now, non-state actors like AQ, who will swoop in to conduct UW for their own purposes as well.

Poor governance opens the door for change...what that change will be depends upon who steps up to the plate.

This is true, but we must be very wary of any impulse to direct change by trying to step up to the plate on someone else's behalf... no designated hitter rule in place here. Evil and selfish aren't the only dangers: it's wise to remember the old adage about the pavement on the road to hell.

[jmm99]

Once upon a time, my dad led me to a couple of deer skeletons - bucks with locked horns. Dumb way to settle mating squabbles.

Or is it (the discourse) more akin to battleships passing in the night before radar ? Impressive salvoes (fired according to perceived fire control), but no real hits.

Not much real comment on Niel's article - or re: each of the multiple factors that he felt were important to consider. Get it - multiple factors (not "one notes").

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Mike,

Once upon a time, my dad led me to a couple of deer skeletons - bucks with locked horns. Dumb way to settle mating squabbles.

Mike, you worry me sometimes

You're absolutely correct there are tens to hundreds of variables that influence the start of insurgencies and that determine who will be victorious. We're at grave risk of misunderstanding the real issues if we come in with preconceived ideas (false truths), and subsquently at risk of developing the incorrect strategy to address the issues.

Neil's article did a great job of addressing several of the variables that influenced the outcome of this conflict instead of focusing on one pet theory.

Pardon me now, for I have to find my ideological foe so we can lock horns again (the break is over).

[Bob's World]

Mike should appreciate this (no deer will be killed in the telling of this story):

So, I'm attending an "Evidence Symposium" on the role of Development in COIN. Good topic, good group, interesting day. What was new for me was this new trend from the administration of "getting beyond argument by analogy (This is what we did in Iraq, Vietnam, etc, and therefore this is what we should do here...) and instead argue with "evidence."

So, I think about that as the keynote guy is talking (sharp guy, tough job, impressive), and on the break I ask him "so, how do you know what evidence is material if you have not defined the elements of what you are trying to prove?" "What do you mean", he wanted to know (and this gets to Bill's point that all insurgencies are different as well); "well, 'evidence' is kind of broad. First you have information, and then you determine what of that information is 'fact', and then just some of those 'facts' make it through a strict analysis that allows them to be considered as 'evidence.' But this is just the start, much 'evidence' is irrelevant to what you are trying to prove, then of that that is relevant, much is immaterial. Material evidence is the gold nugget, as it goes straight to proving or disproving the elements of charge."

He gives me the "I'm listening, but am not sure where you are going with this look."

So I go on, "Insurgency is complicated, and while there are many opinions, you can lock 5 experts in a room to come up with the elements of what causes insurgency and you will get a great debate, but you won't get your elements; and personal opinion, there are some serious flaws in both historic approaches to COIN and much of the nouveau COIN that is being put out, so I really think that the first thing one needs to do in taking an evidencery approach is to first determine the elements of the problem you are seeking to prove.

At this point I was upsetting his neat new approach to problem solving (heavily laden with the implication that the problem with the previous administration was that they used analogy to solve problems), so he got busy talking to someone else. Hopefully he's thinking about it though, as he's much smarter than I am and is in a position to do something about it.

(And yes, I did offer my four causal perceptions as a strawman for the elements for insurgency to guide a quest for evidence that is material to COIN).

When people argue about how every insurgency is different they are always right. The question is, how many of those differences are relevant, and are there in fact certain common elements that can drive a quest for material evidence as to what works and what does not.

This is still new and the group struggled with the concept. One study was based on a broad base of data from Iraq and lauded as "evidence." It was good work with good insights, but to my thinking it was still based on a sample of one insurgency and as such was still 'analogy' until the finding could be cross-referenced and challenged by running them against a history of hundreds of other insurgencies to see if they stand up.

Day two. I'll try to listen quietly....

[jmm99]

Bill is playing the role of worried parent ; and Bob has regressed to his days as a trial lawyer :

from Bill
Mating squabble? ...
Mike, you worry me sometimes

from Bob
So, I think about that as the keynote guy is talking (sharp guy, tough job, impressive), and on the break I ask him "so, how do you know what evidence is material if you have not defined the elements of what you are trying to prove?" "What do you mean", he wanted to know (and this gets to Bill's point that all insurgencies are different as well); "well, 'evidence' is kind of broad. First you have information, and then you determine what of that information is 'fact', and then just some of those 'facts' make it through a strict analysis that allows them to be considered as 'evidence.' But this is just the start, much 'evidence' is irrelevant to what you are trying to prove, then of that that is relevant, much is immaterial. Material evidence is the gold nugget, as it goes straight to proving or disproving the elements of charge."

Good advice in a search for gold nuggets, silver nuggets, or even lumps of hardened coal. I suppose one could take it to its logical extreme and search for the alchemist's stone. However, my own goals are more basic and I would be satisfied if I could identify the elements of a much smaller set of conflicts.

The concept of confronting several hundred "insurgencies" - and fully understanding them to the point of determiniing in each of them what is "material" and what is not (where so much of that understanding depends on knowing population groups of which I know little or nothing) - boogles my mind. Sorry, I'm not that intelligent.

My thoughts re: Sri Lanka is to consider the basic situation where a minority population was promoted by a colonial power to a position where the majority population perceived the minority as being advantaged to the minority's benefit and the majority's disadvantage.

Does that basic situation have one solution, one result ? The answer is clearly negative looking at four cases (adds to the dataset are welcome):

Rwanda

Sri Lanka

Iraq

Finland (Svecomen minority; Finnomen majority)

So, why did Rwanda evolve as it did, as opposed to Finland ? In both countries, a population geneticist would have a hard time distinguishing between the minority and majority groups.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

This is still new and the group struggled with the concept. One study was based on a broad base of data from Iraq and lauded as "evidence." It was good work with good insights, but to my thinking it was still based on a sample of one insurgency and as such was still 'analogy' until the finding could be cross-referenced and challenged by running them against a history of hundreds of other insurgencies to see if they stand up

.

This paragraph indicates you have fallen into the same trap most of us fall into. You're looking for evidence to prove a theory instead of using evidence to discover the truth. I'm sure I can cherry pick evidence from hundreds of insurgencies to support my theory compared to yours and vice versa (RAND does it all the time). Fortunately or unfortunately we have military minds (unconventional or not), and we tend to want to develop simple answers (doctrinal approaches) based on common truths (whether they exist or not).

After thinking about your arguments a little more, I also think your approach is too absolute. You are proposing that every problem is due to poor government, and the center of gravity (pardon the military term) is always the government. I suspect people can find supporting evidence (depending on how you interpret it) for that in many insurgencies, just as they can find examples of where an enemy centric approach worked, but the reality in both cases i suspect will be different, and as Mike stated the outcome was due to several variables, perhaps hundreds of them. Until we all learn to back off our pet theories and preconceived ideas the evidence based approach is doomed to fail just as badly as the correlation approach. For an evidence based approach to work it would require using evidence with no bias, and it is very hard for humans to do that.

[Ken White]

This entire paragraph:

After thinking about your arguments a little more...it is very hard for humans to do that.

Summarizes what I've been saying about Bob's World view from the first. There are other causes (which Bob dismisses as minor inconveniences ) and the human factor (specifically his US specific remedies) will ALWAYS intrude. We're not as nice or as smart as he wishes. I kept saying that but have sort of backed off recently not because I've come to see the correctness of his views but solely because I don't want to belabor the point -- even if Ol' Bob does.

I know Bob's a smart guy and that he knows all that -- but he also is trying to sell a product, one that has merit but is vulnerable to a counter pitch on those two factors. Either that or he's looking for that long river in Africa...

And Mike, as usual, makes excellent points...

[Bob's World]

Come on guys, don't tell me it's "too absolute", tell me where it falls apart.

I only apply it to political based insurgencies, (so the McVeigh one-offs don't apply, nor do the drug cartel profit oriented violence as in Mexico and perhaps even a Sierra Leone). But when the issue is political I've yet to find one where it does not apply.

Now, still all it provides is a focal point for getting stated. So, worst case you go in on an intervention with the following checklist driving your focus for your campaign design:

1. Look at insurgency as a condition that exists within a populace rather than as an organization that is challengeing the government. Deal with the organization, but make your focus addressing the condtion itself; as this will have the best liklihood of disempowering the current organization and also preventing it or others from emerging later.

2. Does the populace perceive that the government draws legitimacy from a source they recognize and accept? As a whole? The insurgent segment? To find out don't worry about objective metrics, instead design and implement a logical system of polling (formal and informal) that gets at this and the following questions indirectly. Ask Gallop, they are pros at this. If not this is a deal breaker. We cannot create legitimacy. State will need to tell them to fix this first if they want our help. If they are unwilling to do so we will ask the same of the next guys.

3. Are there "off ramps" for the populace short of insurgency? Do they have trusted, certain, timely and legal means to address concerns about their governance? If not, make the is a focus of State's enagagement with them. Do it on terms that fit this culture, not ours.

4. Look for systemic inequities that treat some segments of the populace better or worse than others as a matter of status. Ensure that any enagement does not enhance these perceptions, and where possible work to negate them. Focus pressure on the government to address these biases and at the same time encourage the populace to seek non-violent ways to put pressure on the govenrment to evolve. This should be a major aspect of strategic communications.

5. Justice. Look at the rule of law as it is applied, and does the populace as whole, and the insurgent segment in particular perceive it to be just as applied to them? Focus engagement on addressing those factors leading to perceptions of injustice. (too slow, untrained underpaid and therefore corrupt staff, biased, etc etc.)

6. Dont' look at intervention efforts as "COIN" and don't look at the operation as a whole as "war." Ensure the HN stays in the lead and that they conduct COIN and that our assistance is called something else and is clearly in support; but focused on the conditions of insurgency rather than on the insurgent and his organization. Don't call it a war because the fact is this government may not be up to the task of governing its populace and we don't need the strategic risk that comes from having to either prop them up, or pull out under the context of "war." Make it clear up front that we are here to support the populace and to address the conditions of insurgency, not just help them beat down an insurgent organization. If they don't want our help on those terms, go home and deal with the new government. They may well be worse, but if we don't coddle them either they will either get better or suffer the same fate as the last guys.

Lastly: A lot of special interest groups will put huge pressure on the government to ignore this advice and but US interests on a back burner behind the interests of their corporation or organization. Don't cave in.